

2005 BRAC COMMISSION REGIONAL HEARING

MONDAY, JULY 11, 2005

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

PARTICIPATING STATES:

TEXAS

ARKANSAS

OKLAHOMA

COMMISSIONERS:

ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI

SUE E. TURNER

LLOYD W. NEWTON

JAMES T. HILL

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER:

SUE E. TURNER

Reported by Shirley Morrison and Cindy Cummings

PROCEEDINGS

MAYOR HARDBERGER: May we come to order, please. I am Phil Hardberger, the mayor of San Antonio. And on behalf of my fellow city council members, including Richard Perez, who has -- is here and has been active in this; our county judge, Nelson Wolff, and the commissioners of Bexar County; and all the citizens of San Antonio, we welcome you today. We're very happy to have the BRAC Commission with us. Thank you so much for being here, and thank you, all of the out-of-town visitors that we have here. We are very happy to have you in San Antonio. Feel free to come at any time.

We are proud, though, in particular to be the host for this particular meeting because we consider ourselves Military City USA. And I cannot think of a better place to discuss these issues affecting our military and our national security than San Antonio.

You know, the military's been around a long time in San Antonio. Our first military presence here by the U.S. Army was in 1845 when the military came to San Antonio and leased the Alamo.

That's right. The same Alamo. So we've been -- been
having -- we've had a strong military presence ever

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since 1845.

Today we have three active military installations--Fort Sam, Lackland, Randolph. We also have a privatized installation, Brooks City-Base. And our most successful, I believe, redevelopment effort at Kelly USA, which of course used to be Kelly Air Force Base.

In San Antonio we have 73,000 defense jobs right here in San Antonio, and they generate on the whole \$5 billion a year to our economy. So we really do appreciate you.

The -- I would like now to -- to do some introductions. Chairman Principi, thank you so much for being here. Commissioner Hill, Commissioner Nelson -- excuse me, Commissioner Newton, and Commissioner Turner, you have a tough job to do here today, but we have great confidence in you, and we understand the importance and the fairness of what you are doing.

We would like to introduce Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison. Senator Hutchison, thank you for allowing us to host this. We appreciate you very much.

Senator John Cornyn. Welcome home, John. We're glad to have -- have you back here.

And our own Texas governor, Rick Perry. Governor Perry, thank you for your support of San Antonio and the military in general. We also appreciate all the other congressional members that are here and elected officials.

We -- we would now like the color guard, please, to come forward and post the colors.

(Presentation of colors.)

MAYOR HARDBERGER: Please join me in saying the Pledge of Allegiance.

(Recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.)

MAYOR HARDBERGER: I'd like to ask Tonya Drake to sing the National Anthem.

(National Anthem.)

MAYOR HARDBERGER: Thank you, Tonya. Now may we remain standing. Air Force Chaplain Al Konop, please give us the invocation.

CHAPLAIN KONOP: Would you join me in prayer.

Almighty and gracious God, as we come and bow before you this day, we truly do pause and give you thanks. We thank you for this beautiful city, for this great state of Texas, and we thank you for the United States of America. May we never take

for granted our freedoms, which have come to us at such a dear price. And, Lord, today as we gather here for these important meetings, we pray that those who give testimony will be able to clearly articulate their thoughts and their concerns. We pray for our commissioners, who have the awesome responsibility of assimilating all the facts and data and making those important decisions that will impact the future of the United States military and the men and women that serve in the United States military, as well as the security of our great nation.

And, Lord, as we gather together, may we never stop pausing to reflect on our men and women that are in harm's way, our men and women in Afghanistan and Iraq whose lives are in danger every day. We pray You will watch and care over them and You keep them safe and that You be with their families that they are separated from, help them and minister to them.

We pray that all things go smoothly and that You are glorified and honored through these meetings. We ask these things in Your most holy and precious name. Amen.

MAYOR HARDBERGER: Commissioner
Turner, it's -- the program is yours.

COMMISSION TURNER: Good morning. I'm Commissioner Sue Turner, and I'll be chairing this regional hearing of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. I'm also pleased today to be joined by my fellow commissioners, Chairman Principi, Commissioner Newton, and Commissioner Hill.

As this commission observed in our first hearing, every dollar consumed in redundant, unnecessary, obsolete, inappropriately designed or located infrastructure is a dollar not available to provide the training that might save a Marine's life, purchase the munitions to win a soldier's fire fight, or fund advances that could ensure continued dominance of the air or the seas.

The Congress entrusts our armed forces with vast but not unlimited resources. We have a responsibility to our nation and to the men and women who bring the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to life, to demand the best possible use of limited resources.

Congress recognized that fact when it authorized the Department of Defense to prepare a proposal to realign or close domestic bases. However, that authorization was not a blank check. The members of this commission accepted the challenge

and necessity of providing an independent, fair, and equitable assessment and evaluation of the Department of Defense's proposals and the data and methodology used to develop their proposal.

We are committed to the Congress, to the president, and to the American people that our deliberations and decisions will be open and transparent, and that our decisions will be based on the criteria set forth in the statute.

We continue to examine the proposed recommendations set forth by the Secretary of Defense on May 13th and measure it against the criteria for military values set forth in the law, especially the need for surge manning and for homeland security.

But be assured we are not conducting this review as an exercise in sterile cost accounting. The commission is committed to conducting a clear-eyed reality check that we know will not only shape our military capabilities for decades to come but will also have profound effects on our communities and on the people who bring our communities to life.

We are also committed that our deliberations and decisions would be devoid of politics and that the people and communities affected

by BRAC proposals would have, through our site visits and public hearings, a chance to provide us with direct input on the substance of the proposals and the methodology and assumptions behind them.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the thousands of involved citizens who have already contacted the commission and shared with us their thoughts, concerns, and suggestions about the base closure and realignment proposals.

Unfortunately, the number -- the volume of correspondence we have received makes it impossible for us to respond directly to each one of you in the short time in which the commission must complete its mission. But we want everyone to know the public input we received are appreciated and taken into consideration as a part of our review process. And while everyone in this room will not have an opportunity to speak, every piece of correspondence received by the commission will be made part of our permanent public record as appropriate.

Today we will hear testimony from the states of Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma. Each state's delegated -- each state's elected delegation has been allotted a block of time determined by the

overall impact of the Department of Defense's closure and realignment recommendation on the state. The delegations have worked closely with their communities to develop agendas that I am certain will provide information and insight that will make up a valuable part of our review.

We would greatly appreciate it if you would adhere to your time limits. Every voice today is important.

I now request our witnesses for the state of Texas to stand for the administration of the oath--and Arkansas--to stand for the administration of the oath required by the base closure and realignment statute. The oath will be administered by David Hague, the commissioners' designated federal officer. David Hague will also administer the oath prior to the testimony of each additional panel of witnesses, assuming that you haven't already been sworn in.

General.

(Panel sworn.)

GENERAL HAGUE: Thank you.

COMMISSION TURNER: We'll have our opening remarks and overview with Governors -- Governor Perry and Senators Hutchison and Cornyn from

Texas.

TEXAS PRESENTATION

SENATOR CORNYN: Commissioner Turner, Chairman Principi, Commissioner Hill, and Commissioner Newton, and all the staff, I'd like to join Senator Hutchison and Governor Perry in welcoming you to my hometown, San Antonio, Texas.

As you will hear time and time again, Texas has a proud tradition of supporting our military. And in fact one out of every ten men and women in uniform call Texas home. This has also been the story of my life. I first came to San Antonio in 1965 when my dad was stationed at Lackland Air Force Base. And then in -- actually, even before that, in 1945, after he was liberated by General Patton from a German prison camp, he came back and continued his flight training at Corpus Christi Naval Air Station. So it seems in many ways that things have come full circle here today in 2005 with this important hearing.

While you will hear that there are some disputes with the Department of Defense's recommendations, there can be -- there is one thing with which there can be no dispute, and that is our communities are second to none in their support for

the United States military.

We greatly appreciate your time and effort and your visits across the state. Although we're pleased with many of the Department of Defense's recommendations, we're also greatly concerned that some of them are not in the best interests of our national security. We firmly believe that many Department of Defense recommendations deviate significantly from BRAC criteria, and you'll hear more about that shortly.

Thanks again for being here. Thanks for giving us the opportunity to speak to you this morning. And now it's my honor to turn the floor over to our governor, Governor Rick Perry.

GOVERNOR PERRY: Thank you. Let me just as an aside say that you look mighty good in yellow out there.

Chairman Principi, you probably won't see any more yellow than this except in about two weeks when there are a lot of Texans and a few from Arkansas, I'm sure, that are there at the -- in Paris, France, welcoming Lance Armstrong win his seventh Tour de France.

John, thank you for your work and, Senator Hutchison, thank you today. We stand united

today on military communities to communicate a very singular message, and that is the Texas military installations are central to the mission of the United States armed forces and our war on terror.

And I'd like to also thank our Arkansas neighbors for being over here, Senator Pryor, Senator Lincoln, and the delegation. We truly are working as a team on this in a partnership.

Let me just speak to the Texas side of that equation. What Texas offers in addition to the reverberant support of the military missions is a multitude of advantages that this commission should consider. We offer very strong military community support. We have affordable housing, spousal employment opportunities. We have excellent schools and universities, tuition initiatives such as the in-state rates for our military families.

Texas boasts the most diverse assortment of training environments in the United States that includes an excellent climate. It stretches incredible number of miles of unencumbered land with plenty of room to grow. We have wide open spaces with high visibility for both land and over-water fighting scenarios, hundreds of square miles of open sea area for naval and Coast Guard operations.

Our land, air, sea training ranges allow our military the opportunity to train as they fight without being hampered by constant environmental encroachment concerns. We have strategic military scenarios -- or, excuse me, military seaports for rapid deployment, Beaumont and Corpus Christi particularly. They alone handle 40 percent of all U.S. military cargo that was shipped overseas for deployment here in the past two years.

And, lastly, our military installations are vital to the protection of our critical national infrastructure. The state's coastal petrochemical industry provides 25 percent of the nation's gas supply, 24 percent of the nation's jet fuel, and it produces 50 percent of its general-purpose petrochemical products that are used for manufacturing.

Clearly, a strong military presence in Texas is vital to homeland security. I want to thank all of our friends who are here today, citizens who have made the trip here today, and please allow me to turn the podium over to our senior senator, Kay Bailey Hutchison.

SENATOR HUTCHISON: Thank you, Governor Perry.

Chairman Principi, Commissioners
Turner, Newton, and Hill, we all know you have
accepted an extremely rigorous mission. We
appreciate the tough and demanding job you are doing.
As you know, fully one in every ten Americans now
serving in uniform are from the great state of Texas.
We love our country, and we are far, far more willing
to serve than anybody could ask.

During the war on terrorism, no state
in our country has been more supportive or
contributed more to our nation's defense. I've often
said--and all of us have--Texas defends America.
Texas is the ideal location in the entire country for
the military to recruit and train men and women for
our services. We have it all: great weather,
maneuver and flying room, good schools, low taxes,
great quality of life, and supportive communities
such as these before you.

Commissioners, the DoD recommendations
do not reflect Texas' contribution and capabilities
in their recommendations. Despite what was reported
in the Department of Defense recommendation summary,
Texas will actually lose positions if the Pentagon's
BRAC recommendations are followed.

The book indicates that an aggregate

gain of 6,150 positions for Texas. In fact, from where we are today, Texas will lose almost 3,000 troops if all recommendations are followed and more than 5,000 under certain scenarios. We support any measures that enhance the ability of our armed forces to do their jobs. But the recommendations in many cases do not achieve this goal.

We are eager to give you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairwoman, and Commissioners, a different perspective from eight very strong military communities. One major area of concern for several key bases that you will hear today is the use of 2003 data. In a very volatile time and particularly for the Army, which is bearing such a large share of this operation in Iraq and Afghanistan, information two years old is misleading. A second concern is the lack of focus on homeland defense. These points will be reinforced in the presentations to follow.

We will now begin the Texas portion of the hearing. Senators Lincoln and Pryor will then lead the Arkansas hearing during and after the Texarkana presentation, and then Senator Inhofe will take over for Oklahoma.

I welcome and introduce our first speaker from Texarkana, Congressman Ralph Hall.

CONGRESSMAN HALL: Thank you, Kay, and Madam Chair and members of the commission, my congressional colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, fellow Texans and other assembled guests, welcome. We're happy to have you.

Mayor, thank you for your wonderful welcome.

And as was said earlier, how about those yellow shirts?

That will be my only offhand and deviation from the printed record that I'm supposed to speak from. Thank you. My name is Ralph Hall. I'm a member of Congress from the Fourth District of Texas, and I'm joined this morning by colleagues from the state of Texas, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Senator John Cornyn, and, from the state of Arkansas, Senator Blanche Lincoln, Senator Mark Pryor, and Representative Mike Ross, and of course His Excellency, our governor.

We come before you today to speak on behalf of the Red River Defense Complex of Texarkana, Texas, a true military asset. It's a unique joint logistics facility housing a variety of tenants and -- and three primary mission activities that we -- we want to stress. That's the Red River

Munitions Center from the Joint Munitions Command, and the Defense Logistics Agency Defense Distribution Depot Red River. Their synergistic cooperation together provides the soldiers with what we call a great slogan, quote, "Our best, nothing less," unquote.

Ladies and gentlemen, supporters of the Red River Defense Complex have been down this BRAC river before, and we remember back in 1995 others here did yeoman work during that time. The 1995 commission's rationale for retaining the Red River Defense Complex is visible every day in this country's war on terror.

We contend that -- and we -- we hope that the 2005 commission will be no less persuaded to retain Red River since the current and future need is even more compelling, and I think -- and when you learn the true military value of this outstanding installation and its contribution to the American soldier, fighting an enemy that has no navy we can sink, no capital we can bomb, a true enemy.

The Red River Defense Complex is a valuable and a strategic asset located in northeast Texas but supported by employees from a four-state area. They possess critical skills required to

maintain and required to repair, rebuild all of our combat and tactical vehicles and components to support our sons and our daughters as they serve our military and as they serve our nation.

They've been called upon to work long hours, many weekends, and even on federal holidays to support an expanded mission related to the global war on terror, and they've been very happy to do so. By doing so, they've expanded Red River's ability to accomplish the mission and support the Army's fleet requirements by surging to execute a workload that will exceed five million direct labor hours.

But that has not lessened their commitment to LEAN process and to seeking improvements and efficiencies that speed the critically needed equipment such as armored Humvees back to the soldiers stationed in this country and others and deployed around the world.

So in closing for my opening statement--and I've tried to set the pattern for brevity for everybody to follow--Mr. Chairman and -- Madam Chairman and Commissioners, my colleagues and I acknowledge and appreciate your commitment to making the right decision in support of our armed services, our armed forces, and concerning the Red River

Defense Complex. With that, I thank you very much.

SENATOR PRYOR: Madam Chairman --

SENATOR HUTCHISON: Speaking --
speaking for Red River Army Depot, Senator Mark
Pryor, senator -- United States senator from
Arkansas.

SENATOR PRYOR: Thank you.

Madam Chair, can I ask an
administrative question before -- I'd like for this
not to count against my time, if that's okay. And
that is, I'm wondering if the record is being held
open. For example, our governor cannot be here today
and he wanted to submit written testimony.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Yes.

SENATOR PRYOR: Okay. So it will be
held open for that?

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Senator, may I
also take this time to remind the -- the crowd that
we appreciate their exuberance; however, you might
want -- excuse me, you might want to moderate it just
a little bit because it does feed into your allowed
time, and we certainly want Senator Lincoln to have
some time left when you get to the end of your hour.

SENATOR PRYOR: Amen. Thank you.

Thank you all for being here today.

And I'd like to direct your attention to an important slide that I'd ask the staff to put up on the screen, if possible, and it talks about the Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence; CITE is the acronym. And the slide shows that Red River has all of these six CITE designations. These are very difficult to get. This is a very impressive list. And one thing that's critically important as you'll notice is that for the Patriot missile and the rubber products, they're the only DoD facility that has that capability, and also it's the only qualified source of the M1 roadwheel.

So what they do at -- at Red River is unique. No other installations have these CITE designations, including the sites that are designated to receive the Red River Army Depot workload. These sites, to me it means that if you close Red River and you move its workload to other installations, that doesn't mean that the CITE designation necessarily follows that. It just doesn't work that way. The CITE designation has to be earned, and it should never be taken for granted.

My next slide is about the unique capabilities of Red River. There are three distinct and unique capabilities that are performed at Red

River. All of these are critical to helping the war fighter.

In direct contradiction to the BRAC criteria, the unique capabilities of Red River Army Depot were ignored while other facilities received credit and were exempted from closure consideration. For example, the Rock Island Arsenal is DoD's only forge capability.

Another thing about these three unique capabilities is the work force at Red River, the people that these yellow T-shirts are representing today. The work force there is a key ingredient to all three. Let me run through them very quickly.

In the case of -- of the Bradley transmission, there -- there's a lot of technical details on this, but basically you're talking about something that is very exacting, must be calibrated and put together exactly and precisely right, going down to the millionth of an inch, and they do it at Red River Army Depot and they do not do it anywhere else.

The Patriot missile recertification. Here again, the work force has over 1300 hours of classroom training. It's continually monitored through layers and layers of monitoring organizations

and systems there. Standing down the facility and moving it to a new location will have far-reaching effects on the Patriot missile readiness and could set the certification program back by as much as five years, it's estimated.

And with regard to rubber products, this is a twofold impact. First, Red River is the only DoD source to remanufacture a roadwheel and track. Second, Red River is the only approved and qualified source for new and remanufactured M1 Abrams roadwheels. Although there have been three commercial firms that have tried, no one has been able to replicate it and do it like Red River.

The third slide is this. And that is that as a result of the 2005 BRAC recommendations, presentation charts and recorded minutes of significant Army deliberative sessions and meetings have been posted for access. And what you see in this chart is a compilation of actual minutes from the Army Senior Review Group that affect Red River Depot. It provides a detailed and chronological summation of the events leading to Red River's inclusion on the BRAC list.

I just have about 30 more seconds, so let me make these points very quickly. On -- on

entry number 23 there, the Army supported retaining Red River. In entries 31, 32, and 33, the notes say that there is a question about the information and the data coming from -- coming out about Red River, and also that the information does not reflect the current workload and future requirements, and that you cannot do a sufficient analysis using that data and that information.

And then in entry number 34--that's a meeting in March of 2005--the Infrastructure Executive Council's decision, somehow they say they're going to increase capacity by adding to the other depots. And this is a mystery. I'm unaware of their rationale. I've never understood how they come to that. And also I must say I don't know why they can say that or how they can say that.

But regardless of that, Red River was added to the closure list at a very late date, and it raises some very serious questions in my mind that I cannot explain, and I just wonder if there's some reason, for some accounting reason, they felt like they had to close one of the depots and they chose Red River. Thank you.

SENATOR CORNYN: Madam Chair and Chairman Principi, Commissioners, I'd like to share

with you some of the deviations from the BRAC selection criteria that we believe occurred during the Department of Defense's analysis.

I'd like the second slide. There it is.

The department recommendations to close Red River substantially deviates from Criteria 1 and would adversely impact operational readiness by moving workloads to locations with a lower military value.

For armament and structure components, Red River is ranked number one, but the proposed gaining location at Anniston does not even have that capability.

For construction equipment, once again Red River is ranked number one, but the proposed gaining location at Albany is a distant second.

For starters, alternators, generators, yet again Red River is ranked number one in military value, yet the proposed gaining location is a distant second.

In addition, Red River was not given any military value credit for the jointness and synergy of the Army depot, the Munitions Center, and the Defense Logistics Agency regional distribution

center in a single location. Red River is the only depot with this combination of facilities.

Red River is the Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence, as you've heard, for tactical vehicles. However, for reasons that are not apparent in the data released by the Department of Defense, Letterkenny Army Depot was ranked number one in military value, and Red River was ranked number three for tactical vehicles, even though Red River has double the production performance on Humvee recapitalization effort. In fact, Red River has provided expertise to Letterkenny to help them in their Humvee efforts.

It makes no sense to shift tactical vehicle workload to a location that does not have the expertise or the proven performance of Red River.

Next slide, please.

The initial Department of Defense analysis rated the department -- excuse me, the Defense Distribution Depot at Red River as the number one choice for assignment as the strategic distribution platform for the central region, a mission they are essentially performing today.

However, when Red River was recommended for closure, the mission was slated to

move to Oklahoma City, which has a lower military value. Once again, we see an example of the mission moving from an installation with higher military value to one with a lower military value.

The DoD recommendation further requires \$43 million in construction costs at Oklahoma City. But this is only sufficient to construct a facility 65 percent of the size and capability of Red River. With no construction, and a savings of \$43 million to the American taxpayer, the DDRT can take on the central region distribution mission.

I'd also like to add that the Department of Defense recommendation ignores many unique capabilities at Red River, including, as you've heard, rubber products, missile recertification, and the Bradley transmission expertise. Disruption in any of these areas would have a serious impact on our readiness.

Now, next slide, please.

The Department of Defense recommendation to close Red River deviates from Criteria Number 3 by failing to provide an adequate surge capacity. The DoD uses 40 hours per week to determine depot capacity, and the Army's goal is to

load the depots to 85 percent and have 15 percent for surge. Based on that standard alone, there is not sufficient capacity to warrant closure of any depot.

However, the Joint Cross Service group decided to use 60 hours rather than -- in an effort, it appears, to artificially create more capacity in order to move Red River's 2.1 million labor hours to other depots. These additional 20 hours per week, however, are reserved for surge.

Furthermore, the DoD's analysis did not consider Red River's fiscal year '05 workload, as Senator Hutchison alluded to, of 4 million-plus labor hours or the 6.4 million labor hours in FY06. Instead, for some reason, the DoD relied on FY03 figure of 2.1 million labor hours, a figure that the war in Iraq has not impacted, had -- had not impacted, unlike the '05 number and projected '06 numbers.

In other words, the '03 numbers are obsolete and bear no reasonable relationship to what is happening on the ground at Red River today. That's why the Army, when reviewing the DoD's analysis, consistently questioned the workload number used by DoD to calculate capacity. Unquestionably, using 2.1 million labor -- million labor hours is a

substantial deviation.

Next slide, please.

The DoD recommendation substantially deviates from Criteria 5 by overstating savings and understating costs. Depots operate at approximately a 30 percent indirect and 70 percent direct labor ratio. The DoD assumed that it was possible to save the 30 percent indirect labor costs at a closing depot. But this assumption fails to take into account that a large portion of indirect labor is directly related to workload and will require additional staffing at the gaining installation for support personnel.

In simple terms, a proportion of the direct -- indirect labor hours will be required at the gaining installation, and therefore assuming a 30 percent savings and indirect labor costs is wrong.

Even using the DoD's own data, it will take over ten years to break even. And if the true cost and savings figures were known, it could potentially be more than double that estimate.

Next slide, please.

The DoD chose to ignore the environmental remediation cost for closure candidates and rely on the notion that the Department of Defense

is responsible for environmental cleanup regardless of whether the installation closes or remains open.

In fact, several environmental expenses can be -- or caused by closure would not -- would be unnecessary if the installation remained open, but they were not factored into the DoD's analysis. Examples are the new permit requirements at the gaining installation, closure costs at the losing sites, and potential remediation costs.

Closure drives remediation decisions that may not be the most economical. Removal of contaminated soil versus the option of natural attenuation over several years is a prime example.

I thank you for allowing me to share some of these deviations with you, and I will now turn the floor over to General Robles with three minutes left on my time. Thank you.

GENERAL ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Cornyn. General Turner, Chairman Principi, General Newton, General Hill, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, elected officials and other folks in attendance today, as the famous Yogi Berra once said, it's deja vu all over again. As I was following this swarm of yellow shirts coming up here, it reminded me of ten years ago in Dallas when the same swarm of

yellow shirts came out to show their support, and I applaud you for -- for your cohesiveness and -- and your willingness to show support.

Building, I think, ten years ago when I began on the other side of the table here revisiting an issue that I thought had been put to bed back then, and I'm here to talk a little bit about that decision because, as you know, ten years ago I did the primary analysis and briefed my fellow commissioners on the DoD decision to close Red River Army Depot in which I strongly disagreed at the time, and I believe that the facts today are even more compelling than they were in 1995.

I'm going to take -- I'm going to talk more from a strategic point of view than I am going to talk about from the tactical point of view, because I believe that the central issue in -- in the decision to close Red River has three major points in it. One, that there are some unacceptable risks from a capacity perspective. Two, that there is a major risk from a business interruption or business continuity perspective. And three, you just don't take a -- a center reference, split it apart into bite-sized pieces, move it out somewhere else, and expect it to come back again and everything works.

That just isn't logical and it doesn't make sense.

So let me talk a little bit about my perspectives, and I'm going to come at it from three different perspectives, as a matter of fact. One, I was a commissioner ten years ago and I understand the issue very, very well.

Two, I commanded the First Infantry Division of Big Red One, and so I had a combat commander's perspective and I used Red River products and I used their -- I witnessed up front their capabilities, and they're very, very much a center of excellence.

And three, for the last 11 years I've been a businessman. I've been in charge of a -- working in a multi billion-dollar corporation and trying to make sure we make smart economic decisions, and we worry about risk. We worry about continuity risk. We worry about -- about capacity risk. We worry about work force risk. And so those kinds of -- are absolutely applicable to this decision here today.

I'm going to talk about a couple of things. The first chart -- if you'd put it up, please.

I think a lot can be said about the

capacity issue. I understand the process. All of you who work in the Pentagon and work in this process understand that you start very early for a data call. The data call that was used for -- for this analysis was fiscal year '03, fiscal year 2003. We are now in fiscal year 2005 working our way to fiscal year 2006.

And as you can see, over time the requirements for depot level maintenance in the Army have increased significantly. The estimates that you saw in your commission report are way off. In fact, this year, estimated for 2006, budgeted workload will be 6.4 -- direct labor -- million direct labor hours, and that is a -- almost triple what it was back in 2003. So you can't miss it by a factor of three and expect it to not have an impact. And I -- I just submit that you need to make sure that you understand the workload capabilities.

The other thing I will assert is that -- that we don't know the full impact of the -- the work -- required workload. If you'll go to the next chart, please.

One of the interesting things that I saw in this year's analysis--it didn't happen last time--was that late in the planning process, the decision was made to go to a one-and-a-half-shift

concept for planning factors. That is, to have 60 hours per week of steady-state work at these depots. And if you did that, you can crank the numbers up and ensure that there -- there was in fact excess capacity.

But I will tell you that would not be the policy today. It is not in the handbook today. It is not how they operate today, and I dare say they probably will not operate on a steady-state basis of having 60 hours per week as a factor for -- for working. And if you do that mathematical calculation, it doesn't show you some excess capacity. But a lot of that capacity is artificial. It is not there today, and I submit it won't be there in the future. And I think that is something that you-all just need to think about.

If you'll show the next slide, please.

In the middle of the slide -- and there's a lot of numbers here and I'm not here to talk about a lot of numbers. But if you look in the middle of the slide, you see that in fiscal year '03, the River Depot's capacity is 2.1 million direct labor hours. As I said today, the approved budget is for 6.4.

What it does not include in this

analysis is the real workload, because we're in the middle of a war in Iraq, and a lot of combat vehicles are being used in Iraq. And I know you'll try to estimate that, but I'll just tell you about my experience. When I was an assistant division commander for the First Cavalry in Desert Storm I, we did not know our full impact of the maintenance and wear and tear on the fleet till we got back and -- and had a chance to look at the equipment and -- and inspect it, and it -- it was much, much more than our -- our initial estimates.

