

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Holds Hearing on Force Structure Plan, Global Posture Review and the Secretary of Defense Guidance on the Quadrennial Defense Review

May 4, 2005

COMMISSIONERS:

ANTHONY PRINCIPI, CHAIRMAN
GENERAL LLOYD W. NEWTON (USAF, RET)
GENERAL JAMES T. HILL (USA, RET)
SAMUEL SKINNER PHILLIP COYLE
ADMIRAL HAROLD W. GEHMAN JR. (USN, RET)
JAMES V. HANSEN JAMES H. BILBRAY
GENERAL SUE ELLEN TURNER (USAF, RET)

WITNESSES:

CHRISTOPHER "RYAN" HENRY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY FOR DEFENSE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
VICE ADMIRAL EVAN M. CHANIK JR. (USN), DIRECTOR, FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES AND ASSESSMENTS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

[*] **PRINCIPI:** Good morning, and welcome to the second day of hearings of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

Today's hearing, like yesterday's two hearings, will help provide the commission with the foundation we need to provide an independent assessment of the Department of Defense's 2005 base realignment and closure proposal when it is released in less than two weeks.

I also want to express the commission's appreciation to the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs for making their hearing room available for yesterday's and today's hearing.

Yesterday morning we were briefed on the statute guiding our decisions and the criteria we must apply in evaluating the Defense Department's proposal, the issues we are likely to face in the months to come, as well as the lessons learned from prior BRAC rounds.

In the afternoon, we were briefed by representatives of the intelligence community on the threats to our national security we can anticipate over the next 20 years.

The Department of Defense is called upon to develop and field those forces needed to deter or defeat those threats. In turn, it must maintain the bases needed to support those forces without diverting scarce resources to the maintenance of bases which are no longer needed.

The future force structure of our armed forces is therefore a driving force in determining the base structure our nation will need to support in the decades to come.

This commission must have a good understanding of that force structure if we are to meet our obligations to the president, to the Congress, to the men and women who embody our armed forces, and to the American people.

Today we will hear from Mr. Ryan Henry, principal deputy undersecretary for defense policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Vice Admiral Martin Chanik, director for force structure, resources and assessments on the joint staff.

They will speak to the anticipated force structure of our armed forces, their anticipated global structure and strategy of our armed forces, and to the secretary's guidance for conducting the quadrennial defense review now under way.

At this time, I would like to swear in the witnesses, if I can.

Gentlemen, please rise.

The enabling statute for the Base Realignment and Closure Commission requires that all information received by the commission be certified as accurate and complete, and that testimony be presented under oath. Accordingly, do you swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give is accurate and complete to the best of your knowledge and belief?

Thank you.

Secretary Henry, you may proceed.

HENRY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the commission.

We look forward, Mr. Chairman, to the opportunity of having a discussion with you, sharing our thoughts and the work that we have done in developing a national defense strategy – which has recently been published within the last month and a half – also the work that we're currently doing in the quadrennial defense review and the guidance that we have laid out for that, and then finally the work we've been doing since the last quadrennial defense review on the global defense posture.

HENRY: I will address those three areas and then Admiral Chanik will go forward and discuss the force structure statement that has been prepared for the purposes of the Base Realignment Commission.

First of all, we'd like to let you know how much we appreciate your service and the dedication which you'll be delivering in handling the commission. And we feel that the report will be put into good hands for your consideration.

Today I have a prepared statement which I'll leave for you to use.

We thought that for purposes, though, of information exchange, that it might facilitate a little bit if we used some slides to talk through this rather than just my oral statement. And so I will do that and then look forward to your questions at a later time.

So to start with, the three areas again that I will be covering: our strategy, what we're doing in the defense review three years after September 11th and then what we've done in the global defense posture and how that fits into the Base Realignment Commission.

To start with, we have updated our strategy.

The last strategy was published as part of the 2001 quadrennial defense review and then was subsequently updated in some classified documents.

We have issued an unclassified strategy, and in that we've incorporated the lessons learned since September 11th; that which we've learned operationally in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and that the thing – not the criteria, but the underlying foundation of what we understand best military value is and the way that we want to use military activities and employ the force in the future to be able to provide for the national security of our nation.

We also have terms of reference.

In the terms of reference, as in the strategy, we acknowledge the limits of intelligence, that we cannot predict what the future is going to be, that there's a degree of uncertainty in which we live.

With a fair degree of confidence we can look forward and in the next decade predict that we will need to use our forces somewhere, but we cannot predict with any degree of certainty where, when or how they might be needed. Just an example of that, we think that the recent operations from the tsunami on the day after Christmas is an excellent example. That's something that has made a big difference in the attitude of

many of the moderate Muslims around the world toward the United States: the degree to which we were able to respond and help out, to do so without being intrusive.

We had 15,000 troops there within one week of the tsunami. It was a significant operation. It had a significant strategic impact, but obviously that's not something one can predict.

HENRY: And so as we look forward to both our global defense posture and what we're trying to do in the quadrennial defense review, we want to approach it with a certain degree of humility in being able to predict with any certainty on how we might have to use the force.

We also recognize that much can be done by acting early and effective measures. And we want to use those to avert crises. And if crises do arise, then we want to use those early measures to be able to work our way out of those crises to the benefit of our nation and our partners without resorting to kinetic effects or to armed conflict.

And finally, a theme that runs through all the strategic documents that we've been putting out, especially since September 11th and as we've entered into this global war on terrorism, is the requirement to do it in partnership with others.

And so a key part of our strategy is how do we build up the capacity and capability of the partnerships we have. In order to be successful, though, this is not a war that we're going to be able to win on our own.

The national defense strategy, then, as a document, talks to what the defense ends are that we seek and the ways which we hope to be able to achieve them.

As part of that, it is the objective of the strategy to secure the United States from a direct attack. With that security, then we want to be able to gain strategic access to key areas of interest and to be able to have freedom of action within those areas.

HENRY: With that access, we want to be able to strengthen partnerships and alliances, and generate and grow that capacity and capability and then, once there, to establish the conditions for a sound international order and conditions that are favorable to the United States, its interests and those of its allies and partners.

We have retained from the 2001 strategy the way we plan on doing that by assuring our allies that we are credible partners, that they can count on us being there, that we will dissuade those who may harbor ambitions to confront the United States, that cooperation is a better way to go than confrontation, and then those potential adversaries that do develop capabilities and threaten to use them, either through coercion or threat, that we will be able to effectively deter them.

And then should the president decide and circumstances demand that we enter into conflict, then we will be able to defeat any adversary at a time and a place and a manner of our choosing.

I've talked to the concept of strategic uncertainty and the need for partnership capacity and early action.

The fourth part of the major idea within the strategy is that we want to have an active and layered defense. And that concept and that thought is then picked up by the military strategy, which is developed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and how we can use military action to be able to generate that active layered defense.

We are faced with a global war on terrorism, and as that we have a component of the strategy that specifically focuses on that, and it thinks of the war on terrorism as somewhat of a three-front war, but rather than those fronts being geographical, they're more conceptual.

The first one is to effectively defend the homeland and to make sure that we're secure from direct attack. But in doing so, we can't just isolate ourselves to that one aspect of it, because if we only took a defensive

position, in order to make sure that we were genuinely secure we would have to start to take actions that might impinge upon our way of life and the liberties we enjoy.

And so we have to take the fight to the enemy.

And that's the second front: to get out and to attack and disrupt terrorist networks and take actions that'll hasten their demise. But as we do that, if that's all we do, then with the population base the enemy has to draw from, eventually they would be able to recruit faster than we would be able to attack, and so we have to get to the root cause, and that's the third front, the ideological front; that we have to counter the ideological support that terrorists draw from and that we have to show that terrorism, just like slavery of the 18th and 19th century, is an unacceptable entity to have in international norms. And we have to work with all nations to overcome that.

As we do that, there are some tools that we're going to have, and four important tools or components of transformation.

We think of transformation as changing the way we think, the way we do business and the way that we fight. We want to be able to do that by having adaptable mechanisms, and we've moved that into our different planning and strategy and operational mechanisms.

And then we want to be able to refocus on a group of challenges that we think that we are going to be facing in the 21st century. And I'll deal with four of those when I get into the quadrennial defense review.

And finally we look at risk not in a single focus but across an integrated risk framework, which looks at current operations, future challenges, the stress or force management that might be experienced in doing that, and then institutional mechanisms.

As we look to the challenges which we face – and this is something that's picked up in the force structure statement – is we see four different sorts of generic challenges that we face in the future.

HENRY: And this is a key step in the way that we're trying to change our thinking.

The last 100 years we have been focused on a set of traditional challenges which were basically massed armies in the field, force on force, nation states at war, normally involving some sort of cross-border incursion. It's something we are very good at, we are the best there is in the world and we have significant capability in that area.

