

2005 BRAC COMMISSION HEARING

THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 2005

GEORGIA TECH HOTEL AND CONFERENCE CENTER

800 SPRING STREET, NW

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

ADJUTANT'S GENERAL AIR NATIONAL GUARD HEARING

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COMMISSIONER SAMUEL SKINNER

COMMISSIONER JAMES BILBRAY

COMMISSIONER HAROLD GEHMAN, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONER LLOYD NEWTON

CHAIR:

COMMISSIONER SAMUEL SKINNER

APPEARANCES :

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN

COMMISSIONER BILBRAY

COMMISSIONER SKINNER

COMMISSIONER NEWTON

DAN COWHIG, Deputy General Counsel

UNCERTIFIED

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: The afternoon hearing will come to order. I am Samuel Skinner, and I have been designated as the chairperson for this hearing as the Defense makes a reassignment commission as it deals with the Air National Guard issues. I am pleased today to be joined by my fellow commissioners, Jim Bilbray, Harold Gehman and Floyd Newton. They will be here today for the session as well.

The purpose of our hearing this afternoon is to hear testimony, first of all, from the Department of Homeland Security as well as representatives of the General's Association of the United States regarding the Department of Defense of BRAC recommendations. The commissioners have traveled throughout the nation visiting many installations and specifically Air National Guard bases. A number of issues have been raised and presented to the Commission regarding the Department of Defense's recommendations.

We have heard representatives of Air National Guard facilities speak of the potential negative aspects the recommendations would have on retention, recruitment and training. We've heard them tell us how airport -- aircraft relocations may not provide the optimum mix of how Guard support for

the Homeland Security mission may suffer. We have heard the adjutants general's concern that they were not an integral part of the Department of Defense's decision-making process as it relates to BRAC.

All of the above issues concern us as commissioners, the most important being the potential effect of the DoD recommendation of the Homeland Security mission. No mission is greater nor ever been more historic apparent in our duty to protect America's homeland. Since September 11th, 2001, our nation witnessed several state and local partners -- public partners working together like never before.

We've transformed our intelligence enforcement and response communities at the federal and state level. We have mobilized our air and sea defenses, including the United States Coast Guard, to adapt this enhanced mission. With those concerns come to this hearing, we have invited a representative of the Department of Homeland Security to testify to this impact. We are pleased to welcome Rear Admiral Tim Sullivan, who will speak in a minute. We've also invited the Adjutants General Association of the United States to provide issue-oriented testimony about the effects of the DOD recommendation and the effects that it will have

on the overall mission of the Air National Guard. We welcome Major General Lempke of Nebraska, the president of the association, and thank him for helping us coordinate the hearing and providing the distinguished panel before us.

Admiral Sullivan will begin with an opening statement, followed by General Lempke's statement. After General Lempke, we will have the opportunity to hear a statement from each of the attending TAG's, who will offer us their insights on this issue. Following the statements, the commissioners will have an opportunity to ask questions of our witnesses.

I now request our witnesses for this hearing to stand for the administration of the oath of office as required by the Base Closure Realignment Statute. The oath will be administered by Dan Cowhig.

(Panel sworn.)

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Normally, we take questions at the beginning of each section. And Admiral Sullivan, we might under normal circumstances ask questions of you right after you present. But if your schedule permits, I think we probably would like to hear from the members of the panel as well, and then I think we will probably

have some questions for you. And we will probably be better informed, our questions will probably be -- first of all, some of the answers may have been answered by the Guard presentation.

No. 2, we will be better informed to ask you questions after they present. So if that's all right with you, we will proceed along those lines.

With that, Admiral Sullivan.

Admiral Sullivan is an admiral in the United States Coast Guard. He has appeared here today not as an admiral of the United States Coast Guard, but he is a special advisor to the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security. Thank you.

ADMIRAL SULLIVAN: Yes, sir. Members of the 2005 Defense based closure realignment with the commission. Thank you for allowing me to testify before you today. I am here on behalf of Secretary Chertoff, who sends his regrets that he could not attend today's hearing. I am a rear admiral in the United States Coast Guard, an organizational element within the Department of Homeland Security. I appear before you today not as an officer of the United States Armed Forces, but as a representative of the Department.

The Commission's purpose, as directed by law, is to provide an objective, nonpartisan and

independent review and analysis of the lists of military installations and recommendations that the Department of Defense has issued.

Among the factors for your consideration are operational and financial impacts that base closures and realignments will have on securing and defending the Homeland.

I am here today to talk a little bit about the impact of base closures and realignment on the Department of Homeland Security's mission. I would like to start first by providing you with potential specific impacts on Homeland Security facilities and then close by addressing concerns within the broader context of homeland defense.

There are a number of components within DHS that have facilities co-located at Department of Defense installations. As well, DHS components often rely upon DoD for operational support. The proposed realignments and closings of the Department of Defense installations are expected, in general, to have limited impact on DHS's ability to carry out its mission. However, they do bear a financial impact.

The Coast Guard, with its long history of interoperability and shared infrastructure with the

Defense Department is the most impacted by the BRAC initiatives. The Commandant of the Coast Guard identified a category of potential efficiencies that could result from BRAC and two categories of financial impacts resulting from BRAC.

An example of potential efficiencies is evident on the West Coast, where realignment potentially frees up ground facilities and critical unrestricted air space at Naval Base Ventura County, California. There's potential for the Coast Guard to consolidate at Ventura, which offers a unique opportunity to co-locate several commands and achieve efficiencies in mission performance. Ventura is the only west coast location that meets all the Coast Guard requirements for a consolidated facility, with access to airspace that allows unrestricted UAV deployment. UAV deployment is an emerging capability for increasing maritime domain awareness in support of homeland security.

The first of two financial impacts of the BRAC proposal occurs in the cases where Department of Defense vacating a facility places a significant direct cost impact on Coast Guard mission performance. This is the case with the movement of the 102nd Air National Guard Squadron off the

Massachusetts Military Reservation at Cape Cod, closure of the Portsmouth Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, and closure of the Naval Station in Pascagoula, Mississippi.

In each of these three cases, the preferred Coast Guard option is to remain at the legacy site, establish a new fence line, and assume operations, security and maintenance for the new, smaller facility. For each of the two naval stations, the costs are estimated to be about \$1.5 million up front and an additional \$1.0 million recurring.

At Cape Cod, the costs associated with operating an airfield as the sole user are comparatively much larger. Most of the Coast Guard air stations share their operating costs with a public facility or multi-unit military facility. This will not be the case if the 102nd Air National Guard leaves Massachusetts. The 102nd Air National Guard's share of common airfield operating requirements totals about \$17 million per year. This figure, set upon by the Coast Guard, will reflect a very significant portion of the agency's discretionary spending. But if the Coast Guard were forced to move from the current site, there would

also be a significant cost impact one-time and recurring. Plus, there will be an opportunity cost if the Coast Guard is forced to move from the central location of its busy northeast U.S. operating area. This operation will increase mission response times beyond current accepted standards.

The second financial impact is increased support costs due to loss of Coast Guard access to the Department of Defense's housing, medical treatment facilities and supply sources. The Coast Guard has alternate sources for these forms of support, but it comes at an incremental cost. A very rough estimate puts this right in the 8 to \$10 million range annually.

Housing and medical services on the local economies, are expected to cost more to our soldiers, sailors, airmen than on military facilities. And storage of mission critical components cost more at commercial facilities than the current arrangements at Department of Defense facilities.

The closing of Fort Gillem in Atlanta, Georgia could force the relocation of the FEMA Logistics Center in Atlanta. The logistics center

is currently located on the premises of Fort Gillem and is one of five FEMA logistics centers in the United States strategically located to provide critical commodities and supplies during disaster response operations and/or national special security events. The logistics center in Atlanta primarily serves the Southeast United States region, and also provides backup and supplemental support for all the regions and states.

Fort Monmouth in New Jersey currently supports the FEMA Region II COOP Facility. This facility is 7,500 square feet and serves as a joint field office and a regional response coordination center. Travel time from New York City to these vital national response facilities is only 80 minutes, and the Army post offers significant backup communications capabilities.

Many of the proposed closures could affect potential sites selected for FEMA mobilization centers, which are used extensively during incidents of national significance. However, mobilization centers are temporary sites that are frequently relocated due to space issues or proximity to the affected jurisdiction.

As with the Coast Guard, alternate sites

are available but at an increased cost that is not within current budgetary flexibility.

With the few exceptions that I've noted, the base closures and realignment will have overall a limited impact on DHS and its mission. The effects are minimal in scope when compared to the overall effects of the BRAC recommendations. Of course, where BRAC decisions do have an impact on DHS, the realignment and closure process should afford adequate time to find and fund appropriate measures to protect our missions and support our people. When the final determination is released, the Department of Defense has two to six years to close or realign the facility. DHS will work with the Congress, Department of Defense, and state and local governments to develop mitigation strategies whenever DHS components are tenants of a Department of Defense facility slated for closure. DHS is also preparing plans to take advantage of intergovernmental transfer of properties that will enhance our mission performance in those cases where the total operating costs are favorable.

Protecting the United States from direct attack is the highest defense priority of our country. The military has traditionally secured the

United States by projecting power overseas. The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 demonstrated that we are confronting fundamentally different challenges from those faced during the Cold War.

The base closure and realignment recommendations are important milestones and significant proposals when considering the Department of Defense's concept of an active, layered defense outline in the national defense strategy.