In fact, we -- we said that we put ten years' worth of miles on our track and wheeled vehicle fleet during Desert Storm I. And I can't even imagine how many years of wear and tear we're putting on the fleet today. And those are not in those numbers. Those are not fully included numbers. So again, I think there's just a problem from a capacity issue.

I'll switch to another topic now. My second premise is about risk management, and those of us in -- in private business worry a lot about risk management, especially in light of 9/11 and things that have happened since then.

And from my perspective, one of the

biggest risks that corporate America faces today is the ability to keep these operations continued. They almost took down the economic system and -- and the -- and the capital market system during 9/11.

So we worry about building redundant facilities. We worry about building backup facilities. And I find it incredible that the Department of Defense's recommendation is to put all their eggs in one basket at Anniston Army Depot. A hurricane just went by there, or is in the process of going by there. You've got to worry about industrial risk. You've got to worry about geographical risk. You've got to worry about weather risk. You've got to worry about other special missions around that Anniston Army Depot. And I think putting all this capability in one place just does not make prudent sense.

The third perspective and the one that I think that is the one, probably from -- from -- from my viewpoint, the one that's the most important perspective, is that of the work force. I learned when I was in uniform that it took 20-plus years to build a leader, and you just couldn't build a leader overnight and sprinkle some water and say you've got a leader.

The same thing is true for the civilian work force. It takes 20 years plus to build a high-performing, synergistic work force. The senator talked about the fact that -- that Red River is a Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence. You just don't get those designations by just wishing it so. It takes years and years and years to build that capability, notwithstanding the unique capability for rubber products and some other -- and rapid transmissions and certification -- recertification of Patriot missiles.

You're just not going to build that. And to take a high-performing organization that has plenty of work far into the future, tear it apart in three -- into pieces, move those pieces somewhere else, and then hope that it gets back together again, even at the same level of performance, it just doesn't make sense to me.

And so as I did ten years ago, I guess we can go through a lot more analysis and -- and look at some of the assumption. I'm just telling you I don't think it makes strategic sense. I hope that you will take a look at the numbers. I hope you'll take a look at the -- at the cost estimates. I hope you'll take a look at the impact of -- of taking the

work force and hoping that it will move to -- to another place.

I think my final point is when you assume 75 percent of the people are going to move, when in reality, in most settings that I'm aware of, less than 30 percent of the people move, I think that is a stretch of the imagination.

So I thank you all for listening to me. I hope you'll look carefully at the numbers. And I appreciate the time you have given me in front of you today. Thank you.

SENATOR HUTCHISON: General Robles, thank you so much for stepping up and being willing to give that powerful testimony for this great depot. That was something that you agreed to do willingly, and no one could have more credibility than you on this subject.

I'd like to start with slide number one. As I say, this discussion is reminiscent of the BRAC Commission analysis of 1995. The military value of preserving sufficient capacity to perform depot maintenance work guided the BRAC Commission discussion and decision at the time.

The need for Red River Army Depot was discussed in hypothetical terms. No one foresaw the

future conflict that we would see today. But the BRAC Commission knew that surge capacity was required for them to consider. The wisdom of the BRAC Commission was clearly proved by subsequent events.

We would be in a desperate situation today without the facilities and the professional work force at Red River Army Depot. I will not repeat the uniqueness of the depot because you have heard that from several other speakers. But what I do want to repeat is what the Army has said repeatedly about its need to preserve Red River's capacity.

Everyone outside of a small group that was working on the Army recommendations was shocked by the recommendation to close Red River Army Depot. Every signal that we had gotten was that it was doing a great job, it was needed, and it would be safe from a BRAC.

Second slide, please.

The GAO recently came out with a report dated July 1st that analyzed the 2005 BRAC selection process and recommendations. It raised more concerns about the Red River Army Depot recommendation than most of the other recommendations that were made.

The GAO questioned DoD's methodology for developing the depot maintenance recommendation, and it found that the methodology was not found consistent with operational plans of the war fighter because of, and I quote, "The uncertainty associated with future requirements and the need to provide for additional capacity if a contingency arises."

Similarly, GAO found particular problems with the transfer of the rubber production capabilities. We have said rubber production is only done at Red River Army Depot in the entire Department of Defense. Red River's rubber plant is the source of 100 percent of roadwheels for the Abrams M1 tank and a major source of rubber pads for other ground combat vehicles, track and wheeled vehicles.

The BRAC recommendation calls for disestablishment of this vital production facility. Disestablishment means that DoD would eventually try to re-create this capacity elsewhere at a substantial cost of time and money. The cost to replicate the rubber products capability alone, including facility and equipment, is \$49 million. It would take more than three years to accomplish, assuming the proper environmental permits could even be obtained.

This is an unacceptable risk during a

time of war, and, further, the GAO reports questions whether it can be done at all. This is why. It is an artisan process. Red River Army Depot alone creates the unique rubber compound. Three commercial vendors have tried and failed to qualify. Even though three commercial firms--Soltam in Israel, North American Molded Products, and Goodyear--have obtained the compound formula and have attempted to replicate Red River Army Depot's products, none--not one--none have achieved certification. Red River Army Depot remains the sole qualified source for the M1 Abrams roadwheel.

The GAO found other uncertainties, but I just wanted to emphasize the -- the GAO report questioning whether you even could replicate those facilities elsewhere, even if you had the money to do it and you were willing for -- to have a three-year delay when we have troops on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The other facilities, munitions storage facility, also was issued as a recommendation for closure. We believe the decision to close Red River Army Depot had two other components that would not have even been recommended if you didn't have Red River Army Depot recommended for closure.

The recommendation to move ammunition storage and demilitarization from Red River and Lone Star to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant was made to remove a munitions storage and demilitarization work as part of the Red River closure. This aspect of the recommendation was made using outdated data.

McAlester has had significant increase in its storage occupancy since 2003 when the benchmark was made. If you assume 100 percent occupancy and 85 percent is the recommended goal, there would be a shortage of 1.9 million square feet to store the ammunition from Red River and Lone Star. As -- as the capacity does not exist at McAlester, millions of dollars would have to be spent in military construction.

The DLA, the Defense Logistic Agency's Distribution Depot at Red River is the second offshoot from the first closure recommendation. This distribution depot is -- has the highest military value rating in the central region of the United States. And it was designated as the strategic distribution platform for the central region. It is a state-of-the-art facility that serves the central region by carrying 110,000 lines of supplies with a total value of \$7 billion.

Additionally, with 11,000 new soldiers moving to Fort Bliss, this distribution center will need more capacity, which is available at Red River but would not be at Oklahoma City.

Additionally, Oklahoma City Distribution Depot has a lower military value. It is in an urban center and therefore would slow the trucks that move out every day to bases throughout the region, and making the move would require \$34 million in military construction.

Again, the use of '03 data is what caused, I think, a skewing of the numbers here. In '03 the DLA put out 520,000 parts. In '05 it will be one million. It has doubled in two years, and it has plenty of excess capacity. Fifteen acres under roof right now, many of you have visited and you have seen the great job they do.

I want to go back to Red River and have the third slide come up, because this is the key. The Army's Senior Review Group stated the FY03 data used in the analysis for Red River does not reflect current workload or future requirements and is not sufficient for analysis. The workload at Red River has jumped 600 percent between 2003 and 2005. In addition, future trends indicate increased future

depot maintenance requirements, not decreases.

Currently, the Army has over 20,000 wheeled vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are currently over 140,000 troops serving in Iraq. Boots on the ground and wheeled vehicles on the ground will be the norm for the foreseeable future.

Let me just mention one other thing. The increased maintenance demands due -- due to the out-wearing of ground vehicles. Based on peacetime calculations, the annual wear and tear on a vehicle currently operating in the Iraqi war zone occurs in one month. That means a vehicle used the same number of hours in the United States for training and other purposes, it will take one year to have the same wear and tear as one month in Iraq. We all know that sand is the key here.

So you are seeing these vehicles have to be refurbished and made almost new again time and time and time again. Also, keep in mind the GAO report confirming that only a one-shift operation was ever envisioned at Anniston, and they would have to build the additional capacity needed, and the GAO once again questions whether it could even be done at Anniston as it has been done time after time, month after month at Red River where they have gone 24/7,

they have gone to one-and-a-half-shift days. They can do it and they have proven they can do it.

I would ask you to review the following questions. Is it supportable for the Department of Defense to spend \$456 million to replicate a portion of Red River's capabilities when no excess capacity exists for Red River missions?

If -- number two, if we reduce our current depot maintenance capacity, would we have sufficient surge if we were forced to engage in a major conflict?

Only a few months ago, the Army senior leadership answered no to all of these questions. I would just ask the following question. If the purpose of BRAC is to save money, when would the savings start? The \$456 million does not even include the cost of environmental cleanup.

Commissioners, if you agree that Red River should be kept, we hope you will keep the unit together. It is a complex that works. It is performing for the Army today. It will perform for the Army under any circumstances in the future.

And I just want to end with this. Commissioners, this is the last authorized BRAC. I urge you to err on the side of caution. If you close

facilities that are needed in the future,
particularly facilities that will cost hundreds of
millions of dollars to replicate--it may even be
impossible to replicate--are we doing what is right
for our men and women in the armed services? Are we
doing what is right for our country?

I urge you to consider that if we need
another BRAC round and the Department comes to
Congress, they will authorize another BRAC round. Do
not close facilities that are doing a great job and
have surge capacity.

I will end with this statement, Mr. --
Mr. Chairman and members. We have given you facts.
We have given you deviations. I cannot leave without
giving you the heart of this work force. Mr.
Chairman and members, the signs all over Red River
Army Depot say, "Work as if your life depended on
it," dot, dot, dot, "Theirs do." This work force has
the biggest heart in all of America. They're doing a
great job. They will answer the call whenever and
whatever it is.

Please look at these facts. Look at
the deviations. And consider the heart. Thank you.

Thank you for letting us have that
little deviation. I now introduce my colleague,

Senator Blanche Lincoln, United States senator from Arkansas.

SENATOR LINCOLN: First of all, I'd like to join my colleagues in thanking the commissioners and the chairman for being here today and for the tireless work that you're doing in the service to our country. You have crisscrossed this country holding hearings and conducting site visits, spending a tremendous amount of time. These decisions are -- are never easy. And as General Turner mentioned, they are necessary. And when our constituents can see how hard that you are working and the distinguished group that we have before us, I think it certainly provides them the comfort that they know that the decision-making is in the right hands. So we're proud that you're here.

I want to thank all of my colleagues for being here today, and would like to add some comments on the Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, which is the brother facility there at Red River and a part of the overall family that's been talked about.

I'm certainly proud to be here after seeing this tremendous display of yellow shirts to the commission to reinforce the facts and figures

that really reflect the dedication and the hard work of the men and women, both military and civilian, who provide both security and pride for our great nation.

I have some slides to join these. I won't point to them each time, but just -- there's four slides there that will follow my comments, the first being that Lone Star AAP has critical capabilities and intellectual properties that will be lost if the commission follows the DoD recommendation.

Much of the intellectual properties belong today in Zimmerman, not the DoD. This includes designs for production, equipment, processes and tooling, process control programs developed for production of detonators and self-destruct fuses, and patents on critical production equipment.

Lone Star also has critical capabilities that may be lost if it is closed. It produces, stores, maintains, upgrades, and demilitarizes munitions, the full scope of activity. It includes loaded components, grenades for the MLRS system, hand grenades and fuses.

The next slide will show that several -- several current DoD programs will be negatively impacted by the BRAC recommendations for

Lone Star. For example, the M-915 program, which is the only source for certain types of self-destruct fuses, could be severely impacted by the closure of Lone Star. And the Defense Reutilization Marketing Service to the DRMS program could also be adversely affected.

Lone Star has over ten years of de-mil and reutilization experience. It's the largest de-mil and reutilization center for the DRMS program.

The next slide shows that closing Lone Star is contrary to the interests of full and open competition, which we also know that you take into consideration. Directing the ammunition workload to other facilities, McAlester and Crane, is contrary to the long-term DoD strategy of moving to more competitive contracting.

Shutting down a Lone -- Lone Star in favor of government-operated facilities such as McAlester and Crane completely ignores the benefit of competitive contracting. Lone Star's most formidable competitor is SNC of Canada. SNC is proficient in mortars, artillery, energetics and grenades. SNC is most -- most likely the winner of any subsequent hand grenade competition if Lone Star is closed.

And then finally the last slide

reflects the cost of relocation in relocating functions to gaining installations is tremendously understated. The Secretary of Defense excluded the over \$14 million in closure-related moving costs to establish capabilities at gaining installations.

For example, the COBRA cost of the 150,000 for grenade equipment does not represent full scope of hand grenade assembly equipment to relocate. The COBRA cost of 40,000 for the demo charge equipment and tooling does not take into consideration equipment to load the submunitions. And perhaps the biggest cost could come from the loss of proprietary data from an incumbent contractor gained from 54 years of experience of operating the Lone Star AAP. You cannot -- you cannot purchase or re-create overnight that kind of experience. This too was not taken into consideration with figuring the one-time cost of relocation.

I've tried very hard to be brief. But to reinforce to you all, to the commission, if the purpose of the BRAC process is to help our military operate more efficiently and effectively, the closure of Lone Star would appear to be at odds with that goal. The facility has performed a vital service to the U.S. military and should remain open to ensure

that our soldiers have the ammunition they need on the field of combat. They are an enormous part of the overall Red River family. We are proud of the work that they do and the opportunities and equipments that they offer our men and women in combat.

Thank you very much for your time.

And I will now defer to my colleague, Congressman Mike Ross.

CONGRESSMAN ROSS: Thank you, Senator Lincoln.

To the commissioners, thank you for your service on this very important commission. My name is Mike Ross and I represent Arkansas's Fourth Congressional District. And some of you may wonder why would a congressman from Arkansas be advocating for Red River Army Depot and Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. But, you see, about 35 percent of the work force there actually lives in my district in -- in Arkansas.

I was born in Texarkana. My wife is from Texarkana. And these yellow shirts out here are people that I grew up with, I hunt with, and have gone to church with.

There are three main concerns I would

like the -- the commission to consider while evaluating the Office of the Secretary of Defense's-- and I'll refer to that in the future as OSD--their recommendations concerning Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant.

First of all, there are major inconsistencies in the military value and capacity analysis conducted by the OSD. Secondly, the data calls for Lone Star were inaccurately reported. Specifically, the misrepresentation of Lone Star's manpower and capabilities.

And finally Lone Star has critical capabilities which, if lost, will significantly impact current DoD programs. OSD's analysis does not accurately represent the military value of Lone Star. OSD used inappropriate attributes to form its recommendations. Red River Army Depot and Lone Star were rated inconsistently in areas such as soil, resiliency, water quantity, and environmental elasticity.

However, this is important to note. Red River Army Depot and Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant are only separated by a chain link fence. I can't imagine how these results could be accurate considering the facilities are located side by side.

Based on these inaccuracies, it is clear that there were miscalculations in the analysis of Lone Star.

My second point pertains to OSD's analysis of Lone Star's capacity and usage. In our opinion, OSD did not account for the size and complexity of the various munitions assembled and stored at Lone Star. Additionally, OSD did not account for all production lines at Lone Star.

For example, Lone Star manufactures the M-67 hand grenade and primers, which was completely ignored by OSD's analysis. I hope that the commission will consider the entire production line, current usage and capacity of Lone Star during its evaluation.

According to the Army stationing and installation plan that was released on May 23rd of this year, there are over 400 men and women working at Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. However, OSD reported Lone Star's manpower at only 229, which placed them below the required number of personnel to receive a site visit. This inaccuracy resulting in a loss of a site visit should be taken into consideration by the commission.

Lone Star is a multifunctional site performing with full scope of functions--

demilitarization, production, maintenance, and storage. Lone Star was only given full credit for production in OSD's analysis. In addition to production, Lone Star has also successfully demonstrated demilitarization, maintenance, and storage capabilities.

In the production category, Lone Star was the third highest ranking installation in the Industrial Joint Cross Service Group's summary, military value report for munitions.

In regards to demilitarization, Lone Star is the largest site in the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Services and performs activities including open burn and open detonation. Critical maintenance activities are performed on the various munitions listed. Also, Lone Star has 1.23 million square feet in storage capacity.

All of these combined capabilities are of tremendous value to our armed forces, and I encourage the commission to consider their significance during its evaluation.

Closing, I'd like to thank the commissioners and their staff for their time and attention to these facts relating to Red River Army Depot and Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. Thank you

very much.

SENATOR HUTCHISON: Commissioners, this concludes the Texarkana presentation. And now for the Arkansas portion of the hearing, 40 minutes is my understanding. I'm honored to introduce my colleague, the senior senator from Arkansas, Blanche Lincoln.

ARKANSAS PRESENTATION

SENATOR LINCOLN: Well, a very special thanks to our hosts here in Texas, in the great state. We're delighted to be here.

Chairman Principi and commissioners, on behalf of the Arkansas congressional delegation, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to express our concerns with the Department of Defense's recommendations. Your task is daunting, and we respect your willingness to serve on this commission, which in the end holds little reward except the self-satisfaction that you voted your conscience based on your military and/or practical experience to make our military the best that it can possibly be.

My comments will be brief this morning in order to allow enough time for the technical component of our presentation. In representing the 188th Fighter Wing based in Fort Smith, Arkansas, we

are presenting the case that we are confident will compel you to exercise military judgment, practical experience, and just plain common sense.

Fort Smith is uniquely positioned to offer this nation the key attributes sought by Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Dominguez, and Air Force Chief of Staff, General John P. Jumper. We will point out areas in the MCI calculations where military value was either underestimated because of inaccurate data or because updated data was never captured. We will familiarize you with the innovative joint operations training which is already being conducted just ten miles off the end of the runway at Fort Chaffee on a 24/7, 365-day basis.

This training is a picture-perfect example of what the Secretary of Defense terms jointness. Yet the type of integrated joint training currently underway at the 188th is so ahead of its time that it got zero consideration when the Department of Defense calculated its military value. Even when the 188th receives zero credit for some of its most valuable military components, Fort Smith should have gained aircraft based on the number of lower-rated Air Guard units which increased the number of aircraft in their fleets. Instead, BRAC

recommended that the 188th lose its flying
commission.

The commander of the 188th and more
than 300 of its unit's airmen are unable to attend
this hearing today because they're deployed to Balad,
Iraq. We are so very proud of their courage and we
are enormously grateful for their service.

With that, I'd like to introduce
Colonel Brock Strom. Colonel Strom was the director
of operations for the Air National Guard from July
the 1st, 2002, through February the 11th, 2005. He
has no affiliation with the 188th, no particular ties
to Arkansas, and is not a professional consultant.
Colonel Strom is here today because he has witnessed
firsthand the unique value to our nation and the
total force of basing fighters in Fort Smith.
Colonel Strom graciously agreed to provide the BRAC
Commission with his fair and objective assessment of
the 188th Fighter Wing's military value. I think you
will find his presentation enormously compelling.
Thank you so much.

Colonel Strom.

COLONEL STROM: Thank you, Senator
Lincoln. Chairman -- excuse me.

(Panel sworn.)

FORT SMITH

COLONEL STROM: Thanks again, Senator Lincoln, Chairman Principi, General Turner, General Newton, General Hill. As Senator Lincoln spoke to you, I'm the retired director of operations from the Guard, and my job here today is to paint you a picture of the range and airspace complex at Fort Smith that portrays the military value much higher than they were rated in the BRAC criteria.

We're not here today to argue with their criteria. We believe that the data used with the -- to derive the military value from Fort Smith had dated data, some inaccurate data, some insufficient to make the right case.

And, Mark, if you can throw the slides up there real quick. Next slide, please.

Let me first talk about some of the high points of Fort Smith, and then we're going to go specifically through the different criteria and the grading of the military value of Fort Smith.

First, Fort Smith owns Razorback Range ten miles off the runway. They own and operate that range 24/7. That's where they do all their munitions expenditures, et cetera. There are three military operating areas, airspace to fly and train in within

62 miles of the airfield. Two of those ranges, two of those MOAs, Fort Smith owns and operates and is the scheduling authority. The third one is scheduled and owned by Tulsa.

There's now a standing low-level roof structure that supports the complex that got access to aux fields for diverts, et cetera. And the infrastructure on the base has grown since '03 and it continues to grow and has the ability to grow even further, and we're going to show you a couple of pictures, some of the unique growth opportunities there at Fort Smith.

It's the number-one cost-effective unit in the Air National Guard. I think that's a fairly significant statistic. All Guard units are cheap; this is the cheapest to run.

And then the other two points I really want to talk about down there at the bottom, the ability to train with joint forces, Navy SEALs, the Army Special Ops, Forward Air Controllers, et cetera, and exercise the entire spectrum of the digital kill chain that's so -- that's being used in Afghanistan and Iraq today.

And, Chairman Principi, I know you're going to get a demonstration of that this afternoon

when you visit Fort Smith.

Next slide, Mark.

Okay. What we're going to do here is we're breaking the presentation. We're going to talk about the support criteria, and you can see on the left side of the slide the criteria that were weighted and actually derived by 38.63 military value score. And then on the right side we're going to talk a little bit about the nonsupport criteria, the tie-breakers.

The military value score at Fort Smith was 38.63. There were several units that had a lower military value that also -- they did not lose aircraft; they kept aircraft and are plusing that, but we're going to talk about those tie-breaker net criteria, et cetera. Next slide.

Okay. Criterion 1. What we did here was we broke out the three areas in the first criterion that, no kidding, Fort Smith really scored really low on. And we're going to take a look at why that is. Talking about the airspace, the low-level structure, and the auxiliary fields. Next slide.

Okay. This slide, this is the -- this is the simple math form book that a fighter pilot has to use. You can see here Formula 12 -- 1245. That

talks about proximity to airspace, and it kind of rates and weights the different areas that they will use at the Razorback Range for their -- for the score.

You can see airspace volume is 15 percent, operating range, 15 percent, et cetera. What we did on the far right side is we put up our own score and said kind of a yes and no. Do we -- do we meet the criteria or not? There are only two no's up there on the chart. That's the ability to drop live ordnance at the Razorback Range, and that accounted for three percent of the score. And the ability to train through electronic combat, and that's five percent of the score.

So when you total that all up, you come up with a score of 92 percent. That's a pretty good rate, and if you can meet 92 percent of requirements of DoD range in the future, you're doing pretty well. But I'll point down in the book, right below that, you scored basically 25 percent or less than 25 percent of the available points towards your military value. It doesn't seem to reflect the robustness of the range, the closeness of the range, and the joint training capability that you have both at Razorback and military operating areas that we

talked to. Next slide.

I'm going to show you a couple of charts here that show you some of the pictures that we want to drive home some points with. Up in the upper left-hand corner, you see the 188th Fighter Wing at Fort Smith. Down there in that square to the far right is Razorback Range.

Now, that's a 20-minute drive from the ramp to the range. Now, why is that important? Well, if I'm training with Special Ops, SEALs, Forward Air Controllers, Joint Task Force Controllers, et cetera, I can brief, we can go fly our mission, and we can debrief all face to face.

I can show on my tapes, say, "Hey, you were telling me this. This is what I saw. This is what it looked like in my jet." And that back-and-forth training is invaluable and has proven invaluable both in Afghanistan and in Iraq, as I'm sure you've seen in many of the reports.

The Chaffee Munitions Storage there at the -- kind of the middle left side of the slide, just note the distance there, and then we're going to talk more about munitions storage at Fort Smith and the ability to store munitions there. Next slide.

Okay. This is the big picture of the

military operating areas. You see the 188th. You see Razorback Range. You see the proximity there. That black outline is the Hog Military Operating Area. Up to the right you've got the Shirley Military Operating Area. And down to the bottom left you've got Rivers.

Those are all, again, like I said, 60 miles of the base. Equates to a much lower average sortie duration. You can get to the range quicker. You can do more training. You spend less time getting back and forth and more time actually doing real training.

The other part, that green outline there, is the Oachita National Forest. The importance of that is what? The importance is it sits right underneath the Hog MOA, so encroachment issues and environmental concerns that may be in other ranges aren't here. And that's going to lead to the next slide.

Next slide, Mark.

This shows the ability to bridge or to connect both the Hog and Shirley MOAs, so now you've taken two separate military operating areas, combined them into a much bigger piece of sky. And you can -- they -- they do this for some of the large force

employment exercises they do. There is an initiative. It's gone through the initiative -- the initial work with the FAA and is at the headquarters to--no kidding--make that a permanent range, bridged Hog and Shirley MOA. And again, that would be owned and operated by the Fort Smith folks.

Now, we've taken that, and you take the next slide, and we superimposed that range airspace over the Nellis Air Force Base complex.

And, General Newton, I know that when you compare range airspace anywhere to Nellis Air Force Base, you're -- you're comparing something to the -- to the mecca of all fighter ranges out there.

The next slide we're going to combine and tie four different military operating areas together. Up to the northeast you have the Lindberg MOA, which is where the unit can do the supersonic training, which has access to supersonic airspace. And down to the bottom there, we've got the Shirley MOA that, again, we're going to show on the next slide the expanse of airspace that you'll have. Basically, we've got Nellis and the Edwards Range air -- airspace complexes there superimposed underneath the expanded range complex.

Again, that's a huge volume of

airspace for any kind of training, whether it's joint strike fighter, FA-22, UAVs, et cetera, down the road, as well as F-16s and F-15s currently. Next slide.

This slide here kind of narrows down or kind of shows different areas in the country where there are certain types of training available and where it's kind of -- there aren't certain types of training available. Off to the west you've got the desert environment. The northwest, you've got your environmentally sensitive areas. Down central south U.S. you've got a lot of AETC ranges. There are great ranges, but it's real hard to get access to those if you fly if you're not in a training command unit and you don't control those.

The over-water ranges, you can do supersonic training. You've got cold weather up to the north. And then you've got the East Coast ranges that have their own issues with encroachment and noise sensitivity. And you can see right there in the middle of it, you've got the Fort Smith range complex.

And again, I'll point out that this is one of the few locations where you've got mountainous, forested terrain where you can -- you

can do urban pass type of training in that environment. There are very few locations in the United States you can get that training. That's exactly the type of environment they're flying in in Afghanistan now. It could potentially be in Korea, et cetera. Next slide.

Okay. Now we've talked about ranges. We're going to talk about the low-level roof structure. Again, still part of Criterion 1, you see the score was about 25 percent of the overall score. But when you look at it, you look at the low-level routes that are available for training and you've got 14 low-level routes available for training, seven of which go straight into the military operating areas and Razorback Range for employment.

The next slide is going to show you the spaghetti. And you see a circle around Fort Smith and you see all the different low-level routes that feed in and out of Fort Smith Range Complex. And again I'll point out to you that the military operating areas sit right on top of the majority of those low-level training routes, which again I think is a -- is a benefit that didn't quite show up in the overall military value score assigned to that. Next slide.

Auxiliary fields. There are two fields that Fort Smith uses as an auxiliary field, neither of which -- neither of which counted in the deliberations. There was a 15-mile circle requirement and there was an 8,000 foot runway length requirement. The requirement for most aircraft to use a field as a divert field is 7,000 feet. So where 8,000 feet came from, we're not exactly sure.

In the 50-mile circle for the F-16, whether you're at 50 or 54 or 55 is relatively statistically insignificant for a divert. Really, a divert at Fort Smith, the weather is usually clear in a million, but when they do have to divert, they've got Davis Field which is within 50 miles, but it's only 7400 feet long, and you've got Northwest Arkansas Regional Airport, which is 8500 feet long, but it's outside of the 50-mile circle. So again, the intent was, do you have access to aux fields? Yes, they do, but technically do they meet those criteria? They did not. Next slide.