We also have a new set of challenges, though, as we move into this century that are on the national security front in which we believe the Defense Department needs to play a contributing role – not necessarily always the leading role, but a contributing role.

So one is in the area of irregular challenges, similar to the stability operations we currently see in Iraq and Afghanistan, and also though that we've recently experienced in trying to bring stability to Haiti and Liberia a year and a half ago.

And these are the type of military activities sometimes where commanders' emergency funds in the hands of a local commander can mean more than bullets and artillery.

It is being able to support stability operations, but the role that we play is not the leading role. We are responsible for providing the security environment so others can come in and make a difference in the area of essential services, the development of a rule of law, the growing of civic society and representative political processes and free market economic systems, where real success will be won, but it can't be done without us providing the security environment.

In the area of catastrophic challenges, those are one-time events that the nation cannot afford to absorb.

HENRY: Obviously 9/11 represents an event like that. One might look back and say that Pearl Harbor did also.

The American people expect the department to play a significant role in preventing those, but we do that in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security.

And finally there are a set of disruptive challenges, that if we don't continue to look forward and make investments in key technologies which have made a significant difference in our fighting capability over the last century that we can put ourselves at risk.

And so we want to make sure that, for instance, we've had a monopoly on stealth technology for the last 20 years. We don't want to find our selves in a position where another nation, adversarial in nature, might have a key technology like that that we wouldn't possess, and it would put us as at a distinct disadvantage.

So these are the challenges we see. We're trying to move from our comfort zone in the traditional area and to be able to adapt our force. And that's a key part of the strategy and where we're going with the quadrennial defense review is not to change the force specifically or build new forces to address these challenges, but to take the force we have today and make sure that it's adaptable to be able to address these new challenges.

Let me speak now to the quadrennial defense review.

As you may be familiar, the quadrennial defense review has two tasks that it's given. One is to develop a defense strategy. And the second then is to resource that strategy at a strategic level, looking out and planning over a 20-year horizon and trying to understand what might be out there.

And so it is to balance the strategy with the capabilities that one is going to purchase to be able to fulfill that strategy.

This year is a little bit different than the past. It will be delivered five months later than normal, and so it will go up in February of 2006 with the president's budget.

We find that that and the alignment of where it is with the Base Realignment Commission here are two things that will make the quadrennial defense review stronger, because we'll be able to align it with the regular budgeting process and programming process we have within the Pentagon and also we'll be positioned well to take the BRAC inputs when they come out here in a couple weeks and be able to factor them into where we're going in the quadrennial defense review.

The thought process within the building is that we are at a unique point in time, three and a half years after we absorbed the attacks of September 11th. We have a unique perspective. We can start to understand how the world and the international situation has changed fundamentally.

As we look back in history over the last century, we've seen where there's been other opportunities.

And that's what this slide is meant to capture, both at the inter-war years, when the nation went from a regional power to an international power; after World War II, when we understood how we were going to use nuclear weapons and integrate them into the force; and then in the '80s, when we looked at things such as competitive strategies to be able to use against the Warsaw Pact and hasten the demise of the Soviet empire.

We also find ourselves, we think, at a similar time as we enter into this century, and we think that there are four things, new challenges that the Defense Department needs to make sure that it has adequate capabilities to do.

And the first is, is to be able to protect the homeland and do a job where we'll be able to secure our nation from direct attack.

Additionally, we want to hasten the demise of these terrorist networks. It's not an overnight job. It's something we'll probably have to measure in decades. But we want to make sure that we have the tools in partnership with others to be able to do that.

There are a set of countries out there, key countries that will be major players in the next century. We want to do what we can to positively shape the choices that they make, so that they'll be cooperative and constructive players in the international order.

HENRY: And then, finally, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, with a particular concern to nuclear weapons. And as they continue to proliferate and spread, how will we handle that?

We have developed a theory of deterrence, that was honed in the Cold War, that's been quite effective. But we now find ourselves with the possibility of weapons such as this getting into hands of entities, either states in failure or nonstate actors, who would use it – and we do not have an effective means to deter them, because we don't have something that they would value to hold at risk like we have with a standard nation-state.

So we need to figure out a mechanism and generate capabilities that will allow us to effectively deal with this situation when and if it should arise.

So those are the four problems that are laid out on this slide here. We want to balance those against these different challenge areas that I spoke to earlier. And each of these four challenges don't exist in any one of those quadrants of the strategic challenges, but they're spread across different aspects of it.

And this is the major task of the quadrennial defense review, to balance these new capabilities we have to have against the traditional type of capabilities that we want to maintain and that we've developed significant capability against.

And that's what we'll be looking to do in the quadrennial defense review.

There are some assumptions as we go into this. Again, we believe that we will be tested in the next decade. We just can't predict exactly how that will be.

We realize that we're a nation at war, we are a department at war. This will be the first time a quadrennial defense review has been done under those circumstances; that the global war on terror is something that'll be measured not in years, but probably decades; and that currently, for current operations, strategic victory in both Iraq and Afghanistan is a key part on the road to victory.

We're also sensitive to the fact there will be both internal and external pressures, specifically on the availability of resources. We have a push on nondiscretionary resources, the growth in operations and support accounts that continues to grow, that limits the dollars that we have available to invest and that we also have to absorb some fact-of-life cost increases in things such as health programs.

And we're also cognizant that transformation is not an end-state, it is a process. It is one of continually adapting to the realities of the situation, being able to do hard self-assessment and being able to make the changes that are necessary.

With that in mind, there are 16 questions which we're going to try to answer in the quadrennial defense review and we have broken those down into six different lines of approach.

And each of these lines of approach are led, in a hands-on manner, by one of the senior members of the department, either the deputy or one of the undersecretaries or a service chief.

HENRY: And so we'll be looking at what is the capabilities mix that we need to be able to have a force to be able to answer both traditional problems and these four new problems.

We want to look at the roles, missions and organizations that we need to have to be able to effective in the 21st century. We'll look at that both internally and come up with recommendations externally that one might consider.

We'll look at what are the joint enablers that we need in the area of logistics and intelligence and surveillance and reconnaissance.

We want to look at what our human capital strategy is, at what our back office, our business practice, functions are, and then finally what new authorities might we have to execute this.

And as part of the business practices now, we'll take a look at what the infrastructure is that we need to support things and will play largely in that particular area with the inputs that we get from the BRAC report and the work of this commission.

All these are linked together.

We have a strategy which is driving our quadrennial defense review. There is a terms of reference at the classified level that the secretary's put out by way of guidance on how that will be conducted. And then there will be a number of different planning entities that we will do in the coming years, both in the operational, in the resource and the organizational level.

And across all that, we will build on what our global defense posture is, which I'll talk to here now. And a key part of that will be the work you do in the Base Realignment Commission.

When we looked, starting three years ago, at the disposition of our forces around the world, we looked at the peak of the Cold War we had a large concentration of forces in the European theater and in the Far Eastern theater and then we were tending to do some operations from rotational and mobile platforms in the Gulf.

Then as we looked at where we were as we started this investigation, we found that our operating areas tended to be in the Eurasia and the Middle East area, that the number of personnel there were increasing; we had taken steps to downsize in both Europe and the Far East, but that we still maintained much of the infrastructure. And basically the situation we had was that our forces still were where they were at the end of the Cold War, and the concept was is that they would fight in place: the enemy would come forward and they would come out of a garrison to meet the enemy.

And the world we found ourselves in, again based on this idea of uncertainty, was much different. We knew that we were going to have to go to the fight, we were going to have to get there rapidly, that responsive action was going to be a key to military success.

So with that in mind, we developed some key themes in going into developing the global defense posture.

One which I've talked to you previously about is the uncertainty.

HENRY: The other area that we found different is that we tended to have a regional approach to much of our defense. For purposes of division of labor that made sense, but for managing a force it didn't make sense. And we wanted to move to be able to globally manage the force and to be able to operate, obviously, within regions, but also across regions.

The other thing, in looking at this, is the role that our allies might play with us, and we needed to do a better job of leveraging the capability that they brought. And we also were going to need to build new partnerships to be able to successfully pursue the global war on terrorism.

A key point that we had found is in the past, in looking at global defense posture, we tended to look at numbers: numbers of ships, numbers of installations, numbers of troops on the ground.

And in war-fighting that doesn't really do you a lot of good. It's really the capabilities that you can bring to bear against the enemy, whether in peacetime in the area of security cooperation, or in wartime in actual conflict.

And so we moved away from the specific numbers – although I'll give you some gross numbers today on some movements we expect to see – and more on what were the capabilities that we were being able to deliver, and what we had learned from both Afghanistan and Iraq on a more effective way to employ the force.

