

2005 BRAC COMMISSION REGIONAL HEARING

THURSDAY, JULY 7, 2005

8:41 AM

334 CANNON OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D.C.

STATES TESTIFYING:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND PENNSYLVANIA

COMMISSION PRESIDING:

HON. ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI, presiding

JAMES H. BILBRAY

HON. PHILIP E. COYLE

GENERAL LLOYD W. NEWTON, USAF-Ret.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SUE TURNER, USAF-Ret.

CHAIRMAN:

HON. ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI

ALSO PRESENT:

BOB COOK, Deputy Director for Research and
Analysis

RUMU SARKAR, Associate General Counsel

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 8:41 a.m., HON. ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI, Chairman, presiding.

COMMISSION MEMBERS PRESENT:

HON. ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI, presiding
JAMES H. BILBRAY
HON. PHILIP E. COYLE
GENERAL LLOYD W. NEWTON, USAF-Ret.
BRIGADIER GENERAL SUE TURNER, USAF-Ret.

ALSO PRESENT:

BOB COOK, Deputy Director for Research and
Analysis
RUMU SARKAR, Associate General Counsel

P R O C E E D I N G S

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Good morning. I am Anthony Principi and I will be the Chairperson for this regional hearing of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. I'm pleased to be joined by my fellow Commissioners, the Honorable Philip Coyle, General Lloyd "Fig" Newton, United States Air Force Retired, and Brigadier General Sue Turner, United States Air Force Retired, for today's session.

As this Commission observed in our first hearing,

every dollar consumed in redundant, unnecessary, obsolete, inappropriately designed or located infrastructure is a dollar that is not available to provide the training that might save a marine's life, purchase the munitions to win a soldier's firefight, or fund the advances that could ensure continued dominance of the air or the sea.

The Congress entrusts our armed forces with vast, but not unlimited resources. We have a responsibility to our nation and to the men and women who bring the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps to life to demand the best possible use of those resources.

Commission recognized that fact when it authorized the Department of Defense to prepare a proposal to realign or close domestic bases. However, that authorization was not a blank check. The members of this Commission accepted the challenge and the necessity of providing an independent, fair, and equitable assessment and evaluation of Secretary Rumsfeld's proposals and the data and the methodology used to develop those proposals. We committed to the Congress, to the President, to the American people that our deliberations and decisions would be open and transparent and that our decisions will be based on the criteria set forth in the BRAC statute.

We continue to examine the proposed recommendations set forth by the Secretary of Defense on May 13 and measure them against the criteria for military value set forth in the law, especially the need for surge manning and for homeland security. But be assured we are

not conducting this review as an exercise in sterile cost accounting. This Commission is committed to conducting a clear-eyed reality check that we know -- that we know will not only shape our military capabilities for decades to come, but will also have profound effects on the communities and on the people who bring our communities and our military installations to life.

We also committed that our deliberations and decisions would be devoid of politics and that the people and communities affected by the BRAC proposals would have, through our site visits and public hearings, a chance to provide us with direct input on the substance of the proposals and the methodology and assumptions behind them.

I would like to take this opportunity on behalf of the Commissioners to thank the thousands of involved citizens who have already contacted the Commission and shared with us their thoughts, concerns, and suggestions about the closure and realignment proposals.

Unfortunately, the volume of correspondence we received makes it impossible for us to respond directly to each one of you in the short time with which we must complete our mission, by September 8th. But we want everyone to know the public inputs we receive are appreciated and taken into consideration as part of our review process. And while everyone in this room will not have an opportunity to speak, every pieces of correspondence received by the Commission will be made a permanent part of the public record as appropriate.

Today we will hear testimony from the District of Columbia and the state of Pennsylvania. Each elected delegation has been allotted a block of time determined by the overall impact of the Department of Defense closure and realignment recommendations on their area. The delegation members have worked closely with their communities to develop agendas that I am certain will provide information and insight that will make up a valuable part of our review.

We would greatly appreciate if you would adhere to your time limits. Every voice today is important.

I now request our witnesses for the District of Columbia to stand for the administration of the oath required by the base closure and realignment statute. The oath will be administered by Rumu Sarkar, the Commission's Designated Federal Officer.

[Witnesses rise.]

MS. SARKAR: Congresswoman, Mayor, members of the City Council, please stand for me and raise your right hand.

Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give and any evidence you may provide are complete and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?