Okay. Now we're going to talk about infrastructure and ramp space. And I think here's where we can really start adding some points and start adding more military value to Fort Smith. The ramp has expanded since the '03 data call went out

from 48,000 square yards to 68,000 square yards; 66,000 was the minimum required to score points. You can add points right off the bat for that.

Munitions storage. If you remember back to the picture we showed where Chaffee Munitions Storage was in relation to the 188th, currently you can store 120,000 pounds of 1.1 munitions at Fort Chaffee. The requirement to score was 49,000. And there's an ongoing construction project at Fort Chaffee to -- that will be completed in 16 months that will allow you to store over 1.1 million pounds of -- of munitions.

Now, do you have the ramp directly access to Fort Smith? No, you don't. You have to drive about a ten-minute drive to get access to those munitions. However, that's an equivalent drive to the munitions drive at Hill Air Force Base or Nellis Air Force Base, as far as doing that. So again, we understand the intent of the -- the intent of the criterion, but we believe we meet that intent.

Access to the supersonic airspace got zero points. I pointed out to you where Lindberg MOA was. If they had been given adequate credit for that, that would have been another four points to their military value score, which would have

increased that significantly. Lindberg MOA does sit within the 150-mile circle scoring, so I -- I assume it was an honest oversight.

The range complex supports mission. This -- this is almost a double jeopardy-type criterion. You remember the formula I showed you at 1245 that had all the breakouts on electronic combat and live runs, et cetera. This one does the same thing, has the same criteria, same weight, except electronic combat is rated at ten percent instead of five. So you've got an 87 percent score instead of 92 percent, and yet we're still looking at about a 50 percent overall score.

This criterion of 12 points and the Formula 1245 of 22 points accounts for 34 of the hundred points for military value, and if you get dinged on one, you get dinged on another. The range complex at Fort Smith is significantly better and warrants a much higher score than they were given in either one of those criteria. Next slide.

Here's a picture showing the ramp space that's been added since the '03 data call. That's an additional 12 F-16s or you can put C-17s or their equivalent on that ramp. Next slide.

This shows the ring -- ramp air --

ramp space that's available for expansion as well. And you can see that that's a fairly significant jump. Right now without any expansion today, you can house 37 F-16s or equivalents on the ramp. This would give you the ability to accommodate significantly more. Next slide.

As I touched on, we can support six-plus C-17 equivalents at Fort Smith, which again allows you the mobility deployment capability as well as the fighter surge capability on the ramp, either simultaneously or separately. Next slide.

Okay. We talked about the cost-effectiveness of the Guard for Fort Smith, and we won't belabor that point. That was -- it wasn't weighted very -- very heavily. Next slide.

Now we're going to talk a little bit on the non-weighted criteria and the non-graded criteria, and we think this is where some of the tie-breakers didn't fall in Fort Smith's favor.

The extent and timing of potential cost savings, Criterion 5. In the report it says you'll realize a \$2 million savings after 20 years of closing Fort Smith. We think one of the things that was missed was the firefighter detachment that currently supplies firefighter support for the

municipal airport at Fort Smith is being moved to Tulsa as part of this action. When you do that, that automatically triggers a seven and a half million-dollar capital investment bill, as well as \$2 million annual operating cost. So it's pretty hard to make a case that we're saving money long term with doing that maneuver there.

The economic impact on the existing communities. The BRAC report says 78 jobs are lost as a result of the BRAC initiative. That accounts for seven jets that were moved from Fort Smith to Fresno, but does not account for retiring the rest of the aircraft off the ramp. And when you do that, all the maintenance jobs, all the pilot jobs go away, and that number blooms to 670 versus 78.

We're going to talk about Criterion 7 here in a second. Criterion 8 we've touched on briefly, the environmental impact. Limited, if any. Next slide.

This is pretty interesting, and I didn't know it as well as I do now. But Fort Smith sits in an MSA of about 288,000 people, which gives you adequate access to housing, educational opportunities, plentiful jobs, child care, et cetera, all the things General Jumper, Secretary Dominguez

have said. If you put an active-duty unit at our -- at a location, you need to have access to quality-of-life issues away from the base. Fits the model perfectly.

Another little-known fact is that Northwest Arkansas, which is a 45-minute drive from Fort Smith, is the fifth fastest-growing metroplex in the United States--and we're going to show you a picture of that here in a second--which leads to a 98 percent retention rate and in-strength rate historical average for the last several years at Fort Smith. They have the demographics and the people to draw from, and I think it's shown here. Next slide.

This shows the population centers that you can touch within a 15-minute drive of Fort Smith proper. And, again, it incorporates an MSA of approximately 280,000 people.

The next slide, I think, is the big eye-opener. Those are the five fastest-growing metroplexes in the United States. You've got Washington, D.C., Atlanta, Dallas, Las Vegas, and you've got Northwest Arkansas. Two things I want to point out. One, to the east of that fast-growing area is where all the military operating areas are, away from the rapid population growth. And your

ranges are there. You can expand there. And there will be limited, if any, encroachment issues. And then the population growth primarily to the north and west of Fort Smith and Northwest Arkansas. Next slide.

Let's now get down to brass tacks and talk about what should the military value have been. When you take supersonic airspace, the ability to house C-17s, the ramp space addition, that's a total of six points, six-plus points. You add that to your military value of 38.6; you come up with a score of 44. That takes you from 110 overall up to 154. There should be little, if any, debate on those numbers right there.

The next slide, we get into fuzzy math where on the far right side we've got the areas where we didn't score very high, so we give the score and the available points and you can see 38 points were still available to score. We know 13 overall is too low; 51's not realistic either. So we cut it in half to 18, added that to the military value score and get a score of 63.66. We're not saying that's the right score, but we are saying 38.3 is significantly lower than the military value at Fort Smith.

If 63 were the right score, now you've

jumped from 110 to 23rd overall in the whole list of Air Force installations. A pretty significant jump, and I think one that warrants further scrutiny by you and your staff.

Okay. To sum it all up, Fort Smith meets senior leadership directives as far as having the ability to train jointly, the ability to surge, the ability to support both fighter and mobility surge operations. They've got great access to ranges. They have the ability to expand range airspace that many places in the United States don't have, and you can get training there that you can't get anywhere else.

It's got a demographic population that will support missions today, tomorrow, and well into the future, whether you're talking F-16s, joint strike fighters, UAVs, et cetera. There is a -- there is a complex there, a -- a diamond in the rough that we need to keep long term in the Air Force.

Next slide.

What this slide talks about -- and I'll talk to it briefly and I'll be off the stage. These are the different pieces of the puzzle that we've talked about today. We're tying them all together, and we believe that when you put them all

together, Fort Smith is a natural fit and deserves further consideration to remain on the -- to house fighters, et cetera, and to become a robust, total-force base of the future. And the last little deal that will come on here is the little thing on joint force training. And again, that ties it all together even more.

And appreciate your time, Commissioners. And if there's any questions, I'll be at the end and we'll talk about those. Congressman Boozman is next.

CONGRESSMAN BOOZMAN: First of all, thank you for your service, sir, to your country. Though all of you have had extraordinary careers, it's ironic that perhaps your most important issue may be the one that you're involved with now.

I was fortunate enough to be part of Secretary Principi's VA team under his bipartisan leadership. We were able to accomplish a tremendous amount for our nation's veterans. From his previous visit -- visits to my district, the chairman is very familiar with my large veteran constituency. Nationally, we rank in the top eight percentile of veteran population. Members of the military predominantly come from veterans' families. So the

188th has a lot to offer in recruiting capability and military support, which is critical to sustaining our military forces.

Western Arkansas also contains the country's fifth fastest-growing metro area. It's a powerful economic engine; it's the home of several Fortune 500 corporations. This includes Wal-Mart and Tyson Foods, both of which are winners of the Secretary of Defense's Employer Support Freedom Award.

My father was retired Air Force, and as a result I spent my childhood on military bases. My work on the NATO parliament and VA committees allowed me to visit military bases throughout the country, throughout the world.

I recently returned from Germany with Chairman Hefner where we saw the centralization process our military is experiencing abroad. Based on my personal experiences, based on the testimony that was just presented by Colonel Strom, and the fact that our region is rapidly growing and has enormous employer support for the military, I can truthfully say it will be a mistake to eliminate the mission of the 188th.

As a congressman who's very active and

supportive of our nation's military, I'm very concerned that the BRAC report branches into the policy arena, especially with the enclave concept. I feel Congress, along with the administration and the Pentagon, should make these policy decisions in order that we have greater continuity.

Again, thank you for your service, and thank you so much for your service on the BRAC Commission.

SENATOR PRYOR: I only have two minutes, so I'm going to be very direct. Let me just say at the outset, I'm a supporter of the BRAC process. I voted for it many times, but I think it's imperative that we get it right. You-all have this packet. I would encourage you and the staff to look at it. There's many things in there, but I want to talk about three of the items that are in that packet.

First, the 188th is not just a unit but a package that cannot be moved. Part of the package is great airspace. There's a lot of it and it's getting bigger. In that airspace you can simulate Korea, Afghanistan, Northern Iraq, and many other places. There's zero encroachment issues, zero environmental issues, universal community support,

and it is very close to Fort Chaffee. That's my second point.

Due to the proximity of Fort Chaffee, the 188th can coordinate very closely with troops on the ground. And what has developed there is they -- the soldiers and the airmen have a trilogy where they brief, they do their mission, and they debrief all together, the airmen and the soldiers. They can do that every day. They can do it face to face. And I'm unaware of any other location in the country where that can happen as easily as Fort Chaffee.

Third, jointness. For the first two years I was -- I've been in the senate, I've been on the -- I was on the Senate Armed Services Committee, and for two years jointness was drilled into us on Armed Services Committee. In Fort Smith you don't have to build jointness. It is already there. It exists.

My final two points are this. The enclave concept doesn't make any sense to me. They say it's going to save \$2 million over 20 years. I have serious doubts about that. There are too many unanswered questions about it. Frankly, I believe that shift in policy is best handled through Congress and not through the BRAC process.

But -- and lastly let me say this. If there is any doubt about the military value of the 188th, just remember it's deployed right now. It's in Iraq. And it's deployed for the second time in three years. Thank you.

MR. HUTCHINSON: Good morning, Commissioner Turner, Mr. Chairman, members of the commission. Today I am pleased to testify in support of the 188th Fighter Wing. I am testifying today as an 18-year resident of Fort Smith, as a former member of Congress representing Northwest Arkansas, and as someone who has been engaged in the security of our nation as a former undersecretary in the Department of Homeland Security.

In my time today let me emphasize a couple of points for your consideration. First, the Fort Smith Task Force, the community effort to make the case for the 188th, is fully supportive of the BRAC review. The increased effectiveness of our military structure is an objective we support. But we are convinced that keeping the F-16 mission in Fort Smith is consistent with our criteria set forth by the Department of Defense. This is also consistent with the joint operational strategy of our nation.

The heart of our argument is that the facts do not support the scoring assigned by the DoD review. For example, Colonel Brock Strom pointed out that Fort Smith received a low score on proximity to airspace, when in fact Fort Smith has Razorback Range and three other MOAs, all within shouting distance of the runway. The low score of four out of 22 is not consistent with the proximity, the quality, and the volume of available airspace.

Pilots know that the airspace under the control of Fort Smith is comparable to the finest air training bases in the country. The scoring also did not give Fort Smith credit for the superior low-level routes that provides quality support of the mission. The scoring criteria also set arbitrary limitations on what constitutes auxiliary airfields. This resulted in a score of zero, when the 7,400-foot runway at Davis Field that is within 50 nautical miles of the Northwest Arkansas Regional Airport with an 8,500-foot runway within 54 nautical miles should have entitled Fort Smith to receive the full 5.18 points.

When it comes to the condition of the infrastructure, Fort Smith should receive credit for the additional ramp space that was completed post-

assessment. Now there are 37 spaces for F-16s, and the base can support large-scale mobility deployments with 68,000 square yards of ramp space.

Next is cost-effectiveness. Fort Smith is the most cost-effective Air National Guard installation in the U.S. And realignment decisions require you to answer a fundamental question. Is the potential gain from the move worth the cost? In this case it takes 20 years to realize a \$2 million savings. But if you factor in the other costs of the taxpayers, such as 7.5 million to replace the fire support that is provided by the 188th, then it turns out to be a net loss. And it should be remembered that Fort Smith has one of only five FAA- and DoD-approved regional fire-training sites.

Under the DoD review, there were six units that had lower military value score and still kept its mission. And if scoring is recalculated consistent with the presentation today, then we move up further. But it's also important to look at the nonmilitary value criteria. Fort Smith has a four-year college, excellent schools, community support, high-level recruitment and retention, and quality employment opportunities. Fort Smith believes in the 188th, and the 188th is committed to

Fort Smith.

Finally, I would urge the commission to consider the point raised by Congressman Boozman and Senator Pryor. The realignment should follow existing force structures, strategies, and policies, and not require a military strategy to conform to an ad hoc realignment. Fort Smith meets the military value criteria, the quality-of-life factor, and its mission is consistent with the goals of senior leadership.

Many of the 188th is currently deployed to Iraq. A number of spouses and family members are here today. Mr. Chairman, they would all be gratified to know of your comments last night.

You recognize that this commission is to exercise independence and to serve as a check and balance to the defense review. We submit that an independent review will find substantial deviation from the established criteria and will find the F-16 should remain a part of the mission of the 188th.

Thank you. And Colonel Brock Strom or any of the other members of the delegation will be happy to answer any questions on this subject.

SENATOR LINCOLN: We do want to thank all of our presenters for the 188th, and a very

special thanks to the men and women who serve in the 188th, as well as their family members. There may not be a sea of yellow out there, but there's some really strong Razorback red folks and some precious children down there whose dads and moms are deployed at this moment. So we're very proud of them.

We also want to thank you again. At every request you have responded and listened to our information and details over and over. We'd now like to shift the focus to the base that gained personnel and equipment in the BRAC process, and that's the Little Rock Air Force Base. We do realize that the time is short and that's why we only want to take just a few moments in discussing a base which has a positive view of the DoD recommendation.

This is a premier training facility for the C-130s. We're very proud of it. And we have today Congressman Vic Snyder and the mayor of Jacksonville who would like to address just a few of the arguments that you have -- may have heard as you've traveled around the country hearing testimony from bases that are slated to lose aircraft to the Little Rock Air Force Base.

Congressman Snyder.

LITTLE ROCK AIR FORCE BASE

CONGRESSMAN SNYDER: Thank you. Good morning. I want to thank the commission for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of Little Rock Air Force Base and the central Arkansas community. It's good to see you again, Chairman Principi, and General Fig Newton -- General Newton -- Newton. We in Central Arkansas remember you fondly for your long service as head of AETC, and we're glad the commission has someone with so much familiarity with C-130s and the Little Rock Air Force Base.

Chairman Principi, your great work for veterans is remembered and much appreciated. And Commissioner Sue Turner, thank you for your years of -- of service.

We all appreciate what a hard job this commission has. There are no bad bases. The tens of thousands of civilian and military personnel who will be impacted by your decisions are all outstanding. There are no easy decisions here. You have two chores. First, to make the right decisions. And second, to have a decision-making process, the conclusions of which some will disagree with. But all will have no doubt regarding its fairness, transparency, and integrity. As one who's supported this BRAC round, I thank all of you, commissioners

and staff, for taking on this important work.

My nine years of interaction with the Little Rock Air Force Base made evident to me the ability of this fine base to play an even greater role in our national defense. For years at the Little Rock Air Force Base, the active side and the Air Guard, specifically the 189th C-130 Wing, have had an intensely close working relationship in training instructor pilots. An Air Force Reserve Aerial Port Squadron is based and trains at Little Rock Air Force Base. Little Rock Air Force Base for years has been a model for how the Air Guard, an active component, as a team can thrive together.

There are several important considerations in the C-130 community. Overall the fleet is declining in number due to wing box problems, the slow rate of C-130/J acquisition, and a currently stalled C-130 aviation modernization program. The high rate of use of C-130s means it is desirable to increase the operational availability and flexibility of the fleet.

We have to maximize the assets we have, and we believe that the Air Force's plan for the active-duty C-130s does this. It is also my hope that centralizing more airplanes will allow the

aircrews and their families to have more stability in assignments and lives.

Little Rock Air Force Base, the C-130 schoolhouse, is the right training -- is the right choice for the Air Force's plans. Mayor Swaim will talk specifically about the local community and some important base assets, but I wanted to mention a few points.

Little Rock is the center of C-130 training now, and no one has suggested that this mission could be more easily or cheaply conducted anywhere else. There is increased efficiency in centralizing operational assets where training is conducted. This should make continuation training easier and allow the more efficient use of training facilities and training areas such as simulators, drop zones, and assault landing strip.

The capacity of ramp space at the Little Rock Air Force Base could easily handle more planes. It's also well known, as evidenced once again this past weekend when numerous planes and helicopters were moved to Little Rock Air Force Base from other bases out of the path of Hurricane Dennis.

An attribute of Little Rock Air Force Base not adequately recognized is the variety of

surrounding terrain. Terrain has long been a determining factor in military operations and is vitally important for the low-level airdrops and assault landings that are part of the C-130 mission. Central Arkansas has varying terrain types, from mountains to plains to forests to rivers within minutes of flight time. It is important that both training units and operational units have access to such terrain for practice. And the presence of such an unmatched variety of training is a further advantage for Little Rock Air Force Base.

Thank you for this opportunity to share my views on the great military value of the Little Rock Air Force Base. I want to acknowledge the presence of my colleague, Congressman Marion Berry, who has about a third of the personnel of the Little Rock Air Force Base living in his district.

Mayor Tommy Swaim of the absolutely incredibly supportive city of Jacksonville, Arkansas, will now share his views about the community and the base.

MAYOR SWAIM: Thank you, Congressman Snyder. Commissioner and Chairman, members of the commission, thank you for providing this opportunity for me to speak. I wear two hats today. I'm

president of the Little Rock Air Force Base Community Council, and also mayor of the city of Jacksonville, Arkansas, the home of Little Rock Air Force Base.

Due to time constraints, I'll only make a few points and will be glad to answer questions if need be.

Little Rock Air Force Base has always been a welcome addition to the communities of Central Arkansas, the state of Arkansas, and particularly Jacksonville. The combined communities raised over a million dollars in 19-- fifty years ago in the 1950s to purchase over 6,000 acres of land for the construction of a military installation. The result was Little Rock Air Force Base.

To say the communities of Central Arkansas are excited to have a mission star base would be an understatement. We're not only excited; we're also prepared and stand ready to do whatever is necessary to provide for new personnel and their families. Should any issue arise that needs attention, the Little Rock Air Force Base Community Council, made up of citizens throughout Central Arkansas, is prepared to assist immediately. As in the past, the Community Council has given moral, physical, and financial help whenever needed.

Little Rock Air Force Base is known as a C-130 center of excellence, and we want to keep that title. We have great flying conditions, low-level flying routes, a large established drop zone, dedicated airspace. Encroachment is not a problem because the State of Arkansas and the City of Jacksonville have established an overlay district restricting density of residential and commercial development. An assault landing strip is available at Camp Robinson nearby with adequate ramp and runway space, as the congressman had said.

Mr. Chairman and commission members, our citizens are serious about their support of Little Rock Air Force Base. They voted a tax to raise \$5 million to help construct a new joint education center on Little Rock Air Force Base.

In closing, we think the evaluation of Little Rock Air Force Base and its ability to accept additional missions is accurate, and encourage you to review the duty and send a recommendation for the Little Rock Air Force Base to the president for his signature. Our community around Little Rock Air Force Base is prepared to handle recommendations of consolidation. And I thank you very much for your time.

SENATOR LINCOLN: Madam Chairwoman,
Chairman Principi, commissioners, this concludes our
Arkansas presentation. We are very grateful to you
all for your willingness to listen to all that we
have to bring. We've been a little bit overzealous
about getting all of our words in. It should go
without saying that we are at your disposal to answer
any questions and to be resourceful to you as you
make your deliberations, but we are very grateful for
the time that you've given us and the ability to
present to you, as a unified Arkansas delegation and
unified communities, our strength on behalf of the
servicemen and women that serve this great nation.
Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Thank you very
much for your testimony today. And Commissioner
Newton does have a question for you.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: A question for
Colonel Strom, please. For your airspace, can you
give me the tops and bottoms of the airspace and how
much of that airspace is cleared for supersonic.

COLONEL STROM: For the Lindberg MOA
airspace is what St. Louis uses, and that's the
supersonic airspace I was talking about that was
within that 150-mile circle. The different MOAs are

roughly between 18- and 20,000 feet in height. And depending on which MOA, you have different dimensions. I can refer that to the unit if you want specific --

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Just -- just provide that for the record for me, will you, please. Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Thank you again. We will take a ten-minute break.

(Recess.)

SENATOR CORNYN: Madam Chairman, it does me --

COMMISSIONER TURNER: I'm sorry.

SENATOR CORNYN: Those who have not been sworn, would it be appropriate for them to stand and be sworn at this time? Those who are going to be testifying.

(Panel sworn.)

TEXAS PRESENTATION - SAN ANTONIO

SENATOR CORNYN: Madam Chairman, it does me great pleasure to introduce the Military Task Force Chairman for San Antonio, an entrepreneur, community leader, and tremendous Spurs fan, Charlie Amato.

MR. AMATO: What an introduction.

Chairman Principi and commissioners, as a former chamber chairman and a chairman of the local base closing task force, I am grateful to our local, state, and congressional leaders who are here today to show their support and who have generously deferred to local experts who will best utilize our time.

We believe that overall, the Secretary of Defense has an excellent set of recommendations for the military missions in San Antonio, particularly those that reaffirm San Antonio's role as a national center for military medicine. We urge you not to change those recommendations. However, we do believe there are a few local missions that can be realigned in a way to increase their military value.

We have three topic experts. Dr. Francisco Cigaroa, president of the University of Texas Health Science Center here in San Antonio. He will discuss the changes in military medicine.

Also, retired Brigadier General John Jernigan will discuss the realignment of U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, the Air Force Institute of Operational Health, and the Direct Energy Research at Brooks.

And also we have retired Colonel Doug

Williams, who will address the issue of Cryptologic Systems Group.

Thank you very much. And our first speaker will be Dr. Cigaroa.

DR. CIGAROA: Chairman Principi and commissioners, on behalf of the people of South Texas, we welcome you to San Antonio, Military City USA and the home of military medicine.

San Antonio is a national model for joint military medical operations and training and civilian military partnerships. It is key to supporting the global war on terrorism. This synergy is saving lives today and has helped produce the lowest dire-wounds rate in our history.

As president of the University of Texas Health Science Center in San Antonio, a comprehensive university overseeing five professional health schools, over 50 accredited degree programs, and over \$200 million in sponsored research, we are proud of the interdependent relationship we have had with military medicine since our very beginning.

In my estimation, there is no better city in America than San Antonio to accomplish the goals outlined by the DoD recommendations for military medicine. Those recommendations are well

within our capacity to implement. Great centers of military medicine and academic medicine require a synergy of education, research, and clinical care. This is what we proudly offer, and we pledge to be a national treasure for our military and for their families.

The recommendations to build a regional medical center to consolidate medical training and to establish a joint center of excellence for health care and trauma in San Antonio are all compatible with our expertise and are consistent with the goals of DoD and the BRAC recommendations.

With Brooke Army Medical Center, the Air Force's Wilford Hall Medical Center, and the South Texas Veterans Health-care System, San Antonio has long been the place to which the nation has brought its wounded and cared for its nation's heroes, from private to president of the United States. We pledge to continue this service.

Let me address a few specific issues. San Antonio appreciates DoD reaffirming their commitment to the trauma mission in our region. The congressionally supported Trauma Institute of San Antonio is working well for trauma care and

research. We are confident that we can adjust to two Level 1 trauma centers. The loss of Wilford Hall's inpatient services, however, will require investment in both a new military medical center and the University Health System.

We would appreciate the BRAC Commission revalidating this commitment to keeping the total volume of military trauma at its current level.

Trauma is but one example of the special relationship the Health Science Center has with the military. On any given day, dozens of Health Science Center students, residents, nurses, and faculty are engaged in clinical care, education, and research at our military hospitals. And in turn, the Health Science Center has dozens of military physicians, nurses, and others engaged in education and research in our program.

Many of our graduate medical-education programs are joint civilian and military residents, and we're proud to expect those numbers to increase. The leaders of San Antonio would appreciate the BRAC Commission acknowledging the Health Science Center's special relationship as a preferred partner for the military medical organizations in education,

research, and critical care, and adding value to military medicine unlike any other place in the country.

In closing, the DoD recommendations for military medicine affecting San Antonio are far-reaching and they are visionary. They make logical sense. It builds upon what is already happening, and you should not change them. And by combining these recommendations with the superb resources of our civilian institutions, we will be able to make military medicine even better and to produce health care teams and medical leaders of great competence and character for a lifetime of service to their communities. This is vital for saving the lives of our troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

And now I'd like to introduce Dr. John Jernigan, a retired Air Force brigadier general and a former commander of Brooks Air Force Base.

GENERAL JERNIGAN: Chairman Principi and commissioners, I am addressing you today as both a concerned citizen and a person who has expertise in aerospace medicine, aeromedical evacuation, and who was a former dean of the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine.

I agree with everything Dr. Cigaroa just testified to, and I do believe that there are some changes that will increase the military value of recommended realignment. The first of these regards the United States Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, referred to as USAFSAM. The report out of DoD states that -- as follows: that the justification for this realignment is, and I quote, the end state will co-locate the human system development and acquisition function and the human system research function with Air Force aerospace medicine and occupational health, education, and training.

Such a move totally ignores the fact that the majority of the training of the School of Aerospace Medicine has nothing whatsoever to do with human systems research and development. For example, there are four separate courses in aeromedical evacuation, one of which is the critical care in the Air Force so vital to bringing our troops home every day. In total these courses account for over 300 training days each year, and they are absolutely vital to assure we have the teams that can bring our young heroes home when they are injured.

Furthermore, there are over 2,000

enlisted medics trained in the School of Aerospace Medicine every year, and they are trained in a variety of skills that allow them to support the deployed Air Force.

And finally, the Aeromedical Consult Service serves to do special exams of pilots and other fliers who have particular problems on a daily basis, and they depend on vital partnerships with Wilford Hall Medical Center which will not exist at Wright-Patterson.

Therefore, it seems to me that Fort Sam is the perfect place for the School of Aerospace Medicine. In fact, it could remain in its current high-quality facilities until the end of the six-year BRAC implementation period, and in fact might not ever need to leave Brook City-Base and serve as a cantonment training area much as Camp Bullis does on a daily basis right now.

There are multiple benefits to this suggestion. First, much of the faculty, both active duty and civilian, will not move to Wright-Patterson, and I don't believe an adequate analysis has been done on how they're going to deal with the impact of the loss of that faculty.

Second, much of the faculty that

teaches critical care in the air comes on a loaner basis from Wilford Hall Medical Center, and they're the people who are doing that mission worldwide on a day-to-day basis. That does not exist at Wright-Patterson.

Third, air-evac is so vital to all of our military services that having it together with the joint training organization that's standing up at Fort Sam definitely will have positive benefits.

A second realignment that should be changed is the Air Force Institute for Operational Health, called AFIOH. Now, while AFIOH used to be a part of Armstrong Lab and therefore part of the Air Force Research Lab, it's been disconnected for the last ten years. And right now it does a wide variety of medical functions to support our deployed troops worldwide. This organization should remain in San Antonio tied to USAFSAM.

A public/private partnership which was almost complete prior to the BRAC announcement should be reengaged. That plan would give DoD much greater military value than moving AFIOH in toto to Wright-Patterson.

The third realignment involves directed energy research. The BRAC in 1989 directed

the establishment of a tri-service directed energy bioeffect laboratory in San Antonio. It remains tri-service today, and it should remain tri-service through the end of BRAC 2005.