And that's the final point is, is what we needed to have was rapidly deployable forces. So as we had sites that they worked out of, we would have to ensure that we would have the legal arrangements that we would be able to use those and employ those as serve the best interests of the American people.

So as we tried to construct this in a conceptual picture, we divide global force posture into activities, things we're going to do with the force, relationships, how we're going to work with others. And then there's the facilities part.

And I know that, for the work of you're commission, you're interested principally in the facilities. But I would like you to be sensitive from our perspective is that the facilities are a piece of it. But the key piece is how we're able to use the force and working with others. And the end result is that we're looking for prompt global action.

And finally, just at a larger level, this, kind of, represents some of the things that we are doing with the force.

HENRY: As you probably heard, there will be two divisions from Germany that'll be coming back to the United States. The division in Korea, we'll be bringing portions of that back to leave it with a brigade in place.

We're going to be putting naval assets, strike assets, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capability forward in the Pacific.

We're going to increase the number of training areas that we have to operate. We're going to go with a three-tier system of main operating bases, which are similar to the bases that most of us are familiar with, where there may be permanently stationed forces.

And then the concept of being able to have forward operating locations. Those would be sites that would only be permanently manned by support personnel, but the operating forces would rotate in there.

And then finally cooperative security locations. And those would be sites that might not be occupied except when we're going to go into use them either for training purposes, security cooperation, or perhaps if we had to actually use them for genuine operations.

We lay out on this chart some of the major themes and activities we plan on doing around the globe.

Again, a point I'd like to leave with you, though, is the infrastructure is only one part of this, which we refer to as the footprint.

There's also a significant part of the presence and how we manage the force that's out there, the ability to surge that force for both contingencies and for security cooperation, and the significance of prepositioned stock, to be able to make it so we can move the force much quicker.

We have a concept of reach-back, which we've learned over the last two major operations we've done. We find that we can do that more effectively. We don't have to put the full force forward; there's many

activities we can do back from here in the United States. And we want to move to a more expeditionary or rotational force.

Sum total, as we make these readjustments, we'll have in the neighborhood of 70,000 military persons coming back to the United States. And when we put in their families and the contractor base that might be coming back, that might add another 100,000. We could not do this if we did not and we were not married up with the base realignment, because we would not be able to put the forces in the places that they would give us the best military value.

Now, I've only worked the overseas piece, so I'm not familiar with exactly where those forces would be placed, and that will, obviously, be revealed to both myself and to you when the report comes out here in a couple weeks.

But we have been working on making sure that the themes that we have for the total global defense posture are integrated into the work that folks at the Pentagon working on the BRAC have done and that they are in concert with each other, they're mutually supporting, and that we feel that these two entities, our overseas posture and how we realign here at home, have a symbiotic and a critical relationship.

And with that, I thank you for the opportunity to be able to share these ideas with you.

And Admiral Chanik will talk to the force structure.

CHANIK: Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the BRAC Commission, thank you for the opportunity to come speak to you today.

Mr. Henry laid out in pretty good detail the background and basis for the force structure plan that you have, so I'll spend just a few moments with a little more background on that before we get to your questions.

During the past two and a half years, the department has been performing the analysis necessarily to develop the BRAC recommendations for the secretary to consider.

As you're aware, the secretary will deliver those recommendations to you not later than the 16th of May.

CHANIK: The Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, required the secretary of defense to submit to Congress a force structure plan for the armed forces.

The legislation directs the plan be based upon an assessment of the probable threats to U.S. national security during the 20-year period beginning with fiscal year '05, the probable end-strength levels and major force units needed to meet those threats and the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during that period.

The secretary of defense directed the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop that force structure plan.

The force structure plan, along with the secretary's certification of the need for the closure and realignment of additional military installations, were submitted to Congress in March of 2004. Additionally, further amended guidelines and revisions to the force structure plan were submitted to Congress on the 15th of March of this year.

My staff had the lead in coordinating the integration of this plan. After receiving service inputs, the consolidated plan was thoroughly coordinated throughout the department.

The plan begins with a discussion of the department's capabilities-based approach for match strategy to force structure that Mr. Henry just spoke to.

While the department shifts to a capabilities-based versus threat-based approach, assessment of probable threats is prudent and included as directed by legislation.

Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps force structure tables, probable end-strength levels and anticipated funding levels complete the document and represent the capabilities the department estimates are required to meet the probable threats, including the capability to surge.

The force structure plan reflects a transformation strategy which balances near-term operational risk with future risk in investment decisions.

CHANIK: The department invests now in technologies and concepts that are transformational, yet remains open to other paths for transformation.

Capabilities are developed, supported by force transformation, allowing the department to fulfill the defense strategy, yet able to explore new and essential capabilities.

These force transformation efforts permit the creation of a future capabilities-based and network-centric force structure that adds the full spectrum of conflict. It enables the U.S. military to create conditions for increased speed of command and opportunities for self-coordination across the battle spaces.

The goal of our transformation is to contend effectively with the challenges our country faces and channel future security competition in ways favorable to the U.S. and its international partners. We accomplish this by assuring our allies and friends through demonstrations of our resolve to fulfill defense commitments and protect common interests, by dissuading potentially adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities and ambitions, by deterring aggression and coercion, and by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces.

And then finally, at the direction of the president, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place and the manner of our choosing, setting the conditions for future security.

As we transition from Cold War-era systems and platforms to flexible, more agile capabilities, our men and women in uniform will have the ability to respond to the challenges our nation faces today and into the future.

This force structure plan, along with the BRAC's selection criteria and certified data, are what the secretary's recommendations will be based upon.

The information in the service tables represent the estimates of force structure the department needs to meet the probable threats to national security. Also significant is that these numbers were developed to include prudent potential surge capabilities.

I thank you again for the opportunity to speak and I'm ready to respond to your questions.

PRINCIPI: First, I'd like to make a request. Given the intensity of our efforts and the very limited period of time we have to submit a report to the president, it is essential that the commission receive all legislatively and process-required information, back-up material and certified data in as timely a fashion as possible after the release of the secretary's recommendations, no later than May 16th.

PRINCIPI: In previous BRAC rounds, there were some delays in the delivery of information, even beyond the seven-day legislative requirement, a situation that I understand started a bow wave back then.

And we the commissioners believe it is in the best interests of the process for the secretary of defense, the impacted service agencies and services if you could deliver the required information as soon as possible.

So I would appreciate if you would bring back to the secretary our request for him to do everything he can and you can to get us that information as soon as the recommendations are delivered to us, if you would.

HENRY: Yes, sir. That's the secretary's intent. We want to have a constructive, collaborative relationship with the committee. And the staff that are working on this – that's also their intent. But we will go back and let them know of your specific interest.

PRINCIPI: Thank you very much.

Let me begin the questioning by trying to reconcile in my mind the force structure plan you submitted to Congress that is based upon the probable threat to our national security over the next 20 years, the quadrennial defense review that is now under way and will not be completed for some time, and the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

And as you indicated in your testimony, the QDR is really designed to examine the capabilities that the department and that the nation will need to contend with the national security challenges facing us. In your slides you talk about the operational, the resource and the organizational aspects of the QDR.

And our responsibility, of course, in part, is to ensure that the secretary's recommendations are in conformance with the force structure plan.

And I guess I'm wondering, in your opinion, will the QDR supersede the BRAC force structure plan or, even worse, render it obsolete? Can you tell me a little bit about how these all fit together, and that we come up with recommendations that are adopted by the president and the Congress, and then the QDR comes out a year later, whenever, and it comes out with a list of different capabilities that are needed to meet the threat over the next 20 years?

HENRY: Yes, sir.

This is not something that we've just started to look at as we go into the QDR. It's been a subject of learning and investigation and analysis ever since the last QDR ended.

So we are not expecting major surprises that would not have been included in the work that went into the force structure document that we've given you.

In the QDR, what we're going to be looking at is capabilities mix. And we currently have currently a force planning construct – which is the current one the department has, which is we refer to that as a 1421 – which says that, first of all, the 1 is we will defend the homeland. And that's the first priority.

The 4 is to be able to deter in and from four key regions throughout the globe.

The 2 is to be able to conduct two nearly simultaneous swiftly defeat operations. And "swiftly defeat" is a term of art, which means a major military operation which goes in, does some sort of operational activity, and then comes back out. It is usually to correct some sort of aggression that may have occurred.

We want to be able to do two of those nearly simultaneously.

And then the 1 has to do with being able to take one of those two, at the direction of the president, and to transition that into what we refer to as a win decisive.

And a win decisive is a strategically significant operation that could incur a regime change in a hostile nation.

That has been the force-sizing construct since the last QDR was done. Some things have changed. We have found ourselves in two major operations since then. And plus, we're conducting the global war on terrorism.

HENRY: As part of the defense strategy, and specifically called out in there, we will go back and look at that force planning construct within the quadrennial defense review. So that will be an outcome of the defense review.