Providing the nation with timely, competent and responsive defense against airborne threats has been a vital component to this layered defense of the United States. This has been accomplished through a network of fighter aircraft that fly air patrol and air intercept missions. These aircraft are currently located at Regular, Reserve and Air National Guard bases located along the Atlantic, Caribbean, and Pacific coasts, and along our northern border. The Air Force's BRAC recommendations recognize that difficult decisions had to be made regarding air patrol and other Air Force missions.

My understanding is that the Air Force

BRAC recommendations call for ending Air National Guard fighter missions currently assigned to units in Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, and Virginia, along with units in Illinois and Missouri. The Air Force has stated that new, more capable aircraft will be stationed at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska, Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, and Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada; and that these aircraft will then be capable of providing air patrol coverage for the Northwest, Northeast/Mid-Atlantic, Southeast, and Southwest quadrants of the United States.

According to the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force was mindful of the need to address homeland defense requirements. We are confident that the Department of Defense and the Air Force will continue to be able to capably carry out its roles in homeland defense in the air domain, which supports our homeland security efforts at DHS.

We also understand that the transformation of the Army and National Guard requires a realignment of reserve component facilities. The Secretary of the Army noted that due to the sheer number of facilities and difficulty of comparing

reserve component capabilities to active component capabilities, he invited the adjutants general from each state and commanders from Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command to provide information for the analyses of reserve component facilities.

The Army identified existing or new facilities in the same demographic area to provide enhanced homeland defense, training and mobilization capabilities. The Army sought to create multi-component facilities -- guard, reserve and active -- and multi-service, joint facilities to further enhance mission accomplishment.

DHS understands the Army and National Guard's need to transform to best combat the asymmetrical threat to our nation, and we know that the Department of Defense fully considered homeland defense and homeland security in its recommendation.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to stick around for any questions that you might have today.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Thank you.

The next will be Major General Roger Lempke, who is the adjutants general of the Nebraska National Guard and also president of the National Guard Association.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Thank you,  
Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: General's  
Association, I'm sorry.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Correct. Thank  
you, Commissioner.

Again, I am General Roger Lempke,  
adjutants general for Nebraska, and president of the  
Adjutants General Association of the United States.  
The purpose of this panel here today of the  
adjutants general is to summarize key BRAC issues  
from the collective perspective of 54 adjutants  
general.

Our testimony will focus on that portion  
of the BRAC list that deals with the Air National  
Guard because we believe it to be seriously flawed  
and potentially harmful to the security of the  
nation.

The adjutants general in each state and  
territory is responsible for the readiness of their  
respective Army and National Guard units. A state  
employee, the adjutants general may also be  
responsible for emergency management and also  
homeland security. In fact, 23 adjuncts generals  
have this responsibility in some form.

It is important to note that two voices are associated with the National Guard. The chief, National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant Steve Blum is a Title 10 officer charged with administering the National Guard and providing a link of communications between the states and the Department of Defense. Each adjutants general works for the state or territorial government and in this capacity speaks independently.

The Adjutants General Association of the United States brings together adjutants generals of the several states to deal collectively with issues and speak with one voice to the chief, National Guard Bureau, and the nation.

This afternoon, I want to start out with making three points very clear: First, the Adjutants General Associations supports the overall BRAC process as legislated by Congress. We understand and support the need to transform the military and adapt to changing threats and conditions. From our perspective, much fine work has gone into the BRAC process.

No. 2, we support the process used by the Army to prepare its recommendations. The process has been inclusive from the beginning. Most

importantly, the Army recognizes the National Guard's vital role in homeland security while understanding that changing population demographics demanded that armory be updated and reserve center locations be updated and that greater use of joint facilities saves money and promotes training and readiness.

No. 3, the adjutants general were not involved with the Air Force BRAC process. Until very recently, adjutants general were excluded from the deliberations to develop the Air Force Future Total Force plan. This is the overarching guide used to develop the Air Force BRAC plan.

In fact, the adjutants general were only asked to participate in the FTP process in November 2004 and the first meeting which included our representatives was held in December of 2004. Reviewing the information set released by the Department of Defense has revealed that Air National Guard capabilities and operational efficiencies were not properly assessed, resulting in flawed recommendations.

I would like to introduce for the record today the following documents that buttress the testimony given here today. First, we have a hard

bound full report on BRAC Criterion, No. 2, Condition of Infrastructure. We have one copy of it today, and it's over at the end of the statement table. Statement from Governor Ruth Ann Minner, State of Delaware, to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission. I think that's already within your handout, perhaps. Finally, a statement of Senator Kit Bond, Missouri, co-chairman of the Senate National Guard Caucus. We have copies of that item over here on the end of the table for review at your leisure.

In addition to me, this panel consists of other adjutants generals here to testify on key issues. Major General Bruce Tuxill will provide an overview of unique Air National Guard capabilities. Major General Greg Wayt will discuss recruiting and retention. Major General Mike Haugen will discuss optimum aircraft assigned for Air National Guard sites. Major General Allen Tackett will discuss infrastructure criteria assessment and considerations. Major General Frank Vavala will discuss potential impacts from the realignment enclave concept presented by the Air Force. Major General Martha Rainville will discuss community basing.

I will conclude with a discussion of homeland defense/homeland security considerations and recommendations, and then provide final recommendations to the committee.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Thank you.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: General Tuxill?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Thank you, sir.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: We are just commenting. Obviously, you are efficient not only in your missions but also in the way you planned this. Thank you very much.

GENERAL TUXILL: Thank you. Good afternoon, I am Major General Bruce Tuxill. I am from Maryland in my state capacity. I will present facts relative to the capabilities of the Air National Guard.

The Air National Guard brings capabilities and relationships to the nation, state and local communities that are unique and critical to our security, safety and national interest. I will tell you how cost effective, efficient and relevant and skilled our Air National Guard is. When you call out the Guard, you call out America.

I will also talk about our unique dual role that works so well in security. The Air National Guard provides 40 percent of the Air Force's combat capability for 7.3 percent of the budget. Considering the Air National Guard's support of the National Defense Strategy, right now, to defend the homeland, we have 100 percent of the CONUS air defense mission. 49 percent of the tactical airlift. We have 45 percent of the tanker support.

Since September 11th, 2001, more than 225,000 Army and Air Guardsman have been mobilized. In fiscal year '05 to date, right now, Air National Guard has flown over 30,000 sorties and 41,000 optempo days for the Global War on Terror. Truly, we leverage volunteerism better than anyone else. The vast majority of the Guard Forces supporting the Global War on Terrorism is accomplished through volunteerism. Still Force-wide retention in the National Guard remains at an impressive 93.3 percent.

As far as infrastructure goes, Air National Guard units realize financial savings by their locations at civilian airports by sharing costs, thereby reducing costly city-like

infrastructure and personnel cost.

For efficient and relevant: The Air National Guard basing ensures our nation is ready to meet current and future defenses and challenges and dispersal of aircraft at civilian airports to our nation is sound military strategy and very practical, given the threat.

BRAC recommendations to close 29 flying units increases the threat to our infrastructure by centralizing assets and negatively affecting response times to our natural and man-made disasters. Through our relationships and associations with state and local authorities, we are able to meet critical demands during emergency or other unforeseen contingency.

As far as our experience and skill, we compare very favorably with our sister services. Average experience for an officer in the Air National Guard is 17.1 years; enlisted, almost 14 years. We capture and retain civilian skill sets and a level of maturity that simply are not available on a full-time basis. This relationship with the private sector is what makes us a unique force multiplier.

The Air National Guard has the appeal and

stability to attract professionals and skilled technicians who have made the personal decision to remain in one state. Often the members are prior-service military, who remain in their prime and willing to serve. The National Guard offers an alternative form of service to country which preserves taxpayer investment in military training and ensures the retention of the service members' experience and expertise.

When you call out the Guard, you call out America. The Guard connects the military to over 3600 communities. We take great pride being your hometown Air Force. Your Guard maintains a continuous sustainment throughout outstanding community support. That community support translates into a better understanding of the military objectives. The members of that community are immediately involved in our nation's national strategy and our nation's will. Your National Guard largely is responsible for the positive public image of the military through our community with our youth programs, civil air patrol and the like.

But what is truly unique about the Air National Guard and the National Guard as a whole is we are the only military organization with a state

mission. The National Guard maintains a legal authority dispersion across the nation and infrastructure level to support civil authorities at a moment's notice. In 23 of our 50 states, Adjutant General Lempke pointed out the responsibilities for the state emergency management. State relationships forged solely by the National Guard allow timely responses to disasters, natural and otherwise. The Guard will continue to respond to hurricanes, floods, forest fires, earthquakes and other natural and man-made disasters.

In conclusion, the Air National Guard model is one that has proven itself. It is effective. It works. On any given day, our citizen soldiers find themselves in Title 10, supporting a major combat or separation; Title 32, supporting homeland defense mission or State Active-Duty, responding to the home state defense requirements or homeland security.

We are a militia nation, dependent on our citizen soldiers. Americans willing to serve in the community and the nation is our heritage and the citizen soldier will be a critical part of our security contract.

MAJOR GENERAL WAYT: Commissioners, good

afternoon. I am Major General Greg Wayt. I will be discussing the BRAC principles. BRAC No. 1, recruiting and train, which as you can see in this slide must attract, develop and retrain Air Guard.

