

Savings: 1996-2001: \$22.9 million

Annual: \$15.9 million

Return on Investment: 2000 (2 years)

FINAL ACTION: *Close*

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the Commission for closure or realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.

Community Concerns

The community argues Oakland Army Base provides a critical capability during any major regional contingency. Without Oakland, significant combat forces deploying from Continental United States (CONUS) will not arrive in time to meet the theater commander's required delivery dates. Further, Oakland can efficiently ship overweight, oversized, and non-container military cargo that commercial ports have difficulty handling. The community contends Oakland's availability on short notice and its secure operating environment offer vital flexibility to military planners. Commercial facilities are becoming increasingly unwilling to guarantee staging and berthing space, within 48 hours, to military cargo. Because commercial facilities are operating near capacity, they are hesitant to disrupt normal traffic, fearing damage to customer relationships and their long term profitability.

Commission Findings

The Commission found the normal workload of Oakland Army Base does not justify its continued operation as a military terminal. Oakland's role in a west region contingency is based on transportation feasibility analysis that models an obsolete force structure and stationing plan. To date, DoD has not conducted analysis of Oakland's requirements from a ten division Army viewpoint. The Commission observed DoD transportation engineers list six commercial ports on the West Coast capable of deploying a mechanized infantry division. Further, the Commission acknowledged at least two other military ports on the West Coast handled military cargo in support of Desert Storm. The Commission addressed the growing resistance by commercial operators to disrupt commercial traffic to give priority to military needs. They noted the Maritime Administration (MARAD), Port Authorities, and DoD were undertaking two initiatives to address the issue. The Commission

recognized legal means exist under the National Shipping Authority Service Priority Orders to obtain priority for military cargo in contingency situations. Based on deliberations, the Commission found the Secretary of Defense had deviated substantially from operational blueprint criteria by not recommending closure of Oakland Army Base.

Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Oakland Army Base, California. Relocate Military Traffic Management Command—Western Area and 1302nd Major Port Command to locations to be determined. Enclave Army Reserve elements. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, California

Category: Minor Installation

Mission: Formerly supported an Army Reserve watercraft unit

One-time Cost: None

Savings: 1996-2001: \$0.6 million

Annual: \$0.1 million

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)

FINAL ACTION: *Close*

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Close Rio Vista Army Reserve Center.

Secretary of Defense Justification

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center consists of approximately 28 acres. It formerly supported an Army Reserve watercraft unit. Since Reserve Components no longer use Rio Vista Reserve Center, it is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Rio Vista will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 28 acres.

Community Concerns

There were no formal expressions from the community.

Commission Findings

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

Commission Recommendation

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Rio Vista Army Reserve Center.

Sierra Army Depot, California

Category: Ammunition Storage Installations

Mission: Receive, store, maintain, issue, demilitarize, and calibrate special weapons, conventional ammunition, and general supplies; store Southwest Asia Petroleum Distribution Operational Project and Water Support Equipment Project for the Army

One-time Cost: \$10.0 million

Savings: 1996-2001: \$40.8 million

Annual: \$18.5 million

Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate)

FINAL ACTION: Realign

Secretary of Defense Recommendation

Realign Sierra Army Depot by eliminating the conventional ammunition mission and reducing it to a depot activity. Retain an enclave for the Operational Project Stock mission and the static storage of ores.

Secretary of Defense Justification

This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The Army has adopted a "tiered" ammunition depot concept to reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot concept reduces the number of active storage sites and makes efficiencies possible:

(1) Tier 1—Active Core Depots. These installations will support a normal/full-up activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war reserve stocks required in contingency operations and additional war reserve stocks to augment lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization.

(2) Tier 2—Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war

reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have minimal staffs unless a contingency arises.

(3) Tier 3—Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store stocks no longer required until demilitarized or relocated. The Army plans to eliminate stocks at these sites no later than year 2001. Sierra Army Depot is a Tier 3 Depot.

Complete closure is not possible, since Sierra is the Center of Technical Excellence for Operational Project Stocks. This mission entails the management, processing and maintenance of: Force Provider (550-man tent city), Inland Petroleum Distribution System; and Water Support System. It also stores such stocks as Clam Shelters (mobile maintenance tents), bridging, and landing mats for helicopters. The cost of relocating the Operational Project Stocks is prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the Army will retain minimum essential facilities for storage.

Community Concerns

The community argues the Army military value assessment undervalues or overlooks Sierra's demilitarization mission. They point out Sierra has over 40 percent of the Army's open detonation capability, without which Army demilitarization goals cannot be met. The community notes conflicts between the Army's goals expressed in the Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Program and criteria weighting factors in the military value analysis have not been resolved, and inclusion of the ammunition tiering plan in the operational blueprint short-circuits the military value analysis process. They contend due to a data error, the recommendation would cut only 125 direct positions, not 305, and reduce expected savings. Savings would also be reduced by the \$38 to \$91 million dollar cost of moving ammunition, and by having to ship ammunition in wartime from installations farther from west coast ports. The community contends Sierra received no credit for its almost complete ammunition surveillance facility or its missile maintenance and test facilities, and was undercounted by 88 percent in demilitarization capability. It also states the depot's desert location, with dry outdoor storage, was scored the same as less-desirable locations. In addition, the community states the 839 jobs projected to be lost would constitute an 8.8 percent increase in county