Normally the way QDRs have worked is that it has been taken as an input: "This is the force planning construct we'll have; now let's go and conduct the rest of the QDR based on that."

There are some fundamental things we think that are different in this QDR. One is, normally a defense strategy is developed during the QDR also. We have taken the last 18 months to develop a defense strategy. We will not be looking at the strategy in the QDR, because that work is done, it's been vetted through the interagency, and it represents the work and input of all the key leaders, one of whom you happen to have on your commission, that put inputs into that.

That strategy was also what was based on the force structure document that you have. So the strategy that you've been given and the one we're going to be using in the QDR is the same.

PRINCIPI: So you're confident that any recommendation that the secretary might make with regard to closing or realigning bases will not be undercut or affected by the QDR?

HENRY: No, we will actually take those recommendations and have those as input into the QDR and build upon those.

PRINCIPI: As you indicated, the Department of Defense is in the process of negotiating U.S. military force structures in Europe and Asia to support recommendations in the integrated global posture and basing strategy released by the president in September 2004.

And some of these moves will result in a change in defense capabilities as major units are returned to the United States, and new requirements for strategic mobility emerge to meet critical requests for forces by our combatant commanders around the globe.

Does the force structure plan, prepared as part of the BRAC process, account for the changes in the posture of our forces around the world?

PRINCIPI: As an example, would the location of the home ports of our aircraft carriers worldwide affect the number of carriers we need to meet these requirements?

CHANIK: To get to the first part of the question, sir, as the BRAC has been worked inside the department, the IGPBS anticipated moves were a part of that process and part of the consideration with respect to where relocation might occur for those forces that would be coming back into the continental United States.

So those anticipated moves were part of the considerations for the methodology inside the department as they looked at what the potential basing requirements might be back in the continental U.S.

In particular, with respect to carrier basing, that certainly was something a later bit in terms of when the decision process came out. But that was an issue that is still being discussed, as you are well aware.

But from the perspective of the Navy – and they are obviously very much into the process of putting in the recommendations for the secretary – they are considering what they need for port availability throughout the next 20-year process and are comfortable with that.

PRINCIPI: And that will be part of the BRAC recommendation?

HENRY: Mr. Chairman, just a point of clarification on the question. You mentioned that we are negotiating what our overseas posture is going to be.

Actually, what we're negotiating is individual basing agreements with different agents. We've done consulting with our partners overseas on what the structure will look like.

HENRY: And inherent in the negotiation process is one of flexibility.

The secretary has some parameters he's laid out: that our forces won't go where they're not wanted; that we will maintain freedom of action of the forces that we have, being able to train as we need to, and also with other partner nations; and also the cost will be a consideration as we do this.

So specific agreements are still in the process of being worked out and there will be flexibility there.

And that would also apply to specific basing, whether it be of naval assets or land assets. Exactly what that's going to be will be an iterative process. And we will maintain, we think will be in the best interests of our fighting forces and the American public, a certainly degree of flexibility so that we couldn't be held hostage to one specific negotiation.

PRINCIPI: Thank you.

General Turner?

TURNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being with us today.

I have two questions. The first one deals with the notion of jointness and encouraging jointness.

As a commission, we anticipate bold recommendations to support, encourage and instill jointness through realignment of forces and training. Will the department plan to improve joint interoperability be matched with an equally bold and innovative approach to establishing and stressing joint training?

And in the process of responding to that, would you also address if we might see an effort to – or how we would see an effort be brought to the service academies in terms of developing the leadership for the future?

HENRY: Yes, ma'am.

In the area of jointness, let me just say how much we have learned in the last three years about jointness. Jointness was something, in 1986, that the Congress strongly encouraged us to look at. There were differing opinions on how fast we should move, what the inherent goodness of that was.

That debate is over. After the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, the inherent benefit of jointness – the ability not just to deconflict, but actually to integrate the forces in the field – is extremely clear.

If you look at what went on in Iraq, the degree of integration between special forces and conventional forces there.

And also we look at – an extension of jointness is the ability to interoperate with our allies.

In the area of joint training, that's something that we have had a training transformation group, led by Joint Forces Command and the undersecretary for personnel and readiness, for the last two years.

Lots of different changes coming out of there. You might be familiar with the Joint National Training Capability, which is a major initiative.

And we are looking specifically at joint training and joint education in the quadrennial defense review to see how we can move further.

I can't speak to any extent of what might be in the BRAC report that'll be delivered to you, since I haven't been privy to it. But I do know this is a very significant thrust from the secretary on down to every soldier and sailor, that we can do a better job if we operate in a joint framework and the training is a key part of that.

TURNER: Thank you very much.

I have one other question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

TURNER: And this deals with the notion of returning troops and the communities who will be receiving them.

How is the department prepared for that return operation in terms of locations, housing, schools, those kinds of things?

I'm curious as to whether there would be an expectation on the part of the department and those returning soldiers and families as to how that will affect their quality of life. It might be better, it might not. I'm just, kind of, curious about that.

And also curious as to how quickly this might occur. Obviously everybody won't move at the same time, that's not logical. But would it be reasonable for the returning folks to expect that everything will be in place for them when they do arrive?

HENRY: The exact sequencing of when those 70,000 forces come back is something that's currently being worked out. There are sensitivities, obviously to the impact of the community, obviously the quality of life of the individuals. Some of the things that we put in place – many of these troops will be rotated into Iraq, and as part of their rotating back, they'll be rotated then back to the United States.

But we will ensure that no families have to make moves independent of their servicemembers, so their servicemember will join them at their overseas post, they'll move back together.

We have a goal of not putting people in temporary facilities, but being able to put them into permanent facilities. So a lot of work is being done on this currently to exactly sequence that in.

The moves will happen over probably about a six-year time frame. Services currently have budgeted for all that. We've had numerous coordination meetings on that.

So it is the intent to be sensitive to the impact on both the communities, the service men and just as importantly is the servicemember families, because a major thrust as we do the global force posture – and this is basically tasking that we've gotten from the president – is to make sure that we improve the quality of life of the individuals.

HENRY: So we are expecting longer tours in different hub facilities in the United States, the ability to do multiple tours in the same locations, so there will be a social support network. So this is a sensitivity that we have, and it's our intent to carry through with a sharp execution of it.

TURNER: Thank you very much, and thank you for your service.

Mr. Chairman?

SKINNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen.

I am struggling a little bit, as I think the chairman was, as to how the QDR plays a role. And as I read the purpose of the quadrennial is lay out an agenda for developing needed capabilities in shaping the future force.

Obviously, what we're doing as part of the BRAC Commission is making sure that as we rationalize the base structure in the United States that we are meeting the needed capabilities of the future force.

And, as you are aware, the secretary has less capability to declare a base inactive and, kind of, have a contingency plan.

I assume that what you've said in answering the chairman's question is that, while the QDR will not be published until Congress until the '07 budget, it is well under way, and that a lot of what you are developing as part of your force structure that's being presented, as well as your BRAC recommendations, are based upon the QDR as you think it will eventually be finalized and presented to the Congress.

Is that a fair summary?

HENRY: I would characterize it as what are the capabilities of future force is going to need? We know what some of those capabilities are today. As we go through and we have discussion in the QDR, they tend to come up over and over again. They're encapsulated in the defense strategy and in the chairman's military strategy.

They're the value of speed, the value of precision that comes from getting accurate information, the speed of decision-making which comes from become network-centric, the awareness of the situation that you're, which also comes from network-centric, a force that's survivable, that's lethal, and that has a certain degree of agility. Many of these things contribute to the aspect of wanting to have reach-back, of only putting forward that which is the fighting component, a component with as little support services as absolutely necessary so one can enhance that speed.

HENRY: So these are all aspects that we know.

We have the strategy which the BRAC report will be based on and which we will base our QDR on. And then here in another few weeks we will also get the BRAC report, which we will take as a given, from which we will build the specifics of the force planning on the QDR. So the BRAC report will be an input to the QDR that we'll take.

SKINNER: OK. And that's where I'm struggling, because it would appear to me that the purpose of the BRAC in rationalizing would be to make sure that the structure we have remaining supports what is needed in the force structure, which the force structure then supporting what is needed to execute your strategy.

And as I understand it, the BRAC recommendations are going to be made, you're still going to be working on your force structure, or revisions to the force structure, which will be basically not finalized until you get your QDR.

So I'm worried, just as I think the chairman was, is that in a short period of time, we're going to be charged with making BRAC decisions which will determine the infrastructure and resources that are available, and that seems to me a little bit like the tail wagging the dog.

And so I'm concerned that we get as much information as we can on both of those issues, the quadrennial as well as the force structure, that's going to be needed to meet the QDR requirements so that we're not making major decisions that we'll regret in the not-too-distant future.

