

2005 BRAC COMMISSION REGIONAL HEARING

FRIDAY, JUNE 17, 2005

PORTLAND, OREGON

PARTICIPATING STATES:

OREGON

MONTANA

WASHINGTON

IDAHO

Commissioners:

Philip E. Coyle

James V. Hansen

Anthony J. Principi

James H. Bilbray

COMMISSIONER CHAIRING HEARING:

JAMES HANSEN

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P R O C E E D I N G S

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Good morning. We welcome you here today. Grateful that you can be with us. This hearing will commence now. And as I understand it, the Governor of Oregon will be in in just a few moments; is that correct?

SENATOR WYDEN: Yes.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: We appreciate that. My name is Jim Hansen, and I will be the chairperson for this regional hearing of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

I'm awful pleased to be joined for today's session with my fellow commissioner, Anthony Principi, who is the BRAC commissioner chairman; also by James Bilbray and Phil Coyle.

As this commission observed in our first hearing, every dollar consumed in redundant, unnecessary, obsolete, and inappropriately designated infrastructure is a dollar not available to provide to the training that might save a Marine's life, to win a soldier's fire fight or fund advances that can ensure continued dominance of the air and of the sea.

The Congress entrusts our armed services

with vast, but not unlimited resources. We have a responsibility to our nation and to the men and women who bring the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps to life, to demand the best possible use of the limited resources we operate with.

Congress recognized that fact when it authorized the Department of Defense to prepare a proposal to realign or close the domestic bases. However, that authorization was not a blank check. The members of this commission accepted the challenge of providing an independent, fair, and equitable assessment and evaluation of the Department of Defense proposals and the data and methodology used to develop that proposal.

We committed to the Congress, to the press, and to the American people that our deliberations and decisions will be open and transparent, and that our decisions will be based on the criteria set forth in the statute.

We continue to examine the proposed recommendations set forth by the Secretary on May 13th, and measure it against the criteria for military values set forth in law. Especially the need for surge manning and for homeland security.

But be assured we are not conducting

this review as an exercise in sterile cost accounting. This commission is committed to conducting a clear-eyed reality check that we know will not only shape our military capabilities for decades to come, but will also have profound affect on our communities and on the people who bring our communities to life.

We also committed that our deliberations and decisions would be devoid of politics, and that the people and communities affected by the BRAC proposal would have, through our site visits and public hearings, a chance to provide us with direct input on the substance of the proposals and the methodology and assumptions behind them.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the thousands of involved citizens who have already contacted the commission and shared with us their thoughts, their concerns, and suggestions about the base closure and realignment proposal.

Unfortunately, the volume of correspondence we received makes it impossible for us to respond directly to each and every one of them, and in the time that the commission has to

complete its mission.

But we want everyone to know, the public inputs we received are appreciated and taken into consideration as a part of our review process. And while everyone in this room will not have an opportunity to speak, every piece of correspondence received by the commission will be made part of our permanent public record as appropriate.

Today we will hear testimony from the states of Oregon, Washington, Montana, and Idaho. Each state's elected delegation has been allotted a block of time determined by the overall impact of the Department of Defense closure and realignment recommendation on that state.

The delegations have worked closely with our communities to develop -- again, that I'm certain will provide information and insight we'll make a valuable part of our review.

We would greatly appreciate it if you would all adhere to your time limits. Every voice is important.

If I may, we never have enough time on this commission. We just run from one place to another. We were in Alaska yesterday. We're all going different places immediately following this.

So we ask our colleagues on the other side, who I've served with most of them before, all of them before, that we all stay within our time. We greatly appreciate it. And, of course, you wouldn't be offended if I gaveled you down, would you?

MR. SMITH: Won't be the first time.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: I now request that the witness from the state of Oregon please stand. Stand for the administration of the oath required by the base closure realignment committee. The oath will be administered by Ms. Sarkar, the commission's designated federal officer.

MS. SARKAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senators, Congressmen, do you swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give and any evidence you may offer are complete and accurate to the best of your knowledge or belief, so help you God?

OREGON PANEL: We do.

MS. SARKAR: Thank you. You may be seated. If I may just make a brief announcement. As you notice, we do have an American sign interpreter with us today. There are reserved seats in the front if you do need an interpreter for this hearing. I will make this announcement at

the beginning of each panel session so that if you do not need those services we can give our interpreter a break. Thank you for your cooperation.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you. We'll start with Senator Wyden and just go down the line. Senator, I think that five minutes is what we're giving everyone. I hope that's okay.

SENATOR WYDEN: It is. Good morning, and on behalf of all of us, welcome to Oregon. Thank you Chairman Principi; my former house colleague, Jim Bilbray; and Jim Hansen; Commissioner Coyle, your patriotism and for your service.

You all are certainly going to pick up plenty of welts on your back as you get out about the country to listen.

Now, as you travel across America more often than not the local Congress people will come out and say that if this base or that installation is closed, well, western civilization is pretty much going to come to an end.

I am not going to say that. But I am going to try to convince you, the initial recommendations for the Portland air space -- for

the Portland air base will leave the air space over the Pacific Northwest uniquely isolated, dangerously unprepared, and virtually defenseless if the enemy chooses to attack this corner of the homeland from the air. The recommendations simply defy common sense.

Now, the first map you see demonstrates how the 142nd Fighter Wing currently patrols and protects the Pacific Northwest. The second map shows how vulnerable our region will be if our region is left with just two alert fighters.

After removing most of the fighters to Atlantic City in New Orleans, the Pentagon's proposal would make it impossible for our region to respond if a large scale attack or multiple simultaneous attacks were launched here.

Under the Defense Department's plan it would take additional alert fighters hours to arrive from elsewhere, Fresno, Idaho, who knows where, but they would have to refuel and it would take time to respond to any aggression.

It is naive to act as though our enemies will come at us one at a time. Yet the Pentagon plan seems predicated on just such a hope.

I serve on the Senate Intelligence

Committee. I believe after 9/11 in a dangerous world every corner of America must have a big league security capability, and the Pentagon's proposal leaves the Pacific Northwest with a little league air defense capability.

I'd also like to point out that the sacrifice of the region's security as being proposed is a plan that moves most of the fighters to a facility with a lower military value at a cost to taxpayers.

If the goal of the BRAC commission is to save dollars, let's look this way. Sharp pencil accounting provide the plethora of regions to reject the Pentagon's recommendations. The Secretary's plan for the Northwest simply fails to meet the fundamental goal of saving dollars.

There are not dollars to spare on sloppy financial management when the whole goal of the process is to keep from breaking the bank. With a budget deficit of over \$400 billion how can America afford to move bases and units at a loss? This plan would move the 142nd at a loss.

The proposal for the 939th Air Refueling Wing is another poor fiscal decision. This wing is in the last phase of a long-term transformation

that has already cost the Air Force more than \$60 million.

Secretary Rumsfeld's plan would throw this investment away just to move the wing. He admits this plan would cost so much the Air Force wouldn't break even for seven years. At a maximum the plan would only save \$42 million in ten years.

Scrapping a \$60 million investment in an attempt to save \$42 million doesn't make sense. The proposal will waste, not save, taxpayer dollars.

Other witnesses will testify on these issues today so I won't dwell on them. But I encourage you to keep your green eye shades on as you examine the Pentagon's plan.

But I want to conclude that at the end of the day it's not just about maps or charts or dollars, it's about people. Not long ago Oregonians woke up to this headline. You may not be able to see it, but it says, "War's Toll Far Worse on Oregon."

At the end of 2004 the death rate for Oregon's National Guard members in Iraq was nearly three times that of the National Guard as a whole. The first six months of 2005 our state has lost

three more guard members.

At a time when Oregonians are being asked to make a disproportionately high sacrifice of lives in Iraq, and in the face of the Pentagon's recommendations that simply defy common sense, I would urge that the commission reject the Pentagon's recommendation. Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you, Senator. Senator Smith.

MR. SMITH: Thank you, gentlemen. All like all Oregonians, I'm very proud of our men and women in uniform with the services they render to our community and nation. I truly appreciate the sacrifices the members of our armed services can make to protect our country and state.

While Oregon has relatively few military base assets, there are several sites in Oregon affected by the BRAC recommendations, including the Umatilla Army Depot, the 304th Rescue Squadron, and the 939th Refueling Wing. I'm here to speak on behalf of the 142nd Fighter Wing of the Oregon Air National Guard.

I've examined the BRAC recommendations and questioned the decision to close the 142nd Fighter Wing. While I support the Department of

Defense's efforts to save money and to make the armed forces more efficient, I don't understand why this suggestion was put forth.

It seems that while the Pentagon is trying to trim the fat, Oregon security is being cut to the bone.

There are two primary reasons for the existence of BRAC. First, it is designed to better protect national security by more efficiently deploying resources. And second, it is meant to save taxpayer dollars by closing or realigning excess installations. The Pentagon's proposal that got the 142nd serves neither purpose.

First, it would leave only two planes available to protect the Pacific Northwest, including two population centers with over 5 million people combined, and a target-rich environment of hydroelectric dams, the Hanford nuclear reservation, a chemical weapons depot, and many high technology centers.

Furthermore, if the two planes are scrambled to investigate a situation in Seattle, who is left defending Portland? I believe the BRAC proposals answers, nobody.

Surely the Pentagon does not believe

that two or more situations will never occur simultaneously. 9/11 taught us better.

Currently we have fighters in backup that can be in the air in five minutes. Under the BRAC proposal the nearest backup fighters will be in Fresno, California, more than an hour away. That cannot be called readiness.

The second goal of BRAC is to save money. But more will actually be spent on this proposal than the status quo. At first glance BRAC says that closing down the 142nd will save \$19 million. But the spending increases at the bases receiving our planes will increase by the same amount. Plus, it will cost \$5 million to maintain the alert detachment at Portland.

So this realignment will actually add to our defense budget while compromising the security of the Pacific Northwest.

This proposal just doesn't save dollars and cents. And if homeland security is the goal and our duty it makes no sense.

The Department of Defense may look at this as a minor change. It is not. And if adopted this proposal will have major ramifications.

In testimonies that follow you will hear

about the capabilities of the 142nd and what would remain if the BRAC recommendations are approved. I urge your close attention to what these experts will say.

I have been a strong supporter of the BRAC purpose and intent. But the commission needs to give me a better explanation of how the Pacific Northwest can be adequately protected by two fighters. Because right now it looks like we're tacking up a vacancy sign on our air base and putting out a welcome mat for the enemies of the United States. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you, Senator Smith. Congressman Blumenauer.

CONGRESSMAN BLUMENAUER: I would defer to our Governor, if you wish, Mr. Chairman.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Governor, we welcome you here. If you would stand to be sworn in we would appreciate it.

MS. SARKAR: Please raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you're about to give and any evidence you may provide are complete and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?

GOVERNOR KULONGOSKI: I do.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Appreciate you being here, Governor. We're trying to hold folks to around five minutes, if you could do that we'd appreciate it.

GOVERNOR KULONGOSKI: It's always difficult. Chairman Principi, Commissioners Coyle, Hansen, and Bilbray, I want to welcome you to Oregon and thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense's recommendations regarding the 142nd Fighter Wing and the 939th Refueling Wing located at the Portland air base.

I'm here today speaking on behalf of the Oregon National Guard and all of the citizens of Oregon.

I bring with you a joint resolution signed by the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House, and every member of the Oregon legislative assembly, calling on you to reject the Department of Defense's recommendation to reassign the 142nd and the 939th.

As a general rule here the wheels of the legislature turn slowly. But this bipartisan resolution was passed with unprecedented speed because no matter where we are on the political spectrum Oregon's executive and legislative

branches of government are united in the belief that the Department of Defense recommendation will do harm to our state, harm to our region, and harm to our country.

As I've already indicated, the recommendations to reassign the 142nd and 939th is of serious concern to me. This is true in both my capacity as Commander in Chief in the Oregon National Guard, and as Governor of the state of Oregon.

As Commander in Chief I have the -- a responsibility to make sure that the Oregon National Guard is capable of fulfilling its constitutional role, what our soldiers are doing with great pride, honor, and professionalism in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As governor I have a responsibility to make sure that the families of our soldiers and all Oregonians are safe back here at home. That is why I urge you to reconsider the Department of Defense recommendations to reassign the 142nd and 939th units.

The 142nd fighter squadron is the premier F-15 unit in the nation. It is proven that it's not only capable, but in the aftermath of

September the 11th, critical to carrying out the role of homeland air defense for the Pacific Northwest.

This unit is made up of highly trained citizens, airmen and airwomen who stand alert and ready at any hour of the day or night to serve as the primary air defense capability for all of the Pacific Northwest and Western Canada.

Like any good team, this unit has more than talent, it has depth. That means the 142nd can respond to multiple threats simultaneously and has the ability to maintain an on-station presence because of the 939th Air Refueling Wing.

The air refueling wing is in the final phase of a \$60 million construction project at the Portland air base. When construction is complete the refueling wing will be even better able to carry out its diverse mission, which includes assisting the 142nd fighter squadron should the need arise.

On the other hand, stripping the Pacific Northwest of this vital defense capability will leave Oregon and the rest of the Pacific Northwest dangerously vulnerable to air base threats. We simply won't have the tools we need to defend this

region. That alone is reason enough to reconsider this decision.

But removing the fighting capability of 142nd Fighter Wing and the national air defense matrix will also make the Pacific Northwest a more attractive target to anyone looking to strike the United States from the air. In other words, our enemies will look for the weakest link in the chain to attack, and the weakest link will be in the Pacific Northwest.

You will hear from experts today who are better able to address the substantial risk posed to the citizens of this region by the removal of the 142nd Fighter Wing and the 939th Air Force Refueling Wing, and the subsequent plan to replace that assistance by two plane -- by a two-plane detachment headquartered out of state.

They will explain the existence of people within Oregon's borders who have active ties with individuals and organizations who wish to do us harm. And they will address the ability of these groups to carry out attacks and the differences in our ability to stop them depending on whether the Department of Defense recommendations to remove the 142nd and the 939th

are implemented.

So I will let the experts speak to what they know best and ask you to let the 149th and 939th do what they do best by not accepting the recommendation of the Department of Defense to reassign these units.

Keep in mind this just isn't about homeland security, it is about homeland defense. I believe that relocating these trained and ready forces from their current geographical location will compromise our ability to protect citizens in the Northwest.

While my focus remains on the security and defense role of these two units, I cannot overlook the economic impact a relocation will have. That impact is certain to be negative. Growing Oregon's economy has been and remains my top priority.

We are not just coming -- we are now just coming out of a painful recession, job growth is strong, but we still have one of the highest unemployment rates in the country. Relocating these two bases will set back an already fragile recovery and will hit the Portland area especially hard. You will receive more information on this

issue.

I appreciate the time you have given me to explain why I believe this is critically important that you reverse the decision of the Department of Defense.

I know that you are speaking to many communities and have a very difficult task in front of you. But I have tremendous confidence that you will give serious consideration to this information collectively submitted to you today.

I want to close with one other thought. As the Commander in Chief of the Oregon National Guard, and recognizing the integration of the National Guard into our active duty forces, I believe it is critically important that the citizens of this state continue to see the presence of the Air National Guard here in this community.