These laboratories are the world's center for the effects of lasers and microwaves on humans accomplishing both classified and unclassified missions that impact military medicine, operations on the ground in Iraq, and security at our nation's capital. Military medicine uses these laboratories to set safety standards and to treat injuries that come from directed energy. Policy-makers use the research to answer questions regarding the use of directed energy to noncombatants such as with the airborne laser or microwaves used for riot control.

Now, let me shift gears and talk briefly about the support on the ground in Iraq. Our tri-service laboratories are actively developing new nonlethal capabilities like microwave systems that are on the ground in Iraq and offensive urban operations, new concepts that destroy mortar rounds, force protection systems for use in convoys and at checkpoints, and aircraft warning systems that are in Washington, D.C.

This joint success story cannot be

moved without permanent harm. BRAC 1995 data shows that about 70 to 80 percent of scientists will not move, and you're not going to find directed energy bioeffects programs in graduate schools or in commercial companies. If you move it, we're going to lose that function.

Finally, one must note that the research they do depends on nonhuman primates. A primate colony that's appropriate exists in San Antonio with a vivarium to support it, and it does not exist in Dayton, Ohio.

Now I'd like to turn it over to retired Colonel Doug Williams with a wealth of experience and intelligence, and he's going to talk about a specific mission.

COLONEL WILLIAMS: Good morning, Chairman Principi and Commissioners. The Cryptologic Systems Group, or CPSG, provides highly specialized support to a host of military and nonmilitary governmental agencies. These agencies depend on the CPSG to protect their most sensitive and classified operations. Because of the secretive nature of the CPSG's work, my comments will be limited to just a few observations and will emphasize how I believe that the proposed realignment of the Cryptologic

Systems Group has a very real potential to severely damage our national security.

The Defense Department first -- first proposed closure of the CPSG and realignment of its functions during the 1995 BRAC. At that time, the CPSG was part of the San Antonio Air Logistics Center. Fortunately, the '95 BRAC Commission recognized that the vital functions performed by the CPSG should be left intact as part of Lackland Air Force Base.

We don't know what led to the department's recommendation to break up the CPSG during this current BRAC route, but there are indications that the intelligence community was not sufficiently involved in the decision. For example, we know that the National Security Agency has formally expressed concern about the realignment recommendation.

In addition, the DoD realignment proposal appears to violate BRAC military value criteria in that it would decrease efficiency and adversely affect the war fighter.

Now, this slide shows what I mean. As you can see, CPSG customers such as tactical commanders, the National Security Agency, or the

National Reconnaissance Office currently enjoy a one-stop shopping capability. They make one call to one provider. They get -- by that call, they get all the tools they need.

Now, this next slide shows you what will happen if it changes. Instead of going to one provider, they'll have to go to five just to get what they get right now with a single phone call to the CPSG.

We think it's reasonable to assume that the speed and efficiency of even the most sensitive and important operations will suffer. And I should tell you as the former commander of a large intelligence group, if you don't have a responsive CPSG, you're in big trouble mission-wise.

Among the hundreds of realignments suggested by the DoD for this BRAC, the disassembly of the Cryptologic Systems Group is one that would directly threaten or could directly threaten the security of our nation and the safety of our troops.

To summarize, CPSG is a joint operation. It supports national -- vital national security and intelligence functions, and breaking it apart has the potential to do real harm. We therefore urgently urge you to carefully weigh and

consider the background data we provided, and we look forward to answering your questions and working with your staff on this matter.

We thank you for your time and attention.

MR. AMATO: Commissioners, in closing, would you direct your attention again to the monitor. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Could you please -- I'm sorry.

In closing, could you please direct your attention to your monitor, and it shows our bottom line. Please do not change the medical recommendations except for three realignments from Brooks--U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, the Air Force Institute of Operational Health, and Directed Energy Bioeffects Research. And finally, please do not dismantle the Cryptologic Systems Group.

And we thank you for your service to your country. We appreciate all of you being here, and thank you for scheduling this hearing at the home of the World Champion San Antonio Spurs.

SENATOR HUTCHISON: This ends the presentation from San Antonio, and we would now like to ask El Paso to come forward. Thank you.

EL PASO

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Gentlemen, if you haven't already been sworn, would you please stand so we can administer the oath. Thank you.

(Panel sworn.)

SENATOR CORNYN: Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, when talking about how the military has impacted my life, I forgot to mention my dad's assignment at Fort Bliss William Beaumont Hospital in El Paso, so I have personal connection with the presentation made today. But without wasting their presentation time, let me now introduce Congressman Silvestre Reyes, who will kick off comments about Fort Bliss's contribution to our national security.

CONGRESSMAN REYES: Thank you, Senator. Madam Chair and commissioners, welcome to Texas. Thank you for your time and for your attention to this very important matter for our national security.

El Paso is very enthusiastic about the recommendation to bring over 16,000 new military and civilian personnel to Fort Bliss. With these recommendations, Fort Bliss and El Paso will become home to the First Armored Division, an aviation brigade, and a field artillery brigade. Our top

priority is to warmly welcome these new troops, civilians, and their families, and provide a smooth transition for them to our community.

In recent years we have made key investments in our infrastructure to ensure that our community has the ability to support current and future troops. The DoD recommendations also include realignment of the ADA Center and School, and an ADA brigade from Fort Bliss to Fort Sill.

We believe the data will demonstrate the better recommendation, and we ask you to listen closely to our rationale. Our region can best support one of the most high-tech missions of the joint war fighter, Network Fires. The BRAC report requests that El Paso specifically provide documentation relative to water, public education, and housing. Our written submission includes all the verifying backup data.

First in regards to water, we have ensured sufficient water for the next century and beyond with significant supplies of groundwater and surface water, reclaimed wastewater, conservation efforts and future importation from neighboring counties. This month we will also break ground on the world's largest inland desalinization plant which

will produce 27.5 million gallons a day beginning next year.

Edmund Archuleta, general manager of the El Paso Water Utilities Public Service Board, is here to answer any questions that you might have.

Second, in reference to our schools, we have significant search capacity to accept the additional students projected to accompany the incoming soldiers. With current available capacity of 27,000 seats and recent approval of \$645 million in bonds, this will generate an additional 14,900 seats. With our low student-to-teacher ratio and rising student achievement rates, we are ready to provide quality education to the children of our men and women in uniform, as well as to support high-tech transformation.

Robert Ortega, the interim superintendent from El Paso Independent School District, is here to answer any questions that you might have about the capacity and quality of El Paso schools.

Finally, regarding housing, of the projected net gain of 11,500 troops for Fort Bliss, an estimated 60 percent or 6900 of these families will live off post. We have current surge capacity

of over 7200 units and can document plant construction of at least another 12,800 new units over the course of the next three years. Almost 70 percent of these new units will be in the northeast part of El Paso with easy access to Fort Bliss.

In addition, a master plan for the northeast part of El Paso identifies sufficient land to construct at least 62,000 new residential units as the market demands.

Now I'd like to turn it over to Bob Cook, president of the El Paso Regional Economic Development Corporation to further our discussion.

MR. COOK: Good morning. It has been my great privilege to represent El Paso's private sector for the past three years to make sure that our community's message to the military has been clearly understood. Within that context, it is also my duty today to demonstrate that the BRAC report contains erroneous and, in some cases, incomplete data as it relates to our community and our regional installation, Fort Bliss, White Sands Missile Range, and Holloman Air Force Base.

By the way, even with errors in the data, Fort Bliss still ranked number one in military value among all Army installations. I will focus

only on the most significant data, data that indicates why we believe a faulty recommendation was made to establish the Net Fires Center at Fort Sill instead of the location most able to accommodate it, Fort Bliss.

The current slide demonstrates five military value criteria for which BRAC data incorrectly gives a higher relative score to Fort Sill. We have already submitted information that supports our position challenging these relative rankings to the BRAC Commission staff.

The BRAC report utilizes 2003 data on air quality, which correctly indicated that El Paso was non-attainment for ozone, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter. The current slide shows as of 15 June 2005 we are officially in attainment for ozone. Later this month the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality is expected to formally petition to remove our community from the non-attainment list for carbon monoxide based on the data you see here.

State unit data included in your binder also indicates El Paso is monitoring in attainment for particulate matter. The state is currently working with the EPA to resolve this issue.

Commissioners, we have no challenges to receive these new missions from an air-quality perspective.

This chart contains data that came directly from the BRAC report. The recommendation to move the ADA Center and School from Fort Bliss to Fort Sill is rated as high risk, based on ten quality-of-life factors. This chart indicates that DoD believes six factors will worsen for soldiers and their families if the ADA Center and School are realigned to Fort Sill.

Only two factors were deemed to have improved--cost of living and employment opportunity. Utilizing the same data considered by DoD, we have presented additional information to commission staff that clearly indicates El Paso provides 3.3 times more employment opportunities than does Lawton.

We have also submitted current objective data in your binder that demonstrate cost of living is virtually equal in the two communities. This recommendation should be placed clearly in the high-risk category. We believe the commission should consider that if this is a high-risk move for soldiers, civilians, and their families, it will also be high risk to the high-tech contractors who currently employ hundreds of personnel in El Paso

that will be needed in close proximity to support the ADA and Net Fires mission.

The current chart, also taken from the BRAC report, depicts four military value criteria where Fort Bliss capability significantly exceed those of Fort Sill. These criteria, we believe, are critical to achieving the critical objectives of joint war fighting, joint training, and joint readiness. We must point out also that the workforce of El Paso, the nation's 21st largest city, is almost seven times larger than that of Lawton.

On the screen before you now is wording taken directly from the BRAC report, the key elements of this quotation from the Army's detailed analysis: Maneuver land is scarce. We must train as we fight. Therefore, the ideal training environments are those that best mirror combat operations.

As I get ready to turn the presentation over to Major General Jim Maloney, former commanding general at Fort Bliss, one final point must be brought to your attention. The current slide pulls from Table 13 of the Army's detailed analysis, and we can discern clear inferences from these data. DoD places clear value on locating large schools such as Air Defense Artillery in close

proximity to ample maneuver areas. These data -- our community asks a component question. Why move a large school--Air Defense Artillery--from a location--Fort Bliss--that has maneuver space ample to support five large schools?

GENERAL MALONEY: Good morning, Commissioners. We plan to prove to you that the Net Fires Center should be placed at Fort Bliss. We will show that Fort Bliss provides a far superior environment.

The bases that comprise the Bliss/White Sands/Holloman Air Force Base Complex lie in high desert terrain that resembles major contingency in combat areas. Fort Bliss comprises more than one million acres. White Sands Missile Range is contiguous to Fort Bliss. It has about two million acres. Holloman Air Force Base is on White Sands Missile Range. About one million more acres are available for call-up under contract.

This area comprises more than 25 percent of all the Army land in the United States. It is the largest DoD-controlled air and ground space in the country. It has U.S. Air Force air traffic controllers who control the airspace from mud to space. It is slightly smaller than the state of

Connecticut.

Now let's look at the very southern tip of this military region. In 2004 Fort Bliss, at Department of the Army request, studied its ability to station as many as three divisions. Fort Bliss assumed that the ADA brigades and school and center would remain in the cantonment area.

Fort Bliss identified three new division areas. This area, about five miles from the cantonment area, would house the First Armored Division. There has been a suggestion that moving the Air Defense School and Center and a Tactical ADA Brigade to Fort Sill would open necessary space to incoming troops. Such a vacation of space is not necessary. Fort Bliss has plenty of capacity as shown in the Bliss study and in the BRAC data.

This is Fort Bliss without White Sands or Holloman. This is a to-scale outline of Fort Sill. Fort Sill is about one-twelfth as large as Fort Bliss.

Stinger is the shortest range ADA missile. It cannot be fired within Fort Sill's boundaries. ADA's school students fire 140 to 220 Stingers per year at Fort Bliss. The ranges of Fort Sill do not accommodate any ADA missiles.

Fort Bliss troops fire on average 23 Patriot missiles every year for missile lock validation and as a part of White Sands testing and evaluation. In a prime example of the cross-functional use of training and testing ranges, Fort Bliss troops obtain great training value from this live firing. It would be difficult and costly for elements of a Fort Sill-based ADA brigade to travel more than 600 miles one way to participate in these activities.

At Fort Sill, an operational ADA brigade cannot train as it fights. Here's why. Patriot doctrine specifies a 20- to 30-kilometer distance between batteries to obtain the optimum defended area. Here are four batteries to scale arrayed in line. You could do that when you're fairly sure of the direction of attack. Even using conservative distances of 20 kilometers, the array of batteries would not fit on the Fort Sill Reservation.

Now let's look at remote launcher location. A Patriot battery has six launchers. A launcher or a pair of launchers can be located from six to 30 kilometers from the engagement control station at the battery. This enlarges the defended area, and can improve probability of kill against an

incoming missile.

Fort Sill is far too small for this task. To squeeze the training into a small area would inject a lack of realism into missile resupply, maintenance activities, communication distances, and soldier care. At Fort Sill, an ADA battalion cannot train as it fights. It can at Fort Bliss.

In the near future, new systems will enter the force. Each will extend the range of the systems they will replace. Typically, the Air Defense Artillery School trains the troops, writes the doctrinal manuals, forms new organizations by assembling the trained troops and their equipment. The new organizations maneuver, and when fully trained they fire their new systems to prove them and to display their ability. And the center certifies the unit's ability to fight.

Fielding the ends in 2008 for SLAMRAAM, followed quickly by THAAD, MEADS, and then the JLENS system, which is an aerostat-mounted radar currently developing technology, each of these missile systems is longer ranged than the system it will replace. The reach of ADA will continue to require very large ground and airspace and increasing electromagnetic radiation permission and

coordination. The Fort Bliss/White Sands/Holloman Air Force Base Complex is ideal for these purposes.

Rapid inductive development called SPIRAL has been proven over several decades at Fort Bliss. I'm not going to read this chart in detail. SPIRAL development transforms complex systems such as Patriot incrementally and rapidly. All elements that develop, test, and evaluate, train, operate, and employ are resident at Fort Bliss.

There is a proven track record at Fort Bliss that is important. The new troops that are headed into Fort Bliss make it an even better place to develop. SPIRAL won't work well if we move a part of it to Fort Sill. And Germany's Air Defense Center located at Fort Bliss is partners in the MEADS and other activities.

Fort Bliss is a far better environment for Army transformation, joint combined and coalition training, firing of weapons systems, deployments, testing and evaluation. And let me highlight one particular item there. The Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems recently decided to be placed at Holloman for operational testing, the SPIRAL capability, interoperability, force stabilization, and quality of life.

We urge the commission to carefully examine the data we provided to recognize that location of the Net Fires Center at Fort Bliss best serves Army transformation and to propose that the Net Fires Center should be located at Fort Bliss. Thank you.

SENATOR CORNYN: Subject to any questions, we appreciate your time this morning.

COMMISSIONER HILL: I have a question for General Maloney. Do you think that there should be a Net Fires Center?

GENERAL MALONEY: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER HILL: You do?

GENERAL MALONEY: I do.

COMMISSIONER HILL: So you -- the argument that you're making is not to keep the Air Defense Center at Fort Bliss and Fort Sill stay as it is. But you think there should be a combination that you think that should be at Bliss?

GENERAL MALONEY: I believe there -- I believe the Net Fires concept is a very viable and valuable one that should be pursued. I believe that the Fort Bliss portion of that operation is far better pursued at Fort Bliss. I believe if the two schools are to be co-located, then they should be

co-located at Fort Bliss.

SENATOR HUTCHISON: That ends the presentation of El Paso. Thank you very much, and thank all of the community leaders for coming. And the mayor, the mayor of El Paso is also with us. Thank you all.

We are now going to start the presentation from Houston, Texas. And as the mayor and congressmen come forward, I would like to just mention that this presentation is about Ellington Field. This is a base that sits contiguous to NASA. It is a short distance from one of the largest chemical complexes in the world, and a very few miles from the Gulf of Mexico, which is the largest source, new source, of oil and gas production in the United States outside Alaska. So it is a huge economic center and also a homeland defense center that should be certainly looked at from the homeland defense standpoint.

And now it is my pleasure to introduce the majority leader of the United States House of Representatives, Congressman Tom Delay, who will open and manage the Houston 30 minutes. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: May we ask the new participants to rise to be sworn? Thank you.

(Panel sworn)

CONGRESSMAN DELAY: Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this regional hearing here in Texas, the state that so many of the troops and military families affected by the BRAC's work call home. And I also thank the other commissioners for your service to the Commission and to our country.

Madam Chair, the Texas International Guard's 147th Fighter Wing based at Ellington Field and currently scheduled, because of BRAC recommendations, to lose its -- F-16 fighters as an essential strategic component to the security of the Houston-Galveston region.

Given the data of this commission as supplied by the Department of Defense about the region and its strategic reliance on the 147th Fighter Wing, I understand, even if I still disagree with the preliminary recommendations it has made, but by that -- that of Madam Chair and Members of the Commission, I believe and we will show was flawed in both substance and -- and method.

In a moment retired Colonel Rob Par, a former commander of the 147th at Ellington Field, and

Mr. John Cook, chairman of the Ellington Field Task Force, will run you through some of the oversights the Pentagon made in its analysis of Ellington Field's homeland security, military and strategic value.

With -- if you leave here with nothing else, I hope you leave here with the notion that -- that Houston Galveston is the fourth largest city in America. It's the fourth largest port in the world. It has the largest petrochemical facilities in the world. And it's the only region in the entire United States, including New York City, that has all nine of the terrorist targets outlined by the FBI.

Such a massive population and geographic area simply cannot be defended without adequate military assets. And those assets need a home along the Gulf Coast. And that home should remain Ellington Field despite the Pentagon's incomplete estimation of Ellington's strategic value, an estimation that was unfortunately made without any coordination with the Texas' governor or the National Guard leaders.

The current recommendations do not accurately reflect the strategic necessity of Ellington Field or other Air National Guard bases around the country. A mistake has been made and we are appealing to the Commission to fix it.

Thank you, Madam Chair, for the opportunity to testify this morning. And at this time I'll yield to John Cook.

MR. COOK: Thank you, Congressman Delay.

My name is John Cook. I'm the chairman of the Ellington Field Task Force. The Ellington Field Task Force is a two-year old community-based organization of literally hundreds of individual business and political interests who are deeply concerned about the DoD recommendation to retire the 147th at Ellington Field.

This task force sprang out of the Bay Area-Houston Economic Partnership whose service area includes Ellington Field.

Congressman Delay has recognized those members that are here today. And I also request that these letters of -- of support and resolutions be entered into the record.

The DoD summary documents indicate a total job loss of five due to their recommendations. A closer look at their own detail reveals a total loss of 556 jobs. The loss of these jobs is significant. However, this is not an economic development issue. It is a national security issue of the highest magnitude, which just happens to be based in the heart of Houston,

Texas.

The Houston region, as Congressman Delay has mentioned, is home to all nine terrorist target categories as identified by the FBI. No other city can make the FBI nine claims. This makes Houston the single-most terrorist target rich metropolitan area in the United States.

We respectfully challenge the recommendation to eliminate the primary source of protection for these terrorist targets. It just doesn't make sense. I will now identify some of these potential terrorist targets located in and around Houston and explain why vulnerability and protection of these assets has huge national implications.

The petrochemical and refining industry, 40 percent of the nation's base petrochemical capacity sits in the Houston area. 25 percent of the nation's crude refining capacity sits on the Texas Gulf Coast. 24 percent of the nation's jet fuel is produced on the Texas Gulf Coast in just two facilities.

Industry is not allowed to have weapons to combat air attacks for defense. They need the 147th for that. This is a high-value target for terrorists.

The Port of Houston, this port is the largest in the United States in foreign tonnage. It is

the second largest port in the U.S. in total tonnage connected to the 3,000 mile intercoastal waterway.

There are over 6,000 ships that call on the port each year. That's over 16 ships every day seven days a week going through a ship channel to shiplines. There are five more major ports on the Gulf Coast protected by the 147th. This is a high-value target for terrorists.

The Texas Medical Center, this is the largest medical center in the entire world. It is part of the national disaster medical system with Ellington Field as the designated facility. Over 65,000 people work there just in this medical center.

There are over three and a half billion dollars in research grants that were carried out in the last four years at this facility. There are more new anti-cancer drugs evaluated there than anyplace else in the United States. This is a high-value target for terrorists.

As has been mentioned, Houston is the fourth largest city in the United States located right on the strategic Gulf Coast. There are over five million people that live in the Houston area. Houston contains more people than the entire state of Minnesota. And Harris County contains more people than the entire

state of Oregon. This is a high-value target for terrorists.

There are many other high-value targets in the Houston region. NASA's Johnson Space Center, America's Mission Control Center for Human Space Exploration, strategic petroleum reserves. The University of Texas Medical Branch National Biocontainment Laboratory is currently under construction in Galveston 50 miles away. The nuclear power plant in Bay City, major event venues such as the Superbowl just last year was a national security event. These are all high-value targets for terrorists.

We don't understand how you can protect this wide array of national security targets without a full wing. In closing, I simply repeat based upon the FBI data, Houston is the single-most terrorist target rich metropolitan area in the United States.

We respectfully challenge for the above-mentioned reasons the recommendation to stand down the 147th Fighter Wing. This would eliminate the only credible source of protection from air attack against these numerous high-value targets. This includes anything from a Piper Cub to a foreign-charted 447 to hijacked corporate jets.

None of our other homeland security, law

enforcement or other Air Force resources can replace the 147th at Ellington Field to protect our national assets in this area. Thank you. I will now turn over the podium to Colonel Parr.

COLONEL PARR: Good morning. My name is Ron Parr. I'm a former commander of the 147th Fighter Wing. I'm here to present the citizen's case opposing the inactivation of the 147th Fighter Wing at Ellington Field Joint Reserve Base.

After the recent site visit by Commissioner Hanson, it's now obvious that the general public and elected officials are aware of the importance of the Houston infrastructure to the nation and that the 147th Fighter Wing is a vital part of the layered homeland defense of that area.

The final disposition of air defense assets for the Houston area needs more review by senior leadership, both of the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. But to do that, we must first stop this BRAC recommendation.

The very fact that the Air Force let this premature recommendation slide under the radar and screen and into the BRAC process is in itself indicative of a flawed process.

We believe the DoD recommendation to the

BRAC commission to inactivate the 147th Fighter Wing is wrong. It is wrong because the DoD deviated substantially from its own guidelines and BRAC law in arriving at this recommendation.

The BRAC process was flawed. It was flawed in four areas. But first let's take a quick look at the BRAC law. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that military value is the primary consideration.

With regard to homeland defense, this recommendation leaves crucial national assets along the Texas Gulf Coast inadequately defended. Homeland defense considerations were not factored into military value as they should have been.

The data metric -- you have heard this over and over and over. The data metric was flawed. The DoD did not utilize meaningful data to score Ellington Field's present and future military value.

The cost analysis, this recommendation does not save money as you have heard over and over from other presenters. The application of military judgment, the DoD did not use the data that it did assemble in an appropriate manner. No evidence use of military value or military judgment was evident. With regard to BRAC, this decision now appears random.

They failed to consider homeland

defense. The Department of Defense in the BRAC process are by their own statements committed to homeland defense as the highest priority. I'll show you more on that in a moment.

For those of us who don't know, U.S. Fighter Wings have both a worldwide and a homeland defense mission. While they are training in their stateside bases to perform worldwide deployment and employment missions, if they are properly located, they can also fulfill important homeland defense missions. Where they are stationed then is key to accomplishing both of these missions.

Ellington, as we have seen, is strategically located near numerous high-value potential terrorist targets. This seems to be an ideal bed-down base for an Air National Guard Fighter Wing. And it has been for over 50 years.

The 147th is the only asset in the Houston area capable of dealing with an airborne threat. And a simple alert site without apparent wing co-located is inadequate.

These statements show the Department of Defense and BRAC commitment to homeland defense. Protecting the U.S. Homeland is the highest priority for the Department of Defense as per their own statements.

The Air Force consulted with U.S. NORCON to ensure BRAC recommendations preserves sufficient installations near our borders and near high-value targets to support air sovereignty as part of homeland defense. We find no evidence of meaningful inclusion of either concept in this recommendation. This is a substantial deviation in the DoD policy and guidance regarding BRAC.

If they take the Fighter Wing away from Houston and leave only an alert site, they are not preserving sufficient installations near our borders and their high-value targets as you can see from this map. Inactivation, therefore, of 147th Fighter Wing is inconsistent with BRAC guidance.

The key to this argument is the inadequacy of an alert site without a co-located parent wing. Here are some of the differences that some may not understand. An air sovereignty alert site is a small force designed for quick reaction against a small threat and it has only limited defense capability.

A full Fighter Wing, of course, is a much larger force. It's capable of augmenting the ASA site quickly if it is co-located. It has sustained in-depth combat defensive capability. If it is not co-located with its alert site, a significant time is required to

mobilize and deploy the forces to the area of need. And when seconds count, location is key.

When a wing is co-located with its air sovereignty alert site, local familiarity becomes part of the mission. Pilots fly on a daily basis around their parent wing and they learn about the local area. They learn where the harbor is, where the ports are, where the petrochemical concentrations are, where the population centers are.

Imagine for a moment a scenario where a fighter pilot is scrambling to try to find a hostile target in the midst of civilian traffic near airports, near population centers, near petrochemical plants. Not having intimate familiarity with that area could be the difference in success in a serious national disaster.

The infrastructure and personnel required to provide air defense to the Texas Gulf Coast had been in place at Ellington for 50 years. That includes an alert site and the Fighter Wing.

Almost all of these things would go away if the Wing did. And under the BRAC proposal, they would be replaced with less and less infrastructure and less well-trained people providing a lesser capability.

These have been tested over and over in the last 50 years. At a time when the real threat to

our homeland is probably greater than it has ever been, this makes no sense.

The data metric for developing military value is gone. And I know the Commissioners have heard this over and over and I will go very briefly over this point. However, military value with regard to homeland defense was part of data metric number two.

We can find no inclusion in the database of any homeland defense datapoints. Had there been some, the strategic location of Ellington would have scored at high. Its four combat alert sites for sending ASA alert, plus the 24-hour sustainable crew quarters would have been important. The command post, which has operated for many, many years 24 hours a day, is capable of 24-hour fight in place.

Joint training was not credited -- and again, I won't go into detail there, but Ellington Field has always been a joint base. The Air National Guard, the Army National Guard Aviation, the Coast Guard Aviation and NASA's fairly substantial astronaut training program and research flight operations occur there.

Other military values and anomalies and omissions. Once again, I won't go into those. They're listed. They were part of the record that Commissioner

Hanson picked up on Friday. But interestingly enough, today there's another squadron of C-130s that deployed in from Mississippi parked on the Air National Guard ramp at Ellington. And it didn't get scored for that extra space that those C-130s are enjoying now, and we're glad they're there. They're utilizing a secure ramp. They're utilizing our fueling capabilities, our security and our command post, plus maintenance facilities.

The bottom line is that Ellington does have the infrastructure to support future missions and it is available as a valuable air enclave for the Department of Defense.

424 dedicated sorties were flown in the last two years training 24,000 Army troops directly with 147th Air Power, including forward air controller certification for those about to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Our large usable air spaces, many other units have talked about this, but look at Ellington's air space, a national treasure right off the Gulf there, 170 miles long by 90 miles at the widest point. There are two of them. They're both quite large. One goes from the surface to 50,000 feet and the other from five to 50,000 feet, very usable, appropriate for F-16s,

F-15s, F-22s and F-35s.

Supersonic air -- supersonic operations are available and used on a routine basis. Electronic countermeasures, air refueling, lights out, a national treasure.