And I think the only way we can do that, given where these things lie sequentially, is to be fully up to speed, even if it's of a preliminary nature, in the area of information that we think will eventually be in the QDR, because that won't even be presented until, of course, the BRAC decision and process is over.

But I just use that for food of thought. I'm not suggesting that the commission can change the priority of the way things are coming.

SKINNER: And we certainly are going to do the best we can. But the more information we have the better.

And my second question is: The force structure not only talks about the capabilities, it talks about the quantity of the capabilities. And by that I mean, how many do we have?

As a former member of the National Guard in the Army Reserve, I've paid particular attention. And as an employer with both reservists and the CEO of a company that had both reservists and guard members and families involved, I'm very acutely aware of the challenges that they are facing in this particular time.

And, obviously, some of the installations and some of the recommendations will affect the Army Reserve and the Guard.

Will you be well enough along in your force structure planning, given what you've learned in the last three years, so that when we make our decisions, we will know what the structure of the Guard and Army Reserve – as well as the active duty – is going to be to meet the new capabilities to provide the needed capabilities to implement our requirements?

HENRY: Over two years ago, the secretary started an initiative that was referred to as stress on the force, and having us get a handle on exactly what was the force that we needed. So this is not something new that we're starting to look at in the QDR. He had, I believe, 43 different initiatives – I believe that's the correct number – that he launched us on in looking at this.

As the results came back, what we found is that it wasn't an issue – is was the end-strength right? The core issue was: Did we have the force correctly balanced? Did we have the force mix right?

And when we think of the force – and what we'll be looking at in the QDR is – there's four components. There is the active, and there is the Guard and the Reserve that you also mentioned. We also have the DOD civilian force, which is part of the force; a management part, but still a critical part. And then we have our contractor community, too.

And so when we are looking at the force and what we need to do, we'll be looking across the total breadth of those four elements, obviously not just the active.

So we're sensitive to the issues as far as end-strength. We know that there's an awful lot of interest in that.

As we look at the problem set that we have, is that the critical thing is to get the force balance right, to have the right people doing the right sort of tasks, and also to get rid of a lot of the administrative part, what we sometimes refer to as the tail, and start to emphasize the tooth.

And we've been doing that. If you look at the Navy response plan and its ability to get a much higher percentage of the force out than we've had in the past.

Army modularity pushes toward that. When they are complete with the modularity plan, they'll have 50 percent higher combat power that they'll be able to deploy forward.

The Air Force – the work they've been doing in their air expeditionary forces.

So, while there are no results out, we see – again, it's not the numbers as much.

HENRY: We think that we have the numbers to do the job. What we need to do is get the capabilities right, and the capabilities mix. And so that's where a large focus will be going into.

We're willing to come back up here at any time you might ask, need it, and give you a progress report on where we are on the QDR. That would probably be something that – most of those discussions occur at the classified level, but we'd be glad to share with you what we're learning.

Again, though, as we've tried to plan this out and look forward, we don't feel that there will be any inherent conflict of working the BRAC report and taking that as a given and working that in with the force planning construct that we will come up with. And probably the output of the QDR will not be an order of battle table, but rather – to that level of detail – it'll be a force planning construct, and that will be given to the services then to come up with specific programs.

SKINNER: One final question: Do you know – I'll put it another way, because you've indicated that you're not participating – not fully up to speed on the BRAC recommendations and what they will be.

But your discussions about you believe you have enough at this particular time, in particular as it relates to the Guard and the Army Reserve that have been called up like never in a long time, anyway. If, in fact, it turns out that you are going to need more, you're going to continue to rely heavily on the Reserve and the Guard, especially in the specialized areas that are community-based in both Afghanistan and Iraq, is there going to be some flexibility in capacity for growth in the BRAC recommendations as they're presented to us in case you do decide down the road, based on recruitment or based on demand or whatever it is, that you're going to have to – believing that you don't know, but you may have to increase the actual number of units that are involved both on the active-duty and Reserve so that we don't close something and then a year down the road find out we made it our best effort, but we continue to need additional troops, even with all the administrative and civilian support that we have, and we have no place to really put them, train them and house them?

HENRY: Again, I have not been involved – and I'll let Marty follow behind me here – but I have not been involved in the specific planning of what's in the report. But I do know that that's a consideration that they take into account. I can't tell you exactly how it's been used.

But I would really like to emphasize the fact that, just looking at the hard numbers, that's just a base number. And really what you've got to look at is, is how can I affect operational events?

That's what really the military is for. It's not to have a certain number out there. It is to change events on the ground or in a specific region of interest. And that's the capability we need to have.

And everything that we have been doing in the last three and a half years says that we have to organize ourselves a lot smarter. That's where the key in growing capability is.

The idea of bringing in and growing end-strength is one that has a significant tail to it, it has a very, very large lag time, and it can create inefficiencies.

And so we have to be able to do a more efficient and effective job of the operational tasks we've been given. And we think a lot of that is look at internal rather than adding on.

CHANIK: Yes, sir, I think that the last statement summarizes very well.

It is in the QDR in particular, one of the working groups, the title of that group is capability mix. And "mix," I think, is an important word, because that's a look at, across the services, do we have the right capabilities and the space in the right areas or do they need to be moved around a bit?

I think, as Mr. Henry indicates, the assessment – and we, as you are well aware, are constantly, continuously taking a look at our capabilities, running modeling and simulation to determine what that is; a process that continues on today.

We think, in terms of gross aggregate numbers, we have just about the right numbers there. It's just a matter of do we have the right mix inside of those numbers.

So that's where we continue to look. And the second point I'll put out is that part of the methodology in coming up with candidate recommendations to give to the secretary, surge was an allowance that had to be

computed into it. So the capability to surge is a part of the methodology in determining suggested recommendations for the secretary.

SKINNER: And the only observation I make is the surge, if it's a continued surge, rather than a surge surge, so to speak, that puts substantial additional demands on both reserves as well as active duty.

If you believe in our threat assessment, we're going to be in a continuing surge environment, then we're going to have to adapt our force structure because, as you know, you can't stress your surge forces forever.

And we just want to make sure that we don't do something that can't be revised, so to speak, if, in fact, you decide that we're in a continued surge and you're going to need more forces.

As you know, there's two schools of thought on that, and the jury's still out, I guess, till we implement the efficiencies you're talking about, which obviously is the first step.

Thank you.

NEWTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for sharing your thoughts with us this morning.

As you can tell, it's a common theme that we're having here, and I would describe it as: We really want to be sure that we don't conduct these various studies and/or decisions – capabilities that you're working on, like QDR, force structure planning and so on – in what traditionally has been called that stovepipe manner. But instead it's going to be absolutely critical, in my mind, for our war-fighting capability, and particularly for our men and women uniform, that we do this in a synergistic way such that we can come up with the best results that we possibly can for them as we look forward to the future.

So I'm very pleased that you offered to come back to us at some later date so that we can explore this possibly in some more depth, because, obviously, sitting here without the secretary's report so far on BRAC, which will be coming here in another couple weeks, we are somewhat guessing about where we're going. And that limits us a bit for this discussion which we're having this morning.

But a follow-on to my colleague's discussion on that infrastructure strategy that we need to be looking at – and you talked about training areas – obviously, we need to be sure that we lay that infrastructure out in a way that we can continue to organize, train and equip our folks for this new strategy and these new capabilities that we're going to develop in a way that we can be successful at that.

NEWTON: Rotating forces – it's not new to us and it certainly requires us to think a little differently from the way we've done in the recent years here.

So can you share with me a little bit more on those training areas and your thinking along that line, both here in the United States, as well as those that will be out of the country, as we look forward to the future way that we will lay out our forces?

HENRY: Well, the slide I think I presented you at the very end, which showed the major movements going back and forth, I think you'll find a large number of different areas that are designated training areas overseas.

The Australians, for instance, have indicated an interest that we be able to develop cooperative training capability and we're moving forward in those discussions.

Joint training we have done very well, individual training and service component training, and we think we understand that fairly well there. As we go to network-centric, there are some ways that we want to refine that. It's based a lot on having simulations, the ability to merge live training with constructive and synthetic training. And a lot of progress is being made there.

There is a lot of work yet to be done in the area of jointness, moving down joint training to the lowest level that we possibly can. This has been, again, part – a major thrust in the training transformation initiative and it something, again, that will be looked at in the QDR.

So it is a key capability. We want to be able to and we plan on being able to fight the way we train, so it is something we're trying to build into our systems.

As we look at the Stryker brigades that we're bringing on-line, training is integrated throughout there: the ability to do it either in the field or in simulated mechanisms or to be able to combine those together. The ability of the Stryker units that are getting ready to deploy to take operations that they have done – that their sister brigades have done in theater maybe a day or two before, to take the information and to backload it back into the United States, where the units are working up, and to be able to work off of what was a real live operation 48 hours prior, to be able to do their work-up training on that is something that's significantly increasing our capability.