The Air Force recommendations will affect 13,000 military positions. Many closed bases do not have another base within 50 miles. Many realigned bases do not have another base within 50 miles as well, causing limited ability for airmen transfer to another base which will cause the additional stress on the recruiting requirements. The skills of our pilots and maintenance personnel will be lost.

This recommendation affects approximately 3400 full-time positions as well. The assumption is that our full-time personnel will follow the aircraft; most will not. Many of our full-timers will have to seek other employment. Do I have to tell you many of our personnel have interest activities of their own -- non-transferable between states or to the Air Force Reserve.

Let me give you one example. Most states have a tuition incentive. The Base for colleges using state-appropriated funds would not be transferable to another state or to the Air Force Reserve.

However, in the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group, records do not mention recruiting or retention. Rather than focus on fungible attributes like assigned personnel, the military value assessment stressed installation characteristics. The skill and esprit of a specific unit can be recreated elsewhere. There's also stated the skills in those guard units recognizing they are world-class can be recreated. It just takes time.

I would like to point out again the analytical process that was used. Under the scenario development phase, it shows the guiding principles that include BRAC principal No. 1: Recruit and train was to have been considered. This slide shows the military value. I want to point out military value recruiting and training was not considered for -- the cost of retaining our airmen at a future date. This slide shows here Criteria 7 only looks at the population in a metro sense and discusses it as a total population.

I point that out, using Ohio as an example here. Demographics need to include aircraft. Age 15 to 24 which is the ages we seek to become airmen in our great National Guard units. Nor was the

recruiting of units discussed as well throughout this process. You can see why this slide -- if you place bases in the right communities, recruiting will be enhanced.

I want to show you the next series of six slides. These are actual slides for the BCEG process. What I want to show you in these slides recruiting retention was not considered because at this base, a base that had been closed, you can see recruiting retention was never considered in deliberations.

Manpower was discussed but only discussed as what was being lost and what was being transferred. The deliberations considered input in the COBRA bottle. As you can see in this example, retraining costs were not considered as well. Cost of moving personnel were considered. As I told you, most of our full-timers are not going to be moving following aircraft.

Another MILCON slide was considered. Lastly and under summary charts, recruiting and retention was not considered as we move aircraft to different bases.

So I want to point out to you today, in summary, if you look at the Air National Guard as a

whole across the United States, 10 states that are outlined in yellow, with a strength of 96.7 or higher, they will be losing strength. There are seven states in the red borders, 96 percent or lower that will be gaining strength. This is just recruiting that are not considered throughout this process. We have a problem.

In closing, I will discuss the last slide. I want to talk about retention of the National Guard. Air National Guard retention rate is 93.9 percent rate as a whole. I tell you that because as well as service Air National Guard retaining personnel, this high retention rate not only saves dollars but it ensures that we have the skills and our newness to meet whatever mission comes before us. It ensures readiness. More importantly, if this recommendation goes forward, our retention rates will be dramatically impacted by our ability to recruit.

I will be followed by Major General Mike Haugen.

MAJOR GENERAL HAUGEN: Commissioners, my name is Mike Haugen, Adjutant General of the North Dakota National Guard. I will present information relative to the distribution of Air National Guard

primary aircraft for assigned PAA of the United States Air Force and through this BRAC process.

As you will see, the elimination and reassignment of air assets assigned to the Air National Guard creates significant gaps in homeland defense capabilities and also negatively impacts the ability of governors to respond to state emergencies. The Air Force plan makes assumptions regarding Air National Guard aircraft that is not supported by facts.

The overall plan creates a dispersal of Air National Guard state recourses and it clearly is based on offensive operations or expeditionary forces. Such movement negatively impacts immediacy of response, effectiveness and reliability of the National Guard to respond to both the state and federal missions. The defensive capabilities are nearly eliminated in some regions of the country as evidenced by the slides showing pre- and post-BRAC assets. This is a slide of pre-BRAC fighters.

We need to ask a fundamental question: Is our primary goal to protect our citizens or is it to have only a more streamlined way to go to war? With the stated No. 1 goal of our national defense strategy, 1421 strategy being defense of the

homeland, that question has already been asked. It clearly has not been adequately considered in the recommendations for Air National Guard assets in this background. Even without current strategy goal, defense of the homeland is a constitutional guarantee.

The Air Force PAA model is not coordinated with adjutant generals or governors of the states. Eliminated or downsizing Air National Guard assets in states without considering the state or the homeland defense team creates serious problems. A close look at the regional security assets reveals strong support for the larger cities and minimal, if any, support for the less populated areas. There are significant security risks along our northern border particularly in the remote areas. So removal of regional defense assets as proposed appears to be unwise at best.

You have already heard the potential negative impact on recruiting and retention in the current plan. Increase in aircraft to fewer areas will also negatively impact airspace utilization. One additional pilot adds eight sorties per month to a gaining unit. 17 additional pilots add 136 sorties per month. This is for inexperienced

pilots, those with less than 500 hours. Those are the ones we are -- have been -- through surveys have indicated they are likely to move to find a new flying position.

We believe the most critical error is the plan assumption and maintainers will follow the aircraft. This is simply not the case in the Air Guard. Our airmen have local jobs, their spouses have jobs, their children are established in local communities and schools.

In North Dakota, for example, we have conducted an informal survey of our pilots and believe that at most no more than 20 percent of the trained fighter pilots will leave the state.

The most telling result of the survey is that pilots who most likely leave are the junior pilots. Our experienced pilots, the captains, majors, lieutenant colonels with the ties to the community, they will not move. In addition to the loss of our most experienced pilots from the force, this will create an additional stress on the gaining units due to increased flying requirements and training.

The Air Force estimates that the cost to train a fighter pilot is \$4.8 million. In North

Dakota, the elimination of the fighter flying mission will cost at a minimum \$119 million in lost human capital. Something that was not measured.

The experienced pool of highly trained Air Guard members will also be gravely impacted and the training deficit that occurs will take years to stabilize. The United States Air Force has acknowledged the advantages of leveraging the experience of our pilots and maintainers and yet they have created a plan that will likely decimate that core value, by eliminating the very strength they wish to leverage.

Each state should also have Air National Guard flying missions to meet recruiting retention of our national defense needs. By working together and following these key tenants we can create a model that will increase efficiency, reduce costs and both maintain the state and national defense capability abilities.

The recommendation of the Air Force, therefore, in many instances, force structure changes are not intended for the BRAC process. Legislative programmatic changes and movement of air assets needlessly limits our ability to respond to ever-changing world situations. It makes no sense

tactically, strategically and economically. Let the CEOs, that is, the governors, the TAGS, National Guard chief and the United States Air Force make an informed decision that considers the critical means of all concerned.

The Air Force establishes the equipment requirement, funded and approved by Congress. Where to put it and how to meet the needs of the military to include the Air Guard and individual states needs to be a collaborative effort. The Air Force focus since the Cold War has been largely offensive or expeditionary in nature and doesn't effectively consider state and homeland defense requirements.

In conclusion, we request the Commission reject the DoD recommendations relative to Air National Guard PAA and direct the Department of Defense and Air Force to communicate and collaborate as it did with the Army and the Army National Guard with the National Guard Bureau adjutants generals and governors to create a model for Air Guard assets that adequately considers the needs of the states and homeland defense means.

Thank you for your consideration. I will be followed by General Tackett.

MAJOR GENERAL TACKETT: Thank you,

gentlemen. I am Major General Tackett. I am here today to talk about military value BRAC Criteria No. 2, Condition of Infrastructure. My staff focused the review of Criteria No. 2 Value Elements in the Airlift Mission Area due to our efforts supporting 130th Airlift Wing in Charleston. However, upon further research, we found consistent results in seven other measured areas as well.

For illustrative purposes, measurement of value for Criteria 2 in the Airlift Mission Area is broken down as follows: Condition of infrastructure gives you 41.5 percent. Key mission infrastructure, fuel hydrant systems, ramp area and serviceability, runway dimension and serviceability, hangar capability for large aircraft, level of mission encroachment, installation pavements quality. And then operating areas. Airspace attributes of DZ/LZ.

The scoring system for infrastructure as noted in the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group or BCEG meeting minutes is slanted toward large active-duty bases. For many of the questions in this criterion, a base had to have an excessively large size in order to score any points at all.

Obviously, this strongly favors large active-duty installations and is biased against

smaller Air National Guard bases. In the airlift category the scoring matrix awards no points for runway lengths less than 7,000 feet, ramp areas less than 137,000 square yards, bases with no fuel hydrant dispensing system or bases not located within 150 miles of an approved drop zone or assault landing zone. Such scoring obviously encourages infrastructure larger than necessary for Air National Guard missions, a wasteful allocation of resources.

According to the scoring matrix, this value counts for 41.5 percent of the overall unit military value, the heavy emphasis on this physical infrastructure minimizes focus in other areas like mission capable rates, low operating costs, aircrew proficiency, aircraft maintenance experience and strength and retention levels.

Our Air National Guard wings are right sized to accomplish their mission today and most can easily expand without excess requirements of maintaining over 137,000 square yards of ramp space and 7,000 feet of runway.

Other areas measured in Criteria 2 are hangar capability, mission encroachment and installations pavement quality. Again, for pavement

quality if total ramp area is less than 137,000 square yards, you receive zero points, regardless of the age, specifications or the construction standard of the ramp pavement.

As an example, an eight PAA C-130 unit is only authorized a maximum 73,230 square yards of serviceable ramp space by the Air National Guard handbook, 32-1084, Air National Guard standards facility requirements, and it would be in violation of the standards in order to score any points in this measurement.