And let's compare to show you the data metric flaws, the air space of Dannelly Field. It's a wonderful organization. I have good friends over there, but look at their air space. Their air space is a fraction of the size of ours and it goes from eight to 18,000 feet. And those that have flown the F-16 know that's not enough except for segmented types of training. It's not enough for full training. But the data metric gave them credit because they had five ranges versus two and they were much closer to the base.

Now, in many cases the close proximity is important, but with the overwater ranges and the F-16s long legs, that's irrelevant. That range that starts at about -- about 90 something miles out there is well within the easy reach and utilization of the F-16. The size -- supersonic air space doesn't need to be too close to shore or you start to disturb people.

Look at the difference in the points that Dannelly got. Dannelly got twice the numeric score for their ranges that we did. And I suspect -- I suggest

that that's a point to be looked into by the data analysts.

Attribute 1203, that's just a math error. We just wanted to point out that there were math errors in this. Now, let's get on to the costs. The misleading cost analysis -- or as Colonel Strom said this morning -- I liked his term -- fuzzy math. The BRAC showed that \$3.6 million of savings would occur from this move, but all costs were not inclusive.

And I know you've heard this over and over. They simply didn't include all of the costs that their recommendation would incur. And if you did include those costs, it is would be \$33.1 billion. No credit was given for airworthiness support. It's not a large support, but \$100,000 a year is saved by the air combat command because Ellington pilots an aircraft to fly that mission out of home station in the war MOA over Fort Polk. And that present value over 20 years is \$1.5 million. I don't know if we're going to continue to do that for 20 years, but we might.

The cost of operating a remote alert site is significant. It costs an average of \$6 million a year to operate and maintain the site that is not co-located.

And, General Newton, that's like the site

you had there at Holloman. From Ellington, it costs us about \$6 million a year to shuffle back and forth to do that, but it was necessary under those circumstances. If we did that for 20 years, that's \$120 million. I don't know if we're going to do it for 20 years, but I don't know that we're not.

The burden shifts to other agencies who have been considered by other people showing here this morning. The Army Aviation, the U.S. Coast Guard and NASA will have to pick up the bill for \$400,000 a year that the Air Guard now pays. The taxpayer is going to pay that regardless. It just depends on whose pocket it comes out of.

The bottom is the true picture with regard to money is cloudy. No savings are almost certain, possibly a significant extra cost to the government.

Here is possibly the most graphic slide in the whole process. We -- we're getting back to military value now. And quickly this is a bar graph that shows the relative military value of the various 26 Air National Guard Fighter Wings that were considered.

And you see on the left those with the highest military value score and those on the right with the lowest military value score and Ellington about in

the middle -- actually three steps up from the middle. How do you justify the fact that the installation with the lowest military value actually gained resources and aircraft? In fact, it wasn't just the lowest one. There were eight Air Guard Fighter Wings with lower military value scores that received more and newer aircraft. That doesn't make sense unless there's another way of explaining that.

Next slide, please. Now, under the law there is another way of explaining that. And I'll get to it in a moment, but this map shows where the resources went when you look at those light blue six-sided figures. Those are the units that had a lower military value score than Ellington, but actually received more and newer aircraft. This slide and this statement here should be justified fully to the satisfaction of the Commission I would expect.

Next slide, the Air Force criticized its own process. Its internal auditors in their white paper 18 April '05 and I quote, Recommendations that are not consistent with rankings of the installations must be fully justified. Where is the justification? Transformational recommendations, that is a definition of one with no military value justification. Military judgment is the sole rationale. It is not

cost-effective. It has long payback. This seems to refer to Ellington. Transformational has no legal basis and should be removed, quote. These should be justified in terms of military value or force structure plan.

Very quickly an example of military judgment overriding military judgment, Vandenberg and Patrick Air Force Base. The nation has a need to launch satellites in polar orbit. Therefore, we need to retain those two installations regardless of their military value.

Again, Andrews Air Force Base supports the president. Likewise, we would want to retain it regardless of its military value. The same could be said of Ellington, because of its importance to homeland defense, we should use military judgment to retain Ellington. And I'm summing up very quickly.

This decision to inactivate the 147th Fighter Wing was not based on military value. It was not based on military judgment. It was not based on cost. I ask you to consider what was it based on and was that basis a legal part of the BRAC process.

In conclusion, the Department of Defense has not made a BRAC case for inactivation of the 147th. In fact, there's a compelling homeland defense case for leaving it in place and a military value case for

providing it with more and numerous aircraft.

We find no merit in this recommendation and respectfully request that you vote to nonconcur. And now I introduce Commissioner Sylvia Garcia, Precinct 2, Houston.

MS. GARCIA: First, let me thank you for being here and for your service. I want to just bring home the bottom line on this issue. We ask you to reject and revise the recommendation before you. Revise it to allow the 147th Fighter Wing to stay in its full force in Ellington.

As previously stated, the FBI strongs nine potential targets. Our area has every single one of them, half of which are in the area that I represent in Harris County, the third largest county in the country.

It's vital for us to make sure that our port can function all 25 miles to ensure -- our national economy to ensure the energy capital of the world.

Also, we need to ensure that our port is able to do what it -- what it -- its mission of helping with commerce, with helping our economy and to make sure that we have a place that ships can come in a safe manner.

But more importantly, we need to make sure that we can protect our people. I can't think of a

greater mission for military but to protect our homeland and to protect our people. Eight million people live in this region, one half of which are in Harris County. We ask you to reject the recommendation before you and revise it to include the 147th Fighter Wing to stay in Ellington Field. Thank you for your time.

MAYOR WHITE: Good morning. And you know, some people tell me a big city mayor has a tough job. I think the Commissioners may have a tougher job still and I thank you for your service.

I want to leave you with this. See, I'm working hard every day with a lot of other people in our community to protect the second most important economic asset in our critical infrastructure in our nation. Probably the topmost is the financial district of lower Manhattan. But if somebody wanted to hurt our country, I don't think there's any doubt from the experts on critical infrastructure, which I've been working on for many years myself, that the refining and petrochemical complex located in the Houston ship channel would be the target that you would attack.

These people working on it include sheriffs and EMS, first responders. They include people in the companies. And we have counted on air support from the 147th to protect this valuable national asset.

We need your help.

There's no dispute that the homeland security significance of this complex was not taken into account. I could gather the leaders of our energy industry in a small room, classified or unclassified, to debate with anyone the merits of protection of this particular piece of our infrastructure. I cannot put police officers and military aircraft -- or arm them with surface-to-air missiles. We need the 147th.

Because of this flawed process, there's a recommendation and we need your help in crafting how you can nonconcur to send this back Ellington Field. We're pleased. We'll remain open, but how can we explain to citizens of this country in the fourth largest city with all of the assets that we have that are vulnerable to terrorists, that we would strip this area of all ability in the future, as well as the present, to protect them from an airborne threat, from a civilian aircraft or a drum or anything else that terrorists might come up with.

With that I would like it pass it back to the majority leader to conclude our presentation. I don't know who I hand it off to, Tom.

CONGRESSMAN DELAY: We have -- I believe we have one minute left. We have an aerial tour that we

can show here in one minute. I believe we have it queued up. If we can get that on the monitor, we'll give you a graphic view of the petrochemical and refining industry in Houston.

We can move to any additional questions now, if we have those. If not --

COMMISSIONER TURNER: We have one question for you.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: I have one for Colonel Parr. It's great to see you again. Thanks very much for the testimony from all of you.

Does the unit presently have additional alert commitments at other locations other than Helm Station?

COLONEL PARR: No, sir, not like they used to.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Not like they used to.

COLONEL PARR: They have only one alert site there.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Also, will you share your thoughts with me and/or Mr. Cook on other possible weapons that might be important to homeland security.

COLONEL PARR: In the nature of air assets, sir, obviously air to surface, air to

maritime surface would be a very important addition to the 147th's repertoire. As you know, they're trained to deploy those. They simply need the rules of engagement worked out between the various services and the Coast Guard on how the Air Force -- the 147th might be able to scramble and fly, say, three, four, 500 miles out into the Gulf and provide the fire power necessary to -- to stop certain types of maritime threat.

COMMISSIONER NEWTON: Okay. Very good.
Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: We would like to thank this panel for your testimony this morning. And, Senator, are you going to make an announcement or --

SENATOR HUTCHISON: Are you wanting to take a 15-minute break? Is that -- we're at your pleasure.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Yes, very much.

SENATOR HUTCHISON: So we end our Houston presentation. We appreciate it very much. It was terrific and now we will go -- come back whenever you say.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: 15 minutes.

SENATOR HUTCHISON: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Thank you very much.

(Recess taken)

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Could we have the panel to rise and be sworn, please?

(Panel sworn)

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Senator Hutchison?

SENATOR HUTCHISON: Thank you, Madam Chair.

When they released their BRAC recommendations in May, it appeared that Fort Hood was not impacted. That is not the case. Fort Hood actually suffers the single largest loss of any installation DoDwide, including all of those recommended for closure or major realignment.

Starting in late 2004 and continuing until now, Fort Hood has actually gained over 9,000 authorizations, which they will start losing by next year. By 2011 Fort Hood will have lost virtually all of the 9,000 and will have returned to almost the exact 2003 baseline.

So you can see that the 2003 baseline was absolutely erroneously used in the case of Fort Hood to give an implication of a plus or -- or a nondamaged situation when, in fact, that was not the case.

The Defense Department reported that

since the net decrease from 2003 until 2011 is only 73 soldiers and 118 civilians, Fort Hood is not impacted by the BRAC recommendations. Unfortunately, the 9,000 gain and subsequent loss in a compressed time frame has a significant impact on soldiers as well as the Central Texas community. This grossly underutilizes the tremendous training capacity at Fort Hood.

Fort Hood is the only Army installation in the country that has a digitized gunnery range and 12 multiplex ranges. It is an absolute waste. It destroys the efficiencies that Fort Hood has worked so hard to attain. And these capabilities do not exist at Fort Carson.

At several moments in the war in Iraq, Fort Hood has more soldiers deployed than any other single base in the country. While 2,300 soldiers are deployed today, close to 30,000 were deployed early in the spring of 2003, when the Fourth Infantry Division was coming home and the First Cav was just arriving in Iraq.

DoD recognized the great existing capabilities of Fort Hood to train and support our soldiers during a time of war. However, now their recommendations are in direct contradiction to effective and efficient operations.

Along with Fort Bragg, Fort Hood is the most efficient base in the United States of America. When the numbers are reduced, efficiencies are lost in training and maintenance with two full combat divisions rotating in and out of Fort Hood on a regular basis efficiency must be optimized.

After careful analysis, it is clear that DoD's recommendations to realign Fort Hood are not supported by military value criteria, are not physically sound and do irreparable harm to our soldiers and their families.

Congressman John Carter will now discuss the communities' perspective.

CONGRESSMAN CARTER: Madam chairman, Members of the Commission, first I would like the -- we have the Central Texas community, many of them are here today and if they would stand for a moment so you can see the support that we have from Central Texas. It's a great place. Thank you.

The BRAC process was established as a fair method of evaluating our military in an effort to save taxpayer dollars, streamline our military and ensure that we maintain the most effective fighting force in the world.

When American military forces actively

engaged in combat today, our first priority should be the effectiveness of our training to ensure that we maintain our super war fighting ability. We should do this as cost effectively as possible.

This BRAC commission has the difficult and important task of evaluating the DoD recommendations in this light. Our presentation will show that Fort Hood can and is training six heavy brigade combat teams, producing the best-trained soldiers in the world.

When the Department of Defense released their BRAC recommendations on May 13th of this year, the Department assured the members of the Texas delegation, the Congressional delegation, Fort Hood was not being impacted. But as the Senator explained, Fort Hood actually suffers the single largest loss of any installation DoDwide, including all of those recommended for closure or major realignment.

Starting in late 2004 Fort Hood actually gained over 9,000 troops as explained. By the end of this process, those troops will be gone. That is a major blow to our community. It is clear that the DoD recognizes the great existing capabilities of Fort Hood, our nation's most efficient heavy maneuver force training installation.

We train and support our soldiers during

the time of war. They also recognize the tremendous response to Central Texas to accommodate the rapid growth with increased housing, schools and public services.

In creating this surge requirement, the DoD's investment was minimal. The recommendations made to this Commission by the DoD concerning the realignment of Fort Carson will never pay back the expenditure according to the DoD's own figures and the GAO report.

As a member of the appropriations committee, I am concerned about these additional expenditures. I am joined in my concern by our senate -- chairman of military construction in the senate, Senator Hutchison and house-ranking member Chet Edwards.

The estimates are that between \$501 million and \$1.3 billion must be spent to relocate the forces and provide training capabilities and housing at Fort Carson for the additional two heavy brigade combat teams.

Currently Fort Hood is effectively training these two brigade combat teams and four others for a total of six heavy brigade combat teams at no additional expense to the United States.

In today's wartime environment, a massive

DoD budget, supplemental war appropriations and troops in combat, thousands of the senate appropriators must seriously examine any increases in the military construction expenditures, especially when such expenditures appear unnecessary to meet our goals.

Lieutenant General Taylor will give a briefing now that will introduce you to Fort Hood, of new DoD recommendations and rationale and highlight the shortcomings of the DoD process.

You will see that the facts do not support DoD's rationale and will be clear that Fort Hood can train and support six heavy brigade combat teams better than any installation in the Army.

At the end of this presentation, it will be clear that DoD's recommendations to realign Fort Hood are not supported by military value criteria, are not fiscally sound and could potentially cause irreparable harm to our soldiers, their families and the communities in Central Texas who have responded to the requirements that they leave them without question. General Taylor.

GENERAL TAYLOR: Madam Chair and Commissioner Hill, Commissioner Newton. As Congressman Carter indicated, my name is Pete Taylor. I'm retired. I was commander of troops at Fort Hood.

I still live in the Central Texas region,

Newport, Texas, and have remained actively involved with Fort Hood and the Army in general. Today I would like to tell you about a place that I know well and why it has the training capacity unmatched by any other installation in the United States Army.

This outline next -- next. This outline shows you the major points I will be discussing. At the end of this presentation, as Congressman Carter indicated, I'm confident you will concur with our conclusion that contrary to the Department of Defense's rationale, Fort Hood does have the facilities, the maneuver training acreage and ranges to support the permanent safety of six heavy brigade combat teams at no significant additional cost to the taxpayer.

Next slide. This slide depicts the key datapoints regarding Fort Hood. It encompasses approximately 215,000 acres and has been the Army's only two division installation since the 1970s.

Over the past several years, Fort Hood's size and strength has varied between 43 and 48,000 soldiers with at least that many family members. As mentioned earlier, Fort Hood has been the focus of continuous deployments for the past several years and has provided major formations to Desert Storm, the operations in Bosnia as well as the current deployments

to Afghanistan and Iraq.

The corps headquarters in both places, as well as other supporting units, have had year-long tours in Iraq. And the Fourth Infantry division will return there this fall.

Additionally, Fort Hood is the Army's mobilization station of choice with over 25,000 reserve component soldiers mobilized for both the Iraq and Afghanistan operations. In recognition of Fort Hood's capability, the Army selected the post for a prestigious installation deployment award for both 2003 and 2004 indicating that it was the very best deployment installation in the world.

Combining the extended training acreage and state of the art gunnery ranges on Fort Hood with a huge aviation training acreage to the west provides the motion extensive and affordable training opportunities in our Army today. Unfortunately, the off-post aviation training area was not considered in the BRAC analysis.

Next slide. This slide depicts the Army and DoD's recommendations that affect Fort Hood and the rationale for those proposals. As indicated, they saw a lack of facilities, maneuver training acreage and ranges to support six brigade combat teams. The impact of these recommendations on Fort Hood is more practically

displayed on the next chart.

The numbers displayed on this slide are authorized strength figures or spaces that -- where we will be allocated to Fort Hood between 2003 and 2004 using the baseline, of course, of 2003 as they did throughout the BRAC analysis.

While these exact numbers were not in the original BRAC recommendation, they have recently been provided to the BRAC commission by the Army. As you can see, the 2000 baseline authorized strength were just over 48,000.

Late in 2004 in order to implement our transformation, the Fourth Infantry Division gained approximately 5,000 spaces and faces. Soldiers and their families were assigned and are currently at Fort Hood.

In 2005 the authorized strength for Fort Hood continued to climb as an additional 5,000 plus spaces and authorizations were included for the First Cavalry Division transformation, which included the activation of the Fourth Brigade Combat Team at Fort Bliss.

Fort Hood and the Central Texas Community responded by creating an additional capacity capability to support the increase to Fort Hood's authorized

strength. This investment was made with minimal expense to the Army. However, as you can see, if the BRAC recommendations are implemented, by 2005 the authorized strength at Fort Hood would plummet to the original 41,000 authorized number with obvious impacts on soldiers, families and the community, which we will discuss later.

Next slide. This slide provides a simplified examination of the Army-BRAC process that led to the DoD recommendations. It is detailed within volume three, which is the Army's input to the BRAC report and mirrors the GAO -- the recently released GAO report, which analyzed DoD's 2005 selection process and recommendation for the base closures and realignments.

The initial inputs were large amounts of data leading to analysis of an installation's history and operational capability or capacity. The military value was determined by grouping data into 40 attributes and refining those into six capabilities. Fort Hood ranked number three of 97 installations for military value and number one in capability to add forces in the future.

Then using standard footprints, the Army analyzed various stationing scenario and applied a liberal dose of military judgment, which was not totally

explained. And all of these led to the final BRAC recommendations. Therefore, it follows that if flawed or incomplete data was submitted, then less than logical conclusions and recommendations would or could be reached.

In the following slides I will discuss our concerns that no value was given to the quality of the training areas, whether the training areas were continue -- contiguous to where the soldiers and equipment were stationed.

The gunnery range was not involved and not viewed as an attribute, that available simulation -- or the simulators were not considered and that facility requirements were unrealistically and incorrectly assessed.

Next slide. Fort Hood has adequate facilities today to accommodate six brigade combat teams and is doing so. This chart shows a sample of the facility requirements. The first column depicts the required number of the key facilities to support six brigade combat teams. The next column depicts the numbers of those facilities currently on hand today at Fort Hood, permanent and temporary, but does not include any ongoing military construction -- construction projects of which there are several.

The green column shows that, in fact, Fort Hood is currently accommodating six brigade combat teams today and none of them are living in tents. However, the Department of Defense rationale was based on the last column labeled where the metric was -- was based on the last column, where the metric was the 2003 arbitrary standard for required square footage.

As you make your decisions on DoD's recommendations, consider the attainability of the standard DoD used for their analysis. The gaining installations would require military construction to accommodate new units.

In the case of Fort Carson, the cost would exceed \$1 billion. While the facilities at Fort Hood may not totally beat 2003 square footage standards, Fort Hood has facilities to accommodate six brigade combat teams and is doing so today.

Next slide. While the DoD had the data for the quantity and quality of ranges to support tank and gunnery -- range and gunnery as to warrant the Army's instruction, there is no indication that the data was used when assessing an installation's capabilities.

The attributes for training capability that were used included the caliber of the largest weapon system that could be fired, acreage of combat and

facility, total maneuver acreage, classrooms, air quality, noise contours and soil resiliency. While not wrong, it was a very incomplete assessment of training capability.

DoD cited a lack of ranges at Fort Hood to support six brigade combat teams. I don't need to convince the BRAC commissioners that a piece of land is not the same as a range. The Army's first and only digitized multi-purpose range complex at a cost of \$50 million is at Fort Hood. There is no place in the world that has the capacity and quality of the Fort Hood firing ranges. You can fire any weapon that the Army has in its inventory, except the Patriot missile, which has -- and the Patriot, of course, is fired down at Fort Bliss, our friends there.

This chart compares crew, platoon and company gunnery range and force at Fort Hood and instruction that was available from the data columns. Please note the cost to build each of these ranges. As you can see, a huge investment has already been made at Fort Hood.

Next slide. DoD used linear assumptions in its decision process. For example, an acre at Fort X is the same as an acre as Fort Y. We believe this assumption is in error.

The DoD considered the training at Fort Carson and Pinion Canyon maneuver site, although Pinion Canyon is 150 miles from Fort Carson and you must use rail to move track vehicles at the cost of approximately \$2 million per brigade roundtrip. Additionally Pinion Canyon is restricted to machine guns, small arms rifles, live fire ranges. Battalions must train in the fields with a live environment. Battalions from Fort Carson must travel 150 miles by rail to train at that level.

As you can see from the schematic on the left, at Fort Hood units roll out of their motor pools and are in the training areas or on the ranges within minutes. Units can execute gunnery and maneuver training at Fort Hood. They cannot at Fort Carson except in very small formations.

I ask you not to be misled by raw numbers or reported footage -- or reported acres. When it comes to training, there is a quality component that must be considered in the analysis. An acre at one place does not necessarily equal the efficiency and effectiveness of an acre at another location.

Next slide. While the BRAC recommendations state Fort Hood lacks sufficient maneuver training acreage and ranges to support six BCTs, understanding exactly how a unit trains helps. But when you put where

the units train in the proper context for analysis, this chart depicts the approved heavy brigade combat team combined arms training strategy using a combination of live training in the dirt opportunities for virtual and constructive simulations.

The key point of this chart is that the overwhelming focus of the training in a live environment on ranges and in training areas occurs at the company level and below. Therefore, the -- the requirements for maneuver training acreage for brigade combat teams is significantly less of that which the Army used in a standard unit footprint analysis in staging these scenarios.

In fact, Army training doctrine states begin to rely more on virtual constructed environmental, simulators and simulations, coupled with combat training center rotations such as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin to achieve training efficiency at that level.

Brigades also require large tracts of land at each post to train. This slide depicts a live virtual and constructive capability that is fully developed and currently present at Fort Hood.

Next slide. And this slide shows a comparison of constructed and virtual inventories at Fort Hood and Fort Carson. Therefore, it was very

surprising that these training resources were not analyzed in the BRAC report as the training capability when the Army considers them as critical in their combined armed training strategy.

There is no better capability in the Army of Fort Hood's inventory of simulators and simulations. Since 1999 over \$440 million have been invested at Fort Hood and more is on the way. And that's virtual and constructive simulations.

Fort Hood has led the Army in innovative in the dirt training with the constructive and virtual simulations and today has the capability to train units in all three environments. Simultaneously and seamlessly in realtime. No other installation in the Army could make that claim.

To summarize the previous five slides, if you approve DoD's recommendation to realign Fort Hood because it lacks facilities, ranges and maneuver training acreage, units will move to installations where the training op environment will be depleted compared to training opportunities at Fort Hood. It will require a great deal of time and money to begin to replicate Fort Hood's elsewhere.

Next slide. Environmental reverse restrictions for listed -- were listed by the Army as

one of the key subcapabilities for determining the training capacity. Three of the 40 attributes to determine military value were air quality, noise contours and soil resiliency.

As one of the Army's installation leaders in the -- in the sustainable lane and installation program, Fort Hood has made great proactive process in the recent years to ensure it's viability as a training installation and prior project platform is not threatened.

The data listed on this chart came from volume three of the -- of the DoD recommendation. Additionally, there are no major urban areas encroaching on Fort Hood's boundaries, certainly not near the training areas. And in March 2005 as a result of partnership efforts between Fort Hood and local landowners, endangered species habitat restrictions were lifted on 37,000 additional acres of training area at Fort Hood, acreage, again, that was not included within the Army analysis.

Next slide. This chart shows where the demands on facilities, ranges and training areas, even with six brigades, are less than in previous years. Therefore, I've highlighted the shortcomings of DoD's rationale where I demonstrated Fort Hood does have the

facilities, ranges and training areas to support six brigade combat teams.

In 1995 over five maneuver brigades resigned at Fort Hood with a combined total of 986 tanks and heavy track vehicles. Today there are six brigade combat teams at Fort Hood. Before transformation, the brigade had great maneuvers of the day. They transformed the brigade combat teams by sticking them with battalions and now it's known as a squadron with a mix of -- of track and wheel vehicles.

Today's six transformed brigade combat teams, compared to the five earlier maneuver brigades, have 11 percent fewer heavy track vehicles and 40 percent fewer 70-ton tanks, which do the most damage to the soil.

And Fort Hood can train five brigades and was rated the number one maneuver installation in the 1995 BRAC round. It stands to reason that with a substantial reduction in the numbers of track vehicles, Fort Hood today can adequately train six transformed brigade combat teams. This is not just theory. It is a fact and it is being done today and we're sending them off to war.

Next slide. When you analyze DoD's recommendations to realign Fort Hood, you must take into

account the financial burden this will have on the soldiers and their families. In the Army we say you enlist the soldier, but re-enlist the family. And when the enlistment or re-enlistment are putting soldiers in higher cost of living areas, maybe that's the straw that breaks the camel's back.

As stated at the outset, the housing demand to accommodate the station or the additional soldiers assigned to Fort Hood was accommodated by the local communities. Our analysis indicates in the six-month window of October 2004 through March 2005, most of that 5,000 came in. 70 percent of all homes sold in Central Texas were purchased by soldiers. They believe that under the Army stabilization initiative they could reasonably expect to be assigned to Fort Hood for an extended period. Therefore, many purchased homes and realtors worked with soldiers to qualify them to buy a home. Our soldiers may not be financially equalified to buy homes in Colorado Springs.

In the figure side of this chart is a staff sergeant, it indicates that the soldier would have to pay out of pocket costs to meet the monthly rental there. Additionally, over 1,500 soldiers have purchased -- from Fort Hood purchased their own homes in Central Texas. And these soldiers and families may be

severely impacted in a depressed housing market as the starting levels go down.

It is not clear that these considerations were taken in account by the Department of Defense recommendations. The Central Texas community searched without question to meet the growth of Fort Hood in the past two years not only in housing but with schools, municipal services and such. Is it right to leave them in excess capability when they have been so supportive of our deployed soldiers and their families.

Next chart. This chart compares the annual base support cost using the -- the Department of the Army service base costing data for 2003 between six large maneuver installations. These are the heavy force maneuver installations.

The base support costs included utilities, real property values, food services, transportation services, community and moral support and automation. Every installation comes with the cost to train and support soldiers and the Army captures those as annual base support costs.

The most efficient installation base support costs, at \$6,900 plus per year per soldier, Fort Hood has the lowest cost of any comparable heavy maneuver installation. 25 percent less than the nearest

competitor. Installation for getting more assigned soldiers generate the economy upscale.

What is not contained within this rationale are the reasons to move soldiers from the Army's most efficient installation to one where the annual support costs are going to be much higher. Using DoD's data, Fort Hood ranked 28 places above Fort Carson in cost capability.

At this point I would like to introduce Congressman Chet Edwards who will have more to say regarding the physical implication of making these moves.

Congressman Edwards is cochairman of the bipartisan house Army office and ranking member of the military quality of life and veterans affairs subcommittee. He represented Fort Hood in Congress from 1991 to 2004.

CONGRESSMAN EDWARDS: Madam Chair, I'm pleased to meet you, Mr. Hill. Let me first thank each of you for your lifetime of distinguished service to our country.

I know this morning and throughout the hearings throughout the country you have listened to an incredible amount of information. So let me just focus on one fundamental question. Given that the DoD BRAC

analysis rated Fort Hood number three in all over military value and number one in future capability, wouldn't it make more sense to fully utilize the Army's only two division installation where we have invested \$913 million in military construction improvements over the last 14 years rather than to downsize Fort Hood by as much as 9,000 soldiers and then have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars, perhaps more than a billion dollars, to duplicate facilities at Fort Carson that already exist at Fort Hood.

It seems to me that in these difficult budget times we ought to try to look for savings so that we could use those hundreds of millions of dollars that you don't have to build any facilities at Fort Hood to improve facilities and quality of life programs for Army soldiers and their families all throughout the United States.