So training is embedded throughout the thought process on how we can make a more effective force.

CHANIK: I think the other part we all recognize – and Ryan talked about it earlier – that, you know, the forces of today and the future are going to stress mobility, flexibility, speed of response.

CHANIK: All that adds up to a force that has a capability to influence a greater area, if you want to look at square miles. And that would suggest that training spaces, areas, are all the more important.

As we talk about distributed ops on land operations, as we talk air dominance operations and capability of assets, be they UAVs, manned platforms, certainly suggest that the requirement for training areas is going to potentially increase.

We can mitigate some of that by simulation, with better and better simulation for ground and air operations. We'll never replicate the exact event, but we can get closer and closer. And that's all part of the training strategy as we look at that.

Again, in the methodology for BRAC recommendations, training availability, space availability, was certainly a prime consideration in taking into account for the recommendations that will go up to the secretary.

NEWTON: Mr. Chairman, reference the group that is working the training transformation and really spending a lot of time in that area. Maybe if we could have either access to them and/or some of their reports, I think would be very, very helpful as well as we deliberate our requirements here.

So hopefully again we'll have an opportunity to do that. Thank you.

PRINCIPI: Yes, sir. And I believe the week of the 16th, the joint cross-service groups, one of those cross-service groups is, in fact, the training group, and they'll be here for testimony too.

General Hill?

HILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And glad to see both of you, and welcome to the commission.

I have just a couple of thoughts, and then a question that gets at everything we've already talked about, this same issue of the integration of the different studies.

On the global defense posture study, the force structure study that went forward, can you, Admiral Chanik, just give us a little bit more into the process of how those studies were put into the BRAC recommendation

people who are going to send us the recommendations later this week? It might help us in terms of understanding how all this is getting integrated so that we have a better feel for the product that we're going to get.

CHANIK: Yes, sir. Just to clarify, you're specifically asking on how we did for the integrated global basing and present strategy, how that got incorporated into the process?

HILL: Into the BRAC process.

Because, from our perspective, when you say "force balancing" and you say that you have a capabilities-based force, and has to go – the mobility issue that General Newton talked about – all of that impacts very direct directly on what we're going to have to sort out over the next couple of months.

Where do you put those forces? And are they aligned in the right way? And then you'll put on top of that the jointness of the training area, the logistics piece of it.

And what we're all, kind of, grappling with up here is: How did the department integrate all that together into the recommendations that you're going to hand to us?

Make us more comfortable with that, I guess is what I'm asking.

CHANIK: Yes, sir. I'll describe to a little detail – and Ryan may want to add a little bit to that – about how we set up, inside the department, to take candidate recommendations for the secretary and the secretary to make recommendations to you.

That's a process that has been going on for several years, quite frankly, and in the last eight months it's certainly accelerated.

All the services are involved in that, the combatant commanders are involved in the process – they worked through that – as are our various – we call them joint cross-service groups that look at some specific functional areas.

We talked about training a little bit already. There's the technology cross-service group. There's a medical cross-service group.

So there's some cross-service groups that will take functional areas and look at those particular places and see what recommendations might be made.

With respect to the integrated global basing and presence strategy, that was a strategy worked about a year ago. Some assumptions are certainly contained in that because, as mentioned earlier, there still need to be some negotiations with other governments, et cetera.

But, based on those assumptions, the folks working on recommendations took into account where forces might be based, and put in their criteria things that would need to occur there.

We talked a little bit about the quality of life, we talked ability to do that. Training and training ranges is certainly a part of that.

So all that was thrown into the mix to generate recommendations or possible recommendations – and looked at that.

So some assumptions are involved because of the negotiations that still need to occur.

CHANIK: But that was a process that is ongoing to today and will cease when the recommendations come forward.

HENRY: The only thing I could add to that is, as Marty said, the global defense posture and the footprint aspect of that was an input into those who are putting together the BRAC recommendations.

And as you're well familiar with the way that the secretary operates the department many of these key documents, like the QDR and the defense strategy, are leadership documents, they're not staff documents. I mean, staff does the grunt work, but it's the leaders who are involved in laying out exactly what the strategy is, so it's the secretary and his operational leaders, with support of some of the undersecretaries on his staff.

Many of those same individuals are the ones who are leading the BRAC process. So they have been key players and drivers in the development of these other documents and strategies, and therefore, one would, I would assume – although I haven't been on the inside, so I don't know – that that same thinking when they did these other tasks in the area of the BRAC transferred with them.

HILL: Well, that will need to be clearly made out for the commission. And I was not implying that it wasn't well thought out. I was in the middle of all that global defense posture stuff and I know how that worked and the force structure planning.

And I have one specific question, more out of curiosity than anything else. The brigade from Korea and the Stryker capability to Korea, is that a one-for-one switch out of Fort Lewis? It's on your chart.

HENRY: Where assets come from is yet to be determined.

And what we have laid out here and when we put this together was the changes we would make overseas and what would be coming back to the United States. And then that's a black box to us, exactly how that gets rearranged in the BRAC is what drives the inside of that.

I know with your background, it is an area of interest, and I can't specifically tell you where the capability is coming from.

HILL: OK.

And one final thought: The Army transformation that's been ongoing for the last three and a half years, and the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, especially as it looks to tooth to tail and the organization within the Army, that has all been inputted into the BRAC recommendations in terms of Guard changes, Reserve changes and all of that?

HENRY: Well, as you pointed out, Army transformation has been going on for a while, but it's gotten a new impetus with General Schoomaker, and his moving it and putting the label on it of "modularization," which is a specific way of doing it. So he's definitely the thought leader on that, and then he is the final authority on all the Army inputs into the BRAC recommendations too.

So those – from my perspective, both of those intersect with a chief of staff who's very hands-on in this matter.

HANSEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank the witnesses. Excellent presentations: very informative and interesting.

I think back in another life of sitting on the Armed Services Committee, and following a BRAC, Admiral Borda came up and, in a very gentle way, verbally abused us, because he said he had six depots going in and he ended up with three.

And he pointed out, he said, "You folks are always talking about: 'Where are the carriers?' You know, that's a standard cry when something goes wrong."

Now, I understand you're – what are you now, 11 carriers, Admiral? And isn't it true that some of these remaining depots, two on the East Coast, one on the West Coast, pretty well do the logistics and feed the carriers, so to speak?

CHANIK: I'm not sure which depots you're referencing here, the depots are set up to do the care and feeding for the force structure as it is. So they'll do more than just carriers.

HANSEN: So in your mind, it would probably be imperative that there's always adequate places to take care of the carriers. Would that be correct?

CHANIK: Yes, sir. I think there will definitely need to be adequate depot capability to take care of the fleet, which includes the carriers.

HANSEN: OK. I thought you'd say that.

Following up on that, the only thing I ever saw as a member of the Armed Services Committee that the Joint Chiefs really all agreed on was air lifters. I mean, they all could see how important it was.

And, Mr. Henry, you alluded to that in your testimony, that one of the most important things you had to do was deploy and get there. Is that correct?

HENRY: Yes, sir.

HANSEN: Why then in the force structure did they reduce substantially the C-17s?

I know it's a money thing and you have to distribute it around. We've played that game up here for years and years. But I was just curious – it's out of the blue they reduced that one.

HENRY: I actually am not aware of that.

What I am aware of is that we have a decision coming up on how long to extend the C-17 line. We have taken some interim steps to leave it open until we're able to make that decision.

That decision will be driven by something known as the mobility capability study, which is a two-year study of which TRANSCOM is a critical player in that. That's due out later this summer. And those inputs will be taken and directly put into the QDR.

The issue of strategic lift, especially as we become more expeditionary and a rotational force, is critical to the success of how we're going to do this.

So the C-17 is a major player in there, as is fast sealift and some of the work that we've been doing there, as is the craft fleet.

But all those elements will be integrated in and have been looked at in this mobilities capabilities study, so I am not aware of any decisions made yet in the area of strategic lift until we get the output of the study.

HANSEN: In your estimation, do you feel that the QDR – the 20 years gives you enough flexibility?

The world changes almost daily, and I sometimes wonder, as I reviewed this over the years myself, is there enough flexibility in there that you can, kind of, change it as it becomes necessary?

HENRY: Well, if you're going to do threat-based, especially in the world we live in today, 20 years is a long time. And it's difficult to pretty much look out past 10 years, especially in the area of the global war on terrorism, exactly what the threat might look like. A very adaptive threat, very quickly evolving just as we've seen in the last three years, so that presents a problem.

HENRY: And if we did things the way we did during the Cold War, we'd have a real problem. But that's why we've gone to this capabilities-based planning, and what are capabilities we're going to have to have across the spectrum of needs.