VOICES: I do.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: It's certainly a great pleasure to welcome Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, the Congresswoman for the District of Columbia, and I

believe the Mayor will be joining her shortly.

Congresswoman, you may proceed if you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
CONGRESSWOMAN FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

REPRESENTATIVE NORTON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The Mayor is here and our witnesses are here, and I appreciate your graciousness in the slight delay because of the events in London this morning.

We intend to present what we believe is a compelling case against the DOD recommendations affect the facilities located in the District of Columbia. May I thank you for your courtesies, Mr. Chairman, to me and to the District. You have been fair in the process leading up to this hearing. You have said that this Commission is no rubber stamp and we mean to give you the opportunity to show it.

Mayor Williams and I will focus on similar issues addressed directly to the criteria in law that you must follow. He will speak from his background as Mayor of the city. I will speak as a member of Congress representing the city and as a member of the Homeland Security Committee. My testimony will be submitted for the record and therefore I will try only to summarize it this morning, and I will try not to focus on what you know already.

Of course, the proposal to move Walter Reed, focusing first on the most significant and the most radical of proposals, would hurt the economy of the District of Columbia, but we are mindful that we must meet the standard

established by law and we believe that the Department has substantially deviated from established criteria for deciding which military facilities to close and realign. Therefore, we will focus chiefly on factors related to military value, which are heavily favored in the criteria.

We will focus on issues which call into question the Defense Department's proposal on two overriding grounds. First, our objection goes to the fundamental validity and fairness of the process the Department used to make the initial determination. Second, we will challenge the accuracy and the correctness of the analysis that the Department has employed. We will submit a more detailed analysis even beyond our testimony before your deliberations are over.

First, at the outset let me speak to how the Department deviated substantially from the BRAC criteria in the following ways. We will show that the DOD process wrongly determined the military value of Walter Reed because the metrics used to capture the military value were flawed. DOD grossly understated the upfront costs of the closures and realignments, including the closure of Walter Reed. DOD ignored completely the cost of the environmental cleanup. Its recommendation to consolidate Bethesda and Walter Reed into one facility at one location actually compromises force protection. The closure of Walter Reed, finally and we think very substantially, affects the homeland security of our nation's capital.

I will address these points in more detail. I

will be assisted -- the city will be assisted later on by Colonel John Pierce, U.S. Army Medical Corps Retired, as an expert witness, 16 years at Walter Reed, residency program director, who will present we think very troubling questions about the military value analysis employed by the Department.

Commissioners, I think we can begin with the same understanding, that our country and the military and this Commission have the duty to provide the absolute best medical care to those we put in harm's way. This is not a base closing in the normal sense of the word. This is a hospital, the premier research and tertiary hospital of the military.

The BRAC process did not capture this principle, this principle, the principle of the obligation to provide the best medical care, in its attempt to quantify what role the military treatment facilities play in military readiness and the military value they represent.

Let me give -- you will hear more of the technical matter from Colonel Pierce. Let me use an example that I think encapsulates exactly what I mean. Many reports about Walter Reed. No one believes anything other than that it is a world-renowned teaching research hospital, to quote among the many reports.

There was a recent report in the Los Angeles Times about Walter Reed, and then it went on in the same report to discuss a medical health care facility at Fort Stewart, Georgia, that was reported to be substandard, with

people returning often having to wait for long periods of time for surgery and other treatments. According to the article, the Acting Secretary personally traveled to Fort Stewart to inspect the situation he was troubled by and when he did injured soldiers were moved out immediately and he personally dispatched personnel to Fort Stewart, to Fort Stewart's Army community hospital.

The very metrics that the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group used to determine the military value of the military facilities is what I am calling into question here, because those metrics gave Fort Stewart's community hospital a military value for health care services a score and scored them at 65.98. The same metrics, looked at Walter Reed -- 230 beds, filled with war casualties, already treated 2,000 casualties in time of war -- metric score, 54.46 compared to 65.98, even though the Assistant Secretary had to move injured soldiers out of the Florida facility.

How can Fort Stewart be ranked higher than Walter Reed? It can only happen if the entire valuation system is seriously flawed, and I submit that you cannot depend upon that system in deciding to move Walter Reed. The flawed metrics alone it seems to me destroy any presumption in favor of the DOD regulations regarding Walter Reed.