Frankly, I wish costs weren't a factor in funding BRAC military construction programs, but they are a factor. The reality is that this year the Department of Defense military construction budget is \$1 billion less than it was three years ago, before the Iraqi war began.

The reality is that the Army military construction budget, the entire budget, is less than \$2

billion and we face the largest deficits in American history.

Given that, it just seems too powerfully logical that we ought to fully utilize the Army's most efficient, and many of us think the best, heavy training installation in the country rather than underutilize this great facility and spend so many dollars -- tax dollars elsewhere. Thank you for your consideration.

CONGRESSMAN CARTER: Thank you, Congressman Edwards.

Could we put the last -- the conclusionary slide up, please? As it comes up, the department -- let me -- these are the conclusions we think we've shown you here today.

The Department of Defense stated in their realignment recommendation that Fort Hood lacks facilities, maneuver training acreage, ranges to support six heavy combat brigades. There are, in fact, six heavy BCTs being trained, housed and supported at Fort Hood today.

And the timelines that the Army gives us indicates that this -- these same six brigades will be trained for at least the next two or three years. They're doing this in permanent facilities with training infrastructure that is simply unmatched in the United

States Army.

To attempt to replicate these capacities and capabilities at Fort Hood today will amount to an enormous expenditure that has been said of extremely limited funds and I remind you GAO says it will never pay back.

The Army's own support cost data says we have the -- or Fort Hood is the Army's most effective heavy maneuver posts, yet the Dod recommendation would reduce those efficiencies to a level of 85 percent. Is this a good use of our Army?

We -- we as a group strongly support the -- the idea that you look at first the BRAC recommendations so that we may continue to train 6 BCTs at Fort Hood.

By this action -- by doing this, the most important thing that I think all of us ought to be thinking about as we're dealing with this is we want to make sure that those men and women that -- that are now being redeployed -- we have deployed and redeployed to the war zone remain the best trained, most effective fighting force on earth.

Fort Hood has a proven track record of doing that. And we ask that you allow them to continue that excellent track record. And we'll be glad to

answer any questions that you might have.

SENATOR HUTCHISON: Madam Chair, there is two minutes left. And I just wanted to re-emphasize one point that was made by General Taylor because you are looking at factual errors in data.

And the Department of Defense has admitted that it did not take into account the 37,600 acres that were closed to training prior to March 16 of 2005, but now have been unrestricted, given back for training purposes by the Fish and Wildlife Service.

This was an endangered species area. Now the endangered species are thriving. So that was a factor in the consideration of DoD. They have said they did not consider these extra acres. And I wanted to add that to -- an emphasis for -- in our remaining minute. Any questions? Thank you.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Thank you, very much. Thank all of you for coming and thank you for the presentation.

WICHITA FALLS

SENATOR CORNYN: Madam Chair, I believe it would be appropriate to have the new witnesses stand and raise their hand and be sworn before we begin, those who intend to offer testimony today.

(Panel sworn)

SENATOR CORNYN: Madam Chairwoman,
Commissioner Newton, Commissioner Hill, the next
presentation will be on behalf of Wichita Falls which,
of course, is the home of Sheppard Air Force Base.

The county judge, Willie Gossom, Jr.,
Craig Estes, state senator. Kay Yeager who has chaired
the Wichita Falls Area Military Affairs Committee will
present, as will Darrell Coleman with the Wichita Falls
Board of Commerce and Industry. But kicking it off for
Sheppard Air Force Base and the Wichita Falls community
is Congressman Mac Thornberry.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Congressman, can
we ask folks who are coming and going to keep the noise
level down, please. Thank you.

CONGRESSMAN THORNBERRY: As a member of
the house Armed Services Committee for the last ten and
a half years and as a consistent supporter of this BRAC
process, I'm especially grateful for the role that each
of you play in making sure that it is credible and that
at the end of the day it strengthens the security of the
country.

As the senator indicated, you will hear
from some of our community leaders about some specific
points we want to make with regard to Sheppard. I want
to summarize just a couple of the points that I made in

the -- in my written statement, which you should have that apply to Sheppard, but hopefully apply to your larger responsibilities as well.

One of those is that there is a whole lot of change proposed here under the label of realignment and it deserves your scrutiny. I think most members of congress, when we vote on BRAC, see it as primarily a base closing process. You evaluate objectively bases and perhaps close some and then move their missions to other places. A lot of the change proposed here doesn't have anything to do with closings. It has to do as much with what and how we do as exactly where it is done.

Let me give you an example from Sheppard. One of the proposals is to consolidate all enlisted medical training in one place. For most of us that makes a lot of sense not to have a separate Navy, Army, Air Force program to train dental assistants for example.

But it looks like the only option which was considered was to put all levels of all specialties in one place and they did not look at other possibilities. For example, you'll hear in a few minutes that if you do phase one medical training, which it -- it is done in the classroom. If you do that where there are classrooms and do phase two training which

requires hospitals and clinics -- where there are hospitals and clinics, you will save a considerable amount of money and have training that is as good, if not better, than -- than putting it all in one place, but that option was never considered.

It's as much about how we do this joint training as where it goes. And we hope that some of the ideas and -- and suggestions we have will cause you to go back to the military to ask some more questions.

My second observation is that the use of the cross-service groups this time results in -- in a situation where not the most efficient use of all facilities is -- is -- is a result.

As you know in the 1995 BRAC there were five cross-service groups. They had to funnel their proposals into the services before they came -- went forward. This year we have the seven cross-service groups that make their recommendations independently and -- and then you have the services on their own track.

Now, if you'll look at GAO's review of the 1995 BRAC round, they point out that each method has advantages and disadvantages. One of the disadvantages of having the cross-service groups do their own thing is that nobody looks at the whole base. Nobody looks at

how to make the most efficient use of the facilities that are remaining.

So for example, with Sheppard you had the medical group come in and say, we're going to take out enlisted medical training. You had the education and training group come in and say, we're going to take out the joint strike crowd or maintenance training, each on a separate track from each other and from the Air Force. And so the result is that Sheppard, which is ranked number one out of 70 bases for specialized skill training, number three behind only Brookes and Pensacola for health care education training, that base is going to have 768,000 square feet of vacant modern classrooms because nobody put all of the pieces back together.

And I would respectfully suggest that we need y'all to put the pieces back together and make sure that the highest and best use of the facilities is made as well as the -- the goals of the cross-service group. You may not be able to fill all of the holes, but you can certainly help point us in the right direction.

At Sheppard we're looking to the future and you're going to hear some of the specific ideas we have about how to fill some of those holes at Sheppard.

At this point I'm pleased to turn to the chair of our military advise committee, our former mayor

Kay Yeager.

MAYOR YEAGER: Thank you. Thank you. Okay. Senators Hutchison and Cornyn, Representative Thornberry, other representatives present, Chairman Turner, Commissioners Hill and Newton, I am Kay Yeager, chair of the Wichita Falls Area Military Affairs Committee and I am honored to be here today in support of Sheppard Air Force Base and to have so many people from the Wichita Falls area here.

We want to thank our elected officials for their support in preparation for today's hearing. We acknowledge the enormous challenges DoD faced in the process thus far and the task before you as members of the BRAC commission as you make your recommendations to congress in September.

I have been privileged to serve on the AETC commander's group for the past few years. As we have visited different AETC bases, people in our group seem to know a lot about the other eight bases, but little about Sheppard.

I'm proud to be here today to tell you that Sheppard is the largest technical training base of its kind in the world and graduated over 38,000 resident students from the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force last year.

Sheppard has men and women deployed not only all over the United States, but around the world. It has boots on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan helping to maintain freedom. DoD has rated Sheppard military values for initial skills training the highest of all bases.

Sheppard also serves as home to the highly regarded Euro-NATO joint jet pilot training program, the 80th Flying Training Wing.

The core missions of Sheppard 80th Flying Training Wing are to continue bluing and greening process of recruits, to teach them a trade and to ensure they are ready to deploy. This nearly focused set of core values has helped make Sheppard the air education and training command's largest and most successful training facility in the world.

Over \$475 million has been invested in Sheppard since the first BRAC round in 1989. This investment in dormitories, dining halls, fitness centers and virtual training classrooms -- classrooms that almost any college or university in this country would envy has transformed Sheppard into the center of excellence for technical training.

This claim is substantiated by the fact that commanders at bases receiving graduates from

Sheppard ranked their satisfaction with the new war fighters trained by Sheppard at 97 percent.

We have two areas of concern and three opportunities to discuss with the Commission. First, we agree with the recommendation that collocating some medical training with clinical activities will be enhanced by clinical proximity.

However, we have discovered several concepts that indicate an alternative recommendation. The medical joint cross-service group weighted the importance of proximity to clinical activities at 60 percent. Intuitively this sounds great because consolidation usually leads to cost savings and improved efficiencies.

However, 100 percent of phase one medical training for all services is currently conducted in the classrooms using very sophisticated virtual training aids and mock-ups. No services allow students in phase one training to interact with patients or laboratories located in a clinical setting.

The alternate scenarios used in the COBRA reports prove that moving the missions to Sheppard will save the country at least 40 percent over other locations. Sheppard has the highest military value score of all installations for initial skills training.

At Sheppard the mission of bluing and greening is a core policy. Sheppard has the largest available classroom capacity of all bases listed. Removing more students will deviate substantially from a medical group's subcriteria, number one.

The one of a kind joint medical readiness center is a 53-acre classroom equipped to fully train medics in combat and field operations. The facility includes medical wards, operations theaters and labs. It is accessible by helicopter and C-130 aircraft all designed to closely duplicate field conditions.

The excess berthing capacity number appears to be incorrect by nearly 50 percent. According to Sheppard public affairs office, there are 7,224 total beds to date. Included in this number are two new dormitories that were not opened until after the data call. Future will come, will bring the total to 8,024 by the time this recommendation is scheduled to occur.

In the GAO report released July 1st, and I paraphrase, concealed in the overall ten-year payback estimate for the medical realignment recommendation was a 21-year payback for the medical training portion only.

We respectfully ask the BRAC commission to recalculate the composite military value score used to determine the location of phase one enlisted medical

training.

We support the DoD recommendation to co-locate initial joint strike fighter air crew and ground crew training at a single location. It has been widely reported that as the JSF increases in number, a second and third pilot training unit will come online.

For the following reasons we respectfully ask the Commission to enter into the record that after the initial JSF proof of concept is completed, the DoD establish the JSF center of excellence for maintenance training at Sheppard.

Sheppard has an established culture of excellence in training cross-service members. In 2004 Sheppard graduated 27,000 aircraft maintainers. The maintenance training at Sheppard demonstrates that it is the most capable installation for training the next generation of fighter maintainers.

Sheppard currently teaches maintenance from nose to tail on the aircraft and offers a full range of certifications for maintenance personnel, including initial training crew chief and maintenance officer.

Sheppard excels in student through-put, which equates to getting troops to the battles sooner with the required skills. Innovative techniques

have reduced student washback rates by 35 percent.

And lastly, DoD ranked Sheppard as having the highest military value score of all installations for initial skills ranking. In keeping with criteria number one's reference of looking at future missions, we respectfully request the BRAC commission include in their report to congress a request for DoD to consider establishing future JFS center of excellence for maintenance training at Sheppard.

The international customers for JSF will need to send their future pilots somewhere in the United States for undergraduate pilot training. Sheppard should become the lead-in training base for all coalition and allied countries participating in a purchase of a JSF. The reason for this recommendation are for 30 years the 80th Flying Training Wing's core competency has been allied pilot training.

The education and training joint cross-service group report stated that Sheppard was sufficient in excess capacity for runways, air space and ramps. The same report states the military value for Sheppard ground training facilities has the highest score of all installations. Such a move can only strengthen our efforts to fight the global war on terrorism as we build ties with allied nations.

The Wichita Falls area has distinguished itself with a communitywide philosophy to welcome our international friends as neighbors. In keeping with criteria number one's reference to future missions, we respectfully request the BRAC commission include in their report to congress a request to DoD to consider locating future JSF international undergraduate pilot training for coalition and allied nations at Sheppard.

I now introduce Mr. Darrell Coleman, vice chairman of military affairs, to discuss an additional compatible training mission as well as the economic and redevelopment issues.

MR. COLEMAN: Thank you, Ms. Yeager.

We know the Department of Defense makes choices based only on the facts. That's why our presentation is based so heavily on the data used in the BRAC process. We understand BRAC tradition plays a limited role in making decisions for future missions, but we want to go on record as asking for your consideration.

It's been widely reported that the use of unmanned area vehicles can save the lives of our fighting men and women. Our son, Sergeant Russell Meadows, was a member of the First Calvary that recently returned from Baghdad, my wife Jenny and I have heard

many stories about the use of UAVs to fight the insurgents in Iraq.

The global war on terrorism has seen significant increase in the use of UAVs. And the GAO's predictions show the potential of growing the inventory to 1,500 by 2009.

UAVs are currently operated in 14 locations which will require considerable maintenance support. We believe there's an urgent need to establish a center for joint UAV maintenance and that for the following reasons Sheppard is the best choice.

It has the highest military value score of all installations for initial skills training. Sheppard has created the instructing console control for troubleshooting UAV maintenance scenarios.

Sheppard has developed working model internal systems for avionics, fuel sensors and flight controls. Sheppard has exported this training to field attachments all across the country. Sheppard's initiatives have saved \$3 million to date in support of UAVs.

In keeping with the criteria, number one's reference to future missions, we respectfully request to have the BRAC commission include in their report to congress a request for DoD to consider

locating future UAV maintenance training at Sheppard.

We understand that adverse economic impacts are viewed as less important to military value and for good reasons. However, we would be remiss if we did not share with you how these recommendations will impact our area.

In total the DoD estimated a loss of 4,400 direct and indirect jobs, which equates to 4.7 percent of our area's economy. The Wichita Falls area will receive the sixth largest loss in jobs as the percent of the area economy of all of the 2005 BRAC recommendations. This equates to a similar negative impact experienced by several of the bases on the closure list.

During the past nine years our economic development of which resulted in the creation of 4,042 new jobs, the significance of this will likely take us a decade for our regional economy to recover.

We are very well aware that with great and entrepreneurial spirit, many of the bases closed or significantly realigned in previous backgrounds have been successful in replacing jobs through base reutilization programs. However, this type of redevelopment is unachievable at Sheppard for the following reasons. The 768,000 square feet of vacated

space is located deep in the nonprior serviced training area.

Because these students are still in the basic training phase of military life and civilian interaction is restricted, we do not believe private sector, nor government redevelopment is feasible. Therefore, we are suggesting that the highest and best reuse of these available assets is to introduce new nonprior service training missions we discussed to Sheppard.

In conclusion, we're asking that the Commission do two things. Our first request is that you verify the new data we discovered as accurate. And assuming it is, change the way you use the formula to -- to reflect the proper balance between phase one medical training and its relationship to clinical activities. Then use the new formula to recalculate the composite military score for phase one initial medical training.

The 2005 BRAC criteria, number one, states that the process is required to review both current and future missions. With this in mind, our second request is for the Commission to include the following future missions in their report to congress: Follow on JSF maintenance training, JSF international undergraduate pilot training, maintenance training for

all UAVs.

There is a model in front of the headquarters building at Sheppard Air Force Base that says, combat capability starts here. This motto proves true for all ranking military and many of our allies in the war on terrorism. Are we proud at Sheppard? You bet we are. Is Sheppard's position to expand and accept new missions and develop more centers for excellence? You bet it is. That is exactly why we are all here today standing proud for Sheppard Air Force Base.

SENATOR HUTCHISON: Thank you. Thank you very much, and thank you, Wichita Falls.

Any questions?

COMMISSIONER TURNER: We have no questions for this panel. Thank you very much for the testimony today. And, Senator, we're going to forego our break so if we can transition into Corpus Christi as quickly as possible, that will be great.

SENATOR HUTCHISON: Thank you very thank you for being here.

CORPUS CHRISTI

SENATOR HUTCHISON: If Corpus Christi would come forward.

While the delegation is changing, I know that Corpus Christi is moving in, a new set of yellow

T-shirts coming in in here, I would like to just say that Senator Cornyn and I just visited Ingleside on Sunday. And we wanted to reinforce our total commitment to this great Navy asset.

I will be christening -- I mean, actually commissioning the USS San Antonio at Ingleside this fall, our newest marine amphibious ship. It's Marine-Navy and we're very excited about it and very pleased about the stellar presentation and support of the community for this base.

To start the South Texas military facilities presentation, Congressman Solomon Ortiz.

CONGRESSMAN ORTIZ: Thank you, Senator.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: We're going to have to ask you gentlemen to stand and be sworn, please.

(Panel sworn.)

CONGRESSMAN ORTIZ: Chair Turner, Commissioners Hill and Newton, members of the staff, first of all, I want to say thank you for accepting this huge responsibility and I know you're going to do the best work that you can.

I am here to introduce members of my constituency from Corpus Christi, Ingleside Naval Air Station in Corpus Christi, Kingsville.

I am not going to belabor the Committee

because we have a great story to tell about our bases in South Texas and the important role that they play. At this moment I would like to introduce my good friend and former mayor of Corpus Christi, chairman of the military task force Mr. Lloyd Neal.

MR. NEAL: Thank you, Congressman.

Madam Chair, Members of the Commission, my name is Lloyd Neal. And for the record, I'll be chairing -- I am chairing the South Texas Military Task Force. This is a joint presentation today of our task force and the North Bay task force. I'll be joined in our presentation by RADM retired Paul Ryan and VADM retired Al Konetzi.

If you look at the chart before you, you will see what the mayor of Houston and the governor were talking about when they made their presentation a few minutes ago. If the BRAC recommendations as proposed by the realignment commission are followed, there will be no naval ship presence in the Gulf of Mexico.

South Texas is a joint military facility complex, a federal complex that consists of the following bases. Just south of Corpus Christi is NAS Corpus Christi, the home of the Army depot. And I'll talk about that in just a few minutes in more detail.

Nine miles across Corpus Christi bay is

Naval Station Ingleside, which we will devote most of our time to today. Adjacent to the Naval Station Ingleside and south of Corpus Christi are detonated mine warfare training ranges, and you'll hear more about that in just a few minutes.

Outlying fields surround Corpus Christi and the South Texas area and support the Naval air training and the other surface training that is done for aircraft in South Texas. That green area that you see there is the world-famous King Ranch, almost a million contiguous acres. Like we say in Texas, unless the King Ranch subdivides, we don't have any encroachment problems in South Texas.

Naval Air Station Corpus Christi is a joint service and federal complex. It has a number of subsets. We train most of the pilots for the Navy and primarily train -- we train Air Force pilots and Marine pilots and other pilots who fly for the military services.

As you can see, NAS Corpus Christi sits with no encroachment problems. And the City of Corpus Christi years ago became an active member of the AICUZ program.

It's a multiple -- multiple -- multiple facility. We have 50 subtenants. The largest of those

subtenants, in addition to having headquarters of the mine warfare command currently in Corpus Christi. The chief Naval air training is located there and the largest of the subtenants is the Army depot. The Army depot is the center for industry and technical excellence for rotary wing aircraft in the Army.

As you can see, we have all of the facilities there to handle every aircraft, helicopter repair facility for every helicopter in the four forces. There are approximately 3,000 hard-working dedicated employees at the Army depot.

NAS Kingsville 30 miles south of Corpus Christi, noted for its unencumbered air space. There are 28,000 runways at NAS Kingsville and additional runways in the outlying fields. There's a lot of room in Kingsville for additional missions.

Here's a profile of an NAS Kingsville, 18,000 square miles of unencumbered air space. I mentioned the six to 8,000 runways. We have target ranges adjacent to and not far from the NAS Kingsville as well as ramp -- ramp facilities to support the T-45 training.

This is the newest of the naval stations in South Texas and one of the newest in the United States. This is Naval Station Ingleside located on the

Corpus Christi ship channel, 45-foot deep water with authority to go to 52 feet. It's the home of the mine warfare center of excellence. It looks like a college campus. It was built -- effectively built since 1995. I'll let Admiral Ryan take over here.

ADMIRAL RYAN: Thank you, Lloyd.

I'm Paul Ryan. I commanded mine warfare command in 2002 and 2003. I was responsible for the preparation of our ports for Operation Iraq Freedom. I want to talk to you-all today about the importance of mine warfare, the role of Naval Station Ingleside and inaccuracy of the BRAC data. Next slide.

This slide indicates the -- the number of ships that have been damaged by all sources since 1950. And you'll see that 75 percent of that damage has been caused by mines. The most three ships -- most recently ships damaged were the USS Samuel B. Roberts during the tanker war. And then Tripoli and Princeton during Operation Desert Storm. Next slide.

The Navy's solution to the problems of mine warfare during Operation Desert Storm was to establish a mine warfare center of excellence in Ingleside, Texas, based on what's called the Top Gun model.

As you know we had significant problems

during the Vietnam War with our air-to-air aviation combat capability and -- and the services decided to establish a Top Gun center of excellence. Well, CNO Kelso saw the same program with the lack of preparedness in our mine warfare forces through Operation Desert Storm and established a center of excellence in Ingleside, Texas, away from the mainstream Navy on the East Coast and West Coast giving them all of the dedicated facilities and training areas they need to get really good at their mission and it worked.

The center of excellence did a wonderful job in preparing our forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom and continues to evolve in supporting the new littoral ship program. Next slide.

This just illustrates what a mine does. A cheap \$500 mine hit the Samuel B. Roberts in 1988, caused \$30 million worth of damage and put the ship out of commission for a year. Next slide.

Same thing on USS Tripoli and USS Princeton, cheap \$500 mines caused \$50 million worth of damage to these two ships during Operation Desert Storm and put them out of commission for a year. Next slide.

Mines are not the threat of the past. 36 countries are producing mines today. Most of those countries export mines. As the slide indicates, there

are over 350,000 mines in the world inventory, and mines don't get old. The mines that hit some of our ships recently are World War II vintage horned mines.

So the number of mines in the world inventories increases and it's the Navy that continues to operate in the littoral, the shallow water regions of the world. We're operating in waters that are more susceptible to mine damage. Next slide.

What I'm going to do now is I'll take and go through the Navy BRAC recommendation. First of all, the relocation of HM-15 to Norfolk while moving ten mine sweepers to San Diego, it eliminates effective integral training now able at the mine warfare center of excellence and neuters the center of excellence concept. It also violates the train as we fight mantra that you heard so many times today. Next slide.

What it does is it moves the mine sweeping helicopters from Corpus Christi up to Norfolk, moves the ships out to San Diego, away from the mine warfare center of excellence, away from the dedicated training ranges down in Corpus Christi, away from the Navy's only mine warfare lab located in Panama City, Florida.

And I'm a war fighting advocate. It's important to have all of your forces co-located to look

the guys down that you are facing in a war in the eye, train together and we're not going to have that capability because we have bureaucratic-type admirals now deciding that reorganization and short-term cost savings is more important than war-fighting effectiveness. Next slide.

There are many benefits from having a single center of excellence. CNO Kelso foresaw that in the early '90s. We had designated and integrated training down there in the South Texas area, participate in lots of exercises. The ships are in better condition. We have increased operational readiness and it really worked in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Next slide.

This just illustrates the Corpus Christi Bay complex. Naval Station Ingleside down on the peninsula at the bottom. We have the electromagnetic roll facility, which is the equivalent of a deglossing facility to help keep the ships' magnetic signatures as low as possible. We have dry docks. We have shipyards. We have training areas, everything we need to do mine warfare is down there in Corpus Christi, Texas. Next slide.

And mines are easy to get into the water. These are actual pictures of Operation Iraq Freedom.

Tugboats like you see going in in Houston everyday, barges that had been converted into -- to put mines in the water, concealed under 55 gallon drums. The picture on the lower side, they actually hollowed out that barge and put mine rails in the water.

We were lucky during Operation Iraqi Freedom because our enemy was not nearly as smart as we thought he might be. They only got about a dozen mines in the water. But even one mine in the water causes the Navy and the Marine Corps to slow down on their potential operations. Next slide.

The commander of the Marine Corps visited us down in Corpus Christi two years ago and asked, hey, how did you guys pull this off? You opened up the port in a week when we thought it was going to take a month. I told the commander of the Marine Corps that it really is because we have this mine warfare center of excellence. And we have solved the problem that we had during Operation Desert Storm of not training the way we fight. Next slide.

What we -- what we have then down there and why we were successful in Operation Iraqi Freedom, we have four ships that are stationed in the Gulf and we sent a squadron command element over there to supervise the ships and the helicopters in the Gulf. We reported

more ships from Ingleside, Texas, all way the throughout the Atlantic Ocean into the Mediterranean for the defense of the Suez Canal.

We had four more ships and another squadron standing by in Corpus Christi, Texas, in case another country happened to take advantage of our preoccupation with Iraq. We packed up all of the HM-15 helicopters and crews. They fit inside C-5 aircraft and we flew them over both the Mediterranean and to the Persian Gulf.

So the mine warfare concept works and it didn't matter that we're stationed down in Ingleside, Texas. We can get anywhere in the world we have to. Next slide.

So the Navy plans to disestablish the mine warfare center of excellence, no longer co-locate the -- the essential elements, the helicopters and the ships together, really ignores the lessons of history that caused the establishment of a mine warfare center.

The Navy says, well, we're going to establish an undersea warfare center of excellence out there in San Diego, California, and consolidate mine warfare and ASW. Well, this new fleet, ASW command was just established last year, is the struggling to carry out its mission. It's understaffed. And very candidly,

ASW is the higher priority than Navy mine warfare.

So what's going to happen to the mine warfare out there? There's a good chance they're going to be distracted from doing mine warfare business. And, oh, by the way, there's very little in common with submarine warfare and mine warfare except that mines and submarines are both underwater. Next slide.

In summary, the -- this particular recommendation neuters the mine warfare center of excellence, removes the ability to conduct integrated training the way we do it now in South Texas, violates transit flight. And, oh, by the way, the commander of mine warfare command last year comments on this particular BRAC scenario and said, this is dumber than dirt -- not quite in those words. Next slide.

The criteria for establishing military value may not -- was not properly applied to value the special missions conducted by Naval Station Ingleside. Next slide.

There were two BRAC criteria, C-14 and C-15, which would have Ingleside training for unique capabilities, including mine warfare. These questions were removed from consideration, so no base got credit. But then again, the only base that does mine warfare is Ingleside, Texas. Next slide.

This is a very detailed slide. We've given the BRAC staff all of the necessary data, but -- but many of the criteria that would have given Ingleside a higher military score or misinterpreted, just Friday when Commissioner Hill was down in Ingleside, we asked the base operations officer, hey, what about this C number three that says that you can berth the carrier but not provide the carrier for cold water startup? He said, I don't know where they got that information. We have all of the start power necessary to provide cold water startups for nuclear aircraft carriers. He made a call out to the Commander of Naval Air Force just to verify the data and called me back Friday afternoon and said, yes, we really can provide all of the power necessary to support the nuclear area down there in Corpus Christi, Texas.

So there were a lot of military value criteria having to do with submarines and the nuclear support facility that were really not applicable, but there's no NA criteria in the BRAC analysis.

Naval Station Ingleside is very good at what it does and could be facilitized to do other missions, but the Navy has never invested that money in Naval Station Ingleside. Next.

So the military value rank for Ingleside

did not include many scores, gave no advantage for having the training ranges off Corpus Christi, which I'll talk about in a minute. And therefore, Naval Station Ingleside's ability to contribute in the 21st Century was minimized. Next slide.

The Navy wants to close Naval Station Ingleside, close up the mine warfare center for excellence and ship to this new organic mine warfare capability on the littoral combat ships. The littoral combat ships have just been -- the deal has been made. The original capability -- and this really is a risky venture for the Navy. Next slide.