I showed you the chart that spoke to traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges, and that's the spectrum across which we want to plan.

We do feel, as the best we can and we look out at the way the world is moving forward and the strategic conditions we think we'll be at, that those are four challenges that are probably applicable 10 years and perhaps 20 years out. And so as we build our capabilities, that's a good construct to use.

HANSEN: You know, the one thing that always bothers me about the military coming over to the committee is they always used acronyms. So finally the chairman of the committee said no more acronyms.

They gave us a book on what your acronyms were. I think it was five inches thick. It just amazed me how many you had.

But something that seems simple and elementary that we should all know, we don't know, and it comes down to definition of terms. You know, at the end of every contract it defines what the terms are, simple as an auto policy that says what an insured is. Most people should know, but we don't seem to know unless we read it.

I remember we got into a big hassle on what constitutes core. Core work should be very obvious. So the committee and all of us, we had one definition and the Pentagon had another definition.

And so we sent some things over years ago and said we want 12 of you to give us your definition of core, and we got 12 different definitions of what constitutes core.

So now some words that we're going to be flying around here for the next four months should be obvious to all of us, but if I may ask this, I'd like to have the definition of the Pentagon on two words: One is jointness and one is interservicing.

And maybe you can't speak for the whole group, but I'd like your definition.

HENRY: I think, to my definition – I don't know definition. I guess let me tell you what I think it is. Jointness is a realization that the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts, if you do it right.

We have four services and we have the special operating forces, and we look at the capabilities of each of those five entities, and we try to bring them individually to the battlefield, we're going to get a certain capability.

But if we strategize together, if we train together, we get used to operating together, we understand each other's cultures, we have systems that will support us working together, then we can achieve results that are much greater than one would think that those five entities can bring.

The case in point on this I think that actually proves that is the difference between Afghanistan and Iraq, and the operations there.

In Afghanistan, General Franks had a staff composed of different warfare commanders. They had done some training together.

There were a lot of lessons learned on how we can do a better job of operating. And we tried to do basically a deconfliction in Afghanistan.

When it came time to start planning for the Iraqi operations, General Franks had those same combatant commanders that had gone through the Afghanistan experience. And they realized that it was no longer

what they were doing as an individual component, but what was the overall objective and how they could play a constructive role there.

And different component commanders felt comfortable in relying on the other components to be able to provide them the services that in the past they would want to just for purposes of assurity to be able to have that capability themselves. So they had what was referred to as mutual dependency.

So jointness is being able to have a special operation forces platoon, to be able to have under it the command of Abrams M1 tanks, which we did in the Iraqi fight.

HENRY: It is the ability for special operating forces to intermingle with conventional forces. And it's just the mindset of being able to work together, where you get a significant value added to the end result, which is basically being ability to generate operational effects.

HANSEN: Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COYLE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you very much for your testimony this morning.

Admiral Chanik, I'm always happy to see a top-level officer with joint experience in test and evaluation. I'm sure it has served your career ever since those first experiences.

Secretary Henry, with respect to your chart about the movement of military personnel, you show about 70,000. It wasn't quite clear from the chart or your testimony whether that's a net number or a gross number, or if it's possible to first order both.

I'm trying to get a feeling for the magnitude of the military force personnel moving forward, the red arrows, compared to those returning to the United States.

How does that balance go? Are those moving forward in the noise compared to those coming back? And about what's the balance, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines – if you can?

HENRY: The number, which would probably be something shy of 70,000, is net number. And it deals with the number of forces that will be returning from outside the United States and its possessions – is the way that we look at that, because that's the same definition that BRAC uses.

And in order to make these things statutorily work together, that's the way that we looked at it.

The arrows going out, if they're going out and – I apologize. The size of the arrows going out, many of those are rotational capabilities rather than permanently stationed.

HENRY: There will be a Stryker battalion put into Korea as part of a brigade there. But as far as troops on the ground, the net number is tending to come back.

Now, in the areas of the Air Force and the Navy, there may be a higher number of rotational forces out there, but not permanently stationed.

To get to your point on the mix, the preponderance of the change is in the Army.

One of the lessons coming out of Iraqi Freedom was that many times we're going to be able to move forces to the fight quicker from the United States than we might be able to from some other foreign place.

Obviously there was some difficulties in moving some of the forces from the European theater, delays that they were experiencing. And the routing that they actually ended up having to take was roughly equivalent to what they would have had to have done from the United States.

So the Army finds that it can probably respond more rapidly by having a large part of its mass back in the United States.

There are some changes in the Air Force, but they tend to be minor and again more rotational capability forward.

In regards to the Navy redistribution of forces overseas to optimize them, the Marine Corps, some of those changes are still being looked at and are subject to some final decisions, and looking at different concepts as far as how we use special operating forces.

So the large numbers you see here, which are net overseas numbers, the preponderance of that is the Army.

COYLE: Well, I expect that it would be. But by preponderance, do you mean 50 percent? Do you mean 90 percent? Can you say?

HENRY: I can, but I don't know how accurately, but I'm getting some help here.

It would be – somewhere between 45,000 and 50,000 would be the Army number.

COYLE: And with respect to the cost of these movements of military personnel and families and contractors, to what extent will the cost of these moves be a factor in the BRAC process?

COYLE: To what extent, in looking at the calculations of cost savings that are projected by the department, will the cost of moving these troops, especially perhaps to bases that are being realigned, be a factor that we should look at as a cost that you wouldn't have had in past BRACs?

HENRY: For purposes of planning, the department set aside part of the defense program for implementation of BRAC, and so that is something that's actually in the defense program.

For the purposes of the global defense posture and the overseas aspect in that movement, those are things that are individually programmed in, and the specific services handle those independent of BRAC.

The one place that they cross is if units will be coming from overseas back to a BRAC installation, then that would be covered in the BRAC cost. But since we that have been working the overseas portion don't know exactly where that's going to be, I can't talk to you on numbers or effect about that. But that is basically the rule set which we've been operating on and which the folks working at BRAC have set up.

COYLE: Thank you.

BILBRAY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Admiral and Secretary for coming here.

I'd like a quote old Mo Udall in the old days that I'm the last on the totem pole, but the fact is everything's been said, but not everybody has said it. So you'll probably get a lot of redundant questions from me.

And the first question I have is, did I understand you correctly when one of my colleagues asked where these troops were going when they came back, and somebody said, well, that will be determined what the BRAC does?

I would presume that you know where these troops are going to go and you wouldn't have anything on the BRAC list where these troops could potentially be assigned. Is that not correct?

HENRY: The process is one that the folks working, of which I had some of the leadership role and on the overseas part of the global defense posture, basically looked at how we would posture ourselves overseas, what we needed there and what we would be better to have back in the United States.

And those inputs then were given to a different set of folks who were working the base realignment aspects of it.

HENRY: Exactly where they took those troops that are returning, which bases they put them at, we are not witting of, because as part of the legislation and the way the process is supposed to be handled, that's a boundary that we didn't want to cross.

And so it was an insulated group that was working the BRAC process with these inputs from the overseas. So there are people in the Pentagon that know – that have worked both sides of it, and there are individuals like myself that only work one side, which is the overseas part, and other individuals that have just been working the United States and its possessions part.

So in talking to the people that are working on it, I have a high degree of confidence that they have the inputs and understand the background behind them.

And the other point that's important to us is they understand the strategy on which we're trying to implement and why we're making these moves, the benefits that we see we're going to get out of it.

That's really something that is sometimes lost on folks on how both the BRAC and the global defense posture work or dovetail together, and the fact that we have these forces coming back, but if we couldn't put them in places that would give us the best military value, which is the freedom of action that BRAC allows us to do – allows us to do it in a coordinated way rather than each individual unit coming back and having to go through a long, laborious process – we wouldn't be able to make the overseas moves absent the BRAC, because we wouldn't be able to effectively position the forces in the U.S.

BILBRAY: So we'll have that information from the – when we receive the information from the secretary, we can presume that these troops are not – nothing is going to be on the list that's possibly on the list to receive these troops. Is that correct?

HENRY: Well, I would imagine when you get the list, it would also discuss the returning troops, but I'm not personally knowledgeable of that.

BILBRAY: That's what I'm presuming.

And the other question I have is I am kind of shocked when it said after what's been going on in Iraq and the threats from Korea and Iran and other areas, that from what I understand that there is no intended increase in the amount of military personnel in the near future; that you feel that you've got enough people under the current manpower to meet the requirements of our old, as Jim Hansen and I both know, fighting two wars simultaneously and meeting the requirements?

BILBRAY: When I see, I mean, what's going on – the recruiting problems are there first, but for the force to be increased, you've got to do more than that.