But the other point that we really need to make is that we don't need the 137,000 square yards of ramp space to accomplish our mission with eight aircraft. Nor do we need 137,000 square yards to park 12 aircraft. In fact, we can park 12 C-130s on our ramp space based on the standard for eight aircraft. The runway criterion is another example of flawed measuring. Airlift units don't need a 7,000-foot runway as the 130th has proven by safely operating C-130s out of Yeager Airport since 1975. We have also had C-17s and C-5s regularly operate in and out of Yeager in support of multiple deployments and exercises.

Our research reflected the same results

for all mission areas. We looked at Criterion No. 2 scores for every measured Air Force, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Base in each of the eight mission areas.

I will tell you, there was some interesting results. Following is a breakdown of the top 50 bases, rated in Criterion 2 by mission area: In a mission area airlift, three Air National Guard bases was in the top 50, two Air Reserve, 45 active duty. In Tanker, two Air National Guard bases was in the top 50, two Air Force Reserve bases in the top 50. 46 in the active duty.

Air Force. In favor, we had two wings in the Air National Guard, three in the Air Force Reserve, 45 in the active duty. Bombers, we have had one in the Air National Guard, two in the Air Force Reserve, 47 in active duty. Right on down the line, 44 active duty, 44, 44, 47 in the other areas.

As you see, regardless of major area, small compact Air National Guard bases were barely included in the top 50 rankings which is clearly dominated by the active-duty bases.

This data along with the analysis of the Air Force BCEG minimums indicates BRAC 2005 was aligned to the development of the United States Air

Force future total force plan, rather than a true measurement or assessment of military value as legislatively mandated by the BRAC process. This source came out of the Air Force BCEG minutes of 10 July '03.

Several times the Air Force BCEG received briefings on the future total force. Air Force BCEG minutes 12 December '03. During Major General Heckman's briefing to the Air Force BCEG, he refers to expedient basing guidelines and their relevance to military battle. That came out of the BCEG minutes for 9 January '04.

Specifically, Major General Heckman states the need to enable us to fight early on without the non-volunteer Air Reserve components. The ARC must invest in new missions to sustain relevance. These statements are curious in nature, given the date that they were made. 9 January '04 is prior to the first BRAC data call the Air Force had been issued.

How can the co-chairman of the Air Force BCEG make statements of this kind without any validated information to support it? Many of the goals outlined by Major General Heckman in his briefing are Air Force goals under their future total force.

It was during the same briefing that Major General Heckman first proposed military value attributes to be used during the deliberating process. Weighting of each criteria data was first discussed by the Air Force BCEG on 22 June '04 with Criteria 1 and 12 favored heavily from the outset. It comes from the BCEG minutes 22 June '04.

The cueing tool was used to assist Air Force BCEG in developing potential scenarios for base closures and realignments. This tool was populated with two capacity analysis briefings and with the weighted scores from the MCI data. Considering that the capacity data presented by the Air National Guard was incorrect and the extraordinarily heavy weighting given to Criteria 1 and Criteria 2 which favored large active-duty installations, the Air National Guard had many units identified as candidates for closure or realignment. It comes from the Air Force BCEG minutes 1 November '04.

In summary, the primary point to take away is that the data used in Criteria 2 overwhelmingly favors active-duty bases with large infrastructure and a weighted value of 41.5 percent. This score significantly affects the overall military rating

value. This measurement ignores the value added by right sized.

Air National Guard bases structured to avoid excess infrastructure meaning billeting, clubs, commissaries, in addition to inherent cost savings measures such as long-term leases, some for as little as \$1 a year, use of commercial runways taxiways and FAA provided 24-hour air traffic control. Even the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group, BCEG, admitted in their meeting minutes when looking at the pros and cons of these criteria, that they overstated the requirements and negatively impacted units with right-sized infrastructure.

Thank you, gentlemen. I will be followed by Major General Vavala.

MAJOR GENERAL VAVALA: Good afternoon, Commissioners. I am Major General Frank Vavala, the Adjutant General for Delaware. I am testifying today in my state capacity. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you today regarding the Air Forces' recommendations, DoD, on the proposed enclave process.

I must tell you on 13 May when I first received word that the Delaware Air National Guard was designated to become an enclave, I was at a

total loss. At no time prior to 13 May had anyone at the National Guard air level or the Air Force level disclosed the concept of enclave with me or my fellow adjunct generals.

My immediate reaction was to jump in with both feet and attempt to determine the definition of enclave. What's the mission of an enclave? How many personnel does it require? My research first led me to a memorandum, dated December 2004, entitled Submittal of BRAC 2005 Candidate Recommendation, signed by Michael Wynne, chairman of the infrastructure steering group. He provided guidance submitting and documenting BRAC 2005 candidate recommendations. Noticeably absent from Mr. Wynne's set of 19 BRAC 2005 definitions is the word "enclave."

Further research led me to the GAO report dated June 2003 entitled Military Base Closures, Better Planning Needed For Future Reserve Enclaves. It's evident from this report and so stated that the GAO undertook this review to ascertain if opportunities exist to improve the decision-making processes used to establish Reserve enclave.

If after reviewing the report, I thought I increased my knowledge of enclaves ten-fold but

still to this day, 48 days after I first heard the term applied to 23 Air National Guard units, my colleagues and I are unable to stand before airmen and provide a well-informed, professional, logical, detailed explanation of what an enclave is. I can't explain to my boss, the government of the State of Delaware, what the United States Air Force is proposing for the Air National Guard because I don't know.

Obviously, this leaves me in quite an untenable position. I have no answers for the men and women who to this very day I am sending into harm's way. I represent approximately a thousand men and women in the Delaware Air National Guard as do my fellow adjutant generals in their states who have units labeled enclaves. 23,000 members of the Air National Guard are affected, and we have no answers for them.

My concern is why don't we have any answers at this late date? Why are we being kept in the dark being told to standby for emerging missions?

Within days of receiving word of the BRAC results on three separate occasions, I sent a contingent Delaware Air National Guard Senior

leadership to the National Guard Bureau and to headquarters of the airmen mobility command to discuss emerging missions.

On all three occasions they returned without any definitive answers. To this day, the National Guard Bureau has a web site up and running that's reminiscent of what active-duty airmen called a dream sheet when they want a PCS, change of station. The National Guard web site is a volunteer system whereby you put your name in and they will consider you for a mission. I ask you this: Is this any way to run the greatest military machine in the entire world?

Again, I repeat in December 2004, the term enclave did not appear on the list of BRAC definitions. Yet five months later we have 23 Air National Guard Bases labeled as such being touted as absolutely necessary for the continuance of a strong viable Air Force. If that is true, does it not beg the question, why is it that only the Air National Guard and not the Air Force are best suited to be enclaves?

I will tell you that we, the adjunct generals, support BRAC, and you heard that already. What we don't support is an ill-conceived

last-minute plan without inputs from the adjunct generals or governors designed to put aircraft in specific locations without in-depth, proper analysis on the impact of the units which were stripped of aircraft.

We believe that an enclave is nothing more than the result of a closure gone bad. BRAC data indicates that Delaware and many other enclaves were originally stamped closed.

It is not enough to say that we believe that the BRAC process is being used by the United States Air Force to resolve an aircraft inventory problem, but the actions flagrantly violate the true purpose of BRAC. That is, to divest the Air Force of infrastructure in the longer needs while improving the overall effectiveness of our Air Forces and the military value of the retained portfolio of infrastructure.

That's an excerpt from the Executive Summary of 9 May 2005, Volume 5. The adjutants general and our Guard members cannot understand or explain how an enclave supports the purpose of BRAC, something is unquestionably wrong.

The Air National Guard answered every call of our nation. We deserve a thorough review of the

uniqueness of our military value in the area of community, family, homeland defense. Before we are cast aside because our runways aren't as long or our apron is not as wide as active bases.

I respectfully request that you fully review the enclave concept in light of the 2003 GAO report and in light of the fact that the infrastructure steering group didn't need to attempt to define the term until late in the BRAC process. We need to be sure, absolutely sure, that enclaves are right for the Air National Guard, United States Air Force and the Department of Defense.

I propose that the Air National Guard not be excluded from planning but should be equal partners at the table with DoD and the U.S. Air Force to ensure that we get it right. Our nation which is a nation at war cannot afford to get it wrong.

Thank you. I will be followed by my colleague, Major General Martha Rainville.

MAJOR GENERAL RAINVILLE: I will be speaking today on community basing. In the future, more and more of today's personnel active-duty Guard and Reserve will operate within a single unit in all types of missions. Active-duty personnel will

routinely locate and operate on Air National Guard installations.

Community basing is the organizational construct that provides for the operational integration of active-duty personnel in the Air National Guard flying units, fighter, transport and tanker at an Air National Guard installation. Under community basing, active personnel will work side by side to allow for joint training and execution of assigned missions while receiving through the community many of the support services found on active-duty installations such as medical, housing.

Community basing enables the total force to leverage and sustain several benefits, specifically community basing leverages the vast experience of the guard component. For example, the majority of maintenance personnel are skill level 7 or higher while the majority of active-duty personnel are still level 3, harnessing the extremely high experience levels throughout the Guard. Our Guard personnel will mentor and season active-duty personnel.

Community basing increases combat capability. Community basing can combine a significantly larger percentage increase in unit

aircraft with the smaller increase in personnel required to support additional aircraft.