Today the Navy has 26 mine sweepers. The Navy wants to save money by inactivating half of the mine sweepers in preparation for a future BRAC choice, which is littoral combat ships. So in three years there will be 14 mine sweepers left in the Navy.

The Navy recognizes there will be a gap in mine warfare capability and will have to either accept the gap or depend upon our allies. The Navy's physical -- the shipbuilding budget is really in turmoil. The plans to build 50 littoral combat ships, it really is a dream to build that many.

The House Arms Appropriation Committee and the House Arms Services Committee have expressed

reservations about the Navy's plan to inactivate all of these coastal mine hunters over the next three years. And then if the Navy does inactivate the mine sweepers, close Naval Station Ingleside, disestablish the mine warfare center of excellence and then truncates the littoral combat ship program, we're really going to be in trouble. So the BRAC recommendation is based on a poor structured plan congress has not yet approved. Next slide.

The recommendation did not account for the cost of replicating mine warfare training outside of the Corpus Christi, Ingleside operating areas. Next slide.

As -- as you-all know, the State of Texas was an independent country before it became a state. And has, therefore, maintained sovereignty over its coastal waters out to nine miles. No other state in the union has that sovereignty.

Texas has been very cooperative with the Navy. It's allowed the Navy to establish six offshore mine warfare training ranges. We have excellent cooperation with the State of Texas. Next slide.

And we've been leasing these areas since 1994. This past year the Navy signed another ten-year lease of these mine warfare training areas. They're

used extensively by the ships. The Navy seems to want to downplay the significance of these ranges. When we asked the Navy to give us data on the number of days that ships and helicopters have trained on these ranges in the past year, the Navy had 400 ship days of training on these ranges last year and 100 helicopter days of training on these ranges last year. These are not infrequently used training areas.

They also give you a range of -- of capabilities, including shallow water ranges, deep ranges that you need for mine warfare. It also gives us the ability to use explosive charge, nuke mines just like we do in real life. And setting off explosive charge is a major environmental impact issue that the State of Texas has been very accommodating of us.

And, oh, by the way, the time to get to these ranges is one hour from the pier for a ship and about 15 minutes for a helicopter. You couldn't find better mine warfare training areas than we have down in Corpus Christi. Next slide.

So we have a good training range. They don't have the same type training ranges in Norfolk or San Diego. We have proximity to the Naval Surface Warfare Development Center in Panama City that has extensive test ranges, which actually gives us the

ability to drive our ships over sensors that can either tell us whether, you know, the -- the ship would set off a mine or whether our testing gear would set off a mine.

The Navy has been trying for the last eight years to get the environmental rights to use an East Coast shallow water test range. We're still in the eighth year of this environmental certification process. So the conclusion is that -- is that number one, you need dedicated training areas to do mine warfare. And number two, the recommendation to move our forces to Norfolk and San Diego is really going to impact on our ability to train. And it's going to take years to replace these valuable training ranges.

ADMIRAL KONETZI: Commissioners, it's great to see you again. I'm here because I asked to be here. My name is Al Konetzi. And as you well know from other testimony, I retired September of last year.

My last job was as the deputy and chief of staff for the fleet forces command involved in an awful lot of things. One was a year-long study on mine warfare. I feel pretty adept at mine warfare.

The other one was to serve as the executive agent for the chief of Naval operations. As we move forward regarding homeland defense and the establishment of what we now call NAV North, the Navy

component of the northern command for homeland defense.

I have here -- because as I've said before, there are two access missions that only the United States Navy has, one is anti-submarine warfare and the other is mine warfare.

And I am concerned that we are about to make some decisions that will affect our ability to gain access. Every nation I know that has a large Navy has a fleet, a port, facilities on each coast: China, Russia, Great Britain, most of the Mediterranean countries with two coasts, even small, Canada.

And we are about strategically -- we are about to take the only sole fleet concentration area in the Gulf of Mexico, our southern port, and close it. I'll speak more about that as we -- we move along.

Can I have my first slide -- next slide there, please? We talk about strategic importance. Again, military value criteria number two is an awful lot to protect here.

When you take a look at just the -- recently provide a strategy for homeland defense and civil support from the Department of Defense, it makes it very, very clear that we need to have a layered defense and protect critical assets.

The slides that you're looking at

obviously have lots of bullets, but what needs protection: Oil, commercial shipping lanes, overland trade and so forth and all.

As an example, just a couple of weeks ago with Tropical Storm Cindy, it sent oil prices up \$1.50 a barrel. Thank God it did not become much, but it talks to this issue of homeland defense. May I have the next slide, please?

You'll notice there where that slide says, ladies and gentlemen, top ten U.S. ports, well, eight of them are in the Gulf. And here we are very soon to have zero -- zero Navy presence in the Gulf.

Now, some would say, well, you have Key West. I was part of that. General, knows that, General Hill. The organization that said, let's kind of keep that here. Let's lease it to our dear friends in the commercial industry and cruise ships. It's a small pier. We own nothing leading up to it. There's no facilities there.

Some people would say, well, how about Pensacola. I would tell you this, that Pensacola has a lot of dredging to be done. There are no power facilities on that pier that would help today.

So when we shut down, God forbid, Ingleside, we leave. It's amazing to me how things turn

around because you'll see in that little red bullet on the lower left-hand side for the first time with Naval Station Ingleside, the United States Navy has the capability to support an aircraft carrier battle route in the Gulf of Mexico. It is a capability we don't want to give up. Of course, Retired ISF Steve Loftus when he was on active duty said that during BRAC about a decade ago. Next slide, please.

This is a different slide to put together, but it talks, once again, to ports -- strategic ports, Norfolk and Mayport on the East Coast; San Diego, Bremerton, Everett on the West Coast. And yet we're about ready -- this country -- this great nation of ours to have zip, zero on the sub-end coast. And just the stand by and show relatively the miles of shoreline to protect, the percentage of U.S. total refining capacity, you'll notice that those numbers don't have -- there are a couple of small refineries in there, crude oil imports and the like. And we're going to leave it. Very difficult for me to comprehend. Next slide.

Thank you. I've already addressed this so I wouldn't bore you, ladies and gentlemen, but Ingleside can take all of our ships. It's got the facilities. There are no ships on port at Key West as I

stated before, and Pensacola and no plans for it. We talked about Key West. I talked about Pensacola. When I take a look at the future of this nation -- when I take a look at what has to be guarded and protected in the Gulf of Mexico, our southern coast, it occurs to me that this is different than all of the wonderful things that you-all have to deal with here.

And I feel bad for some of the people when I talk about alignment -- or realignment. This is permanent. If Ingleside goes away, it goes away and there's no coming back. This is not moving some people around, which is a tragedy in itself. And I think it puts the nation at very, very great risk.

Finally, regarding mine warfare, the synergy that we have gained by having the mine warfare command down here in the center of excellence has been very helpful to this nation. My Navy -- I love my Navy -- has a poor record in mine warfare and funding and developing and going on.

We come up with dream after dream. The organic methods that were supposed to be out and serving the fleet today 2005 are years out. I am not willing as an American to see this synergy that comes from that center of excellence be taken away because I don't think it's good for this nation. And I know clearly it's not

good for the young men and women that serve this nation. So it's all about risk. Thank you very, very much for hearing me today.

ADMIRAL RYAN: Next slide, please.

Although the BRAC criteria looked at encouragement, it never provided any military value for expansion capability. Next slide.

Naval Station Ingleside can accommodate growth. There's over 400 acres immediately to the -- to the left of the -- of the blue -- Naval Station Ingleside is immediately available. It's shorefront, 80 percent. There's 1,400 acres available both behind the base and about five miles of coastal waterway that's available. So Ingleside has great expansion potential. Encroachment is not an issue for Naval Station Ingleside. Next slide.

On the contrary, we're going to move some of our forces to San Diego, California. San Diego is chalked full. We're going to put the headquarters at Point Loma. Point Loma is pretty full and we'll move the helicopters to Norfolk. Norfolk is pretty full. So there's not much expansion potential over there. Next slide.

So NSI or Naval Station Ingleside was not considered in the BRAC analysis. There's 1,800 acres

immediately available for expansion. And neither of the receiving bases has this much future expansion potential. Next slide.

Naval Station Ingleside's ability to support other missions was not considered. The Navy did the initial military ranking criteria. Ingleside came down the lower half and therefore they started looking at what can we cut. Cut Ingleside. There was no thought about putting the ships that are being -- BRAC, the potential closure of Pascagoula. Next slide.

Corpus Christi is a strategic deployment port. We're moving a lot of Army troops back into Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, Fort Carson. And all of those troops, if there was a national emergency, would come either to Corpus Christi or Beaumont. We need to expand the -- the -- the capability -- the through-put capability of Corpus Christi. And Ingleside was not looked at in a way of expanding the through-put at Corpus Christi. Next slide.

The Army Reserve was looking for a place to -- to house over one million square feet of controlled humidity storage. They came down. They looked at Naval Station Ingleside and they liked what they saw. The red indicates where the Army would like to put the stowing facilities. Next slide.

Where they were looking for a location that has already -- already has security and has access to seagoing transportation, the Navy was noticed by -- on December 3rd that Ingleside was the best of the four sites that the Army had looked at. And yet Naval Base Ingleside received no military value credit for the Army's interest in expanding into Naval Station Ingleside. Next slide.

The Navy pays to berth military sea command ships in commercial facilities. Why, because there isn't enough room at naval bases. No thought was ever given to putting military sea lifts and any ships at Naval Station Ingleside.

So there's a lot of expansion at Naval Station Ingleside. Yes, the Navy eventually is going to inactivate ten coastal lines for ships, but there are other good uses for Naval Station Ingleside. Next.

The Navy finally overestimated recurring savings for Naval Station Ingleside, both in their COBRA data and in the GAO report. Next.

In the COBRA data the Navy is going to take away the ten coastal mine units eventually. Well, when the Navy first did the calculation, they satisfied, okay, we're going to take away ten of the 20 ships at the base. There is zero manpower savings in the

overhead structure of the 1,200 people that operate the base and provide maintenance. And we said, wait a minute, this isn't right. You can't reduce your core structure by half and find no overhead savings.

So we went back and asked the Navy to recalculate and they said maybe we'll have about 48 million we can close. I suspect that the number is closer to 200. And then, oh, by the way, in this one January -- one July GAO report, the GAO says that the Navy has already taken the savings for 21,000 manpower that they're going to cut out of the Navy here in the next six or eight years so that -- although the -- the Navy says the recurring savings from closing Navy Station Ingleside is 75 million a year, 50 million of that is military manpower costs which is being double-counted.

So if I'm operating my checkbook, in fact, I'm only going to be saving \$27 million a year by closing Naval Station Ingleside because the manpower savings has already been counted someplace else. Next.

So how would we use Naval Station Ingleside in the 21st Century? As Admiral Konetzi indicated, there's going to be a gaping hole in the south coast if Naval Station Ingleside is closed.

So if homeland defense of the Gulf Coast

continues to be a mine warfare center of excellence, why do you create facilities someplace else when you have a great facility.

The new littoral combat ship, one of its three missions is mine warfare. Why not build on the synergy of having mine warfare training and basing it on some LCS down there.

There's an article in this month's Naval Institute proceedings by a former mine man enlisted sailor who says, you know, Ingleside is on the BRAC list. Maybe we ought to think about putting two LCSs down there to do mine warfare training. What a great idea. He goes, the Navy can use littoral combat ship overseas and keep some of the ships at home station. Why not make that home station Naval Station Ingleside. And oh, by the way, the new littoral combat ship has a homeland defense mission. What a great place to do it, Naval Station Ingleside.

The area should continue to be the home for joint pilot training. The Coast Guard wants to put three Coast Guard patrol craft at Naval Station Ingleside. That was never considered as part of the BRAC analysis. Next slide.

I mentioned potential LCS support. It would be a great place for LCS mine warfare mission

training. And oh, by the way, they can build on the synergy of having the older ships helping the work with the newer ships to make sure we have good integrated capability. Next slide.

This slide indicates, you know, what an LCS would look like there on the long pier. It doesn't take up much space. On the righthand pier, there's three Coast Guard patrol craft illustrated there. In the center in blue is a joint high-speed vessel.

The Army and Marine Corps are putting together a program to buy like 12 high-speed vessels. The program will produce its first ship in about 2008. No one has ever thought about where to start putting the joint high-speed vessels. I submit Ingleside might be the right place. Next slide.

The community of the State of Texas has offered to the Navy a coastal training area for amphibious training right on the Gulf Coast. Except for the sea turtle mating season, it would be a great place to conduct amphibious training. Next slide.

So looking forward to the 21st Century, the Gulf Coast needs protection. The Navy is looking for a place to train. A great littoral warfare center of excellence would exist to combine Panama City or Egland Air Force Base all the way over to Corpus Christi

Ingleside. Next slide.

The BRAC recommendation, yes, it looks at quality of life, but every soldier and sailor really lives the quality of life. And in Corpus Christi Ingleside, the cost of living is significantly less than San Diego. Home ownership is a reality for enlisted personnel down in Corpus Christi, Ingleside. Quality of life is important. Next slide.

In summary, mine warfare is an undervalued warfare specialty except when mines are in the water. The Navy wants to move mine warfare to fleet concentration areas, but very honestly mine warfare ships don't operate with the fleet. They operate well ahead of the fleet and they go home and the fleet moves in.

The Navy says that mine warfare ships can't get to the fight fast enough. Moving to San Diego doesn't solve the problem. LCS can help because LCS can go 40 to 50 knots. You can put these ships in the Gulf of Mexico and they can get there a whole lot faster than the mine sweepers regardless of where they start from.

Military value criteria, bias against special purposes bases. Red River had a good point this morning. When you move a facility, you probably lose 70 percent of our dedicated civil servants. Well, mine

worker command moved from Charleston, South Carolina to its current site in 1993. We lost a lot of talented individuals. We're going to move mine warfare command again if the BRAC recommendation goes through. We're going to lose a lot more talented individuals in this very arcane warfare specialty.

So what are the homeland defense implications of the Navy to pull out of the Gulf of Mexico? What are the implications of disestablishing the mine warfare center of excellence? The Navy has made up its mind. We look at the BRAC commission to do the right thing.

ADMIRAL RYAN: Would you go to the slide that is entitled strategic importance to South Texas?

In summary for the Commission, South Texas has a joint military and federal complex. Mines are a major war fighting access threat. The solution after the Gulf War was to establish a mine warfare center of excellence at Naval Station Ingleside.

Dedicated support assets for a dedicated mine warfare center are in place. There is too much risk in the Navy plan as the admirals talked about. Irreplaceable assets such as the mine warfare training range in Texas at no cost to the United States Navy.

Closing Naval Station Ingleside causes

the nation to lose a strategic staging area for homeland defense. The Gulf shipping chokepoints need protection. And that's been said not only by us, but by the Houston mayor today this morning and the governor.

Naval Station Ingleside creates the potential to support joint operations not considered in the analysis. The COBRA data overestimated the savings. DoD estimated annual savings from BRAC recommendations to be about \$5.5 billion. Naval Station Ingleside closes. It's less than one percent of the DoD estimated savings.

I would like to close by thinking about the chart that Admiral Ryan showed that -- that the cost to operate Naval Station Ingleside going forward is about \$27 million a year. That's approximately the cost of one tanker of oil that enters the Gulf of Mexico. And 7,000 tankers enter the Gulf of Mexico every year.

Ladies and gentlemen, we appreciate you letting us make our story. And we'll be glad to answer any questions you might have.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Let me say thank you to all of you. We have no questions from the panel, so thank you for your testimony.

ABILENE

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Our panel looks

like it's ready to be sworn, so we'll go ahead and do that.

(Panel sworn)

SENATOR HUTCHISON: Madam Chairman and Commissioners, the last Texas presentation is unique. We have a base that the Department of Defense gave its seal of approval.

The Department recommended a net gain of 374 positions. However, in the recommendations it is bringing in a bomb wing from Ellsworth and moving a C-130 squadron to Little Rock. So what do you do when the other bases could keep this great base whole or split it in half thereby slashing it in two and wasting its superior assets.

To start the presentation is Congressman Randy Neugebauer.

CONGRESSMAN NEUGEBAUR: Gentlemen and Commissioner Turner, thank you for having this hearing today.

Also, I want to recognize the gold shirts, not to be confused with the yellow shirts, is here and I think you can see the support to this base. While I know it's been a long day and you're probably getting tired, however this presentation really deserves your undivided attention.

The civic leaders of my district which encompasses Abilene, Texas and Dyess Air Force Base are here to discuss issues of national defense impacting our relation both now and in the future. We're here to talk about combat aircraft and the way that we prepared for our air crews to fly and fight.

Our Department of Defense and United States Air Force are led by new leaders who are forming new policies that require changes in how we train, how we employ new tactics and how we utilize additional air space that can accommodate the weapons that we currently have and the weapons that we will have in the future.

The base realignment and closure process is about the future. We're going through this process in order to transform our forces and to meet the threats that we face in 2005 and the ones that we will face in the future. This process is not about where we have been, but it's about where we're going.

With 67 B-1s and 29 C-130s assigned to the base and a beddown location for future and emerging weapons systems, Dyess Air Force Base is prepared to be a part of the total new force structure of the Department of Defense and Air Force.

Dyess Air Force Base has always scored in the top two position of large aircraft bases. And the

2000 BRAC is no exception. The data clearly indicated that Dyess Air Force Base has a higher military value than Ellsworth Air Force Base in regard to bomber missions, a higher military value than Little Rock Air Force Base in regard to airlift mission.

Using the information provided by the Department of Defense, Dyess Air Force Base is the base of choice for all 67 B-1s and the 29 C-130s and additional emerging missions such as the ABL and the UAV.

Now I would like to introduce retired Colonel Bill Ehrie who is the president of the Abilene Industrial Foundation and also serves as chairman of the Texas Military Preparedness Commission, which reports directly to Rick Perry -- Governor Rick Perry.

He will provide you with specific data on why the B-1s should be consolidated and why the C-130s should be retained at Dyess Air Force Base. Colonel Ehrie.

COLONEL EHRIE: Thank you, Congressman.

Commissioners, my community, Abilene, has reviewed all of the data collected and given to the Commission by the Department of Defense. We find numerous substantial deviations in the analysis, especially in regard to the C-130 mission.

We have some questions which were addressed with the BRAC staff on June 29th. They were very helpful in resolving specific areas where there appears to be some issues. However, most statisticians would tell you that given the model used and the weighted values in the data, even if corrections are made, the final standings will not change significantly regarding the military value.

We ask you to note in those standings that Dyess Air Force Base has a higher military value in the bomber and airlift categories than Ellsworth Air Force Base and Little Rock Air Force Base as certified by the Department of Defense.

As a matter of comparison, if the military value for all 154 bases in the large aircraft category, the bomber, tanker and airlift considered by the Air Force were totaled and weighed, Dyess would score 12th in the overall rating of 154 ahead of other installations under consideration. Dyess Air Force Base is mission ready today and for the future.

Dyess was built in the last -- in one of the last military installations, built in the late 1950s. It has always been the home to multiple weapon systems, including the B-47, KC-97 and C1C21, then the B-52, the KC-135 and the C-130, and today's systems the

B-1 and C-130.

The total number of aircraft on the base has been in excess of 90 for many years. In addition Dyess is and continues to be able to accommodate special mission aircraft such as the POTUS, NEACAP, TACAMO and the space shuttle. And today we're the host to 30 F-16s out of Egland Air Force Base Florida due to Hurricane Dennis. That is capacity, ladies and gentlemen.

The strength that Dyess Air Force Base has and will continue to is its ability to accommodate multiple weapon systems on the existing infrastructure thereby maximizing all of the resources available to the military in the 300 nautical mile region.

When there are multiple weapon systems on base, they are not competing for the same air space, drop zones, assault strips, low-level routes and transition ties. Rather they complement each other. This is the primary reason why the whole location of the B-1s and C-130s makes sense at Dyess Air Force Base.

The infrastructure as seen on this slide has and is ready to continue to support both missions. Dyess does have a single runway, but presents no issues to operations since there is a parallel taxiway that is the same length, 13,500 feet, as the runway and we can

use it in an emergency.

We also know our civil engineering teams will address any repairs on the runway immediately, thus making it functional right away. Dyess can accommodate all 67 B-1s on the existing ramp. This was verified on May 17th, 2005 in testimony before the BRAC commission by the secretary of defense, the acting secretary of the Air Force and the chief of staff of the Air Force.

This does not include having any aircraft in the 12 hangars with 17 parking spaces, all of which are used for aircraft and not recreation, any aircraft TDY or in the depot.

Dyess is the center of excellence for all B-1B initial training and instructor training, B-1B weapon school, the B-1B test and evaluation unit, the engine regional maintenance center for all B-1 engines, which includes two test cells existing on the base. And we have the largest B-1 simulator operation used in support of training all B-1 crews.

Dyess is responsible for all activities scheduled in the realistic bomb and training routes which were developed in the late 1990s and contain scoring sites for both ECM and simulated bombing. The route is located in the vast air spaces of West Texas.

On a regular basis Dyess conducts joint

operations with units from the Army, Navy, Marines, Guard and Reserve assets in the State of Texas on existing ranges and military operating areas within 300 nautical miles of the base.

Regarding ranges, the Department of Defense certified that Dyess has 126 named areas with the closest being 28 nautical miles. Ellsworth has 34 named areas with the closest being ten miles.

While we acknowledge that Powder River MOA is within seven minutes of Ellsworth, it is questionable to expect any large long-range strike aircraft, even with the most qualified crew, to be prepared to enter any MOA seven minutes after takeoff and not compromise safety issues that need to be accomplished in sequence prior to entry.

It is unlikely that Dyess crews would use Powder River, which is two hours' flight time for training. However, the reverse for Ellsworth crews is more likely given the training resources we have in Texas.

Already air crew program training requirements can be accomplished within 300 nautical miles of Dyess Air Force Base. This is not true for the Ellsworth Air Force Base training areas.

Dyess has 11 IR routes within 300

nautical miles. Ellsworth only has eight as certified by DoD data. The Dyess ranges can accommodate a full array of training requirements mandated by the Air Force to include scoreability, air-to-ground activity, IMC weapons delivery, electronic combat, laser flare drops, Chaffee drops and live drops. Ellsworth Air Force Base has limited capabilities in many of these areas according to DoD certified data.

The development of the New Mexico Training Range Initiative scheduled to be operational in 2006 will enhance the training environment available to all crews as stated at the close of BRAC regional hearing 24 June of 2005. An MCRI as it's known is within 300 nautical miles of Dyess air space.

With regard to consolidated fleets, the Air Force has made a conscious decision over the years to consolidate fleets of 75 aircraft or less in one location. This includes the B-58s and F-111s in the past and today's weapon systems such as the U-2, F-117, B-2, JSTARS, special missions and now the B-1s.

It would be inappropriate to make a statement that the threat analysis would not have been done prior to this decision being made.

Consolidation of the B-1 fleet will create efficiencies in operations, training, supply,

logistics, manpower, support equipment and numerous other areas. Contractor support already established on Dyess with 50 people would also be centralized creating the efficiencies for modifications and on-site repair in areas such as hydraulics, electrics and structural repair.

In summary, putting all 67 B-1s at Dyess Air Force Base and retaining the C-130 is a good decision backed up by DoD certified data which says Dyess has a higher military value than Ellsworth and Little Rock both now and in the future. Complementing the B-1s is the consolidation of the C-130s at Dyess, which has a DoD certified higher military value than Little Rock.

The Air Force will achieve greater efficiencies and cost savings by utilizing the data as follows. The C-130 fleet which now numbers approximately 500 aircraft has several outstanding issues that need to be resolved prior to any realignment activity.

They are the resolution of the wing box cracks in the E-1, the E model and the H-1 model, the C-130 AFT model conversion, the C-130 J future procurement and the role of the guard and reserve units.

Dyess has 29 of the 44 C-130s H-1

models. It is scheduled to receive four additional aircraft from Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. This would bring the total aircraft on Dyess to 33, which according to the base closure executive group letter dated 24 August 2004 can be accommodated at Dyess along with 67 B-1s.

This is further verified by the Air Force response to the Texas Delegation letter dated 15 June 2005, which clearly indicates that Dyess can accommodate the aircraft. But more importantly they stated no formal Air Force analysis was accomplished for Little Rock regarding the 118 aircraft to be stationed at that location. I repeat, no formal analysis was accomplished for Little Rock with regard to 118 aircraft.

Retaining the C-130s at Dyess would create DoD certified costs and manpower savings as per the slide you see on the screen. The move of the C-130s to Dyess to Little Rock, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, and Peterson Field, Colorado, does not appear to be in the best interest of cost and manpower savings.

With regard to operations, if the recommendation is not changed, Little Rock will have 118 aircraft assigned on station. This includes E models, H, H-1 and H-3 models and J models, which could create a logistics issue with regard to engines, avionics and

parts management.

Additionally this type of saturation for one location would create congestion on visual low-level routes, drop zones, assault strips and transition times, which is unnecessary given the resources that Dyess has in place to accommodate these activities.

The DoD certified data states that Little Rock already has 110,000 takeoffs and landings per year on a single runway. This would increase proportionally with the additional aircraft. Dyess only has 36,000 per year with 36 B-1s and 29 C-130s.

Any Ellsworth aircraft would put an additional 4,300 takeoffs and landings at Dyess per year. It is obvious that the data did not consider the density of aircraft that would be at Little Rock and the stress it would place on the air crews for access to training areas that would be necessary to accomplish their proficiencies.

Dyess' resources should be used to complement Little Rock. Dyess has a long history, 40 years plus, of C-130s operation. Its two assault strips on base, drop zones, one of which is on base, numerous unencumbered visual low-level routes and it's H-model simulator are valuable assets that the Air Force would lose access to with this realignment.

The C-130s joint operations has worked successfully for over 40 years in cooperation with Fort Bliss, Hood and Sill. The mission needs to be kept at Dyess where the operations meet the needs of the Army units and complement Little Rock rather than saturate Little Rock.

We request that based on DoD certified data, the 29D C-130s be retained at Dyess and that the four additional C-130s be transferred from Elmendorf to Dyess as scheduled. Thus rounding out the two squadrons to the optional number as predicted by the Air Force of 16 and 16 or 32 aircraft with one additional aircraft as backup inventory. This would complement the consolidation of the 67 B-1s to Dyess.

Any move away from this position would violate military value as stated by the DoD certified criteria. And this was identified by the red team in their white paper dated April 2005. Paraphrasing the comments, the Air Force and Department of Defense are violating their own criteria without sound military justification.

If the recommendation to move these aircraft to Little Rock is not fulfilled, the number of aircraft on the ground at any one time will exceed the number of commercial aircraft on the ground at many

major airports.

In conclusion, let me remind you of the Congressman's statement. We are a combat base that prepares our crews to fly and fight. This is why the decision should be based on DoD certified military value criteria.

At this point I would like to introduce our mayor of Abilene, Norm Archibald, who had made some comments regarding the city and Dyess Air Force Base. Mayor Archibald.

MAYOR ARCHIBALD: Thank you, Bill. Chairman Turner and Commissioners, thank you for this opportunity to share the message of Dyess Air Force Base.

You have heard our case today. Dyess has and continues to be prepared to accept the assigned missions. And Abilene is growing to accommodate those needs of Dyess.

Our community has formed a great partnership with Dyess over the last 50 years. Our citizens have been patriots without uniforms since 1956 when the base began. It is our largest employer. And we are home to thousands of retirees who have served at Dyess and now continue to live in Abilene because of its great quality of life.