But, looking further at the DOD's own criteria, you are required to look at the recent GAO report which by law accompanies the BRAC process. This report dramatically reinforces our challenge to the DOD process that it was so

flawed it cannot be used to close Walter Reed. The GAO found that DOD had failed to include at least \$11 billion that will be needed to cover the up-front costs of base closures and, importantly, that the effect of that failure will cause the military services to raid the individual services' budgets to come up with the funds.

The Army alone, according to a senior military adviser, says that the cost to the Army would be somewhere between \$500 million and \$1 billion annually and that -- and here I am quoting -- "officials do not yet know where the money will come from." Well, I know. Given what we experienced last week in the Congress with the shortfall in VA medical services, you'll raid, and someone will come back to Congress and we'll be in a crisis.

In previous BRAC rounds environmental cleanup costs amounted to about 40 percent of total BRAC costs. How can they not be a part of how the system -- how DOD evaluates the costs involved here after that experience? We know what happened and you know what happened. The Defense Department simply low-balled the upfront costs and ignored the real environmental and historic preservation costs that somebody's going to have to pay for if you decide to close the hospital based on the data provided you. The savings clearly are illusory if you factor in these costs.

Let me speak to the consolidation notion. This is very troubling to me because we have heard it before. The protection of the military, active duty, civilian

employees, is of course an important concern of your process. The Department has been remarkably inconsistent in its approach in recommending the location of government facilities. This is very clear in the Walter Reed recommendation.

In the fall of 2002, after the attacks on the Pentagon and in New York, the Secretary announced that it was his intention to issue a directive that would prevent construction or lease of any new military space within a 100-mile radius of the Pentagon. He said the point was to prevent disruption of government agencies in the event of another terrorist attack, and his reasoning was clear. If you attack a mission located in multiple locations, it is more difficult than if the mission has been consolidated into a single location.

A major consolidation of the premier medical services facility into a single, single location not only contradicts this criteria, but is completely the opposite of what the Secretary said after 9-11 and is really dangerous if we're talking about a medical facility, which would be a high level target to begin with.

Let me move on to how the closure of Walter Reed threatens the District's response to terrorist attacks. Astonishingly, the Defense Department failed even to address the homeland security function that Walter Reed plays in our nation's capital in the event of a major disaster creating mass casualties. In the case of a chemical, biological, or a radiological attack or other

calamity, the District has an informal agreement with the Defense Department whereby Walter Reed would serve as a critical resource in the District's efforts to treat mass casualties.

Specifically, Walter Reed is positioned to provide a staging site for medical personnel and equipment, including the use of a helipad, one of the few available in the nation's capital, ambulances and personnel for the transport of civilian casualties. The entire assets of the Federal Government are located here in a few square miles, and critical decontamination facilities for the management of people exposed to chemical and biological agents.

Walter Reed currently partners with the District to store and manage crucial stockpiles of pharmaceuticals to be utilized in the case of a major attack.

The closure of Walter Reed would terminate this agreement and cripple the emergency response capabilities of the nation's capital in the event of a major catastrophe, despite the high stakes for Washington. The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group never addressed the removal of these critical homeland security capabilities from the capital of our country, although Walter Reed is located just 5.5 miles from the White House, 6.5 miles from the Capitol, 6 miles from the Washington Convention Center.

Even if these critical resources were in Bethesda, it would require medical personnel and equipment to travel a 50 percent greater distance to reach those in need. The distance is very significant in light of the way

gridlock crippled the nation's capital after the September 11th attack. It would be very difficult to reach resources downtown from Bethesda, far easier from Walter Reed, which has a direct route to downtown.

These points, the points I have made, were not lost on the Army's representative to the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group, who voted against closing Walter Reed.

The Army expressed reservations about the impact of closing Walter Reed on its operational readiness. Medical readiness should be the only measure of military value in time of war when assessing whether to close or move a medical facility. Combat is the only reason to even have a medical department. Combat soldiers, combat veterans, are who are primarily served by Walter Reed. No one is in a better position to make this judgment about military medicine's readiness than the Army's Deputy Surgeon General, who was the Army's representative to the medical group.

Let me say a word about the military value criteria which govern your proceedings. The first criteria asked the question, how does the recommendation affect the current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense? Since the Iraq invasion, Walter Reed has treated over 4,000 patients, including a thousand battle casualties, 245 amputees. But remember, an outpatient clinic in Florida scored higher than the nation's premier tertiary combat facility.