It is critically important to all of us if we're to gain the public support for the efforts to fight terrorism that our citizens not only just read about, but they see the efforts that their Air National Guard is making in this war against terrorism.

As you continue your analysis I will always be available and prepared to provide any

additional information you need to make our decision -- your decision. Thank you for your time, your attention, and your service.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you, Governor. Congressman Blumenauer.

CONGRESSMAN BLUMENAUER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by saying how much I appreciated the overview you gave in terms of the purpose of BRAC and of this commission.

I have supported this effort throughout my tenure in Congress, which overlaps a little bit with yours, Mr. Chairman. I have resisted efforts to dismantle the BRAC process. I think we need to make sure that our dollars are spent wisely and that our military efficiency is optimized.

But I must say that the process that you're going on here about today is critical -- is a critical reality check. Because, first of all, the outstanding men and women who are part of the operation out at our air base here have been in a constant state of flux in recent years.

Despite that you will hear evidence that they have met the test against their peers, both in terms of reserve and regular armed services, that perform at the highest possible level.

Second, you will hear, as you have already heard from the Governor and our two Senators, the concerns we have about the role of homeland security in a post-9/11 era.

If the map of the Pacific Northwest were superimposed on the continent of Europe you would see that the area that is served from the Portland installation of 600 mile radius is basically equivalent to the continent of Europe.

Now, populations vary, but as you know, this is an environment that is rich with targets of opportunity for people who would do us harm.

And distances don't vary in terms of the operational capacity. In Europe there are 146 American fighter planes for an area that we will be left here with two. It simply cannot be done effectively.

If somehow this were enhancing our overall security profile for the country, maybe, maybe you could rationalize it. But as you will hear, these men and women have performed at the top level, tested in competition and are second to none.

If somehow it were to yield dramatic savings for other military operations, maybe

somehow you can rationalize it. But as you have heard from my colleagues, the net change after you've put aside all of the costs of reconfiguration, it's not cheap to go through the changes. The operating cost will increase for the Department of Defense almost 10 percent in terms of the total money involved.

I think what you are doing here today is absolutely critical in terms of the integrity of the BRAC process. We can't continue to operate an envelope of military activities that is a throw back to World War II or to the Korean war.

It obviously has to be dramatic, it has to change. But we need you for the reality check to look at the capability, look at the impact for homeland security that, frankly, was not part of the initial BRAC legislation. And still I feel is shortchanged in terms of the process.

And last but not least, Mr. Chairman, your words about providing a clear-eyed reality check. The notion that we will actually be paying \$1.6 million a year more in scarce military operations when we're done I think defies a rational explanation in terms of the requirements for the BRAC process.

It's hard to justify paying more tax dollars for less security and undermining the outstanding work that these men and women have done.

I appreciate your being here, listening to us. And I think I'll give the extra 30 seconds that I have allocated to the people that follow us who really have the facts and figures that will supplement your important deliberations.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you, Congressman. Congresswoman Hooley.

CONGRESSWOMAN HOOLEY: Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the commission. For the first time in modern history the United States is poised to implement a major base closure and realignment program, while at the same time implementing a global war against terrorism, an unprecedented effort to protect the homeland, our number one defense priority.

Instead of funding the 9/11 commission's suggestion that says we should increase reserve fighter presence within the growing Northwest, we are here today to discuss the reduction of our capacity to defend American citizens.

We know your charge is a difficult one.

We acknowledge the need for adjusting fiscal investments into initiatives that will produce a stronger defense. But I've never been so concerned that reducing tactical aircraft, a capacity for response from 15 F-15s to two has to be shortsighted. A dangerous proposal that exposes 11 million citizens to unnecessary risk.

Realigning the F-15s, KC-135s, and the professionals that maintain them mean nothing less than withdrawing combat legality.

This recommendation sends a clear, undeniable signal of weakness to our enemies. Shifting force projection assets away from the Pacific Rim will encourage our traditional enemies.

North Korea will understand the removal of air-to-air superiority fighters and aerial refueling capacities as nothing short of retreat.

The symbol of our strength, the mere existence of the fighters, tankers, and troops currently stationed at Portland Air National Guard Base is itself a mighty deterrent against interest that only recognizes bombs, bullets, and blood.

We are here today because as leaders within our community we are responsible to ensure America is safe and protected. How do you explain

to the citizens of the Northwest that they are safer with 13 fewer F-15s and no aerial refueling capacity, with 650 fewer national guardspeople to help them during crisis? I respectfully suggest we can't explain that to the citizens. Sometimes something sounds good until it meets the test of common sense, and this is such a case.

As we know, had the French maintained their defenses the entire world might have avoided much of the carnage of Hitler's war machine, but they didn't. The French government, seeking to recover from the expenses of World War I, tried to build and maintain the missional line on the cheap.

Knowing it was folly, but doing it anyway because they couldn't separate their position from their purpose. In a short period of time the missional line was a hollow shell. As a result their once mighty military crumbled before the Nazi Gudskri.

We cannot stand by and allow the creation of a missional coast. We must not allow short-term budgetary goals to dictate our strategic defense posture.

We know from history that nations risk their very survival when they sustain a military

machine that is more efficient than effective. We want an effective military.

Consider the new age we find ourselves in. The threat of asymmetrical attacks on American soil is real and we must be prepared. The recommendation to realign the 142nd Fighter Wing from the Pacific Northwest does not fulfill our most critical mission of homeland defense. This is a time to put the safety and security of the people of the Pacific Northwest, the people of America first. Thank you so much for taking your time to listen to us.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you. I'll turn to my colleagues and see if they have any questions for this panel.

MR. PRINCIPI: No questions.

MR. COYLE: No questions.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Apparently not. Let me ask the audience, does anyone in here need language interpretation? Sign language? If they do we'll provide that. Thank you. Thank the panel. Appreciate you being here.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: We appreciate the second panel being with us. And this panel stood when swearing in the first panel so they have been

sworn in. We appreciate your presence with us at this time.

My eyes aren't good enough to see who's who over there so you'll have to introduce yourself. Let me ask the Air Force. The Air Force has got a clock right there, very valuable. Can they see it on that side? They're more critical than we are. Maybe you can do that. Probably be helpful to them.

We surely appreciate you all being with us at this time. And if it's -- does someone have a plan on how you're going to speak, or we just start one end and go down? We'll start with you, General. Thank you so much.

GENERAL BYRNE: Sir, I'd like to thank you, the members of the base realignment committee for the opportunity to appear before you today to offer some input for your consideration on the impact of the current DOD plan may have on the Northwest, the state of Oregon, Oregon National Guard.

My name is Brigadier General Ray Byrne, I currently serve as the acting national general for the Oregon Army and Air National Guard. I would like to discuss four issues with you today.

First, the Oregon National Guard has currently prepared a 20-year plan that will take our organization, both Army and Air, into the future. In preparing the plan we have brought together the leadership from both organizations working in a collaborative environment to discuss roles and missions, the facilities and training areas and resources needed to support those roles and missions.

Additionally, we have been working with state agencies to ensure we are on track with current and future requirements. I tell you this because we have concerns about how the current DOD proposal is put together. I have concern because the Air Force, unlike the Army, did not consult or work with the adjutants general in crafting recommendations.

Further, I have seen few indications that the services consulted or worked together to determine potential impact, efficiencies, or savings that they would have achieved together as they relate to Oregon.

The DOD proposal for Oregon would have three Army reserve armories closed in Portland and have units become tenants in either current or

future National Guard armories while we have proposed extensive vacancies and facilities at the Portland Air National Guard base.

This clearly demonstrates a disconnect in the DOD process. It is not a coordinated process. The adjutants general in 54 states and territories sees the Air Force future total force transformation plan as having a profound impact on the Air National Guard and our nation's homeland defense.

In a March 9, 2005 letter to General Jumper, the adjutants general association indicated that the FTF plan issues exist that could be very detrimental to the National Guard to the point of irreversible deterioration. Coupled with the impending base realignment closure process I am very concerned about the potential negative impacts to the Oregon National Guard.

Second, a key consideration for determining DOD decisions with military value as it applies to homeland defense and secondarily to force projection. It would appear that the homeland defense was not considered as applies to the Pacific Northwest and force projection was given clear consideration.

The Air National Guard does 100 percent of the air defense, not the Air Force. We are the home team, the Air Force is primarily focused on the away game. The 142nd Fighter Wing in Portland defends our homeland with the F-15 Eagle Jet Fighter and provides both continuous air defense and air superiority capabilities on 24-hour alert as part of the North American air defense system.

Since September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America, the 142nd Fighter Wing's operation Noble Eagle Homeland Defense Mission is more critical than ever to Oregon and the Pacific Northwest.

I will be followed later by Colonel Brad Applegate, commander of the 142nd Fighter Wing, will discuss in greater detail potential threats, concerns we have for the air defense of the Pacific Northwest.

The current DOD proposal will compromise the security of the Northwest and leave the region with less capability to respond to an aerial attack than existed on the 11th of September 2001. As a commander you cannot expect me to accomplish the mission with two fighters on alert. I simply cannot do it.

Third, the loss of human capital of the Oregon National Guard would be tremendous, reducing our organization by about 650 guardsmen and women, over 25 percent. The Oregon Air National Guard provides the Governor of Oregon with critical assets to help protect the citizens of Oregon, during natural disasters, and other emergencies.

Floods, earthquakes, Tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, and security from terrorists, and other human threats are not theoretical possibilities for this state, they happen. In fact, just last week we experienced two Tsunami warnings as a result of an offshore earthquake.

If, God forbid, we experience a major disaster such as occurred recently in Southwest Asia -- Southeast Asia we need this space and its capability and infrastructure to the surge site for federal response to assist in timely disaster relief.

The National Guard Association of the United States, in a letter dated 10 June 2005, has asked this committee to consider both the significant loss of highly skilled, experienced air crews, maintenance of flight support personnel, as well as the failure to consider the overwhelming

superior flying record of the Air National Guard units. With the nearest Air National Guard location over six hours away most of our military members will not continue to serve.

The loss of trained members has not been captured in the DOD data. The cost of reduction in force, retraining, and recruiting were similarly not reflected in cost required to implement the DOD recommendation.

The Guard has always brought jobs to people. Not people to jobs, as do active services. Given the lack of active duty military bases in Oregon, this loss has huge negative impacts on the homeland security response capability to the state of Oregon.

Lastly, the issues we discuss here are not just concerns for the state of Oregon, it is clearly a regional issue. All the states in the Pacific Northwest have agreements in one form or another to assist each other in the event of national or man-made disaster.

Another consequence of the failure of the Air Force to work with the adjutant general in the Pacific Northwest is a negative impact the DOD proposal would have on regional response capability

of the Idaho Air National Guard C-130s and the Washington Air Guard's KC-135 refueling unit.

If adopted this would leave the Northwest governors without any emergency airlift, respond to disasters, and leave their diminished air refueling resources within the region.

As I understand the objective behind the BRAC process, to eliminate costly, redundant, unnecessary military infrastructure. As I point out with the proposed USA consolidation facilities in Oregon, it appears the Air Force is using the BRAC process to realign their force structure instead of waiting for the QDR. This is putting the cart before the horse.

Having said that, if in fact there was a substantial cost savings from the Portland air base closing -- or proposal, then one could weigh the cost savings against the higher security risk that is presented. The numbers don't add up. There is no cost savings, in fact, it would cost more.

In conclusion, you have a difficult task to be accomplished in a short period of time to meet your obligation. I would like to thank you for being here today and listening to my concerns about the proposal. I'm ready to answer any

questions.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you,
General. Mr. Jordan.

MR. JORDAN: Good morning,
Commissioners. Thank you for allowing me to appear
before you. My name is Robert Jordan, and I am the
special agent in charge of the FBI here in Oregon.
I'm truly honored to be among the select group to
speak today.

In fact, I believe that Colonel
Applegate's request that I appear here with him is
indicative of the outstanding relationship shared
by the military, the law enforcement community in
Oregon.

I will spend my time before you talking
about that relationship and its importance to the
safety and security of the people living in the
Pacific Northwest.

Although I am not an expert in military
matters, I am knowledgeable about the threat of
terrorism, especially in the Northwest. As I'm
sure you are aware, the FBI's number one priority
is protecting this country from another terrorist
attack. The military, and specifically 142nd
Fighter Wing, is a critical partner in that effort.

Some people will ask why Portland, why Oregon, what's here that has the potential to escalate our risk. I'll start with our infrastructure.

Nuclear power plants. We have one here in Oregon, Trojan. Sits on the Columbia River. It has been decommissioned but still serves as a repository for almost 800 spent fuel assemblies. In addition, we have the Hanford nuclear reservation that sits just across the river in Washington. Hanford is a plutonium production complex with nine nuclear reactors and associated processing facilities.

There are more than 50 million gallons of high-level liquid waste; 2,300 tons of spent nuclear fuel; 12 tons of plutonium in various forms; and about 25 million cubic feet of buried or stored solid waste. We also have two nonpower reactors in Oregon; one at Reed College here in Portland, and one at Oregon State University in Corvallis.

Chemical weapons. As you know, the Umatilla chemical weapons depot operated by the Army is only one of eight in the U.S. that currently stores chemical weapons, and one of only

a handful that is currently equipped to destroy those weapons.

Dams and power generation. By one estimate there are more than four dozen dams on many rivers considered high hazard in the state of Oregon. The most significant, of course, being the Bonneville Dam less than 40 miles from downtown Portland.

Bonneville alone can hold more than a half million acre feet of water. The entire federal Columbia River power system, which includes 31 federally-owned dams on the Columbia and its tributaries in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho and Montana, provide about 60 percent of the region's hydroelectric capacity.

In addition to the dams, any attack on the various power transmission facilities in the state could affect the entire Western U.S. power grid.

Industries. Portland division includes one of the largest and most robust high-tech sectors in the country. The region called the silicon forest is home to more than 1,700 companies employing more than 64,000 people. These companies impact everything from national defense to biotech

research. All totaled six Fortune 1,000 companies are headquartered in Oregon, and others have a significant presence, all of which have a great impact on the nation's economy.

Transportation. Interstate 5, which runs from Canada to California, is the backbone of regional trade connecting rail lines and port facilities to distribution centers. 75 percent of the goods shipped to or from other states move by truck, and the majority of those move in and out of this area via I-5. The attack on either the I-5 or I-205 bridge across the Columbia would be devastating economically.

In addition, we are home to Portland International Airport which serves a total of 332 international round-trip flights each month. PDX is the 32nd largest passenger airport in the country and the 25th largest cargo airport.

Also, the Port of Portland is the primary destination for many of the cargo ships docking in Oregon; an estimated 64 ships a month. In addition, there are a number of smaller private and public ports along our waterways that serve as local, regional, and national interests. A total of \$15 billion in goods moves up and down the

Columbia River each year.

Chemical gas and oil facilities. In addition to, and in some cases combined with port facilities, many other companies of interest populate this region. These companies house massive amounts of chemicals, gasoline, and oil reserves that would be an attractive target.