Community basing is cost effective. The Air National Guard is inherently cost effective per aircraft, given its significant numbers of part-time members combined with smaller base footprint. Also a community basing brings additional benefits by reducing the total cost of ownership to the Department of Defense with respect to active-duty infrastructure.

Community basing directly contributes to enhanced operational effectiveness. Community basing results in better understanding of each component for all total force members. Community basing increases efficiencies to address an aging and shrinking aircraft fleet. Community basing ensures effective dispersal of forces.

The benefit of having dispersed forces is a fundamental tenet of aerospace power and supports homeland security and homeland defense missions in support of our state governors, as well as the federal missions such as Operation Noble Eagle. Community basing directly benefits active-duty recruiting and retention. It enables the active-duty Air Force to have a significantly

increased community presence throughout our Air Guard units across the nation.

Manpower savings may be redirected toward stressed career fields. With the addition of active duty personnel to a Guard unit, Guard positions may become available for immediate re-role to either stressed career fields or to sunrise missions.

Community basing has buy-in from stakeholders. Community basing has been fully staffed and approved by stakeholders, including United States Air Force, headquarters or combat capabilities.

Community basing solutions focus on people. Community basing as organizational transformation remains focused on our people, both active and Guard.

To summarize, community basing is a new organizational construct characterized by two forces. One providing daily experience and continuity to support the mission and one consisting of personnel who rotate to other locations as the United States Air Force needs dictate. Active-duty and Air National Guard manpower resources are operationally integrated to enhance overall capability. Increased capability is built on the

lower infrastructure costs of the Guard and the long history of the Guard meeting all taskings.

The result is optimized use of limited resources, while focusing on capability-based warfighting. This is a blueprint for implementing transformational change in a model that we believe should be adopted in other locations.

We urge you to include community basing as a key issue in evaluating the Defense Department's closure and realignment recommendations.

Thank you. I will be followed by General Lempke.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: I am going to discuss homeland defense and then homeland security and then provide a few concluding remarks along with recommendations.

The American homeland has become a central and undisputed part of the 21st century battle field. Unrestricted and global field of engagement, the transnational terrorists. We can no longer focus our military resources on the, quote, unquote, away game, to use a sports metaphor. The security for our homeland can no longer be taken for granted or relegated to a lesser included military priority.

The national strategy for homeland

security signed by President Bush in July 2002 makes homeland security a shared responsibility, for which the federal government and the several sovereign states are jointly accountable.

Since the founding of our nation, the states have federally recognized militias. Today's National Guard have a military force shared by and available to the state commander in chief, governors for state missions, and the federal commander in chief, the President, for federal missions, and to both governors and the President for shared state and federal purposes.

In recent decades, the Air and Army National Guard has been enhanced as a fully operational dual mission force. Dual missioning is a function of our federal and state constitution and a conscious and prudent objective of our national security policy. Equipping and providing resources to the National Guard is the responsibility of the federal government, more specifically, the Department of Defense.

Training, discipline and maintaining the readiness of the force is the responsibility of the states. To be effectively dual missioned, the National Guard must be equipped and deployed for

both homeland defense and homeland security measures.

Having unit equipped aircraft such as C-130s or KC-135 tankers Air National Guard or National Guard units for air transport sorties, if you will, give governors direct access to tactical airlifting abilities that are critical in preparing for or responding to national and man-made disasters. Air National Guard flying units were deployed under the authority of the governors in getting the emergency workers to fly to New York City and Washington, D.C. in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th, 2001, attacks.

They were equally critical and once again deployed under the authority of the governors for getting emergency workers and supplies to the storm-ravaged areas of Florida and surrounding states during last year's hurricane season.

In addition to the governor's access to Air National Guard aircraft, specially trained and equipped personnel, that are part of the infrastructure that every flying unit has, gives every governor a trained and disciplined Reserve in the emergency responders to call upon in times of domestic crisis.

This is true regardless of the type of aircraft, be it F-15, F-16, KC-135, A-10, C-5, C-17 or C-130, in that all National Guard flying units have engineers, fire fighters, medical personnel and a host of other emergency response specialists in their unit, some of which are written into regional plans for FEMA and state responses. Governors can deploy Air and Army National Guard personnel and aircraft within hours of an in-state or intrastate emergency.

Under the Congressionally-chartered emergency management assistant compact, or EMAC, 48 of 50 states have a standing arrangement for supporting one another in such emergencies. By contrast, deployment of National Guard equipment and personnel under federal authority and federal control typically takes weeks, even months, to negotiate and ultimately implement.

When states use National Guard aircraft and personnel for state-directed missions, the states bear a direct responsibility for cost of using the equipment of personnel. If the equipment qualifies for a Presidential disaster declaration, the federal Department of Homeland Security reimburses the state or states for these expenses.

When the deployment is solely a state's expense or is ultimately reimbursed by Department of Homeland Security, then the Department of Defense still bears the cost of the deployment, even though the use of the Air National Guard enhances our domestic security in the overall national defense.

Distributing the aircraft and related assets among the 54 states and territories also achieves the strategic objective of critical asset target dispersal. When defending against the threat of nuclear attack during the Cold War, we pursued a strategy of disbursement of military targets. Now that our homeland is part of the Global War on Terrorism battle space, survival of our military also requires prudent, strategic disbursement of high value military assets to National Guard units.

Many of the DoD BRAC recommendations strip the governors of access to Air National Guard aircraft, equipment and personnel that are vital to our national defense and security and central to each state's ability to support the central government within the state and all the other states.

The Air Force proposals concentrate Air National Guard aircraft and other critical assets in

federal control and in a limited number of federal enclaves, thereby undermining our national policy of shared state and federal responsibility for homeland security.

Commissioner, you have heard from a distinguished experienced group of officers dedicated to homeland security and homeland defense. In addition to the panel members this afternoon, we also have a number of representatives of states throughout the nation who care very deeply about the citizens of their state and the nation.

What you have received today is not new information to you. You have heard this from governors, adjutant generals, community leaders at regional hearings conducted by the BRAC Commission already. The message is consistently clear about the portion of the BRAC that is dealing with Air National Guard sites and facilities.

The dramatic reduction and consolidation of Air National Guard flying missions to a few sites will do irreparable harm to the fabric of the nation's militia forces. Experience and capability essential to homeland defense and homeland security will be lost at the time when it is, indeed, needed the most.

An aircraft move and other programmatic actions that make up the Air National Guard portion of BRAC list are inexorably intertwined. To suggest a few changes would simply cause the entire plan to unravel. The only reasonable approach is to deal with all pieces at once.

The Adjutant General Association of the United States strongly recommends that the BRAC commission collect all BRAC actions intended for the Air National Guard and vote to set them aside in total. This action will permit the adjutant generals, the National Guard Bureau and the United States Air Force to work together towards developing a cogent plan that will secure and defend the homeland and provide forces in depth to defeat the enemy abroad. This action will also relieve the Commission of having to address programmatic actions and concentrate instead on infrastructure assessment to save money.

On behalf of the Adjutants General Association of the United States and the 54 adjutants generals, I thank you for this opportunity to present our case today. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Thank you all very much for making the trip in and giving us this

information. We have got a significant amount of time. I imagine there will be a lot of questions. I will start down with Mr. Bilbray. He usually has to go last and complains, so I will let him go first.

COMMISSIONER BILBRAY: I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. You asked about enclaves. Are you aware that when the -- in October 28th, 2004, the authority of the Pentagon of the DoD to mothball base was removed by Congress so they couldn't hold a base, basically, in mothballs?

Now we have the word "enclave" show up. I know what your answer is going to be, but I want to hear it anyway. Do you believe the enclave situation was created because the Congress took away the ability of the DoD to mothball bases? Anybody take it.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: You are the president, that goes with being the president.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: We are not aware of the specific action that you mentioned in the Guard. We will say this, though, that it does appear to us that at some point in time in the process, most of the National Guard bases that were eventually enclaved, if you will, where it had previously been

identified for full closure. And it does bring a question with regard to what would be the response to homeland security if that closure action had been taken instead of the enclave action, for example.

Just what the Air Force position think or Air Force thinking was going in to this until when they saw the entire list and realized that they hit, and the damage they would do in total to the Air National Guard if they had followed through with the initial closure recommendation.

MAJOR GENERAL HAUGEN: I believe also if I look at my own personal state, I have a great many personnel enclave security forces, civil engineering, some in motor pool area transportation, some of which are on their second rotation in the war zone, in Iraq specifically. Some of them have been in Afghanistan.

I believe that the Air Force probably looked at the amount of personnel in those critical AFSCs and decided they need to maintain that force for use in this war effort.

COMMISSIONER BILBRAY: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Thank you very much. As I am sure you are all aware, by the statute, we are required to only consider certified

data. I hope that you and your staffs would produce these very informative briefs for us and will make yourselves available to work with the Commission staff; that we can take some of this very, very interesting data and convert it into what could be called certified data, so we could put a genuine and open analytical effort to get to resolve these issues. I am sure you will be happy to do that.

For example, the first briefing, a statistic was thrown out, 40 percent of the Air Force capability cost 40 percent of the budget. Can you elaborate what you mean by 40 percent capability? Flying hours, number of -- pieces of metal, people?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Pieces of metal, sir.