But the Guard and Reserves are really going to be hurt over the next few years. I can just see the fact that a lot of guardsmen and reservists are saying, "Hey, listen, I'm willing to go and I'm willing to spend my time, but every time I go over for six months and then I'm called back six months later and sent over, my tour of duty is extended."

You know, it seems like to me that we are short of manpower.

HENRY: Well, if you think about 2.2 million people under arms and we're trying to put less than 10 percent of that forward, the issue is not what the end strength is, the issue is how we're organized to handle that.

Forty percent of the Reserves have not been called up yet, but we are misorganized because we're not getting at that 40 percent.

So that's why it's so important to us.

And one of the things we'll be doing in the QDR to optimize is that we have a force that's built on a Cold War idea that there would be a – we would see a fight coming, we would mobilize everybody and throw everyone into the fight very, very rapidly. In the world we're in now, that's not it.

There's a lot of need to do stability ops, there's a lot of specialized skills that are only found – or large preponderances found in the Guard and the Reserve, and we need to have that redistributed into the active force.

So it's not an issue of – I mean, 10 percent of the force deployed is something we ought to be able to handle, but we can't do that if we're not effectively organized to do it.

BILBRAY: Yes.

I was in the civil affairs military government unit in the Reserves and the first thing I looked up, I said, "We would have probably been called up in the first 30 days."

So you're talking about having more combat-ready units and civil affairs military government, people that can go in and help you out at the same time?

CHANIK: Yes, sir.

And I think that's part of when we talked about capabilities mix, the recognition that perhaps as we look at the future, in your example, maybe we need more civil affairs – easy for me to say – civil affairs and less of artillery, for example, might be one.

And so that's part of the mix that we are looking at hard now.

BILBRAY: Thank you, gentlemen.

HENRY: Just as a point here, we've already increased, as far as the number of combat forces, 50,000 by the reorganization efforts that we've done here in the last two years as far as being able to have that many more available for front-line deployment.

But we still have a lot more work to do.

The other point would be is, again, we think of the total force as being all four of those communities and we have to look at which roles which one does best.

So there might be a lot of things that we have military people doing that might be able to be functions that can either be handled by the civilians or the contractor force so we have more of the forces to do the war fighting, which is where we can't substitute them.

PRINCIPI: Thank you.

I'd like to follow up with another question on the inter-relationship between the QDR and force structure plan as they relate to homeland security.

In your testimony, you indicate that one of the four focus areas that the QDR will address is that of defense of the homeland in depth, and that the QDR will assess the capabilities needed to meet the requirement for defense of our borders, our population, our national assets, our critical infrastructure.

Can you tell me whether the levels and the locations of the proposed force structure are based – on the report that you have submitted are based upon an assessment of the requirements needed to meet future requirements to defend the homeland?

HENRY: Let me speak – we know what our tasking is for defending the homeland. We are responsible for the strategic approaches which is both the sea space and the airspace. That's out for 500 miles and some areas out to 1,500 miles, to be able to monitor and defend the country in those spaces.

We're also responsible for responding to threats in the airspace above the continental United States. And those are our principal tasking in defense.

Should for some reason there be an attack on the United States that was successful, then we also have a role in supporting civil authorities in responding to that, and that's – but we are not the lead federal agency. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead federal agency in that.

HENRY: That's what our tasking is.

As far as what the division of labor is, we understand that fairly well, between ourselves and the Department of Homeland Security.

The issue comes down to, should there be an attack, being able to support the civil authorities, and exactly predicting what that would – the intelligence community has difficulty in coming up and saying exactly what we should expect in way of attack, what the size of it would be, obviously what the geographical position would be with the United States. Those are all unknowables.

So it's basically having flexibility to be able to respond to that. And that is what I believe will be reflected in the report you get, is the flexibility and the speed with which we can respond.

PRINCIPI: I see.

Admiral, do you have anything?

CHANIK: Not much more to add to that, sir. I think, as part of this process, the deliberative process to put forth recommendations, we did have combatant commander involvement, so there was some assessment of risks when we talked about location.

So that's part of the deliberations that were made to forward the recommendations up.

PRINCIPI: Thank you.

Any further questions?

NEWTON: Mr. Chairman, just one.

Referencing the last part of the conversation you were just having, do you feel that you've had access to all levels of the intelligence community to help you make the kinds of decisions that you have been and will be needing to make as we go forward here?

HENRY: Yes. Yes, we did.

I just think, as we look at intelligence and what it can do for us, there are certain things that intelligence – they can let you know what the background is and what the forces at play are, but to be able to specifically

tell you what's in the mind of an adversary, before he's made up his mind, that's just not something that they are going to be able to do.

And so that's one of the reasons why we emphasize this uncertainty. As we look forward, we're not going to be able to have the predictable adversary that we had during the Cold War, who wrote out doctrine, who had long-range plans and did everything they could to follow it.

We have a much more agile and adaptive adversary. And so, intelligence can only give you so much on – they can give you what's knowable, but they can't give you what's unknowable, even though you'd like to be able to have that to plan with.

NEWTON: Yes. I fully appreciate it. Thanks very much.

And as you try to develop this force, as you just talked about, because of those things that are so unknown, as we look forward to what we would classify as a different kind of threat, and having that force and that capability that will be needed to meet this full spectrum of possible warfare as we go forward in the future, it certainly will leave the department, I think, in a position where you will be criticized in some areas just because the question will be asked: Gee whiz, the war today and the threat today, and those that we're engaged with look like, act like and conduct war this way; while at the same time we have to be prepared to fight a very different kind of conflict if it was to evolve tomorrow.

Thank you.

PRINCIPI: In '91, '93, and '95, we closed a significant amount of excess infrastructure, based upon a different threat assessment.

And now, 10 years later, in 2005, we're proposing another round of base closures and realignments, and I just want to be assured that you believe that all of the previous closures and whatever might be proposed this time, whether it be active, Reserve or Guard, is not going to have a detrimental impact on our ability to respond quickly to any threat to the American people, our national assets, or our critical infrastructure, where our bases been closed and now instead of being 10 minutes to whatever, we're an hour, an hour and a half away.

PRINCIPI: Is that all being taken into consideration in putting together the force structure plan and the recommendations that are going to come to us?

HENRY: Again, I can't speak to what will be in the report that will be delivered here to you in a couple weeks, because I haven't been privy to what's in it.

If you remember, one of the slides I had were the three circles, different aspects of it, and at the center was prompt global action. And that is what success in warfare as we see going forward in the future is going to be based upon.

We have a very agile adversary in the network that we're fighting out there. And if we're going to beat it, we're going to have to be extremely responsive and we're going to have to get to the point where we can start to operate inside their decision cycle.

So speed is a major – if not the most significant, one of the most significant attributes of the future force.

The chairman has a number of documents that he's putting together. One's a joint operations concept and a set of joint operating concepts which is basically the way that the American forces will fight in the future. And the key to all of those is the value of speed.

So everyone in a decision-making capacity in the Pentagon is extremely sensitive. As we make decisions, we have to do things that will increase our speed of global response. And I can't help but strongly believe that that's an inherent part of the report you'll be getting also.

PRINCIPI: Thank you.

Any further questions?

COYLE: I just have one question more on cost. As I'm sure you know, Mr. Secretary, overseas, our forces have agreements with the host countries that provide for facilities and military construction which would be the envy of a base commander here at home. In Japan, for example, the military construction that's provided by the Japanese government and people is something that we're not able to match at bases here at home.

COYLE: In Japan, for example, the military construction that's provided by the Japanese government and people is something that we're not able to match at bases here at home.

So when these troops come back to the United States, they're going to be perhaps coming back to very different conditions relative to military construction to what they've been used to. Has that been a factor in your planning? And if so, how?

HENRY: Well, first of all, I think what you said is right, the Japanese do a remarkable job of supporting our troops that are stationed there.

That's not uniform across the globe. There are, I'm sure, some people that are stationed in some spots in the four corners of the Earth that would look forward to the quality of life that they'll get when they come back.

So it's not all the same.

What is part of our planning is is to enhance the quality of life of our forces as much as we possibly can, to decrease the burden.

One of the elements of burden that we currently have on our forces as we are rotating forces in is when we have families that we've put overseas and then deploy the servicemember from there without a support mechanism.

So that's a big increase in quality of life. As we tend to lengthen their tours in the same geographical spot and they chart the work into the community, they'll have a much more robust support mechanism there.

As we work on some of the housing initiatives that we've had going back here in the continental United States, we think that those things significantly improve the quality of life.

Is there a chance that there's someone who's going to move from a bachelor enlisted quarter that's been built by the Japanese that is of remarkable quality and that there might be a slight detriment in the United States? That's probably in the realm of possibility. That will not be the overall experience, though.

And, again, I think that you picked an example which is interesting but not necessarily universal.

END