I've given you a brief overview of some of the infrastructure concerns. I've not been able to give you a complete list for obvious security reasons. But this should give you a general idea of what we face and the critical assets that are potential terrorist targets, and, conversely, assets we seek to protect.

Now I'd like to move on to some very real threats we've seen here in the Pacific Northwest.

In 1999 an alert U.S. customs agent stopped and arrested Achmed Rasam crossing into Washington from Canada in a car loaded with more than 100 pounds of explosives.

A so-called millennium bomber's plan was to attack Los Angeles International Airport. In October 2002 our joint terrorism task force arrested the first of the Portland seven terrorist

cell. Six of those seven traveled overseas with the intent to enter Afghanistan and fight against U.S. forces.

Over the course of the past few years we've seen a growing number of incidents involving lasers. There have been six such incidents in Oregon, including four where aircraft were targeted.

And a most recent arrest by our Sacramento FBI are an indication that the threat here has not abated.

In addition to the Pacific Northwest events, we have a steady string of international threats and attacks in recent years. Most obvious being 9/11. Beyond that the list includes the '93 attack on the World Trade Center in New York. Although we view this as a failure for extremists because the building survived, the extremists viewed it as a success, while having patience and the resources to refine the plan and return once more with devastating consequences in 2001.

The same man responsible for the '93 attack also planned a simultaneous attack on 12 planes over the Pacific in 1995. Again, planning, patience, and perseverance. Only an accident led

to his discovery. But, again, you would see parts of this plan recycled on 9/11.

The simultaneous attacks suggest a need to address multiple threats at once. I believe that Colonel Applegate will address the logistics of handling multiple simultaneous threats.

The 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, which killed 224 people, including 12 Americans. The 2000 bombing in the U.S. Coal, which led to 17 American deaths and another 39 injuries. And, of course, we read daily accounts of various bombings occurring overseas.

What these attacks have shown us is that the extremists, bent on violence, doesn't view a failed attack as an actual failure, but rather as a stepping stone or a lesson learned to bigger, more spectacular events sometimes years in the future.

What does this mean for us? Of importance is the ability to share information and intelligence with the greater law enforcement federal communities. To pull the 142nd from Oregon would be detrimental to our collective efforts in this regard.

Again, this goes back to lessons learned from 9/11 and other incidents. We do our best

protecting this country when we're able to share and utilize each other's information and resources.

In addition, the 142nd will play a critical role in addressing what are known as asymmetric threats. For example, the state is home to several hundred crop dusters and other small aircraft. It's not unusual for these aircraft to enter sensitive air space, such as that over the Umatilla chemical weapons depot.

The F-15's ability to respond immediately to such unknown situations is absolutely critical. If the nearest military backup were located as far as away as California or Montana, the federal government's collective ability to respond to incidents, those remote areas, such as Eastern Oregon, as well as population centers in Oregon, would be greatly diminished.

Our dependence on F-15 resources located elsewhere opens the door to a potential secondary attack here. For instance, if extremists attack multiple locations over a short period of time, as they have planned to do and have actually done in the past, Portland would be left vulnerable.

I don't think there's any expectation

that F-16 resources out of California would be available to us in the event of attack in the L.A. region or elsewhere.

The FBI will do everything it can to prevent an attack before it happens. But, again, lessons learned, an attack anywhere in the U.S. is possible.

Our enemies are patient. They plan and they persevere. We are all in this together for a long, long time. When and if the balloon goes up, the ability to utilize the locally-based military resources to stop an impending attack will be invaluable. Thank you, gentlemen, for your time and attention.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you. Let me ask, you folks here all right? I'm a little concerned, we've had some excellent testimony, hate to have you miss it.

Colonel Applegate, maybe we can get you to pull that mike in a little closer, if you would, please.

COLONEL APPLGATE: Chairman Principi, Commissioners, thanks for the opportunity to speak to you today. Commissioners Coyle and Bilbray, good to see you back in Portland again.

My name is Brad Applegate. I'm appearing here today in the capacity of 142nd Fighting Wing commander, Oregon Air National Guard. My professional military career spans over 23 years in the F-15 homeland defense business. Both active duty and guard.

I'm blessed to lead a world class organization where the expectations exceed every measurable standard is ingrained in the culture, and borne out in every challenge we face. We're the current Air National Guard rated for best air-to-air squadron in the United States Air Force.

I'll confine my comments to the DOD proposal regarding the realignment of F-15 aircraft and personnel. I have four themes to share today. First, I'll refer to Mr. Jordan's comments on the security environment, then I'll review the DOD BRAC proposal, I'll follow on with an overview of military value and measurement shortcomings, and lastly, I'll close with review of the cost estimates.

Mr. Jordan gave you an outstanding review of our many security concerns in the Pacific Northwest. Also included in our security environment is an international air carrier traffic

route. Over 3,000 international flights depart monthly from our airports, and thousands more transit this gateway to the Pacific Rim.

I'd like to highlight some of the Department of Defense's most grave concerns, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Cruise missile technology is proliferating rapidly throughout the world. It's become a common means of aggression, more increasingly dangerous, and capable enemies.

The United States's dominance to command aircraft, its four-star enemies to develop the technology is a poor-manned Air Force. During Iraqi Freedom Sadaam Hussein's forces fired three of these missiles that went undetected by coalition forces.

A congressional research service report dated 2 May 2005 notes that 24 nations will pose a serious cruise missile threat from forward locations within ten years. One of these forward locations is the 142nd Fighter Wing's area of responsibility.

In 2003 the defense science board conducted a study that evaluated this cruise missile threat in the near term. The study

concluded that these devices, aided by GPS, could easily be launched from a container ship within 500,000 miles of the United States coast line. This launch range constitutes roughly 3 million square nautical miles from which a cruise missile can emanate.

The 142nd Fighter Wing is responsible for engaging and destroying these missiles in nearly half of that area.

Another threat to our sovereign skies is the unmanned aerial vehicle capable of carrying biotoxins, nuclear bombs, other weapons of mass destruction. Like cruise missiles, UAV technology is widely proliferated and being utilized by our potential enemies throughout the world.

Even Hefalo, the Lebanese terrorist organization, possesses this technology. Based on an Iranian design, the Mirsad I is flown over Israeli air space on three separate occasions, the most recent, April of this year.

We are America's first and only response to these type of threats. If our enemies attempted multiple, near simultaneous attacks our post-BRAC alert forces would only be able to engage one. Without the additional defense in depth the Pacific

Northwest we enjoy today, much of our West Coast would be left undefended.

Let's switch gears and review the DOD proposal. As you can see in the graph prior to 9/11/2001, we had atrophied to just seven alert sites across the nation. We called this area deep peace. We became so comfortable in our four corner defense. Remember, the cold war had been won and the nation looked for ways to reap a peace dividend.

The events of 9/11 changed all that. Today's alert forces are postured as indicated on the slide. With 16 sites across the nation we stand ready for an asymmetric attack on terrorist event. Note the full squadron of aircraft available to Portland Air National Guard base. While not on immediate launch status, the capability to robust surge operations or launch additional aircraft is always available.

All pilots and over 80 percent of personnel assigned to the wing live within a 50-mile radius.

After implementing the DOD BRAC proposal the situation changes radically. With just two armed aircraft available for immediate launch,

backup resources are very scarce. Additional pilots may be available. No intelligent support is assigned and maintenance manning is at a minimum.

Surge operations are not possible.

These two alert aircraft are capable of engaging just one target at a time. A multiple axis attack would be difficult, if not impossible to repel.

As you can see, every other region of the nation is robust in larger dedicated homeland defense squadrons. The capability of the Pacific Northwest is diminished below 9/11 level.

Further amplifying the surge operation shortfall is the lost 16 KC-135 tankers in our region. Both the 939th Wing here in Portland and the 141st Air Refueling Wing in Spokane, Washington are diminished. The tanker forces are a critical part of homeland defense team.

Let's take a look at the additional fighter forces available in each region during an emergency. Again, the Northwest's region is radically diminished in total fighter aircraft available for rapid mobilization.

You might ask, why isn't a two ship okay for alert? In areas of the country where alert fighters overlap one another they provide an

inherent backup. The Northwest does not enjoy overlap of its fighter forces. The nearest backup of air forces is well over an hour away in times of need.

So how did the DOD come to this conclusion? They used military value as required by BRAC law. As outlined in the federal register, an instillation of military value is the most important factor for assessing future viability. Most notably, I quote, The availability of condition of land, facilities, air space, and staging areas for use of the armed forces and homeland defense missions, end quote.

All national security strategy and doctrinal guidance today publishes defense homeland as the number one DOD responsibility. After thorough review of BRAC data it's clear that the DOD recommendation to the BRAC commission completely disregarded homeland defense when developing their proposals.

The opportunity to fix this oversight came during a required public open period comment. Consider Senator K. Bailey Hutchinson memorandum dated 21 Jan. 2004. I quote, The DOD should consider homeland security issues and how close --

or closing or realigning installations affects our national security. The current draft criteria, very similar to the criteria proposed in three previous BRAC trials, do not fully reflect national security issues our country faces in the wake of September 11, 2001, unquote.

Despite the public demand, homeland defense was not adequately considered in the BRAC's military value analysis. First, the final selection criteria did not have a homeland defense champion. The four focus areas were space, command control, global strike, and global mobility. No mention of our number one DOD priority, homeland defense. The DOD was clearly focused on operations abroad. We call it the away game.

Second, the BRAC data contained only two questions concerning homeland air defense out of more than 1,800 total. To date we have no indication these two questions were used in the fighter base analysis. The BRAC data call did not ask questions concerning proximity to major urban centers, vital national assets, transportation facilities, or international borders.

Third, in March '05 the base closure executive group inexplicably deleted an air

sovereignty air defense scenario specifically addressing air defense response criteria. This scenario was crucial to best measure which site served response criteria stipulated by Commander Northcomb.

Lastly, USAP's number 8 realigning the F-15 fleet was created in September '04. It stipulated removal of Portland F-15s and was opened weeks prior to the conclusion of the military value data call.

Homeland defense was not an Air Force key focus area. The BRAC data call did not address homeland defense concerns. The base closure executive group inexplicably deleted the air sovereignty scenario. Without question homeland defense was not factored in.

Military value was quantified in the DOD matrix using a series of veterans mission capability index, MCI. Numerous discrepancies, methodologies, and subsequent military value calculations are apparent. These discrepancies appeared to be huge active duty-type instillations while discriminating against smaller air guard units.

Successful defense of the homeland by

definition requires close proximity to large population centers. The MCI methodology actually penalizes installations for being embedded in or near population centers. The military active duty growth potential actually deducts points from air defense units that are near the areas they're expected to protect.

Surprisingly, air space attributes were the most heavily weighted factors in the MCI calculation of roughly 40 percent of the total. Portland's some of the finest air space in the country. It's large, close to Portland, supports all training needs, and is rarely used by other fighters.

The MCI affords Portland minimal credit for the air space. Why? The air space formulas that were used were biased in three ways. The MCI heavily weighted air space that was in close proximity to the base. Portland air space is relatively close but not within the arbitrary 15 nautical mile radius that would give maximum credit. In fact, air space is only 23 miles or three minutes of fighter time beyond that arbitrary 15 nautical mile range.

Next, the MCI provides additional credit

for air to ground. Our air -- while our air-to-air range fully supports our air-to-air mission it contributed to reduce our military value.

Finally, the MCI awarded credits for units that control or schedule their own air space. Portland does not own or control or schedule the air space, but we have unfettered access 24/7 through the western air defense center.

Active duty units need adequate air space to train for the away game. Air defense units need access to adequate training air space while at the same time performing the home game.

The formula used to compute the value of sufficient munition storage also penalizes installations if they cannot store enough munitions. The formula provides no credit or even partial credit for units that are fully capable to support their primary mission.

Portland has adequate munition storage to support air defense for the Pacific Northwest, but received zero credit for this capability.

The MCI computations and subsequent military value cloud the true value installations with glaring discrepancies hidden within these formulas give little credit to our homeland defense

mission. These errors have unreasonably skewed the MCI values against small air guard units.

As we've seen, DOD proposal increases additional risks to the Northwest. This risk should be offset with savings to the taxpayer. Our analysis of financial debt from Cobra shows just the opposite. The DOD proposals for the Portland air guard base identifies savings of about \$14 million annually in the out years. Identifying true cost has been extremely complex, time consuming, and in some cases nearly impossible due to the lack of information.

First major discrepancy we identified is a complete lack of cost modeling for the proposed alert site in Portland. This significant shortfall will cost approximately 5.4 million per year in man power cost alone. The meager deficiency gain two -- gaining F-15 wings are completely overshadowed by the cost of the capacities. To date we have no Cobra documentation to substantiate appropriate funding set aside for alert.

Second, the loss of human capital investment cannot be overlooked. Our superb community demographics have allowed us to remain at 103 percent for over three years. Due to our

geographic location isolated from other reserve flying operations, most of our trained manpower will not be needed to serve.

Their years of formal training and many years of OJT will be lost. We estimate just the formal school training for operations and maintenance team at approximately \$140 million. The training cost at New Orleans and New Jersey gaining manpower are estimated at an additional \$60 million. Not captured.

The annual savings estimated \$14 million of realized only on manpower. Planned A and G manpower ceilings remain constant; therefore, no savings are possible by simply moving people. The recurring cost reflected in Cobra are, therefore, overstated.

Lastly, we find aggregate scenarios that are not related. For example, a proposed lease from -- move from leased property in Louisiana onto federal property generates a cost savings posted within the Portland realignment.

In closing we'd recommend that the commission overturn the DOD BRAC recommendation to realign F-15 aircraft to Portland air guard base. The increased risks to security of the Pacific

Northwest are not commensurate with the meager or nonexistent cost savings.

The 142nd Fighter Wing as it exists today with 15 aircraft is fully manned and trained for any contingency. The threats are real. Our defense capability would clearly be diminished and the cost savings is nonexistent. This concludes my remarks. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you, Colonel. General Ward.

GENERAL WARD: Thank you for the opportunity to offer pinpoints regarding the impact on the state of Oregon and our security in the Northwest. My name is Major General Retired David E. Ward. I'm a former Commander of the Oregon Air National Guard and a former Air National Guard Special Assistant, commander U.S. Air Forces. I have over 36 years of service to this nation, and my expertise is in air defense.

From cold war threats to Soviet bombers to cruise missiles to aircraft hijacking, and terrorism, my career has been profoundly influenced by airborne threats to our national security.

I have been tasked to intercept hijacked aircraft. I have friends that were killed when

terrorists destroyed Pan Am 103 over Lockaby. And a colleague at Pan Am, when I flew as a pilot, lost his son in the World Trade Center bombing. I watched our nation attempt to deal with these events and the threats they impose. Mainly through improved airport security operations.

Except for some short-term adjustment to our alert posture, our air defense system was allowed to progressively atrophy, more so following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Through a process of devolution you move from a point defense of high value targets throughout the country to a screen defense by maintaining air defense units only on the periphery of the continental United States. A major reason for the success of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was the ability of the perpetrators to get beyond that screen.