COMMISSIONER BILBRAY: That's helpful. I got a question for Admiral Sullivan. I warned you this was coming. Can you help us with -- do the best you can today. You might have to take this back to your secretary. There's been a lot of talk going around this room about requirements of the Department of Homeland Security, homeland defense and homeland security. Has the Department of Homeland Security led these written, signed

requirements and taskers on the Department of Defense that we can refer to or that we can bounce these mission statements and capabilities against?

ADMIRAL SULLIVAN: The short answer to your question, there's no formal assessment that has been done by the Department. There is a difference, as you worded, as homeland defense and homeland security. I would actually give you a recent document that has just been signed actually by the secretary for defense entitled Implementation of the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.

In that document is laid out some of those specific differences between homeland security and homeland defense. Again, I will refer you back. I think the document itself might be of interest to the Commission.

The short version, sir, is we realize that there are seams in that layer of defense. We work very closely with the Department of Defense, NORCOM, to lessen those. Some of that is done through national exercises, joint operations, the 2004/2005 security plans which get into specific request for Department of Defense.

The Department of Defense under all homeland defense through NORCOM actually sets their

own requirements, for instance, the air sovereignty mission. I can tell you that the Secretary of Defence talked -- NORCOM has talked, he talked with the Department of Defense. He feels comfortable that the Department of Defense -- the risks are minimal from BRAC.

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN: Thank you very much. There are half a dozen other of those capabilities or requirements which have been tossed around I think that our Commission is going to have to look at. For example, it was earlier this morning there was a statement that an Air National Guard C-130 unit has a requirement to move a CST within so many minutes or hours. I would like to know whose requirement is that? Is it documented and is there a signature on that paper?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Let me address the first question and follow-up question for a moment. When you look at the Department of Homeland Security, you addressed the question going towards the Department of Defense. There's another direction here and that's coming up from the governors. There is an element of homeland security now, not homeland defense, that deals with requirements that are generated at the state

level -- I will give you an example in just a moment -- and that the National Guard in its role, ability to perform in these state role often plays a role in that requirement. That requirement, since we are generally entitled 32 Status, does not flow to DoD at all. It ultimately does flow back to Office of Homeland Security.

I will give you an example: In Nebraska we are written into our state's small pox vaccine, that's a term, distribution plan. Both in terms of Air Guard and the Army Guard. Now, Nebraska happens to have one of the few small pox distribution plans in the nation. It's one that is being used as a model in other states. It was a stated initiative. The state took the lead. Within that, I saw the need for National Guard resources, both Air Guard in terms of flying, storage and security, along with Army Guard was needed to fill that requirement. That's a requirement that was generated by the state in full recognition by the homeland security and in fact lauded for doing so. So I would submit that you got to look in two directions. There is a way through homeland security that the requirements are actually generated outside of DoD and are entitled 32 Status.

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN: Thank you very much. I certainly recognize and salute the role the Guard plays in meeting the state -- governor's own requirements. That's a legitimate requirement.

So this Commission is going to have to weigh the money resources that are spent to develop capabilities against documented requirements. My experience in Washington, D.C. indicates that the term "requirements" cast around fairly loosely. I am asking to work with us, both Department of Homeland Security and also the state adjutant generals to pin that down.

I have one last question, Mr. Chairman, that is for General Lempke: You may detect, from these commissioners anyway, that we do have some questions about this plan. The question is: Have you and your organization sketched out or developed any kind of alternative plan?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: We have been giving that a lot of thought. We became engaged with the Air Force as I stated in late -- November of last year actually providing National Guard force back to Air Force programming, Air Force programming function and also the Air National Guard programming function, which later converted to what they call their FTF

organization. We have members on the Air Force called "GOS" which is now the future planning for future the general force.

We are planning a meeting with the National Guard Bureau where we will share the ideas we are developing along with ideas and opportunities they have been looking at to work out what will the best fit be for the Air National Guard in the future.

I want to make sure we are clear that we totally embrace the opportunity to become engaged with new missions. We understand where the Air Force is going. We certainly understand the need to modernize and be relevant into the future. We are very eager to become part of that process. However, to do that, you got to have the structure and the ability and have our trained folks available to do that in the future. Thus, our concern over the current recommendations.

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN: Thank you for that. I am pleased to hear that. It doesn't exactly scratch the itch that I have. I heard your recommendation loud and clear. Your recommendation to this Commission is reject whole thing and sent it back to be reworked.

But we have another alternative. We can make changes to the plan. That's what this Commission has to do. If we were inclined to make any changes, we would have to have an enormous amount of help to see us through this. That's why I ask the question whether or not you looked at alternatives. It's one thing to complain about it. It's another thing to come up with a better idea.

Do you still want to kick the bucket or do you want to do something about it?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: I don't want to kick the bucket. I will say this, Commissioner: We have struggled in our analysis of a list of what it means between this idea of what really is a BRAC issue, if you will, and what's a programmatic issue. A BRAC list that is finalized brings finality to it. You make those moves regardless.

Programmatic action, which I believe we are involved with now in future planning, allows us the freedom to look at resources, look at capacities, look at areas and make determinations based on logic and data and time. It makes sense. So the question is: How prescriptive do you want to be? If you follow what the recommendations that they are now, you will be very prescriptive. If

not, then there will be at least some room in there to better size and better optimize our future forces.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Thank you.

General Haugen, do you want to say something?

MAJOR GENERAL HAUGEN: Admiral -- both myself and General Tuxill are on the Air Forces future code. We are looking at many future missions to include a lot of non-flying or non-traditional unit-equipped type missions.

However, what we would like to see is the authority to allow the National Guard Bureau, which they have had in the past, to determine primary assigned aircraft assigned to their states.

There's been a great deal of consolidation in this process of going from 15 fighters to 18 or 24. I have been in a unit that had 24, 18, 15 assigned, very efficient, varies with the mission but can do the mission. We need to look at what capabilities does the Air Force want us to deliver, then let us deliver it. Instead of being asked, you have to do this, and by the way, you must look like this while you do that.

We do have different requirements. We

follow the same checklists and same procedures when it comes to flying aircraft. How we look and how we mobilize where we are at, the number of personnel, that should be a decision that is made other than at the statutory level.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Thank you.

General Newton?

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: I thank you, Mr. Commissioner -- Chairman. To Admiral Sullivan: Before May 13th had your department been contacted in this case specifically by the Air Force, other representatives of the Air Force and the Department of Defense to share with you what they were proposing such that we could ensure that either homeland defense and our homeland security would be well protected?

ADMIRAL SULLIVAN: Sir, the Department of Homeland Security was not consulted.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Okay. I heard what our colleagues at ANG say. I am back to the alternative which Admiral Gehman just mentioned. I would have thought that would have been a stronger answer with reference to yes, we have an option and we are ready to lay that one on the table. More than I heard. Is there something else you would

have available?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Make sure you understand. We are talking about the field here. We have access to opportunities out there as we learn about them. I can tell you right now that we have -- as I said before, we have people at the National Guard Bureau working with them to attempt to flush out these new mission opportunities, to understand them, to see where they fit in the overall scheme.

To be honest with you, from that side of things, there's an uncertainty here. If you look at this, you are suggesting two paths: One path is if the BRAC list goes through, if you will, unscathed, then a set of new missions and opportunities in some form come out in one way for the National Guard.

If there's to be some changes made to the list and some of them significant, the end product becomes different. We are doing our best to engage with the National Guard Bureau. We all have our individual state ideas on what we would like to do and what we would like to see.

For example, to be very direct with you, one of the Air Force strong points is its insistence on [momentary technical difficulties], 24 being the -- claim to be

the optimum. We don't happen to agree with that. We do have alternatives that would suggest we would be entirely capable and very cost effective at lower numbers. Those lower numbers would allow us with the Bureau to redistribute aircraft to cover some of those white areas that you saw in General Haugen's chart, for example. Yes, we have all those ideas in play.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: I will share with you why that question is weighing on our mind. You know that we have a short period of time to make that decision. This Commission has committed to the best of its ability it's going to make the right decision. Therefore, data becomes very critical here if we are going to make the right decision. That is what drives the question. Let me --

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: If I could respond.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Sure, go right ahead.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: As BRAC started, there were many programming actions the Air National Guard was contemplating. I know they were contemplating some in Maryland with different initiatives. However, all of those were shoved until BRAC was completed. So while we have plans

out there, we were not allowed to do any of the pragmatics to make that happen or to work with the United States Air Force until BRAC was finished.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Okay.

MAJOR GENERAL WAYT: Just to use an analogy. I will talk on the Army side. We all work together in deciding what force function is going to look like across the nation. Is the programmatic issue to be transformed to the modular-type force to be transformed? As we transform, it hadn't been a BRAC issue; it's been outside of BRAC, it's programmatic.

We all know where we are going -- we know where we are going, we can tell our soldiers where we are going in the future. We can tell our soldiers what will happen in the future and how we will transform the next five to seven years. If they can't tell you that, how are we going to transform the Air National Guard, what will it look like in the future, where we are going. We got a lot of ideas, we can't look into the future right now with exact data to tell our airmen where we are going. There's a significant difference. As I said, we all work together on the Army side to make that work.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Let me ask you another question. This has come up several times with us. Basically it falls particularly with reference to the C-130s. That because there is such a large number of C-130s in the Air Guard as well as in the Reserves, that we have overextended the Guard in the call to go to various contingencies that the Air Force has had. Therefore, this is an opportunity to rebalance that force structure.