This is about the metrics. This is about the measurement. If you cannot rely on the measurement, you cannot use those criteria to close Walter Reed, I submit. It casts a doubt of the most substantial kind over DOD's view that it can rebuild the same level of care, services, and treatment that are now found at Walter Reed for our wounded service members and the ominous signs that DOD will not be able to do so are already quite apparent. Just seven months ago, the Army had a big groundbreaking ceremony for a new multimillion dollar amputee training center at Walter Reed. It was so important to the military that Defense -- Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz himself came to preside because of the concern that so many are being sent home with very unusual and terrible problems that we've never had before.

A \$10 million amputee center on hold. What are you going to do? What are you going to do during a period while this is on hold? And years later you're trying to build a hospital at some other location. Even assuming that this facility will eventually be built at the new facility, it will not be co-located with the patients it is intended to serve for, what is it, five, six, seven delays and construction costs, rebuilding it? Who knows, particularly when you have heard my testimony concerning costs. This much-needed facility is on an indefinite hold or delay.

I think you must take into account what GAO found. Here I'd like to quote what GAO said in the recent

report issued just a few days ago: "DOD's ongoing assessment of its future wartime medical requirements will not be completed until after BRAC decisions are finalized, following reviews by the BRAC Commission, the President, and Congress. Therefore this assessment was not included in the medical group's analysis."

We're talking -- this is not just another base closing. GAO says with respect to its military readiness in medical terms there is no reliable analysis. I don't know what you're going to do about other base closings because perhaps there is. With respect to medical facilities, there clearly is not.

In time of war, when 20,000 soldiers have been evacuated to Army facilities, the medical group decided to close Walter Reed without having an assessment of the military's wartime needs. And the GAO said, and if I may quote again: "Without having such requirements available during the BRAC process, it is difficult for DOD to identify the appropriate medical infrastructure changes that are needed and to determine the appropriate size of the military health system."

This goes, ladies and gentlemen, directly to the closing of Walter Reed. According to the GAO, there simply is no data at all, much less reliable data.

For this reason, I would suggest to you that you have no choice but to find that the Department substantially deviated from its own criteria and to reject the recommendations to close and realign Walter Reed. The

fact that GAO has found that the Defense Department lacks any data on its wartime medical requirements and won't even have them until after the BRAC process is completed raises a most serious question of whether the recommendation takes into account the ability of both the existing and potential receiving locations to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force to support operations and training and establishes a primary case, a prima facie case, of deviation from the third BRAC military value criterion. We think this is fundamental deviation.

The fourth military criterion requires an evaluation of the costs of operations and the manpower implications of the proposal. In the late 80s and the 90s the military already has closed many of its direct care military facilities. Therefore, both active and retired dependents now use the so-called TRICARE system. As a result, the Department of Defense has faced relentless and explosive growth in its health care budget.

Last week the Department of Veterans Affairs revealed that it would be at least \$6.2 billion short in its fiscal year 2006 health care budget unless Congress provided it in additional supplemental funds. This almost stopped us from going on recess. It hit us in the gut. This came about because the Department of Veterans Affairs had projected that 23,535 veterans would return this year from Iraq and Afghanistan and seek medical treatment. However, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs testified before the Senate that the number of veterans seeking health care

was currently 103,000, almost five times the original estimate. And you're going to rely on DOD metrics and data? Don't get caught the way Congress was, because I don't know what we're going to do about it, except that they are returning military and we've got to raid other budgets and find a way to do something about it.

We must remember that it's the responsibility of the military health system to heal an injured soldier, sailor, airman, or marine before that service member is transferred into the VA system. This is exactly the mission that Walter Reed Army Center has been executing so well.

Here is the clear alternative that we pose to you that does not disrupt medical care for the most seriously injured and sick military. Keep Walter Reed open and align the mission of the Bethesda, which does not provide the level of tertiary care provided at Walter Reed. The new hospital at Fort Belvoir could still be part of the solution and could provide level one inpatient care and outpatient services to those beneficiaries living in northern Virginia, as the DOD proposes.

This solution would ensure that there is no disruption to the Walter Reed mission in time of war. You could rebuild -- we're not talking about a large hospital; we're talking about a hospital about the same size -- renovate, rebuild Walter Reed in stages, the way it is done in hospitals, military and civilian, every day with no disruption in military service because the military knows

how to do that. The many DOD plans on spending to refurbish and rebuild new facilities at Bethesda would better be spent on upgrading Walter Reed.