None of our rules of engagements and procedures imagined that our own aviation resources could be used against us in such an effective and devastating manner. Had the attacks of September 11th never occurred a BRAC recommendation to close the only remaining air defense wing in the Northwest would have been consistently in line with

the lack of priority our defense planners have placed on posturing armed fighters available as a last line of defense.

I'm appearing before you today as a citizen of the Northwest deeply concerned by the DOD BRAC recommendations and committed to preventing our air defense capabilities from ever eroding again. I have three issues to address to you this morning.

The Air National Guard Vanguard engagement strategy leading up to the BRAC, U.S. Air Force BRAC selection criteria, and suggested courses of action. I will first comment on the Vanguard engagement strategy.

The Air Force and the Air National Guard relationship is at a crossroads. Historically, Air National Guard units have been equipped with the oldest aircraft in the Air Force inventory. As the Air Force transitioned to new weapon systems older systems were given to the Air National Guard.

As a force in reserve this arrangement made sense. The stable and highly experienced work forces and the reserved forces allowed these systems to viably remain in the weapons inventory much longer than otherwise been possible.

The 1990s, two key parts of this arrangement began to change. First the Air Force began to increasingly rely on the Air National Guard as an equal partner in the total force. Air National Guard personnel worked alongside their active counterparts in their expeditionary Air Force contingency operation.

Second, the Air Force stopped purchasing new fighters by upgrading older models of F-15s and F-16s. The Air National Guard now has aircraft as capable as those flying in the active component.

Today's force of F-15s and F-16s are approaching 30 years of age. They are old and expensive to maintain. The Air Force plans to replace these aircraft with a smaller force of F-22s and F-35s. Because of cost constraints today's aircraft will not be replaced on a one-for-one basis.

Additionally, the Air Force desires to consolidate aircraft in the larger size squadrons at fewer bases. These two dynamics reduce fighter force structure, consolidate fewer bases will drive a fundamental change in the Air Force/Air National Guard relationship.

The Air Force turned its new

relationship to future total force. There's a place in our system of government to debate and review fundamental changes in DOD submissions. I would offer these discussions would typically be held outside of the DOD in a public forum with plenty of direction from elected leadership. Unfortunately, the Air Force did not take this approach.

In late 2003 the director of the Air National Guard, Lieutenant General Danny James, released Vanguard engagement strategy to address these future total force issues. Vanguard was designed to preserve ANG by moving in the nonflying missionaries. It is the implementation of Vanguard and the abuses of BRAC process that needs your closest attention.

Vanguard specifically targeted its states with multiple flying units for closure, offering those units up as Air National Guard contribution to BRAC. The analytical evaluation required by the BRAC process was done after the air national closure list was developed.

The 142nd Fighter Wing was listed as a candidate for closure before the BRAC data collections were even finished. One look at how

completely disconnected the closure recommendations are, then the fighter mission value rankings will show how political this process has been. The Air National Guard and the Air Force have convoluted what is by law intended to be an open, honest assessment.

I will now turn to the BRAC selection criteria. In developing military value assessment criteria for the 2005 BRAC, DOD relied heavily on selection criteria for previous rounds. These criteria were designed to assess active duty facilities, preparing active duty forces for power projection missions. These missions are commonly referred to today as the away game.

The 2005 criteria do a poor job of assessing strengths and weaknesses of a typical Air National Guard fighter wing. The criteria do not assess geographical location or a unit's ability to support the nation's top priority of protecting the homeland. No metric is provided to assess a unit's proximity to critical infrastructure of operations and logistics, nor is one provided to assess the unit's ability to conduct homeland surge requirements.

The Air Force relied heavily on the

subjectiveness of military judgment to address these disconnects. The air defense realignment recommendation only addressed Northcomb's lowest readiness posture requirement. This one size fits all approach to defending our skies will not protect the Northwest nor the rest of the nation from a coordinated attack.

Not all alert sites are the same. There's a degree of redundancy on the East Coast due to the relative proximity of alert sites and their supporting fighter wings. This is not the case in the Northwest.

Reducing the alert posture in the Northwest to a single alert site fails to address the vast area of the nation that -- the responsibility that extends even up into Canada that these aircraft must screen and protect.

I would call your attention to General Moseley's Air Force base realignment and closure briefing to Secretary Rumsfeld on 8 April 2005. General Moseley has a lot to say about global power, but not one word about homeland defense.

The fact of the matter is that the Air Force is so consumed by right sizing and force reshaping for the away game they have paid little

attention to properly sourcing our nation's air sovereignty there are a number of approaches that could be taken to make air defense resources available to the Northwest.

First of all, there's no need to reserve component F-15 units above 18 primary assigned aircraft. The Air Force has identified 18 primary assigned aircraft as an acceptable number to ensure efficiency in reserve component fighter units. By recommending that reserve component F-15 units be equipped with 24 PAA, the DOD unnecessarily removes 18 F-15s that could be used by the 142nd Fighter Wing to maintain security in the Northwest.

Stop the unnecessary and expensive F-15 conversion at New Jersey. This conversion will drive an expense that's not in alignment with the purpose of the BRAC cost savings.

New Jersey could easily be equipped with additional F-16 units from units with fighter mission capability rankings well below 100. Stop the nautilus Air Force base F-15 aggressive squadron realignment. To use an already limited pool of air sovereignty fighters to serve as targets for air expeditionary course training is not in alignment with the DOD number one priority

of homeland defense.

Any of these recommendations would allow the 142nd Fighter Wing to continue to provide the citizens of the Northwest, as well as those to the east, with security from the attack.

Over the course of my career I have watched the air defense posture of our country erode to the state we found ourselves in on September 11, 2001. Less than four years after the attack the erosion has begun again.

Within the past year the president received a detailed report from another commission that was chartered to provide advice on how to prevent another terrorist tragedy on American soil. Several times during the course of their inquiry they asked, who is responsible for defending us at home. The 9/11 commission specifically recommended that the Department of Defense and its oversight committees should regularly assess the adequacy of northern command strategies and planning to defend the United States against military threats to the homeland. It is beyond belief that the DOD would recommend a readiness posture for the Northwest below that which we had on 9/11.

Your commission has the opportunity to

provide the department of the oversight it so obviously needs. I respectfully request that you stop the F-15 realignment of Portland. National security demands this protection. Thank you for providing me this opportunity to speak.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you, General. We'll dispense with the questions of the commission. We're running just a tad behind. We appreciate the excellent testimony from both panels, and thank you so very much for being here today.

Montana delegation here? Please come forward. We'll take a two-minute break.

(Recess was taken 9:43 to 9:49.)

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Come to order, please. Take your seats. We're honored at this time to have the Montana delegation. The honorable Max Baucus, the honorable Conrad Burns, and General Randall Moseley with us. We're honored that you folks could be with us. I had the opportunity to serving both these senators, was a great experience. But the senators sometimes don't stay in their time as well as the house members. I wanted to point that out.

SENATOR BAUCUS: Until today.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Having said that, we're trying to allot you folks a distance about, what, 20 seconds -- 20 minutes. Is that enough? That'd give you -- or do you need more?

MR. BURNS: Objection.

SENATOR BAUCUS: As I understand it, Montana's allocated 30 minutes total.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: 30 minutes? Well, okay, I guess we can give you the extra ten. I was kind of fudging you on a little there. Okay. Well, Senator Baucus -- hold on a minute. We've got to swear you in. If you'll all stand up. Under the law we're doing this. The statute says that.

MS. SARKAR: Senators, General, please raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give and any evidence you may provide are complete and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?

THE PANEL: I do.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: We'll turn the time to you, Senator Baucus.

SENATOR BAUCUS: Thank you very much. Mr. Hansen, Commissioner Coyle, Commissioner Bilbray, and Mr. Chairman. We -- Montana deeply

appreciates this opportunity to present our concerns about the Department of Defense's BRAC recommendations, as we believe that the recommendations are very seriously flawed.

First, the unprecedented draw down of fighter and air lift assets without a formulated replacement strategy endangers the NASA security of our country.

Second, there's a failure to recognize the reliance of our nation on the highly experienced and cost-effective Air National Guard.

Third, the underpinning rationale of the BRAC process to determine the military value of the installation is flawed. Because it utilizes simplistic data points to measure complex problems which put the Air National Guard installation at a severe disadvantage.

Finally, the process wholly failed to consider the unique training opportunities for future missions in the wide open spaces of Montana. My distinguished colleagues, Senator Burns and the action general of the Montana guard, Major Randy Moseley, will follow me. Our statements, we believe, will convey to you our concerns, and also believe our concerns will influence your decisions.

While many of the aircraft of our Air Force and Air National Guard have passed their midlife point they've been kept relevant by structural enhancements in avionics upgrades. However, this continued relevance is limited by the original design, and at some point continued service will become maintenance intensive and they'll be retired out of the inventory, as shown by the slide behind me of the fighter force.

And you can tell it's with the line off to the left it's a consequence to the BRAC recommendations that the pilot force retire much earlier than it intend.

New tactical capabilities of the next generation of fighters and the unmanned aerial vehicles will eventually come on-line to ensure our nation's ability to defend itself, but none of those systems are ready today or even in the near future to take over the responsibilities of today's fighter force.

Until they come on-line our nation is faced with a fighter bathtub, for we will be constrained by lack of sufficient assets, such assets to protect our force in defense of our interests as depicted on this line.

The bathtub has existed for years. And the funding decisions to delay F-A22 and F-A35 acquisitions has only exacerbated the situation. And only through impressive avionics upgrades receives breakthroughs and structural enhancements as the service life of our current -- was pushed to the right in an effort to mitigate the bathtub's impact.

The BRAC recommendations would undo that. And instead of attempting to manage the bathtub, would turn it into a grand canyon. With the early retirement of over 200 F-16s for the inventory beginning in FY '07 the plan is to continue to retire the remaining Air National Guard F-16s through the Air Force's total -- future total force proposal in an unprecedented move to pay for new aircraft before they are built by retiring existing capability early. Next.

There is no doubt that our Air Force and Air National Guard in 2025 will not look like they do today. But as stated by numerous experts already, these costs come too fast and go too deep. They certainly are too risky for our nation's security as we face threats of instability from Iran, North Korea, and other unknown countries, and

other potential developments in those countries.

Until the quadrennial defense review is completed, until the future force structure of our nation's defense has been fully articulated, and until a funding plan has been developed and properly sourced, I believe we should delay the implementation of the BRAC recommendations.

The statutory BRAC measures will determine the force structure of our armed forces before the threat requirements have even been considered. A total reversal of logic.

Our Air National Guard units are engaged in unprecedented fashion in today's air expeditionary reports, and that meant for ten years. They fought in the first Gulf war, enforced no-fly zones in sections of Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia.

The Air National Guard is still involved in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Performing 100 percent of the day-to-day homeland alert in support of Noble Eagle. Last summer for three months the only fighters force based in Iraq was the Rocky Mountain coalition of Montana, Colorado, New Mexico.

The Air National Guard has done these

continuous commitments primarily through volunteerism. Even so, the number of guard duty days far exceeded the stated contract under which they enlisted. One weekend a month and 15 additional days a year disappeared long ago as active duty downsizing, combined with increased national security commitments forced an increase in reliance on the Air National Guard.

Montana guardsmen averaged 95 days of military participation in '02, and 86 days in '04. Over 650 air guardsmen volunteered for state-active duty fighting the terrible forest fires in the summer of 2000. And over 225 volunteered again in 2003. Our Governor has already put them on notice to be involuntarily activated for duty later this summer.

The leadership of our air guard wing believes they have reached a breaking point and have sustained participation levels of this kind will negatively begin to affect retention and recruiting. And how will the Air Force maintain today's pace with 28 fewer flying units in the guard?

The BRAC recommendations will take 28 units out of the air expeditionary force rotation

at an increasing level of frequency that the individual units have to employ while significantly increasing the length of its days.

I also am having a difficult time making sense of the underlying budget assumptions. The vast majority of closures of the Air National Guard yield incredibly marginal savings, if any. These savings take several years to realize leaving our national security dangerously low in the short term.

The Air Guard has proposed cost-effective proponent of our total air force. For roughly the cost of one F-22, one F-22 sitting on a ramp, the Air National Guard can fly 75 F-16s for a year while training and equipping over 5,000 experienced personnel.

Now, of course, there may be some rare efficiencies with the new generation technology, but I have a hard time believing it comes with a 75 to 1 ratio. Or that the decades of experience of each of those 5,000 people is not a very real asset.

Our Montana air wing provided air sovereignty alert for home station and flew combat air patrol missions over the assets throughout the

Northwest region, all while deploying to Operation Southern Watch and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

These BRAC recommendations will not only close our wing, but six other Air National Guard wings associated with homeland security. Cuts, I believe, will weaken our ability to protect our home.

In summary, I believe these recommendations do irreparable harm to our nation's security, no stated or funded plan to bring our capabilities back on-line, and no real plan to bridge the gap. These recommendations gut the most effective component of our total air force at a time when we need to capitalize on this, not eliminate them.

The nation cannot afford to lose Montana's only flying mission, that is our Air National Guard.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to now yield to my colleague, Senator Burns.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you.
Recognize Senator Burns.

SENATOR BURNS: Thank you very much, Senator Baucus, and thank the commission. I would just like to go in and open up this testimony this

morning saying that this BRAC recommendation by the Air Force fails on a lot of accounts, and most of it there's no future in it.

We know there are changing missions. And they rewarded the legacy part of the Air Force without lending any weight to what our future needs and assessments might be. Today's training requirements, much less those of the future, were completely ignored and the historical basic pyridine was reinforced at the expense of our nation's security.

Further, these recommendations will not only remove the fighter aircraft needed to -- for force projections, but they will eliminate the most important resource of our Air National Guard, and that is experienced personnel. Next slide.

In August of 2002 the Air Force's own policy letter digest, General Fogleton, then vice chief of staff, wrote, Our installations, ranges, and air space are critical national assets that allow the Air Force to test new equipment, develop new tactics, and train our forces to be combat ready.

Embracing his wisdom, I've been a very vocal and persistent proponent of enhancing

training opportunities for the Air Force in Montana. The slide behind me shows you why the lack of competition from civil air traffic for the largest single special use air space in the continental United States.

On Thanksgiving day in 2001, air carriers and general aviation were allowed to traverse the United States unencumbered by the daily restrictions imposed by active military training areas in a test -- the new FFAA's preflight concept.

As you can see, many areas of the United States were absolutely saturated with air travel. What you cannot see are the numerous special use air spaces completely covered by air traffic in areas that the Air Force BRAC recommendations move aircraft and missions toward, not away from.

Montana's big sky country not only holds a military operating area of incredible volume, but it also doesn't compete with air or freight carriers or civil aviation as they move from hub to hub.

Montana's entire population is less than most Metropolitan areas of the United States and centered in a few cities. None of which lie under

the haze military operating area or the adjoining air traffic control assigned air spaces that significantly expand the training volume and training value.

Quite unlike the majority of special use air spaces in other areas of the country, Montana is not constrained by numerous no-fly zones, thereby avoiding noise-sensitive areas. Quite literally what you see is what you get. It is continuous and it's alive.