How do we answer that from your perspective, whether we are -- there's a complaint or concern about overextending the Guard versus doing something that is different that will help to alleviate that problem but still have the capability for the nation and, in this case, the Air Force to go to war?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Sir, I think one of the things that happened when 130-E wing box went up and all of the E models that were over in the country and in the states were grounded, the folks that stood up to this were the H2 and H3 C-130 folks, general tax custom folks and many others. It was not directed by AMC. What happened was we saw what was going on, we saw the need. We saw and we rose to the occasion and gave AMC a plan and

immediately started operating under that plan.  
Really did a wonderful job of that.

Yes, we are stressed. And yes, we are working pretty hard. But I don't know whether the redistribution of C-130s is going to achieve exactly what the Air Force thinks it will achieve.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: That's a very good point.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: That's a broad statement.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: That's one of the questions that I have been trying to find an answer to is whether we can achieve what the Air Force wants to achieve through this process that's going on right now or whether there's something different that needs to be done.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: One of the things that we talked about here is the ability to recruit and retain. We do that better than most.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Yes.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: In innerdispersed areas and innerdispersed bases we are able to recruit, retain and give mission ready force. I see a lot of goodness in city basing. I see a lot of goodness in that. That maybe the reverse would be

true. Rather than consolidating would be to disperse and have more active component personnel on our bases.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: You mentioned city base. I want to go back to community basing, which you spoke to a little bit ago. How do you see community basing play into the future total force?

MAJOR GENERAL RAINVILLE: Community basing can be an integral part of total force. It supports the needs of the total force, not just actively. The total force to grow new missions, to shift into what we call sunrise missions and have the capability. It also helps -- answer how we are going to have sustainable combat capability with a budget that isn't going to keep increasing.

It provides a larger percentage of capability at what should be a lower cost or lower infrastructure cost. It doesn't have to be limited to fighters Burlington with F-16s or first test base. It is a concept that could be used across missions and across states.

I think it is going to be a great tool when everyone realizes that you don't have to put Guard members at active-duty bases to fly airplanes; you can actually put active-duty people at Guard

bases to fly airplanes or drive tankers or whatever.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Thank you.

MAJOR GENERAL WAYT: Can we go back to the C-130 issue?

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Sure.

MAJOR GENERAL WAYT: Thank you. First of all, I want to say there are volunteers that are doing the mission we currently have in the stands. When the unit members heard the comments that the C-130s were stressed out, they were upset about the comments.

The same thing I want to tell you, this unit has 4,000 hours and 160 air medals; they rotate back and forth every 45 days. In fact, again, it's all through volunteers. One year for one pilot, one maintainer. That unit is not stressed out.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: General, thank you very much. Clearly, I want to commend the Reserve and our entire Reserve forces for the great work that you do. I know very well the Air Force cannot do that mission without having you -- that component as a part of our mission.

I am also well aware of the high level of volunteers that come to the table every single day, go out and wear that uniform and represent our great

nation. If there was any -- I certainly wouldn't have expected that I would have been sitting here talking about the Air Force and Air National Guard when we thought we had a model of how to have those components work so closely together and been doing that for so many years.

So it's one of those tough positions that we have to find a way to work our way through. Again, I just want to commend you and all you men and women that carry on that leadership force.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: I got a couple of questions -- go ahead.

ADJUTANT GENERAL TACKET: I'd like to address --

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: We are winding up. If you think you are getting away, we have a few questions here. I think we got -- we saved some time -- you are going to pay for being so expeditious. You are going to have to answer more questions. Let me take a couple and round the horn and if anybody wants to say anything at the end, they can.

I asked at the West Virginia hearing about utilization. One of the concerns that I know there's been a lot of working back and forth between

the active Air Force, Air Force Reserve and Air Guard on the utilization of airplanes. One of the concerns is becoming a bigger issue as you reach your two year out of five mandatory deployment.

What suggestions do you have to make sure that the aircraft that are maintained and ready for mission are going to be able to go to mission, because you won't be hung up because of impediments of too much deployment or I am tired or I just can't make it?

That's the one that it appears to be our goal in total, whether it be Air Force, Air Force Reserve or Air Guard. If there's a mission, one of the three is going to fly it. If the airplane is available and the crews available, they are going to fly it. We don't want aircraft sitting where we don't have people to fly them.

I am wondering, No. 1, how big a problem that is now, how big a problem you think that will be given, what is coming forward with all these deployments.

And No. 3, more importantly, what is your solution? Maybe I heard a part of that, by deploying active-duty pilots closer to Guard aircraft. I would like to hear your thoughts on

that.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Truly, sir, the 130 community is doing almost everything volunteer. They are not dumping any two year out of five. I know I can -- you just heard from Mansfield, Ohio. I know Baltimore, Maryland is just fielding the C-130 J into OIF. We are not having any push back by anybody right now. It's all being done on volunteerism.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: You don't have a shortage of volunteers available, volunteers in the Guard to meet the missions that the Air Force needs you to meet; is that correct?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: That's the way it's coming back.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: It depends on aircraft, I am sure. More particularly, ones that are getting the heavy utilization.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: The greatest management scheme in the 21st Century has been the AEF. Predictability which allows the Guard to plan or force to ask volunteers. They know when they are going to go. We park them with other units so while one unit is located for a while and while another unit picks up a load. There's so much flexibility

and so much predictability in that model. It's a magnificent way to do business. I credit the Air Force with that management approach to maintaining an optempo that's for deploy.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: I guess I want to talk a little bit about -- you mentioned a little but -- we heard a little bit about it. I would like to get it on the record clearly and concisely.

The impact on recruiting when you take away the aircraft, could that be managed or are we really setting up an enclave and nobody will come because there's no airplanes and no real mission to identify with other than an emergency mission that a governor may require? A leading question, a good leading question.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: We had various experiences with aircraft conversions and things like that. As one of the generals mentions, it's an informal question around the units right now that has been identified. A couple -- three things to consider here: No. 1, we are already starting to see a little bit of the effect of the announcements, just from the fact that those that are -- especially full time that want to -- do want to go find a job and stay in the same business are going to jump out

as soon as possible.

The unit that's been identified to lose its aircraft are probably already going to begin to suffer, if not already. That will continue. As also said, our full-time force, our older force, both flyers and maintainers, are very embedded in the communities they are at. Very few of the programmatic actions in the aircraft ground move aircraft close to where they are now. So they got to make a major life decision if you are going to go.

You lose that lieutenant colonel with 20 years and 3500 flying hours. They are going to retire as opposed to stay on and make arrangements to continue to fly. In my opinion, the maintainer is the one who works. They simply aren't in the financial category to leave and establish hometown if they don't have to. When you take a look at what's left after a unit leaves, in my opinion, it's going to be the uncertainty of a mission that's going to continue at a location.

How do you recruit if indeed first they take the firefighters away, then they take another portion of that enclave away, then there are rumors, maybe it's a whole new mission. The enclave goes

away and something else will come in.

There's a large gap between reality of BRAC which says that we start moving aircraft around within another year or so, and the potential and unknowns of the new missions that are out there. It's a stretch, a large stretch, to try to retain people now in the hopes of achieving something out there in the future that is not really very well defined at this point in time at any level within the Air Force.

MAJOR GENERAL TAKCETT: I would like to address that my unit in Charleston, have been deployed and gone since September 11th, 2001. They have been in 26 countries. Now they are coming back from deployments and their airplanes will be taken away from them. How as an adjutant general do I tell these people: You have done a great job, fantastic job, the Air Force no longer needs you. Can you imagine what that's going to do to these people when they've gone back to their communities and of course there's nowhere for them to go?

It's a six-hour drive to the nearest location for our units. These people are going to be kicked out that are dedicated to serving their nation. Their families, their neighbors, their

co-workers, they are going to have a bitter taste in their mouth.

I gave my life for that unit. They took my airplanes away at a time when our nation was at war. I can tell you it's going to have a devastating impact on recruiting and retention all across my state.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Is it the Guards' position or maybe the Air Force position, both of you may agree on it that -- can you talk a little bit about programmatic changes versus doing this all through BRAC? Is there -- I mean, before and after BRAC, you moved airplanes around all the time. Your unit used to be 16, then you went to 12. Now you are down to eight.

I assume that there is meetings of the minds and aircraft move around all the time to meet the needs, either because one unit has got a better recruitment, another one got a lag or maybe you just need more. There's all kinds of good reasons to move around. Is there any reason -- you have been doing that outside the BRAC process for some time. Is there something that happened that doesn't allow any more?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: It's exactly that,

it's the BRAC, as was said, that prevented those kind of actions. Until the BRAC process is complete. You are exactly right.

We can work very well with a National Guard and the Air Force in the programmatic environment. We understand that F-16s are going to retire over time. We understand the reality of that. We also realize that adjustments are about to be made. We realize we in the National Guard, state leaders, are going to have to pursue new missions. We understand all that. We simply feel we need the flexibility to accomplish it that way as opposed to a prescriptive move that basically ties our hands.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: You are also indicating that a lot of that programmatic moving is frozen in the meantime until the BRAC process is complete; is that correct?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: One final question. Before -- I am not saying we would or wouldn't. Before we assume there's nothing good in the BRAC recommendations as it relates to the Air National Guard, is there anything in those recommendations that you think make sense?

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Don't rush right up.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: If you do, and you don't want to admit it publicly, you can -- we don't want to throw everything out and find out there's something in there that could have really helped the Guard that we missed.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: The list that is prepared, as I said in my concluding remark, is so interlinked. It's difficult to go in and pull a few here and a few there without the whole thing coming apart. That's the issue.