Our message is one today of capacity to grow and the support of the men and women of Dyess. Our city has worked very closely with Dyess to help support the infrastructure of the base. We have established affluent water lines on base that we know will save the Air Force over three and a half million dollars over the next 20 years.

Our city has received funding and is preparing plans for a \$21 million gateway directly from Interstate 20 to Dyess. The transportation and infrastructure improvements including a new military drive on the north side will serve to increase security and give Dyess an alternate entry location.

As a matter of fact, we have handled our -- managed our transportation so well around the base that we're proud to be the home of a ten-minute rush hour traffic.

Our school districts today have excess capacity to handle more than 4,000 students. And the quality of our education system ranks in the top tier of the great State of Texas. In fact, the Abilene Independent School District has just launched -- embarked on almost \$79 million of new construction to bring all of our facilities up to the highest level, including technological advances in the classroom.

We have three medical -- medical centers with more than enough adequate capacity. And our medical growth is preceding in a very positive way. Our housing availability today indicates more than enough capacity to handle the increased military personnel.

Our city council has approved over 550 new housing starts in just the last few months. Our city fire department trains with Dyess when there are deployments occurring. Our city cross-trains the firemen so that they are prepared to be on Dyess Air Force Base to manage any unexpected emergency.

Our four universities, our community college, our technical college offer excellent programs located both on the base and in the community to provide personnel seeking anything from an associate's degree to Ph.D. level.

According to a national publication, our metro area has some of the highest scores among communities with military -- military populations of over 10,000. We have the highest scores among the categories of traffic and commuting, spouse employment opportunities, low crime, safety. And we rank among all of those cities third overall in the quality of life.

As I began today our message is one of capacity and readiness. We are ready today to accept

the consolidation of the 67 B-1 bombers and to retain our entire C-130 fleet. We will not disappoint you. We are proud to support Dyess and we are mission ready.

Our city, county and chamber military affairs committee has working groups continually meeting with the leadership of Dyess. And one of those people's involved is Celia Davis, the chair of our military affairs committee, who will now summarize our presentation. Celia.

MS. DAVIS: Thank you. Madam Chair and Commissioners, thank you for allowing us to give you a brief overview of Abilene, but most importantly Dyess Air Force Base. Our factual presentation has been based on DoD certified data.

Now, in Texas, women like to have the last word. So I'm going to summarize what we've said to you today. Dyess Air Force Base has a higher military value than Ellsworth Air Force Base for the B-1 bomber.

In the 1980s Dyess was selected for the beddown of the B-1 and named the schoolhouse for the mission. And now it is the center of excellence for the mission.

Over the years we have worked and fought for funding to make the B-1 the backbone of the bomber fleet that it is today. That is a fact. Dyess Air

Force Base has a higher military value than Little Rock Air Force Base for the C-130 mission. Drop zones, assault strips and training areas are already in place.

Additionally, the central location and available flying days make it a great location for the airlift mission. That is a fact. The hangar configuration, the available ramp space and the runway signs make Dyess ready today and for the future and we stand ready to serve.

The physical plant and infrastructure are in excellent condition. Dyess can currently handle the entire B-1 fleet, plus the 35 C-130s that we are asking you to bring to Dyess. Those are the facts. So you see military value, location, facilities, proximity to training areas, cost effectiveness, access for joint use and support all add up to make Abilene and Dyess mission ready.

I would be remiss if I did not mention some of our greatest assets. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Senator John Cornyn, Congressman Randy Neugebauer and the other members of the Texas Delegation as well as Governor Rick Perry has provided invaluable support throughout this process. But more importantly, they have provided support throughout the years and their support is pledged in the future. We

thank them for what they have done for us.

Through the years Abilene has developed a reputation of working not only what is good for Dyess Air Force Base, but for what best meets the strategic goals of the United States Air Force and the Department of Defense and we are proud of that reputation.

I know as you've gone throughout the -- the country you have heard much about base community support as well you should, and you've seen demonstrations today. However, there is a trophy that has been awarded for a long time by the Air Force. Abilene won the trophy so many times that we were disqualified from competing. That trophy called the Abilene Trophy is now presented by air mobility command by us. We get to present it every year because we are the epitome of base community partnership.

Commissioners, Abilenians are present and accounted for. I told them to be quiet. I'm sorry. Those standing before you -- those standing before you represent their -- there are hundreds, but they represent thousands of Abilenians who could not come today.

Now, if these people look tired, it's because we had 12 buses leave Abilene, Texas, this morning at 5:30. To put that in perspective, it would

be like you boarding a bus in Washington, D.C., to drive to New York City for a 25-minute meeting. We thank you.

Our message to you today is we want all of the B-1s at Dyess Air Force Base, retain our C-130s to round out the two squadrons. May God bless you and bless the United States and the work ahead. Thank you.

SENATOR HUTCHISON: Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. That was a wonderful presentation, Commissioners. You have been very generous with your time and attention and we appreciate the interest you have shown through this whole day.

We believe our state has been undervalued and the impact on communities underreported. In addition to military value, over 5,000 Texans have traveled to make their case today for the bases we love.

This commitment adds to the quality of life for the men and women of the military who live at these bases. Texans have talked to you a lot today. We hope you will remember our hearts are as big as our mouths. Thank you very much.

And Senator Inhofe will come forward for Oklahoma.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: I think we'll take just a short break and let them get set up.

SENATOR HUTCHISON: And how long do you

want your break to be?

COMMISSIONER TURNER: I think just five minutes.

(Recess taken)

OKLAHOMA

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Let us welcome the delegation from Oklahoma. And if you would stand, we'll swear you in.

(Panel sworn)

SENATOR INHOFE: All right. We thank you very much. We'll make this flow just right. It really is a pleasure to be here. I've already apologized as to why I don't have a tie on. My wife and I had eight of our 20 kids and grandkids down fishing in South Padre Island and it never occurred to me to take a tie down there.

We are going to do this probably a little differently than the others have done it. First of all, let me confess. It's good for the soul. I have to confess that when they were talking about hating BRAC, I disagreed with it. And in fact, I argued on the floor of the senate and we lost by two -- two votes.

The reason I was, was that the timing -- we were in the middle of having to rebuild a military from some of the downsizing of the '90s. And even

though there -- there are economics to be gained by closing, the immediate economics are always that it costs more. Right now our biggest problem we have in the military is taking care of our modernization and our end-strength needs and prosecuting a war at the same time.

However, I am the senate ranking member on the Senate Arms Services Committee. I take my job very seriously. And I want the very best for the -- the success of BRAC round.

Now, let me just mention to you that I -- we have four recommendations that I'm here and I'll just do one sentence on each one and then a fifth recommendation is in total agreement with the recommendation of DoD.

The experts that are here with me are retired Lieutenant General Richard A. "Dick" Burpee. He was a former commander at Tinker Air Force Base. Our Adjutant General Harry M. Wyatt, a major general. And Major General Retired Toney Stricklin.

One thing that is interesting about our five major military installations in Oklahoma is all of the commanders stay there once they're retired. So that has to tell you something good about them. So each one of them will talk about these issues.

First what I would like to recommend would be the -- the retention of the face-to-face human resource functions at all -- at the -- all three air logistic centers. The recommendation of the DoD was to transfer these personnel functions to Randolph Air Force Base from all three of the air logistic centers. And our recommendation is that we keep the personnel and the staff where they are right now at the three ALCs. General Burpee will be in a position to elaborate on that.

Second issue is the retention. We have two 137s, the first one being the aeromedical evacuation squadron. The recommendation was to move that to -- to St. Joseph, Missouri. That's the recommendation of the -- or the -- that the C-130s will leave Will Rogers. It would seem to me that they missed the fact that the AES can train in any kind of large aircraft. And certainly we have a number of large aircraft there at Tinker Air Force Base.

The third issue also is the other 137s. That's the aerosupport squadron. That same -- we feel strongly about the same recommendation there, that we do have the vehicles there. We have the -- the facilities and it would -- and General Wyatt will be able to expand on that.

The fourth issue is -- affects Fort Sill. The recommendation of DoD is that DFAS be consolidated in three locations. I'm not sure what the three locations is arbitrary or what it is or the wisdom of that decision, but I would say this. Fort Sill should have been one of those three, if it is three.

We are -- we have the lowest operating costs per square foot in the DFAS system. We're tied to the lowest locality pay factor category and has -- we have unused capacity present on the secure military installation of Fort Sill.

So we were hoping that this -- in feeling that this should be -- that Fort Sill should be one of these five locations. And then finally the one that I thought -- felt very strongly about and that the recommendation of DoD to you folks to move the air defense artillery school and brigade to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to form the net fires center.

I spent an awful lot of time down there at all five of our installations. I think certainly the two generals know that because I've always been very hands-on. I've seen them in the fields as a matter of fact in 113.

But we think that recommendation is an accident one. The -- General Shoemaker the other day --

the chief of staff of the -- of the Army center of excellence for joint fires and effects is fully capable of instituting the DoD net fires mission.

So we feel that was a good decision and instead of introducing them as they come up, we'll just go ahead and -- and hear from the three generals from Oklahoma in the order that I introduced them, General Burpee, General Wyatt and General Stricklin.

GENERAL BURPEE: Thank you, Senator, and Commissioner Turner, and Commissioners. We appreciate the opportunity to be here with you today.

I have to say that the -- the things that the BRAC recommended or the Department of Defense recommended for BRAC for Tinker, we -- we are quite pleased with most of the recommendations they have.

I have what I consider kind of a programmatic issue that I want to address with you. And that happens to be with -- with personnel that -- and this -- the Air Force material command, the main personnel at all of the logistic centers have been designated to be transferred to -- to Randolph Air Force Base.

And this is the recommendation, transferred to Randolph are 111 jobs. This is the total human relations product at each of these air logistic

centers. This is the same recommendation for all of the centers. And it's interesting it's not for the rest of the other Air Force bases.

What we're asking you to do is to reconsider this recommendation and take a look at it. As I said a minute ago, it's probably more programmatic. This is HR, human relations, capability for the civilian work force for 14,000 people.

What it does is it kind of violates the code -- the U.S. Code 5 for accountability and execution. In other words, it breaks the chain of command between the installation commander and -- and the doers -- as I say here, the doers and the owners. The owners have the responsibility. They're accountable. Yet if this -- if this personnel change happens, they will not be -- I mean, they'll still be accountable, but they don't have anything to do with them, which is just simply -- it don't make any sense to me.

It establishes a structure that's totally different from the rest of the Air Force which kind of -- I don't understand this one because a smaller Air Force Base, for example, will still have intact a human relations personnel office. Whereas these large air logistic centers, all of their personnel people will be

transferred.

Back in 1993 the Department of Defense recommended a -- a direction to try to consolidate personnel. And the Air Force portion of that plan was called Palace Compass. And what they did is they gave up a number of slots to the personnel center. In fact, if you put all of the air logistics centers in Wright-Patterson together, they gave up 89 spaces that went to Randolph. And they were supposed to do these things as you can see, computer data systems, online insurance, sort of the simple database kind of activities that are kind of mundane and routine.

Then the additional workload was supposed to continue throughout FY-10. And they were supposed to do these things as you see them here, the staff, records management and that sort of thing. That has not continued on.

The -- the positions have already gone to Randolph, but the work -- the work that they were responsible for has not transferred. And so what's happened now is they -- the Air Force personnel corporate board authorized in Tinker's case 22 overhires to do the work that they -- that they're responsible for that should have transferred to Randolph.

What I'm telling you in 1998 is

that the -- the personnel center told the air logistics center, stop, we can't handle this anymore. Let's don't do this and so they did. So we think that this Palace Compass ought to continue and let them pick up these routine data-type base activities, but that you should keep the human relations face-to-face workload at each of these installations.

And I -- simply as a former commander and I know you people as former commanders, I don't know how you can do the hiring, firing as you see here and all of these different actions, union relations, grievances, EEO, affirmative action and all of these things. I don't know how you can do those remote -- remotely from Randolph.

And there's another big factor that I didn't put on the slide. And that has to do with where they -- where they have to do the planning when they get down -- when the air logistic centers get the budget for their operations, what they're responsible for. The personnel people have to decide how many people they're going to need to execute that. So it's an execution and examination of all of these things. So I just really feel very strongly that you've got to have this face-to-face workload with the people.

So the bottom line here, we request

that you, the BRAC, reconsider that -- go ahead and continue with this Palace Compass as it has existed with the spaces that are -- already have been transferred, but then keep the -- the 111 jobs at Tinker to provide the important hands-on human relation type activities and then keep this -- this would keep all of the ALC personnel aligned with all of the other Air Force installations.

It's kind of interesting. I don't understand why only the three LCs would have to give up their personnel system when the rest of the Air Force does not. That's my briefing and I'll give it to General Wyatt.

GENERAL WYATT: Madam Chair and Commissioners, I'm Major Bud Wyatt, Adjutant General for the State of Oklahoma. I command the Oklahoma Air and Army National Guard. I'm appearing today in state status as the adjutant general. I'm not here to complain about the BRAC process. In fact, I support the BRAC process, especially as the BRAC recommendations affect the Oklahoma Army National Guard and especially as they affect the 138 Fighter Wing, which is the F-16 block in Tulsa, Oklahoma. That's my former command.

I'm here, though, to express some concerns about the treatment of the Air National Guard

C-130 fleet, which I'm sure the BRAC commission has already heard amply enough from my fellow adjutant general. So I'm not going to be redundant and repeat some of those concerns. But I want you to know that I share in -- and agree with the concerns previously expressed by my fellow adjutant generals.

The 137th Airlift Wing is an APAA C-130 unit located at Will Rogers International Guard Base at Will Rogers World Airport in the southwest part of Oklahoma City. The -- the two squadrons that I wish to visit with you today about are the 137th aerial port squadron and the 137 aeromedical evaluation squadron, which I'm sure Commissioner Turner is very familiar with.

The Department of Defense recommendations are to move the 137th aerial port squadron to Fort Worth, Texas, to an International National Guard link and the 137th aeromedical evacuation squadron, AES, to St. Joseph, Missouri. And these recommendations we feel were made on the basis of incorrect assumptions.

It was assumed that since the C -- the C-130s of the 137th Airlift Wing were realigned to Fort Worth -- for those coming to Fort Worth and four to St. Joe, Missouri, that it would be necessary for the APS and the AES so follow the aircraft. This is an

incorrect assumption.

Both organizations, as wartime passes, had been unrelated and totally independent to the taskings of their parent, the 137th Airlift Wing C-130s. In addressing the aerial port situation, this unit has five full-time positions and 94 authorized positions.

The scenario involving the aerial port squadron in Oklahoma is mirrored by similar recommendations affecting five other states. So while I may be talking about one squadron in Oklahoma, I'm also visiting with you about five other squadrons in five other states.

The aerial port has historically had no trouble recruiting and maintaining personnel. As a matter of fact, it was upgraded from an aerial port flight to an aerial port squadron in 2003 just recently because of its strength in recruiting and retaining qualified personnel.

It is currently manned at 105 percent of authorized strength. And the 137th APS has been a tremendous mobility personnel asset for the war fighters. Since 9-11 it has deployed in excess of 19,000 man days in support of OEF, OIF, ONE and the AGF rotation.

It currently has 16 personnel deployed to go over to Air Force Base Delaware supporting the OEF and OIF missions. All 16 of those personnel in September will move to a classified location in southwest Asia. If the APS is moved 201 miles to Fort Worth, Texas, it is unlikely that many of its members will make the move because this is a -- due to the fact that most of them are traditional guardsmen and make their livings with their civilian jobs.

This will have an immediate affect of removing a qualified airlift transportation specialist on the beckon call of the war fighting commanders. If you move the positions, the people won't necessarily -- and probably won't follow the airplanes.

The APS occupies the state-of-the-art facility at Will Rogers. It is ideally suited for training and maintaining the National Guard aerial port. Even without aircraft at Will Rogers, the port will continue to serve as a passenger terminal and cargo processing facility for Air National Guard and active duty operations which are moving into Will Rogers as a result of the BRAC recommendations and would remain as the enclave process that you have heard about with some of the other National Guard bases.

90 percent of the ports, Air Force

specialty code, AFS training is conducted during summer camps and deployments. A small part of this group is its -- in life is to support the flight training of the 137th airlift wing.

It could continue to provide affiliation training to other Air Force and Army organizations and provide little planning support from its current position which includes load planning for some of my Army National Guard aviation assets.

It would have great synergy with the existing aerial port of the 507th air refueling wing across town at Tinker Air Force Base. Keep in mind that the BRAC recommendations are to move the air crew and the maintenance personnel of the C-130 fleet to form an associate unit, the only one of its kind, with the Air Force Reserve flying the KC-135 at Tinker Air Force Base.

Regarding the aeromed, the scenario in the aeromed squadron is that it affects not only Oklahoma City, but two other states. There are five full-time people in the aeromed squadron and 111 traditional guardsmen positions.

The Air National Guard aeromed community is a particularly stressed group of personnel. Since 9-11 they have been highly tasked -- heavily tasked by

the war fighters. Strength is down in the entire AG aeromed community. And the 137th AES is no exception. However, I think it's important to note that the 137th AES is fully manned. It's a skilled medical technician, medicine tech and flight nurse position, which are in high demand by the war fighters.

Since 9-11 the 137th AES personnel have deployed in excess of 17,000 man days in support of contingency operations. As with the aerial port, it is unlikely that many of its people will make the 325-mile trek to St. Joseph immediately removing a pool of highly qualified medical professionals from the country service.

Additionally these people are hard to replace and have long training pipelines with extensive waiting, sometimes up to two years for class dates under normal circumstances. And then you just exacerbate that with the BRAC process, which would put a stress on the training situation as it already exists.

The Oklahoma City Metropolitan area has a population of 1.1 million people and 28 hospitals within a 50 mile radius, a recruiting tool. It is unlikely that St. Joseph, Missouri, with a population of roughly 70,000 could recruit and maintain an AES.

The only tie that the AES has to its

sister 137th C-130 wing is two training sorties per week to support aeromed AES in training. This could easily be conducted on the KC-135 aircraft from Tinker Air Force Base either by a short 20-minute bus ride to Tinker or a short 20-minute block to block flight from Tinker.

The AES conducts wartime missions on a myriad of aircraft: C-130, C-141, C-17, U.S. Allied and Air Force helicopters to name a few. And it is required under regulation to be certified from KC-135. This is not a novel idea. The United States Air Force Reserve currently has four KC-135s and aeromed units to do exactly the same thing.

As with the AES, the 137 AES occupies the state-of-the-art facility at Will Rogers, less than five years old. It is ideally suited to train and maintain the National Guard aeromed squadron to include driving about assorted war-dated materials.

In summary, the 137th and APS -- the 137th APS have supported the global war on terrorism with an excess of 36,000 man days of highly skilled personnel for America's war fighters. If left in place, they will continue to be a valuable military asset not only to the country, but to the State of Oklahoma for homeland security, homeland defense and first response

to national -- natural disasters.

If it moves, they will become primarily an authorized position on a piece of paper for years to come with little or no value to our nation at war. We would ask that you reconsider the -- the moves of these two squadrons and recommend that they remain at Will Rogers Air National Guard Base. I thank you for your time.

GENERAL STRICKLIN: Commissioners Turner, Hill and Newton, it's wonderful to be with you today and I appreciate very much the opportunity to talk to you about Fort Sill and the net fires center that the BRAC recommendations have included.

I am Major General Toney Stricklin, retired. And I was the commander of Fort Sill from July 1999 to August 2001. I was also the Deputy Commanding General at Fort Sill prior to that. I was also a director of combat developments at Fort Sill. Prior to that I was responsible for developing the -- the various weapon systems that our branch has and -- and ensuring that they went through testing as -- as they always have to.

I was a captain stationed at Fort Sill and trained extensively on the Fort Sill ranges. And before that I was a specialist at Fort Sill before I was

a commissioned officer. So I know a thing or two about training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and what can and cannot be accomplished on that magnificent installation. But more importantly, I'm your last scheduled speaker today and I promise I will be brief.

DoD's BRAC recommendations have certainly evoked strong feelings from many communities and states and that's certainly an understandable reaction. In the BRAC military value assessment, military value of installations and the BRAC military value portfolio dated May 2005, Fort Sill was ranked in the top 25 percent of 97 installations assessed by the Army.

The relative size of maps with superimposed other maps on them really don't show anything but a visual effect of relative size. It does not relegate the smaller of the two installations as having low military value.

Fort Sill has trained over 20,000 soldiers, Marines and airmen each year for the past ten years, a far greater quantity of soldiers, Marines and airmen trained in many other training and doctrine command installations.

Fort Sill has already been designated by the Army chief of staff as the center of excellence for joint fires and effects and is totally suited for the

role of the net fires center for the Army.

There's been some criticism of Fort Sill being selected as the net fires center and relocation of the air defense artillery school and an air defense artillery brigade from Fort Bliss to Fort Sill.

General Hill, since you asked the question earlier this morning, let me very quickly state now that there are no issues that exist that would preclude Fort Sill from successfully assuming and executing the mission of the net fires center or the successful integration of the air defense artillery school and an ADA brigade at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

The net fires center on Fort Sill will have the necessary facilities to accommodate the realignment. The totality of the BRAC recommendation will increase Fort Sill's military population by only 2,646.

There are no environmental, cultural or community issues such as lack of schools or a lack of housing that would preclude the successful execution of the net fires center mission or the relocation of the air defense artillery school and brigade to Fort Sill.

Training ranges in controlled air space will support the net fires center, ADA school and ADA missions at Fort Sill. We control zero to 40,000 feet

over Fort Sill. And that is certainly more than enough to accommodate the development of JLENS, which requires 12,000 feet of tempered air space.

Fort Sill's ranges, just like those of other installations, may not accommodate the firing of all weapon systems. However, that has been true for field artillery systems for decades.

The deployment of the Persian-2 missile systems in Germany in the 1980s was cited as a key reason why we won the Cold War. Persian-2 was developed at Fort Sill, trained at Fort Sill, but never fired at Fort Sill because of range constraints for such a long-range system.

The same was true for the Lance Missile System. Today the Army technical missile system employed with such great military value in Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and most recently in Operation Iraqi Freedom was also developed and trained at Fort Sill. But with a maximum range of approximately 180 miles, it is unable to be fired at Fort Sill.

These successful systems have all proven that local live fire is not a distractor to having fully trained and ready crews who are able to employ highly sophisticated weapons systems.

Additionally, just as Fort Sill has

developed systems, it cannot live fire at Fort Sill. It is fully capable of the combat development efforts necessary to field SLAMRAM, THAAD, MEADS and JLENS.

To clarify the live fire requirements of Stinger, Avenger and Patriot, the program of instruction for Stinger and Avenger training at the Air Defense Artillery School requires students to fire a live missile at simulated targets during a field training exercise. This is accomplished today at Fort Bliss by using a tracking simulator in a field environment. And only the class honor graduate is given the opportunity to fire a live missile. This is a demonstration, not training.

Fort Sill can utilize the use of the tracking simulator for the entire class to meet the course graduation requirements. The Air Defense Artillery school has no requirement to fire Patriots in any of its training.

Today virtual and constructive simulation and crew trainers are widely used in the place of previous live firing. Concern has also been expressed that Fort Sill ranges are not well suited for training air defense artillery brigades. This is simply untrue.

Fort Sill in a field artillery has supported joint force commanders worldwide in areas of

responsibility, areas of responsibility much greater in size than even Fort Bliss and White Sands missile range.

Our joint force commanders have relied on third armor corps, Army tactical unit systems located at Fort Sill to support global war fighting systems. In Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqis refer to attack volume, accuracy and lethality as steel ring.

The soldiers and weapon systems of third corps artillery trained at Fort Sill have provided outstanding support to the joint force commanders in all respects. Fort Sill's ability to support war fighting operation in both Operation Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom clearly proves that field artillery brigades trained at Fort Sill that support joint war fighters above the core level is not only possible at Fort Sill, but has been executed very, very well.

The argument of Fort Sill's ranges are not adequate for air defense artillery brigade training is simply not true and without merit. I can truly appreciate the emotions that have resulted from the Army and DoD's recommendations, but to the wonderful people of El Paso and the outstanding soldiers at Fort Bliss' Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Sill is an outstanding training center with great military value and a civilian community known for caring for its

soldiers and families is second to none.

Fort Sill is very capable of the continued development of future air defense artillery systems, training of air defense artillery soldiers and execution of the net fires missions in maintaining the magnificent traditions of the air defense artillery branch.

In conclusion, I know General Pete Shoemaker, the Army chief of staff. General Shoemaker was called out of retirement to become the Army chief of the staff. He could be out fishing in some exotic place today. But instead, he is leading from the forefront military transformation.

He is a straightforward no nonsense leader who will not make decisions that are not in the very best interest of the Army or its soldiers. If the move of the Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Sill in any way jeopardized the training doctrine, weapons and leadership development, organizational structure and the readiness of our soldiers, General Shoemaker would not support this recommendation. Instead he is 100 percent committed to Fort Sill becoming the net fires center and home of the Air Defense Artillery School. That speaks volumes for DoD's recommendations.

Senator Inhofe has already addressed the

defense finance and accounting service, but I would like to add that in yesterday's paper, there was an article about a recent meeting between representatives of the BRAC commission and a local defense finance, accounting system employee.

I would like to reinforce the military value of the Fort Sill DFAS and its ability to be one of DoD's consolidated DFAS sites. The military value of DFAS is enhanced by having a facility located within the secure environment of Fort Sill with its attendant forced protection and proximity to soldiers.

Only five years ago the former Reynolds Army Hospital was renovated specifically for the DFAS mission. And today its cost per square foot is the least expensive of any of the 26 DFAS sites.

The current facility is expansible and affords the Fort Sill DFAS facility the necessary space to expand. With Cameron University in Lawton and the University of Oklahoma close to Lawton, there is no shortage of well-trained finance and accounting majors to help staff increased manning of the facility.

We respectfully request that the Commission review the DFAS consolidation and select Fort Sill to be one of them. I thank the Commission for giving me the opportunity to speak on behalf of the

great patriotic Lawton, Fort Sill. It's been my pleasure to be here today and I will turn this back over to Senator Inhofe.

SENATOR INHOFE: Thank you very much. And I would like the commission to know that we finished two minutes early, 28 minutes.

So I hope that you will take our thoughts, our recommendations into consideration. I -- they come from the heart and not just that we're from Oklahoma. And my background, General Hill, was the United States Army. And yet I -- I spend probably as much time with -- with all five of our installations just as I do at Fort Sill.

We want this thing to work. I'm on the Armed Services Committee and I watched what happened during the '90s. We have got a rebuilding job to do. We've got modernization to do. And this is probably singularly the most important part of that. So I think it's a tough job that you have. You have had a tough job today sitting for such a long period of time, but to get this last round over with is going to give us -- make us better prepared for the future. And that's what this is really all about.

So we thank you very much for your consideration. And if you have any questions for us, we

would be glad to respond your questions.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: We have no questions for you.

SENATOR INHOFE: Thank you, Chairman Turner.

COMMISSIONER TURNER: Thank you very much for being with us today. We appreciate your testimony.

This concludes the San Antonio Regional Hearing of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission. I want to thank all of the witnesses who testified today.

You brought us some very thoughtful and valuable information. I assure you your statements will be given careful consideration by the Commission members as we reach our decisions.

I also want to thank all of the elected officials and community members who have assisted us during our base visits and in preparation for this hearing. In particular, we would like to thank Senator Hutchison and her staff for their assistance in obtaining and setting up this fine site for us.

Finally, I would like to thank the citizens of the communities represented here today who have supported the members of the Armed Services for so many years making them feel welcomed and valued in your

towns. It is that spirit that makes America great.

This hearing is closed.

(End of proceedings)

UNCERTIFIED