Likewise, the community of Great Falls has not experienced an urban sprawl and growth phenomenon common to many cities in America. International airport at Mountain Home Air Force Base fly at opposite ends of the city. And the prevailing winds dictate take-offs and departures toward areas only sparsely populated. Encroachment around air fields should have been evaluated by the Air Force military compatibility indexes, but I don't believe it was honestly or completely evaluated.

However, if an honest assessment is developed please bring it forward and evaluate Great Falls installations. I know they'll both come out with an outstanding rating.

I would also like to take a brief moment to alert the commission on two additional components I believe has been overlooked when you're looking at air space around Nalstrom and Great Falls airport.

As chairman of the aviation subcommittee on commerce we conducted a hearing earlier this year on the future aviation capacity and congestion challenges this country will face in the next decade. In that hearing we heard the testimony predicting record increases and civil aviation traffic across the nation.

In fact, evolving industries, like businesses of UABs, regional jets, and many more will double in traffic. We are going to see an incredible amount of airplanes in the sky and air space, and it's going to be a much needed commodity.

This commission needs to take into account the long-term challenges we see in the national air space. I believe that once you assess your air space you will find that Montana's an ideal and necessary component for future training in this country.

Additionally, we recently reported out

the Department of Homeland Security Appropriation Bill. In that bill we requested a report on the impact BRAC will have on homeland security facilities and activities, along with cost of those impacts. And I worked tirelessly to get air and Marine northern border air wing into Great Falls and have provided the dollars to do so.

And I believe the commission must take homeland security and plans into account in making their decision.

I'm on the Senate appropriations committee. I had the pleasure of chairing the military subcommittee, and sitting on the defense subcommittee I followed the BRAC process more closely than most. And I have to be perfectly honest with you, the BRAC recommendations proposed for the Air Force absolutely stunned me.

We took the stated objective of this process at face value and would evaluate and reward areas with the highest military value. Even Air Force secretary stated on May 17th hearing before the commission that we looked at military value in eight different mission areas, and every base that we looked was evaluated and scored on each of those eight different missions.

Then we took the force structure and bedded it down in the highest military value. So that's the general context that we have to try to do when we approach these challenges. This was not the case in this case.

Montana Air National Guard, 120 Fighter Wing, is losing air craft to Des Moines, Iowa, a unit with lower military value. We honestly expect at worst to retain the present valuation of our 120th and sincerely believe that we were poised to actually gain flying training missions.

As you know, Nalstrom Air Force base is home to a huge, huge deterrent facility there of ICBMs. Nalstrom Air Force base was closed on the last round of BRAC when the tanker force was moved to Madeel Air Force base, and so we suffered through that. And we got 11,500 feet of runway access and parallel air space to facilitate such missions.

We believe we can offer a totally unique opportunity to train the entire sensor to shooter loop, our nation's present air to ground ranges do a poor job of being able to provide a mobile target arraign across a vast amount of real estate. We have proposed fielding mobile targets on a country

road complex underlying the 6,000 square miles of the haze military operating area. We have the room to train. And I'm going to submit the rest of my testimony for the record, if the chairman would so allow.

We've also got something else we have. We have a mature trained force. Do we break up those families and will they stay in Montana, or will they go with the airplanes? I would suggest to you they probably will not go with the airplanes, they will stay in Great Falls. We will lose a mature and aged and experienced citizen patriots that take care of our airplanes and support forces as we go along.

But I ask you to evaluate, is there a future here? Is the future about new missions that will happen in 10 and 15 years? Are we clogging up the rest of the country and leaving the facilities that can support new training areas that's going to be needed in the future?

I would suggest that those of us on the commission know that things just don't happen overnight. We can put in new ideas, a new vision, but they have to -- but it takes five to ten years to get them in place.

So with all that we have to offer, from a people standpoint, from trained people, and in an area that has the facility and the infrastructure to do what we have to do for future missions. We have a new enemy. It is going to be different. We all know that. But the ability to train and to be effective and to carry out missions is part of what we've really been trying to do all of this time.

And now I'd like to turn it over to General Moseley, who has some figures. And I want to give him a little extra time because he walks you through how sometimes we are misguided by certain numbers. And I thank the commission for hearing us out.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you, Senator. We recognize General Moseley.

GENERAL MOSELEY: Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to be here today to present testimony. I would first like to state emphatically that I concur with the overall objective of the base realignment closure process as it was originally stated two years ago.

Our nation does need to divest marginal installations whose military value has diminished over the years. Air bases that were once sited

well outside surrounding communities now find themselves literally under siege by residential areas and air operations covered by increasingly heavy civilian air traffic.

There needed to be an objective military capability assessment that looked beyond the historic basic practices and posturing. Unfortunately, after examining the Department of the Air Force's BRAC analysis and recommendations I am concerned that the criteria for determining military value fell short of the mark.

The very real and complex issues needing thoughtful analysis were instead handled by criteria only marginally touching on the subject. Further, I believe the criteria was skewed against the smaller installations typically associated with an Air National Guard facility, and also against less populated areas of the United States, such as Montana.

Finally, the military compatibility index scores were not even followed in the basic decisions and force structure changes applied to Montana's 120th infantry. I'd like to offer the commission a few examples.

First, the criteria evaluating the

suitability of special use air space failed to consider the requirement of modern airborne sensor systems to have access to continuous large volumes of air space. Such air space must be unencumbered by the numerous noise restrictions dictated by large communities underlying the air space or encroachment by civilian airline and general aviation travel.

A couple of examples. Formulas 1245 and 1266 only marginally awarded credit for volume. However, allowed cumulative points for each special use air space within 150 nautical miles of the installation. Therefore, a base with numerous small postage stamp air spaces may not have received as much credit of volume for each air space, but received cumulative points for each of the air spaces. Conversely, on an installation of only one high volume air space only received points for a single air space.

Specifically, the haze military operating area in Montana offers low level training from 500 feet above ground level to flight level 180 in an area 50 nautical miles by 120 nautical miles. The air traffic control assigned air space above -- extend from flight level 180 to flight

level 510, but offers a full 120 nautical mile by 90 nautical mile continuous volume.

When combined with the adjacent cutback at Shelby air traffic control assigned air spaces, this medium to high altitude volume is expanded to a 290 nautical mile over land, down range look. If placed over the state of Florida this air space covers the vast majority of the peninsula from Jacksonville to Miami across Tampa.

Over land training provides realistic options of threat emitters, ground-based radar inputs, tactical engagement with both friendly and hostile ground troops, and real threat scenarios not available over water. Nowhere in this incredibly unique over land -- is this incredible over land capability given the credit it deserves by the criteria used in the formula.

I believe both formulas incorrectly and heavily awarded value for legacy systems oriented to air-to-ground gunnery ranges that were designed for aircrafts such as the F-4 of the Viet Nam era, and did not address the gunnery -- either the training requirements for future tactical aircraft or the training requirements for current aircraft equipped with state-of-the-art sensors and

weaponry.

Fully 50 percent of each -- weighted toward possession of a gunnery range regardless of the size of the range, the type of weaponry that can be expended, or the target arrays composition.

Current dumb bomb training requirements has significantly decreased in recent years, going from an 800 range requirement for Air National Guard, F-16 wing in 1998, to a 124 range starting requirement today.

This requirement is projected to diminish even further as electronics scoring evaluation becomes more prevalent and allows air to attack the diverse cultural targets set in special use air space instead of the bombing circle in use at conventional ranges.

This diminishing trend will continue as the training requirements evolve to reflect the current combatant commanders insistence on minimizing collateral damage by employing only precision-guided munitions.

The need for ballistic bomb -- is rapidly becoming antiquated and obsolete as it's firing a gun, which is required on only a few stories every 15 months. It becomes almost

irrelevant in future high-tech fighters. The postage stamp ranges become as obsolete as the dumb bombs they were designed for.

In fact, very few ranges in the continental United States allow the live drop of precision-guided munitions modern air crew are training to employ. With their stand-off capability these weapons have an extremely large ballistic footprint to ensure the munitions remain over restricted property for release to any potential impact point. The criteria as outlined fails to make that distinction.

The vast majority of precision-guided munition training will continue to be accomplished in -- like Bear Paw Haze with once or twice a year live deployments to a -- type range.

Current wartime employment procedures requiring -- quite literally dig out the target from an incredibly complex urban setting, or from the very entrenched and camouflaged natural environment. Current gunnery ranges, particularly those not associated with a large complex have very simplistic targets that do nothing to training the air crew beyond the basic employment skills necessary. Instead the majority of air crew

training with either dry weapons employment with an electronic scoring or a simulator.

Secondly, the criteria failed to fully account for either the urban sprawl or for the expedient growth in commercial and general aviation, both encroaching on our air spaces and air bases.

Example, formula 1207 supposedly addresses the level of mission encroachment on an installation. This is certainly a valid concern and one that should be carefully analyzed.

However, the formula only identifies areas immediately around an airfield that are encroached by the noise of operations. It fails to address the myriad of other encroachment issues that are involved with the take-off, departure, recovery, traffic patterns, and landing of modern jet aircraft.

These other areas of concern may literally take place up to 10 miles away from an airfield. And it's not uncommon on many bases to require an aircraft to make turns to avoid noise sensitive areas miles away from the base at either departure or arrival.

In a similar manner, the percentage of

installation departures delayed by air traffic control is a sole criteria to evaluate -- to operations is just too simplistic and does nothing to measure the true cost of deconflicting of intensive military operations, particularly fighter operations with crowded civilian airfield.

An objective evaluation of the 18 restrictions would be far more encompassing and complex. At a minimum it should evaluate noise mitigation procedures that adversely affect military operations. Talking about flight hours, mandatory departures with tail winds, minimum range turns and take-offs impacting radar trail procedures, reductions in training events that can be accomplished in the local area, and restrictions on the types of traffic pattern training events.

Hazardous air traffic reports filed by near misses between military and civilian aircraft and the number of agreements between military and civilian -- to mitigate the conflicts.

Unfortunately, the issue of encroachment in calculating the value of the air space was not even addressed.

The criteria evaluating the military value of installations totally ignored the cost

efficiency or flexibility of an Air National Guard base. Quick example, Portland 1214, 1241 addresses the fuel dispensing capacity of the installation and the amount of government-owned ramp space. However, Air National Guard units have developed close working relationships with fuel vendors and whole civil airport authorities.

DC-5s are parked on a civilian ramp space in cooperation with the Great Falls airport authority, and all of the necessary extra fuel was delivered on schedule by the oil refinery located in Great Falls. A virtually unlimited supply of military jet fuel that gets no credit by the MCI system.

The formulas measuring infrastructure condition was such that they favored large complexes on government property imposing quite literally a one size fits all approach.

In fact, even though the 120 Fighter Wing ramp space is deemed sufficient by both Air National Guard and Air Force standards to sustain operations up to 36 fighters, they receive no points. It's my belief that failing to confront these very real issues has led to recommendations that retain bases with marginal and declining

military value.

Instead of basing our present and future forces where they can fully train to exploit our technological advantages, it appears they will be based where they have historically been based, regardless of what limitations may be present. Instead of increasing Air Force and Air National Guard fighter operations in Montana, the recommendations of the Air Force BRAC report eliminated, discarding the largest continuous over land air space in the continent of the United States. Which brings me to my last point.

If you simply take the military comparability index ranking at face value then why has the 120th Fighter Wing been chosen to lose its flying mission and transfer three of their block 30 aircraft and associate personnel to a base with a lesser score and will have to undergo an aircraft conversion to fly those aircraft, an action that will take months and cost billions of dollars?

The 120th demonstrated time and time again their willingness to support national commissions. In 2001, might still be in an aircraft conversion status. The 120th had aircraft on alert and ready to go within two hours of the

planes impacting the World Trade Center.

After 9/11 the 120th supported at least six air expeditionary force deployments back-to-back performing air sovereignty alert at Nellis Air Force Base, Travis Air Force Base, March Reserve Base, Buckley Air Force Base, and deploying to both Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, and Balad Air Base.

During that same period the 120th scored exceptionally well in compliance inspections and received in 2004 the 120th -- the Air Force received the Air Force outstanding unit award.

I only ask the commission to do what I believe the Air Force BRAC recommendations failed to do, evaluate the ability the 120th to train for combat in Montana and look at extending the utilization of the states -- air space. And I turn this back over to the senators.

SENATOR BAUCUS: Thank you, General, Commissioners. I think we have nine seconds left.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: We wanted to save that nine seconds to question you. Do you have any -- if I may. Do we have any questions from our commissioners? Commissioner Coyle.

COMMISSIONER COYLE: Could you say

something about the potential you see in combining the assets of the Montana Air National Guard and ^ Nalstrom Air Force base?

SENATOR BAUCUS: Well, I thank you for the question. We do see a potential there. It's an opportunity. The runway was closed by the last BRAC. The flying mission at that time, tank commission, KC-135s, was transferred out of Nalstrom Air Force base, which left the missile wing, the only major mission there at the base.

But, basically, it's the missile mission which is the mainstay. That runway, we believe, is in very good shape even though it's closed. Its cost, by our estimates, 1 to 1 and a half million dollars to restore it on a temporary basis and it would cost Pentagon a bit more. In fact, I think the Pentagon thinks it's about \$20 million on a permanent basis.

We think that the opportunity there is for a mission to go in and quickly temporarily set up a runway training mission that could be utilized in other parts of the world. But the benefit would be a runway open to Great Falls.

That's important because the runway up in Great Falls, Montana, to be -- is going to be

closed briefly for everybody for runway repair. And the thought is, that wing's going to have to go someplace and very cheap to go over to Nalstrom Air Force Base with a very inexpensive temporary upgrade at the very least.

I could speak -- I don't want to speak for the General here, but there's a very strong feeling of cooperation in Montana, that is the guard -- makes sense for the guard to work with the Air Force, active Air Force, and we want to do it. We're not saying, no, no, the Air Force is the Air Force and the Guard's the Guard. Real opportunity. Let me ask General Moseley to chime in here.

GENERAL MOSELEY: Again, I would only respond, the overall training in Montana for air crews, fighter air crews is unparalleled. And the association of Malcolm Air Force Base right there with a runway, large hangars, very large ramp space, which could support if it was reopened other aircraft of all sizes and types to participate in the training opportunities that this particular ramp has to offer, would just be paramount, I believe, for future training opportunities for all types of fighters and other aircraft in the future. A synergy could be developed.

SENATOR BAUCUS: We're very much in favor of that, but the commission must know it would take the act of the commission to open that runway because the last BRAC closed it.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Further questions from the commission? Apparently not. We thank the Montana delegation, General Moseley. Appreciate you being with us. And thank you so much. We'll excuse you at this time.

SENATOR BAUCUS: Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Call the Washington delegation, if they would come forward and be sworn in we'd appreciate it. Washington delegation, please stand. And under the statute that we're operating under we swear you in at this time.

MS. SARKAR: Gentlemen, please raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give and any evidence you may provide are complete and accurate to the best of your knowledge and beliefs, so help you God?

THE PANEL: I do.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you. Now, General, the three of you will testify; is that correct?

GENERAL SCOGGINS: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: And in what order?