I am sure we can go back into it and say yeah, there are some things here that are probably not bad. When if you simply focus on those, those are the things that happen, because it is so intertwined. Thus, we believe we need to go back to the programmatic. Let's find those good things, put them where they need to be and deal with the rest of the process.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Thank you. I will start back with General Newton, and then we will go to Admiral Gehman and then we will go to Congressman Bilbray.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Did you have something to say?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: When the decision

was made in the BRAC process in the C-130 community, the Air Force was going to move from the C-130s with the intention that the C-130 line would be shut down. As you well know, since the BRAC process happened and these decisions were made, the C-130 line is still open. It's going to have additional aircraft.

I think a lot of the decisions that were made were made with the intention it would be no more C-130s being built. The line's open and it's going to be built. There is going to be additional C-130s. That's not fair game, I don't think. I have not seen it.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: You are saying there is new data that might have come in that might have affected the decision? I would also assume after the decision is made to re-engine and retrofit the KC-135s, that that would also affect what this plan is. There's two pros and cons on that. A lot of it is timing, a lot of it is money and how old the airplane is. That would be true as well. Is that a fair statement?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Yes.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: I have to go back to the programmatic moves to be sure we clearly

understand this. I am certainly familiar with the fact that we have done programmatic moves. I don't want us to leave this audience to believe that that's just a matter of course. Those are tough moves as well. Not quite as tough as what we are dealing with here. But there are certain pressures that come when you talk about you are going to try to move an airplane or an organization or something like that. Just like we have some difficulties here. Is that not correct?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Most certainly. I think the one difference would be that -- and you are very experienced in programmatic moves, we understand that. As you know, there are changes in that at the very last minute almost always. You have that flexibility in the programmatic world which we won't in the BRAC world.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Okay. I understand. I don't want to leave that -- we just left programmatic, it's going to happen; it won't necessarily go that way. Yes, sir?

MAJOR GENERAL VAVALA: What this is all about, as you know, there's always been a great relationship between the Air Force and the Air National Guard is collaboration and inclusion.

That's what was lacking here. That's the underlying theme. We can address these programmatic changes as long as we are part of that process.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: I don't have any other questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN: I got a couple of questions which require yes or no answers -- maybe not. We will see.

As a member of another service, I can say that the relationship the Air Force has between its active and reserve proponents has been admired and envied for decades and decades. I would be loathed to be party to any kind of system which would make that extraordinarily successful organizational relationship in any way deafening. And I admire you for what ya'll do. It's a remarkable organization. Very successful. I would be very nervous about somehow messing it up.

Along that line, do you believe that in this Department of Defense realignment and closure moves that we are talking about here that there's an effort to realign the reserve activists in the Air Force?

MAJOR GENERAL HAUGEN: You mean aircraft?

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN: Yes, aircraft. Is

there an effort to rebalance the percentages? Would you like to answer that at any time?

MAJOR GENERAL HAUGEN: I would say that in looking at the future course there's a draw down in both the Air Force fighters, aircraft, total aircraft, and the Guard aircraft. The percentage remaining in both the Air Guard and Air Force is going to remain about the same, but the missions are changing. To go back again to the Chairman's question, I would say maybe the good thing that is in this BRAC is the Air Force looking at future missions for the Air Guard. They do not necessarily include aircraft, but new missions, which is a good thing.

In this BRAC, the Air Force wants to draw down 133 fighters from the Air National Guard. Those are mostly legacy aircraft or older aircraft. Now, that has to happen. We know that. We are willing to accept that. What we want to modify here is the fact that not only are we taking a hit in the total numbers, but then we also have been told, by the way, you are going to have to consolidate in a another location. It's a double whammy. It's one that we don't think is the right answer for the states -- for all the reasons enumerated here today.

But the Air Force is also in this draw down going to create what's called a fair bathtub. This bathtub is drawing down fighters to a level that they say provides acceptable risk for a few years until the new aircraft come on line, the FA-22 or the F-35.

So as we look at this bathtub, the question that I believe everyone has to look at, Air Force, Air Guard, Congress, all of us, citizens, is that really an acceptable risk. Is it acceptable to draw down that number of legacy aircraft banking on the fact that somewhere in the future, we are going to have a new aircraft, and they are really going to be great. How do we get from here to there? Is that really acceptable.

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN: I believe I heard you say in the case of fighters, that a portion of the draw down is about the same, proportionally it's about the same amount as the Reserve.

What about in the airlift; can you talk about airlifting?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Really across the board with the exception of the C-130s, we don't dispute that the Air Force attempted, with regard to air frames, maintain a rough apportionality of what

has been.

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN: Thank you.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: With dispute, cockpits availability, we go back and run numbers of that, that's a different issue. We would have issues with timing, how quickly things come down before we move to the new missions.

It's giving up something in hand before you really know what's out there and how to prepare for that thing that's out there. The other piece that is very important to us is the loss of flexibility to establish what we believe is an optimum size. We don't believe the Air Force, as far as we can tell, has any particular analysis which validates the numbers that they propose we be at. Yet that makes a significant difference in that national coverage that you do, that flexibility to size ourselves as we have before.

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN: You made that point. I appreciate that very much. You have made the point several times that the Air Force algorithm for determining military value and military value criteria were skewed very heavily toward active component air bases, which they may -- I will concede the point.

Regardless of that, what kind of advice would you give us as we regard the criteria against Air stations, Guard stations, comparing the Guard station to Guard stations. I am not worried about the different guard stations that are active. I am talking about comparing like Birmingham to Yeager or something like that. Should we ignore that or is it good enough to compare relatively among Guard stations?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: The criteria as the Air Force has done it, in my view, you can't do what you want to do.

MS. PHILLIPS: Thank you very much. The last question for General Haugen: When you showed those very clever maps up there with before BRAC and after BRAC, fighters and airlifts, that was Guard only; that didn't include Reserve and didn't include active? Guard only?

MAJOR GENERAL HAUGEN: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN: So those white states where you showed no airplanes actually they may be active?

MAJOR GENERAL HAUGEN: That may be active.

COMMISSIONER BILBRAY: My question goes to the same area. I am hoping this Commission will not

forget the Air Reserve. What happened in Portland, they retained a unit there, I think it is very tied to the fighters that are important too. There is a rescue unit that is being moved to McCord which is a 6 hour drive each way in a well-trained organization. Unfortunately, they don't have AGs to fight for them. Most of the Reserve guys are very reserved -- no pun intended -- on saying anything.

I am hoping that, you know, some of these cases, the Commission will look and don't forget Reserve. Having been a reservist and National Guardsman, sometimes the reservist do get forgotten. They have no governor or AG to be their advocate.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Let me make one observation to Admiral Sullivan. You can take it back to the secretary. I think I speak for the Commission, that we are surprised and maybe even disappointed that there hadn't been more dialogue between the Department of Defense and homeland security on what the needs for homeland security are as they affect this plan. I know that his table is full. But we are talking about making decisions that really do impact the ability of our country to react to the homeland defense mission.

If we are doing something that's

inconsistent with that, and you have not weighed in, you are doing this nation a great disservice. I would put it much -- put it closer to the top than it appears to have been so far, because it is critical, as we saw in 9/11 and afterwards, and it's not just, by the way, the east coast and the west coast. If you talk to the mayor of City of Chicago, he would say it's the second or third largest city in the country with more nuclear plants in the State of Illinois than any -- almost any country with the exception of two or three. There's Midwestern homeland defense needs as well and all the support that goes with that. I wish you would convey that. It's not too late.

With that in mind, seeing no other questions, I want to thank you all for all that you are doing, all the men and women that are serving with you and all they are doing. It is clear from the stuff we have all -- we are getting a note here. We might give you some more questions for the record going on that I hope will provide additional information as we sort our way through this thing.

Thank you very much for all the work that you are doing.

It is clear from the visits that we have

made as we compare notes as individuals that to a person, our visits have been very impressive. Not only the caliber of the people -- I also include as also former Guardsman and Reservist both enlisted in both for awhile. I also want to say the Reserves, Air Force Reserve, for example, does an equally good mission, 130s based up in Milwaukee that I visited recently they are as proud as you are.

It appears to be the Air Force, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard have really got to get together and get on the same page. I think it's probably just a temporary divergence from what has always been an outstanding partnership. Anything that we could do to facilitate that, we would be glad to do.

MAJOR GENERAL TACKETT: The one thing we worry about is the Air Force Reserve does not have a stated mission. The National Guard does by constitutional right. We have a federal and a state mission. These aircraft that you are taking away from the states hurts us. You can put them in the Reserve and you can put them on active duty. But we cannot use those to help the citizens of our state. They have to be in a Guard base before we can fully actually utilize those facilities, those airplanes

to help in State missions.

That's why we are so adamant toward having these resources because -- let's say a C-130 is not being used in the war effort, shouldn't it be used in an event of a crisis to help the very people that paid for it, the American taxpayers? That's what we are saying, sir.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: I am not so sure we got the authority to pass legislation along those lines, but we will pass that along. I do get your message. It would be a shame, though, that -- we want to do this right.

Again, thank you very much for your cooperation and all the efforts that you put into this. As usual, you have done an outstanding job and have been quite candid as State Guard officers not federal employees in answering the questions.

(Hearing closed 3:33 p.m.)