GENERAL SCOGGINS: Be myself, and then we'll move right on over to our Tacoma chamber and our Spokane chamber.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: We'll leave it in your capable hands to do it and do your best to stay within the time.

GENERAL SCOGGINS: We'll do that. Thank you very much, Chairman Hansen, Secretary Principi, members of the BRAC commission. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today in order to offer inputs regarding impact of the BRAC plan on the state of Washington.

My name is Frank Scoggins, and I'm appearing in front of you today -- assistant adjutant general for air of the Air National Guard in Washington. My prepared remarks today, I'm going to be representing the assessments of Governor Greguar, General -- as well as those of my own.

The Governor would be here with you today, she very much wanted to be, but she's on a trade mission in Europe. Likewise, we're submitting for the record a letter from her, also

from all members of our delegation, our seven representatives, and two senators, both of whom wanted to be here today. In fact, Senator Campwell will be here this evening, but express their -- but we'll put that into the record as far as their testimony.

Let me begin by stating the Governor fully embraces the majority of the recommendations of the BRAC proposal and has been mentioned here before, we're supportive of the BRAC process. Quite frankly, the Army and Navy processes approached -- approaching release of BRAC for we believe very inclusive and collaborative as they could be, and the results of their recommendation will allow the citizens and industry and governments of Washington to continue to strongly support the nation's defense requirement.

Even more important there's no implications in the Army or Navy recommendation that would negatively affect the state in regard to the Governor's responsibility to homeland security, homeland defense.

All the concerns I'm going to address today do evolve around the Air Force recommendations and the negative impacts we believe

those recommendations will have if they're allowed to be implemented. We have no doubt the intentions of the Air Force were good, but the process extremely closed, and it's our belief there are serious unintended long-term consequences that the United States Air Force recommendations fully adopt.

An overview up here. I've got four issues I want to talk with you about today. Again, I'll accelerate this a little bit from what's in the writing, and then go with the submitted testimony.

The first one is nationwide unintended consequence of -- I'll address. Redefine the way the total force practice is being done. I want to talk about the impact, as you see up there, of some of our regional business on homeland security as strategic. And in the end I will accelerate my testimony, but I think it's very important for our senators and for the rest of our representatives and the governor that I talk about the unintended consequences of closing the F-15 unit here in Portland.

Okay. The first issue, as I said, one that affects the entire nation. Slide one here is

illustrated with stars the location of the 88 flying unit equipped with flying wings that exist in the Air National Guard today.

The definition of a unit equipped flying wing is one that has responsibility for the management, maintenance, and operation of assignment of aircraft.

Base recommendation slide, please. Made by the United States Air Force BRAC has been a result of removal -- slide -- of over one-third of these unit equipped wings. As shown on slide 2, this proposed basing is going to leave seven states and Puerto Rico without any unit equipped flying wings. Two of the states, of course, Montana and Washington --

As General of the United States have gone on record that they understand the recapitalization of the Air Force will require reduction in both United States Air Force and Air National Guard flying structure, but they're not resistant to proportional reduction to provide for American future.

I do believe, however, the changes of this magnitude should be done in consultation with the adjutant general and the Air Force to do that

has produced a BRAC basic methodology that if adopted will have the unintended consequence of disconnecting America from a key part of military.

That adjutants general with a common voice stated they support the maintaining of at least one unit flying equipped wing in each state. This is not political maneuvering. It goes to the ideology of militia nation concept of defense -- United States Air -- or United States Constitution.

As you know, the organized militias that were created by the constitution intended to be designed as not as the most efficient accessible military organization as possible. They were in fact created as a political construct designed to keep checks and balances in place -- United States military. Our forefathers envisioned a standing military that would at the immediate call of the President, that they carefully place much of the military force out in each of the states.

The design was crafted specifically to avoid creating a presidency that conduct foreign policies and powers of king, backed by a king's Army or king's military. Organized militia set forth in the constitution; in other words, today's Army and Air National Guard were to be organized,

trained, equipped by the federal military, but be available to be called to duty as the nation needed. However, they were put in place for congressional checks and balances for call up and use of that force.

For centuries this is -- ensured that the United States -- citizens of the United States remain connected to and remain responsible for their own defense. Use of the United States military for large scale operation by design requires the consent of Congress. This concept also ensures military's only used for long-term conflict.

Let me go through here to say that the one anomaly for this was during the Cold War when we had a large standing force because of the draft, we went to Viet Nam without calling up the Guard and Reserve. And, of course, post that time the total force policy was put into place. And that's when we built up the Guard and Reserve forces and modernized their equipment.

I think it's -- in sum now, the DOD, this has become a detriment. They have to go through mobilization processes. It's become cumbersome. I believe that this BRAC is being used

by the Air Force to redistribute the forces around the nation in order to make them more accessible and have to go through fewer and fewer balances to get to the forces.

Others would believe that it's a good and healthy process that has to be done, and in fact is keeping the nation's people connected as we go through.

So let me -- just going to skip through a little bit of this again. I have some written testimony that goes into more detail on that. But we ought to make sure that this restructuring want to do may solve the short-term problems that we're facing right now in Iraq and the Middle East. But we have a very big concern that is going to have a negative, long-term negative impact of disconnecting the citizens.

When the United States Air Force made the BRAC military determination, large installations given very high scores. You've gone through that with the Montana delegation. So let me accelerate here a little bit to say, that even though this is probably the most efficient way to bed down large concentration of forces, it offers no scoring to the small and efficient Air National

Guard wings.

United States Air Force believes looking at it through the eyes of the leader responsible for the President for the instant progression of air power, there's no allowance made for the calculation and value of those community basins.

It's our contention that keeping the Air National Guard distributed in every state Americans throughout this great nation will stay in tune with the Air Force about -- they'll learn about that Air Force and what it's doing for the citizen airmen who serve on the school boards with them and who work alongside as permanent members of their community. Those informed citizens will in turn lend their voice to the military and they will get feedback through their elected representatives.

If those same citizens begin to hear things and see things, see the strains, they will likewise give that same feedback and it will be democracy in action. Again, we believe that was the framers of the constitution intent, that we not have a semi-professional military that's apart from the citizens. Again, we believe that unintended consequence of this business would be to do just that.

With today's lethal weapons and speed that air power can be projected very quickly around the world it might be time to consider a change in the way that we utilize our military. On the other hand, some would say it might be very good at this point in time to make sure that the American people are ready to use that awesome power as projected.

At any rate, whichever way we decide to change the fundamental way America is going to be defended it should be done by debate in Congress and not as a byproduct of BRAC basing recommendations and implementation.

Slide, please.

The second point I'd like to address to you, the impact of the Air Force recommendation and BRAC and the Governor's ability to respond to the homeland security requirements and natural disasters.

Again, I'll go by some of my written testimony. But if we look at the chart up here, as we know, just like Hum-Vs and other things are used for floods and hurricanes, et cetera, the airlift aircraft for the governor's use and disposal and when they're assigned. The Governor has to pay for that utilization as they go through.

Now, we don't believe this is a reason for the United States Air Force to base their lift. They don't have an obligation to base airlift around the nation. But as the unintended -- or it should be looked into as we start to redistribute this equipment.

Idaho and Washington currently have 130s and KC-135s. Both of these units equipped with aircraft -- you can see that the entire Northwest will be devoid of any airlift at the Governor's emergency utilization.

And, again, this is no degradation to the United States Air Force -- always are trumped by those in need of the Governor. But this is something also that was not taken into consideration for military value.

Okay. Slide, please.

My third point to you today is talk about how the air refueling that gives global reach to the United States of America gives an unprecedented capability is affected by BRAC.

Those stars up there represent the unit based wings of KC-135s and the pre-BRAC situation. As you'll see, that distribution -- go to the next slide, please. That fully half of those wings go

away in the West we'll lose 31 percent of that capacity and capability.

Again, if that's military value, that's fine; however -- slide, please. We also know that Asia is in all -- everything that we read and talk of is a large part of the United States best interest to be engaged there. So especially with the C-17s that are based at Travis Air Force Base and McChord Air Force Base, a high user of KC-135s, that seems to be a strange redistribution if it's done off military value. Slide, please.

What this shows is a 600 mile range that goes around Fairchild Air Force Base and McConnell Air Force Base, two mega tanker bases that are in the nation today, as far as the two largest. And, of course, in addition to Grand Forks.

But post-BRAC what we can see is there will be 38 aircraft within that range and around Fairchild. Number up there, 152 aircraft end up in the Central United States. If you look at the receiving aircraft, whether it be Fighter C-17, et cetera, based in those same regions, those 38 tankers service 250 receivers, while the 152 do 481.

Again, we don't believe this is the best

interest of the country. And, additionally, since I'm going to -- I've got some air sovereignty business at the end, but I might just talk currently today, there are four fighters -- or four tankers on alert to support the whole air sovereignty in the Northwest. Slide, please.

You can see that in the last two years we'll have gone from right at Fairchild Air Force Base having 58 permanently assigned aircraft there through some Air Force moves in anticipation of putting the KC-767 there, they had already started to move active duty KC-135s and moved them from the area. What that's post-BRAC, what this is supposed to do is have 30 KC-135s remain at a base that's capable of housing 87 of those aircraft.

There's an implication in there that the KCX is going to come on board; however, the KCX air by mobility commands own slides that I just saw a few days ago, fully recognized that the aircraft has not been designed, selected, no FRP. It's future is questionable. And certainly by 2011.

So I would believe that some of the assessments that the BRAC folks had to -- the DOD to make their assessments ended up to what there will be zero KCXs and a very diminished capability

that leaves us with 30 KC-135s, at any time, at least 13 percent of those aircraft being on alert for the air sovereignty event. So that's something that we believe needs to also be addressed. Slide, please.

As I go on now into my next -- and I'm closing, getting ready in closing to put this down. Those circles up there look at -- it's overlaid, as you can see, on the chart that you saw, it's very similar to that one of Oregon. Those circles or ellipsis are tanker center that are established to support air sovereignty at various places. And the orbits during increased posture levels that take place over Seattle and other critical infrastructure classified targets in the Northwest.

Again, just the homeland security is of issue there. Likewise, you notice the Klamath Falls, star down here in the bottom, is in a different color because it's primarily a training base. But the only other source of F-15s in that region. And that will give you some idea of the relative distances between some of the critical infrastructure targets in Washington that has certainly our Governor and our Senators very concerned about the ability to continue to respond

to that.

Okay. Slide, please.

This is a slide that again shows, as I move on, and I'm not going to repeat some of the testimony since I was here and heard the very good things that were put forward by the Oregon delegation. But this is a slide that shows response times to get to Seattle.

And, of course, the bare minimum response time from Portland is what we've got here today. If we go to two aircraft on alert, I know you've heard this over and over, but I feel compelled to talk about it for just a minute here.

Once those aircraft are launched, and especially if we don't, as we currently do, simultaneously launch KC-135s or start the launch process for KC-135 when F-15s go airborne so that they can -- if we lose that capability, and once the launch has taken place and approximately 30 minutes into it, why, then, with just two aircraft Portland is now removed from the case of being able to react to any threats. They're reacting to whatever they're reacting to, but they're going to be out of fuel, have to return.

And so from the time that they land, get

turned around within the next hour and come back up on alert. That's the protection that we've got from the Seattle area.

So, again, we feel very strongly that it's necessary and very important that the Northwest not be left without air sovereignty. Slide, please.

This is my -- going to make my time for you, I promise, Mr. Chairman, as I go through. But here's our recommendation. Again, if I go back to the initial things I wanted to talk about, we feel very strongly about the unintended consequences of disconnecting America from her citizen airmen, citizen soldiers.

And our recommendation to your commission is to consider directing the DOD to leave an Air National Guard flying unit in each state to keep that connection.

From a reasonable standpoint, we believe that the impact of moving the Governor's ability to utilize those cargo aircraft, whether it be KC-135, C-130, et cetera, should be considered. And that could also be solved by either the 130 issue in Idaho or maintaining KC-135s as unit equipped aircraft here in the state of Washington at the

142nd Air Refueling Wing -- excuse me, 141st Air Refueling Wing.

Strategic implications, KC-135 basic impact, again, by maintaining the eight aircraft that are currently on board with the 141st Air Refueling Wing will at least stem some of that flow and go from 38 up to 46 aircraft. The top three of all of those, at least from a Washington perspective, and then we don't believe Washington is by itself at the top. But from a Washington perspective, leaving those eight KC-135s in 141st Air Refueling Wing unit equipment solves all three of those top issues within the state of Washington, and comes to absolutely no cost. They're setting there and operating in that capacity and in that way today.

The final one you've heard enough about that today, but I am lending my voice also to that of the Governor and our entire delegation in a letter they sent to you, Chairman Principi, and, again, as part of what we submitted today, that we're in strong favor of all these things. So that concludes my testimony at this point, subject to any questions.

MR. PRINCIPI: I'd just like to make one

comment, General. The head of our Air Force analytical team is visiting Fairchild today, so we will have a report on that that you can highlight in your testimony.

GENERAL SCOGGINS: Mr. Small we know is there and we're looking forward to hosting him there today.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: General, what was your plan on your other testimony from the state of Washington?

GENERAL SCOGGINS: We can save the questions for the end if you like if you have any more. But at this point I'll turn it over to Mr. Graybill.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: We recognize you for, what, five minutes. Would that cover? Five minutes for you, sir, second gentleman?

MR. HADLEY: You bet.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. GRAYBILL: Thank you. And I'll help you with the time. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the commission. I'm David Graybill, and I'm the president of the Tacoma, Pierce County Chamber. And I'm here representing the Tacoma, Pierce County BRAC citizens commission.

And as the proud host to over 30,000 uniformed and civilian employees at our two military bases, we thank you for your good work here for our nation's defense and the efficient use of our tax dollars.

I'm here specifically to address the recommendations that are in respect to joint base Fort Lewis and McChord. And on this historic occasion as we prepared our testimony, which would have been somewhat longer but will be abbreviated today, we're reminded of the Lewis and Clark expedition of the core of discovery. We're celebrating the 200th anniversary of that today. And like that group they toured Washington and then set up camp in Oregon.

So thank you Commissioners Bilbray and Coyle for coming to visit Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force base recently. And we hope that you found that they are indeed as we named them and are known around the nation the premier power projection platform in the Northwest.

Washington State is acknowledged for strategic position, and Tacoma enjoys a great relationship with our two military bases cooperatively with our state and community.

At the official level that's been reflected in the adoption of antiencroachment legislation, providing for cooperative land use between the communities and defense installations.

We also, at this time, are looking at the possibility of additional growth at McChord in the future. Not too long C-130 Hercules shared the air base when McChord had 38 C-141 star lifters, a footprint similar to the C-17s now there. And in addition 810s occupied facilities that are still in existence which were once utilized by air defense squadrons.

The close proximity of those war hogs enhance training for the soldiers of ICORE, Especially at Fort Lewis and affiliated Yakima training center. Now we're welcoming a third striker at Fort Lewis, and we're confident that in the future, should it be possible through this process or future ones, that we can accommodate yet additional units.

However, specifically today, I turn my attention to the joint base recommendations for Fort Lewis and McChord, which has us looking at an overall cutback of troop force of in excess of 600. The number is a little difficult to pin down in the

official BRAC report and other communications that we received through our various Senators' offices, but broadly have configured we're talking about moving medical activities from the current clinic at McChord to Madigan Army Hospital and other efficiencies yet to be determined which would eliminate over 600 jobs in the next four or five years.

Therefore, we are here in the absence of good hard data or files to review to ask, please, could we check into what will this mean to the efficiency of the bases and their missions in our joint base alignment.

In many cases the recommendations require flexibility to tailor implementation to the unique requirements at each location. And it's that exact realignment action that concerns us. We have had in the past individual alignment at McChord similar to Fort Lewis. And our question is, how will we combine the Garrison and base commands in one overall function between two very large bases without serious risk to the overall mission?

What sort of mission impact would a 10 percent cut in the work force at McChord, for

example, have on the performance of the 62nd air lift wing's day-to-day missions. And in our medical personnel changes we know that there are variations between the type of medicine practiced at McChord and at Fort Lewis. The day-to-day activities and requirements of our global reach are definitely different than family medicine and retiree medicine that is practiced in this large aggregation of employees and personnel in the Northwest.

We're concerned about poor competency. I've been fortunate or unfortunate, however you might feel about it, to have been the chamber executive throughout all the base closure rounds so far that we've witnessed in the United States. And I would have to say that this round differs dramatically in the ability to access files, methodology, and information.

I've been to Washington, looked in our files, been able to correct misinformation. In this case, however, we suffer from numbers that are very hard to back up in terms of detail.

So I lay myself at your feet. And in terms of time and commitment to it, and also read into the record, or at least give to the record, a

letter which closely parallels the issues I've raised, which is signed by all the congressional members of our area, Norm Dicks and Adam Smith and our two Senators, Patty Murray and Maria Cantwell from the state of Washington, who asked the same questions, what would be the correct number of job cuts at McChord, how was this number derived, what functions, what will be the impact on mission, and what is the impact on the proposed job reduction in the overall health and welfare of these two vital bases. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: You would like that put in the record?

MR. GRAYBILL: Yes. Copies have been given to your staff.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: So ordered, sir.

MR. HADLEY: Thank you. My name is Rich Hadley, I'm the CEO of the Spokane regional chamber of commerce, and representing Spokane and Fairchild Air Force Base. With these comments provided a packet that you have, which includes the testimony, as well as our description of Fairchild's response to the BRAC criteria and a CD that I think will help that become part of your information system.

I also brought over a letter from representative Kathy McMorris, who's our congresswoman from the Fifth District and serves on outside services. Very nice letter for you about Fairchild. And I think one point is very valid, which is since 9/11, and up to February 2005, Fairchild's tankers have been part of the global war on terror with 14,500 sorties, 78,000 hours, and off-loading 721 million pounds of fuel.

So we're very proud of Fairchild Air Force Base and very pleased, too, that the Department of Defense and U.S. Air Force saw Fairchild as a strategic asset of military value and will be part of the future for our military system. As our diverse assets in the entire state of Washington, which were evaluated very fairly.

I just wanted to comment on three realignments that -- very quickly. And I do want to say that Fairchild has room to grow. We are a base that has about 4,000 acres, 14,000 foot runway, we have plenty of land space and air space. No encroachment at all. We have the ability to refuel 50 aircraft at one time. We could stage 100. I give you that as a backdrop to what I'm going to say with realignments.

First of all, the first realignment I just mentioned is, I think, very constructive. And that is the recommendation in the report to close four Army Reserve and National Guard facilities and collocate them, relocate them to Fairchild Air Force Base. And at the base create a new armed forces reserve center to house those units in new facilities.

We feel that that is a very promising move, that it is good for Fairchild, it is consistent with what DOD is looking for. It also helps to mitigate some federal cost associated with leases on other property. And from a community standpoint allows for the sale of that property to private entities and to create a tax benefit to the community.

Those four units are Mandall Reserve Center, Walker Reserve Center, Four Lakes Air National Guard Facility, and Geiger Field Spokane Airborne. And I'm not going to list all the squadrons associated with that.

The second realignment is the one that Major General Scoggins referred to. And that is the issue of the 141st Washington Air National Guard. I would agree with what General Scoggins

indicated. If we could maintain those eight aircraft at Fairchild until the KCX platform is authorized and appropriated, I think we would be well served.

Part of the draw down you saw in one of the slides is predicated on the fact that the KCX was supposed to be delivered at Fairchild early in 2007, along with about \$200 million of -- that has been delayed, obviously, we're all aware of that. And that is what it is.

But we continue to see our active duty aircraft, KC-135Rs, go to the reserve bases around the country. And that's fine, too, but we're getting to a point where if these eight aircraft of the Air Guard go along and we're at 30 aircraft, our missions haven't -- and responsibilities haven't really changed. So we're going to see guard and air and active duty, 92nd Refueling Wing folks flying the same aircraft for all of their missions and all of the active duty missions.

The last alignment is one I'm very proud of, and that's the one we call KCX. And maybe in the context of this commission, if the commission could lend also a word of focus and urgency to both DOD and to Congress that we have pilots flying

aircraft that are twice as old as they are, the cost of maintaining them, the time it takes to take them out of service being maintained is really becoming exacerbated as these air frames become 48, 50 years old.

They're maintained well and we're very proud of the capability at Fairchild to maintain those aircraft, but we need a new tanker platform, next generation tanker. We're anxious to be the site for that. And the report from DOD does indicate that Fairchild will be the staging site and will receive ten -- the first ten new tankers. And we're thankful for that.

In sum, Fairchild did well through this process, review process. And these realignments, I believe, are very constructive. And our concern, I believe, is expressed in support of the Washington Air National Guard aircraft staying until a new tanker arrives.

Lastly, the quality of life that we provide to military personnel is something I know you're very concerned about and as is the Department of Defense. And that is a commitment from our community ongoing. Thank you for this opportunity.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you so very much. Questions for this panel?

MR. PRINCIPI: Just one additional comment. Mr. Folsome raised the issue of accessing data. I would like to have director of our analytical team, Frank Sacrillo, briefly talk about that issue.

MR. SACRILLO: I'm Frank Sacrillo. The inputs did just release yesterday relating to the questions that were asked and the answers that received from the installation to military -- so we're starting to review that right now. So that information should be available to you also. And I believe is being posted on the DMD and our own web site.

GENERAL SCOGGINS: Thank you. We'll look forward to --

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Further questions for this panel?

GENERAL SCOGGINS: May I make one additional statement that I went through very rapidly. It will only take a moment. It should be of note right now, I think, for this distribution of KC-135s that the active duty base at Fairchild, active duty unit, 92nd Air Refueling Wing, is over

flying, because of worldwide need, about 25 percent of their flying hour program this year. They've been very stressed.

Because of that the reserve unit here in Portland and the Air National Guard unit are currently providing crews for all four lines of alert that are taking place there. Three of the aircraft, and by the summer all four of the aircraft, will be coming from those assets that are getting ready to leave the area.

So I think, again, it might be good for someone to look at how that operation's tempo and the requirements that need to be based out of Fairchild are going to be done. In our mind, something very significant that we start moving the pieces of puzzle around it appears that nobody stepped back and looked at the big picture of the nation's basic needs. So thank you for allowing me --

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you for bringing that up. We appreciate it. We'll excuse this panel. And thank you for being here.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Call the Idaho group, please come forward. We appreciate the Idaho delegation being with us. You're the last of

the day. I guess that makes you the best. Like to talk about having you stand and be sworn in. We're doing that because of it's in the statute.

MS. SARKAR: Senators, please raise your right hand for me. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give and any evidence you may provide are complete and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?

THE PANEL: I do.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you. In setting up these regional meetings to determine to give the time to the senior senator and he would divide it up. Have you done that, Senator Craig?

SENATOR CRAIG: I have, Congressman. And we'll proceed in that order.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: We'll turn to you to explain it and start moving.

SENATOR CRAIG: Mr. Chairman, to all your commissioners, Mr. Coyle, Congressman Hansen, Congressman Bilbray, we do appreciate an opportunity to discuss BRAC's recent decision about the future of Idaho's military assets.

And we welcome the opportunity to come before you today. We will try to make this testimony as lively as possible, recognizing that

you have had a long morning and that your input and your capability is no different than ours as it relates to long periods of testimony. But we do believe we have a message for you that is tremendously important.

I will first present the military value, current and future growth, and the absence of environmental, and encroachment at the Mountain Home. Senator Crapo will discuss the community support, community sustainment, the economic impact of BRAC's decision on Mountain Home Air Force Base. Governor Kempthorne will then wrap up our testimony by presenting the strategic and homeland security importance of Gowan Field and BRAC's impact on the mission.

I will also, for the record, submit statements from our two congressman, Congressman Mike Simpson and Congressman Butch Hoffer, for the record.

Before I begin I would also like to recognize all of the attendees on behalf of Idaho. And I must point out that we're all here today representing Idaho, the city of Mountain Home, Mountain Home Air Force Base, and Gowan Field. And not one person in this room, Commissioners, is a

lobbyist.

We have worked collectively together bringing our interest together on behalf of the state of Idaho. We are passionate about our military, and we understand its importance. Let me be clear. It is no secret that Mountain Home Air Force Base is one of the only bases in the U.S. to expand the size of its training range complex in recent memory.

Several factors contributed to this expansion, including Mountain Home's remote location, the support of the congressional delegation, the untiring work of our government -- our governor, the overwhelming support from local communities and interest groups.

Currently the base sits on 134,000 acres of Air Force land and has 5.6 million acres of usable military operating air space. The MOA resides in three states, including Oregon and Nevada. Idaho is currently in the process of expanding to 7 million acres under the proposed Mountain Home range complex expansion.

Additionally, these numbers do not reflect the 2 million acres of the Saddle MOA located just northwest of the Mountain Home range

complex, which is frequently used as a staging area for war games by our pilots.

Currently we are trying to link the Saddle MOA and the Mountain Home range complex. It is clear to see why the base and the surrounding area compromise -- or comprise not one, if not one of the most important assets, national assets that our country has.

Because of the size and the location of the Mountain Home range complex the base has maintained the ability to house numerous weapons systems over the past 15 years alone; B1Bs, KC-135s, and currently F-15Es, F-15Cs, and F-16Js. In fact, the range complex is such a national asset that our foreign allies are sending pilots and hardware to train here.

This year alone we will have Germans, the Brits, the Israeli Air Force send their fighters, maintenance and support groups to Mountain Home for a joined force training.

They recognize Mountain Home Air Force Base as a world class backyard range complex. It is my hope that the United States will recognize that Mountain Home is positioned as the perfect location to expand and integrate our coalition

training opportunities and future -- and the future nature of our combat capabilities.

In addition the vast size of the world class range complex there are no federal airways that run through the complex. Adding to this, Mountain Home maintains 100 -- or 330 VFR days per year in an unrestricted air space that is equipped with 30 electronic threat emitter positioned and repositioned for realistic battlefield training.

These electronic threat emitters provide air crews with realistic threat and can be moved day to day or hour to hour, providing our fighters some realistic scenarios. During this or any training our pilots are able to engage in air-to-air supersonic engagements over high rolling deserts, mountains, deep fissured canyons that combines to provide our pilots and coalition partners with top notch realism of the battlefield we may face in the future.

Added to the realistic nature we provide at the range complex, our pilots and coalition partners are able to get and sustain a flight clearance of 100 feet in Idaho.

Now, I would stress that the normal ACC training is limited to 500 feet, which is 400 feet

higher than we fly in Idaho. That statistic alone, Commissioners, highlights the realistic battlefield conditions we can simulate at Mountain Home.

Aside from the range itself, we maintain the infrastructure -- the best infrastructure in the country. We currently maintain one of the largest ramps of the ACC, with \$3 million dollar renovation just completed which can hold 220 aircraft. In addition, the new ramp has been designed to withstand both bomber and tanker aircraft.

I should also quickly mention that in the past few years we've built 600 new housing units of the 1,400 planned in a ten-year program.

These new housing units were recently the winners of the Air Force design of excellence and coveted award of recognition. Without question these new units will go a long way toward keeping our military families happy and assist in keeping military recruitment and retention numbers up.

Further, Mountain Home has just completed a \$29 million renovation of our 13,500 foot runway, which was recently named the best runway of the ACC by the 2004 sustainment team visitor. This runway is located approximately 10

miles north of the Mountain Home range complex, offering our pilots a two-minute flight to fight. Let me repeat that. It offers our pilots leaving the air base, leaving the runway a two-minute flight to fight.

I'd like to take a moment to highlight the importance of that two-minute factor. This two-minute flight is an entire eight minutes better than the average the ACC has of other Air Force bases. Without question, this time savings equates in U.S. taxpayers dollars being saved, plus it is within the gliding distance for in-flight emergencies. You get in trouble over the range, you can glide home. That doesn't exist anywhere else.

When our pilots take off they are virtually and immediately in fighting environments. Personally, I could not think of a better environment in which to engage.

Once in the range complex our pilots have immediate and numerous resources at their disposal. As mentioned, the size of our range provides our pilots endless opportunities for supersonic air-to-air engagements. Combine this rare asset with the 110,000 acre Sailor Creek range

and the new Juniper Butte Drop range with realistic industrial complexes, surface-to-air missiles, tanks and trucks, and our pilots are engaged in a dress rehearsal for real world missions.

Further, in these dense industrial complex -- or industrial target areas of the complex we are able to provide an air-to-ground precision weapon training and can provide an urban training environment for the Army and special forces operation. We are able to critique and score our training missions through the Mountain Home range complex cowboy control.

This system controls the range complex using multiple radars and links to Mountain Home Air Force Base to Gowan field, and provides invaluable computerized debriefing capability for the joint training that occurs on this very unique range.

In addition to the endless training and expansion opportunities at the base, there are virtually no encroachment problems on the range. Let me repeat that. There are no encroachment problems on this range.

First, the state of Idaho, the Mountain Home Air Force Base, have such an outstanding

record of environmental stewardship that species on the range have avoided being listed. Today no environmental encroachment problems affect any of our training.

Second, the bases located in a remote location, 10 miles from the closest city and 43 miles south of Boise. There are no noise problems.

As you know, the proposed realignment for Mountain Home Air Force Base is to eventually shift the F-15Cs and the F-16 -- the F-16s out in FY '11, while bringing in additional F-15Es in FY '09, to complete the current squadron of the F-15Es based in Mountain Home.

No doubt it is my hope that this realignment is part of a bigger plan to bring future weapon systems like the F-22 and the JSF, the strike fighter to Mountain Home in the near future.

These weapon systems will benefit greatly from the national asset of the complex range, the training range I've just discussed.

However, in the meantime, I want the commission to consider the following: Mountain Home Air Force base has been home to five different weapons systems at one time, and has been a

tremendous training opportunity for all of our military personnel assigned over these years. Each and every day our crews have the very unique and rare opportunity to train with or against mixed forces.

As you know, these -- this mixed force training opportunity is something that rarely occurs and usually occurs only at large training exercises, such as Red Flag. The current mix of aircraft combined with the Mountain Home range complex and its full array of modern, realistic targets, electronic threat, emitters, and air space capable of supersonic air-to-air engagements provides the perfect atmosphere and training environment for mixed aircraft and multiple aircraft exercises.

Combine these facts make the air crews training at Mountain Home more experienced and ready to deploy and be in combat. Again, most wings only get this type of exposure during a Red Flag exercise or in actual deployment.

All of this being said, the value of the joint training exposure is hard to quantify; however, it is definitely countered to the actual dollars being saved by going to single weapon

systems, the F-15Es. Without question our pilots benefit from joint training. Whether their training is with other types of weapon systems or training with our coalition partners, the need is there for joint training. In my opinion, realigning Mountain Home to a single aircraft wing erodes critical in-place combat training synergies not found anywhere else.

Currently, we maintain integrated air defense systems, the F-16CJ suppression of enemy air defense capabilities, the F-15E air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities, the F-15C air-to-air capabilities. The proposed realignment temporarily takes away these joint training opportunities by making Mountain Home and other bases around the country a single flying unit.

I fear we may be making decisions that will cost us more money in the long run to perform joint training. Mountain Home is one of the only bases in the nation that has all of the components necessary to accommodate our training needs of the future.

While it is no secret that I am questioning this realignment, I'm here today to make the case, as my colleagues are, that Mountain

Home should be the recipient of future weapon systems. I can only hope that this realignment is part of a bigger plan to bed down future weapon systems, such as the F-22 and F-35 at Mountain Home.

We, the state of Idaho, fought long and hard to make this region a world class training range, and we believe it is one of DOE's national assets. Idaho is best situated for current roles and missions and present -- and presents the nation with this greatest piece of strategic resource.

The opportunity to grow and expand is obviously there. The training of coalition forces in conjunction with ours and the net savings of tax dollars because of the capabilities that are in place.

So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, to all of the commissioners. We do appreciate the opportunity to be with you this morning to make our case. Now let me turn to my colleague, Senator Mike Crapo, to address the community to support and economic impact of Mountain Home Air Force Base.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you.

SENATOR CRAPO: Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, Commissioner Coyle, Commissioner

Hansen, Commissioner Bilbray, it's a pleasure to be with you today and to have the opportunity to share with you my perspectives on community support for the Mountain Home Air Force Base, and the economic impacts resulting from realignment changes to the base.

Since 1942 Mountain Home Air Force Base has been an important part of the state of Idaho and the local community of Mountain Home. This long partnership has flourished in a state that is very patriotic and proud of its military missions and heritage. Mountain Home is the quintessential military town with an unprecedented level of support for their base. Driving through the town the pride they feel is evident at every corner, from the banners stating the home of the brave to the American and POW flags flying in support of military personnel.

With the current deployments there are signs of support everywhere, especially the yellow ribbons blanketing the town from the back of cars to windows in businesses and homes, to being posted on utility poles along the main street of town.

The city of Mountain Home has long been a supporter the base and missions. Mayor

Joe McNeal, the city council, all of whom are present here today, and the residents of the city keep the base and its mission in mind and their duties as they ensure that they speak with one voice.

The town and the base are inseparable from each other. Many of the town's 13,000 residents are retired airmen who continue their support in the Air Force by working at the base or volunteering to help it in many different ways.

Nearly every business offers military discounts, and much of the town's work force is made up of military spouses. The community understands the strain that deployment schedules put on the military member and their families. And they provide a strong recreation program, school system, library, and many other services supporting the families.

During deployments they're ready to support the families in any manner needed. The community shows its support of the base in many ways. Each September for the last 45 years the community has organized Air Force appreciation day celebrations.

The celebrations include the largest

parade in the state which marches proudly down the town's main street, the American Legion Boulevard. Air Force appreciation day attracts over 10,000 supporters. Every two years the chamber of commerce silver wings of Idaho committee partners with the base to provide a world class air show for this region. These events are invaluable to the local economy.

The quality of life in Mountain Home is second to none for military personnel. The consistent high level of support for the military by the community is the best aspect for most airmen. The town is less than 30 miles from a major Metropolitan area. There's very little crime, there is no smog or traffic.

Outdoor recreational opportunities abound, families can feel safe, your child can leave his or her own bike in their front yard and it will still be there in the morning. Airmen and their families stationed at the Mountain Home base love where they live.

The city has been working hard toward maintaining a strong and prosperous future for the base. With a steady annual growth rate and anticipation of the possibility of new missions and

growth to the base the city committed to an upgrade of sewer and water systems. These upgrades are expected to accommodate the next 20 years of growth.

Other recent upgrades undertaken by the city include doubling the size of the library, the computer lab, and expanding the city's fire fighting capacities, as well as a new junior high school.

The city has undergone a significant increase in housing in the past eight years, including 1,000 new homes and 400 new rentals. The local chamber of commerce and business -- other businesses play a vital role in support of the base with the Mountain Home Military Affairs Committee, which recently celebrated its 25th year. The committee provides an important link between the community and the base and ensures consistent communication between the two.

The strong support for the base doesn't stop at Mountain Home. The state support can be seen in the dollars that the Idaho Department of Transportation has spent with a new four-lane highway from the city of Mountain Home 10 miles to the gate of the base. The state legislature has

also issued a joint memorial support for the air base which was sent to the President.

The state has supported a strong higher education program on the base, and the educational infrastructure is used not only for military personnel and their dependents, but also for local community students. In addition, the state offers in-state tuition rates for active duty military that might maintain their legal residency in another state.

What's the economic impact of the proposals on the table? The Department of Defense's recommendations to the BRAC commission include realignment at Mountain Home Air Force Base. If realignment is approved in its current form it would result in a net loss of 538 military personnel, 31 civilian personnel at the base, and 305 jobs indirectly affected.

The economic impacts of such actions would immediately be apparent in a small community like Mountain Home. For example, the loss of 538 military personnel represents 12 percent of the total personnel at the base. That loss represents a payroll of over \$20 million that would vanish from the local small economy. More importantly is

the impact of the boom to bust that happens due to actual implementation of the proposed plan.

While Mountain Home is a supportive and growing community, the turbulence of almost 900 jobs being lost could upset this balance. One lost military position in a small, tightly-knit community such as Mountain Home, has a greater tangible and intangible effect than one lost in an urban community.

We must be careful to ensure that our planning in the schedule for realignments is affected so that the effects on this community can be minimized.

The ideal scenario would be for the BRAC commission to deny the move of the F-16s and the F-15Cs from Mountain Home Air Force base under BRAC, and then for the Department of Defense to make any realignment in coordination with the arrival of new weapon systems or missions and accompanying personnel.

During this process we must remember to keep in mind our eye on the future. As Senator Craig has so well demonstrated, Mountain Home is well positioned for future missions and weapons systems. And we must pay attention to how the

development and realignment of these new mixes works with the community.

Idaho's preparation for the 2005 base realignment and closure has been to prepare for the future. At every level we have worked toward the modernization and sustainment of Mountain Home Air Force Base. Preparing for the BRAC has been a long-term grass roots efforts from local citizens and elected officials of Idaho.

Mountain Home did not need to hire the work done. So many Idahoans volunteered to help that it truly became a community effort. And I'm proud to be a part of that effort.

I want to thank you for the opportunity to share my experience with the overwhelming community support that Mountain Home provides. In my 20-plus years of public service I have never experienced anything like the support shown by this community and the state for this base.

Between the incredible community and state support, the lack of encroachment, and environmental issues the state-of-the-art training range and the willingness of the community to do whatever it takes to aid the base in any mission it is given makes Mountain Home Air Force Base

prepared and able to grow and continue to play an integral role in the future of the defense of the United States.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, all of the members of the commission, for your time this morning. And now it's my pleasure to introduce Governor Kempthorne, who will present strategic and homeland security issues relating to the importance of Gowan Field and BRAC's impact on its mission.

GOVERNOR KEMPTHORNE: Mr. Chairman, thank you so much, Chairman Principi, and Chairman Hansen, Commissioner Bilbray, Commissioner Coyle, thank you so much for this opportunity to provide a perspective. And in my presentation I would like to include a discussion on homeland security, a vital role for this country.

With us at this table I'd like to also acknowledge that we have Idaho's adjutant General, who is with us, as well as the Deputy Commanding General for the Idaho Air Guard, General Gary Sailor. All of us would be happy to respond to questions in just a few moments.

To begin, let me briefly run through the Department of Defense's recommendations that

specifically impact the Idaho Air National Guard in Boise, Idaho.

First, DOD recommends that BRAC realign three A10 aircraft from Pennsylvania. We can easily accommodate these new aircraft. In fact, we have the capacity for 12 more. So we naturally would welcome this type of decision.

Next, DOD recommends realigning all of our C-130s from Boise to Cheyenne, Wyoming. With this recommendation Boise will lose 77 full-time positions, as well as 154 part-time positions.

What is not outlined in the DOD recommendation is the problematic change of relocating the aerial port flight. This change will cause Boise to lose five full-time positions and 63 part-time positions. This loss occurs for a simple reason; if there are no airplanes to load then there is no need for aerial port flight. Again, this is not considered in the DOD recommendations.

The DOD cost to realign is estimated to be \$2.5 million. The net value of savings over 20 years is estimated to be \$1.7 million. And those are the Department of Defense figures.

Here are the personnel costs. The loss

of up to 294 Idaho Air National Guard members. Citizen airmen serving the nation and state with community roots and employment do not relocate to maintain military membership. Many of our pilots, for example, are police officers, teachers, small business owners. The loss of one qualified pilot offsets the 20-year savings of 1.7 million. Why do I say that?

Because it costs \$1.5 million to train a pilot, and another 200,000 to complete the C-130 training. With 25 pilots that's a \$42.5 million investment not considered by the Department of Defense.

Additionally, the Idaho Air National Guard ranked third highest of all Air National Guard C-130 units for efficient capability. Idaho rating is higher than eight of the units that are programmed to gain C-130 aircraft.

Our recruitment and retention rates are extremely strong, and our unit is involved in every common C-130 mission available. Here are some of the operations that you see of the squadron.

We have accepted and completed 100 percent of all missions, no exceptions. Our OPTEMPO meets or exceeds the Air National Guard

C-130 average, which demonstrates how efficient the Idaho Air National Guard is at keeping our aircraft in the air.

There's also been a \$26.4 million investment in C-130 infrastructure since 1996. These sunk investment costs were not accounted for in the Department of Defense recommendations.

The next few slides are a virtual windshield tour of that investment at the Idaho Air National Guard. This is an overview of a ramp and our C-130 assets at Gowan Field in Boise, Idaho.

Here we have the interim C-130 maintenance facility. 24,000 square feet, cost: \$1.1 million. The C-130 fuel cell and corrosion control, 25,000 square feet, cost: \$4.4 million. The C-130 engine and prop shops, 9,000 square feet, cost: \$1.4 million. The C-130 squad ops, 24,000 square feet, cost: \$2.3 million. The C-130 aerial port flight, 14,000 square feet, cost: \$2.2 million. The C-130 hangar and maintenance shops, 78,000 square feet, cost: \$8.1 million.

The C-130 assault strip. Prior to the construction of this assault strip in 2001, our C-130s were flying two hours round trip in order to get the same training that is now one minute away.

With assault take-off and landings being such a significant part of C-130's combat mission, the proximity of this strip is invaluable to the training of our pilots.

I'd like to turn now to homeland security considerations. The national military strategy directed the U.S. military to transform to meet new challenges. This new approach, known as 1421, requires the military as its first priority to defend the homeland from attack.

The Department of Homeland Security response is one of our responsibilities. Rapid weapons of mass destruction civil support team transport is one of our responsibilities. But based on the Department of Defense recommendations we now have a critical problem.

That critical problem is no tactical air lift in the Pacific Northwest under the control of the Governor. When you consider that Boise, Idaho is a designated distribution point for the CDC strategic national stockpile, that the national interagency fire center, which is directly across the airfield, is the location of the national communications cache, and that we are the FEMA preidentified critical staging area for West Coast

disaster, it becomes easy to see why tactical air lift is critical for this location.

I would also point out that our ability to immediately respond to a disaster with our urban search and rescue teams could mean the difference between search and rescue and search and recovery.

This next graphic demonstrates a one-hour response time for a C-130 based in Boise, Idaho. Or based in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Colorado Springs, Colorado. And Channel Islands in California. The DOD recommendation would have the Northwest without the ability to rapidly respond to a homeland security event.

Doesn't it make sense that we maintain our ability to respond in the event of a crisis? I would also point out the Channel Islands would be the only C-130 unit in the west under the control of the government.

This slide shows the different FEMA regions and the locations of the C-130 units based on the Department of Defense recommendations. You'll notice that in the continental United States only regions three and ten do not have a C-130 unit.

The difference is, when you consider the

one-hour flight time region three has significant air lift capability that could be provided by surrounding regions. But in the Northwest there is no coverage. So we respectfully request that the BRAC retain our tactical air lift capability in the Northwest.

With the C-130 unit in Idaho our civil support team could respond to all urban areas in the Northwest in less than four hours from alert to arrival. Depending on the size of the event that could require from one to four C-130 to move the entire team.

This graphic again shows the one-hour response time of our C-130 units nationally. It also shows the CST locations.

Again, by removing the C-130s from Idaho, our ability to rapidly respond to a weapon of mass destruction in the Northwest is virtually eliminated. Idaho is also aggressively seeking modular airborne fire fighting systems, or MAFFS, in order to expand our mission to include airborne fire fighting.

Given our core location with the National Interagency Fire Center, and considering our ability to quickly respond to regional

wildfires, it makes sense to retain the C-130s at Boise, Idaho, and expand our mission to include MAFFS.

Additionally, no federal declaration is required because the C-130s are subject to the call of the Governor, which allows for immediate state-to-state support. In other words, I can immediately declare a state of emergency and the props start turning.

Based on all that I just presented, this is our recommended course of action to you, the commissioners. Retain the C-130s in the Idaho Air National Guard. This will eliminate realignment costs, there are no savings on all costs to consider. It will retain trained personnel, it will capitalize on the high military capability index. No additional military construction is required to support up to eight C-130s.

This actually will preserve the \$70 million investment taxpayers have made in pilot training and infrastructure at the Idaho Air National Guard. This course of action maintains tactical air lift in the Northwest under a Governor's control, which ensures an immediate response to any high level emergency. It provides

national homeland security, rapid response. And supports the National Interagency Fire Center.

President Bush has said, "The U.S. Government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks." Every American should agree with that statement.

And it's our belief that by retaining the C-130s in the Idaho Air National Guard we're significantly more capable of carrying out that mission.

We have the responsibility, and we ask that you do not take away our capability. With that, Mr. Chairman, I'd be happy to respond to any questions.

COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Thank you. We appreciate the testimony from the Idaho group. I had the opportunity to tour Mountain Home and looked on the guard station and was very, very impressive. Very impressive base. The range is one of those phenomenal ranges in that particular area.

We appreciate your expert testimony and ask of the commissioners if they now have questions for this panel. Apparently not. We thank you for

your testimony and good to see you all again.

(The proceedings then concluded.)

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