The fifth criterion relates to the cost savings of the proposed location and I simply must mention to you that at Walter Reed you have several facilities -- Mologne House, a 280-room facility, allows service personnel and their families at a cost of about \$60 a night to remain after the personnel leaves the hospital. The costs for hotels along Wisconsin Avenue are \$130 per night. The Army sometimes picks up the cost. Families, however, often have to pick them up themselves.

Walter Reed, though, has three so-called "fisher houses." At a fisher house, a family can stay at ten dollars per night, a ten dollar donation per night, or for free if they can't afford that. The spouses sometimes are allowed to stay as long as a year to assist in the recovery of severely wounded.

Mologne House, the Mologne House, fisher houses, clearly discounted. They're nowhere to be found, because they're not paid for in the DOD budget. I submit that it's very important to count it because what it means is, move to Bethesda, the burden is shifted to service members and their families, the very individuals who are already bearing the highest costs in service to their country.

The economic impact on the existing communities you will hear more from, more about. I just want to raise one question with respect to that impact because of what it

tells us about DOD's analysis and the defects of that analysis in their overall proposal. DOD indicated that the loss of jobs would be minuscule to the District of Columbia, .22. So I thought, well, maybe there's something I don't know, until we looked closely, more closely, and found that included in their assessment of job loss was a lumping together of D.C., Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia. This is the kind of analysis that is threaded throughout this report.

Finally, let me say a word about Bolling because we see the same flaws there. The inconsistency in the Defense Department's goal of dispersing facilities or consolidating facilities is particularly apparent in the recommendations to close Bolling Air Force Base and the Washington Navy -- sorry -- to reduce personnel at the Bolling Air Force Base and the Washington Navy Yard.

The Department is placing a premium on secure facilities and is taking steps to move away from rented and leased securities. But not only are Bolling Air Force Base, Walter Reed, and the Navy Yard strategically located near the Pentagon, these facilities already are secure, top secure facilities. If anything, the Pentagon should be looking for ways, for example, to expand the use of Bolling, Walter Reed, and the Navy Yard by making them receiving sites for some of its most important functions.

That is exactly what the BRAC Commission did in 1995. It saw that the Washington Navy Yard was a secure site and, instead of moving the facilities of the Navy Sea

System Command to California, they removed from less secure sites in Virginia to the Washington Navy Yard.

DOD proposes to move the Navy Central Adjudication Facility from the Washington Navy Yard to an Army post. The Navy facility is already on a Navy base in government-owned space. Where can the savings be of moving from a secure Navy installation to an Army post that will require new facilities to be constructed, not to mention the costs of the move? This move does not meet the stated justification.

The same objection applies to moving the Air Force Adjudication Facility and the Defense Intelligence Agency Central Adjudication Facility from Bolling Air Force Base. Again, these are existing facilities already located in a military installation. They're also located to support the Air Force, DIA headquarters, and the Navy facility in support of the mission of the Naval District of Washington. It makes no economic sense to relocate the Civilian Personnel Office from Bolling Air Force Base, for example, to Randolph Air Force Base in Texas. It is located in Bolling Air Force Base because it supports the Air Force activities, including the Pentagon, that are here in the national capital region. They are not moving to Texas, but the personnel office that supports them is.

Does anybody know anything about personnel? Without face to face contact in the troubling personnel systems that a personnel office encounters, it will be very difficult for that office to perform its own mission.

The DOD proposes to relocate the Navy Reserve Readiness Command Mid-Atlantic from the Washington Navy Yard to Norfolk, Virginia. That move will increase the travel time, lodging, and meal costs as reservists will have to spend more time on the road to carry out the missions of the Readiness Command.

The GAO also criticized this methodology because it produced savings and a shorter payback by a most fallacious methodology. They simply lumped the poor moves with the moves that save money, instead of looking at the moves on a case by case basis, and said, voila, there is money to be saved.

Therefore, I respectfully ask the Commission to closely scrutinize the Defense Department's recommendations in light of the flaws that we have examined and not to abandon the important assets located in the nation's capital.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you very much, Congresswoman Norton.

Mayor Anthony Williams and members of the City Council who may wish to join the Mayor. Good morning, Mayor.

Has the Mayor been sworn in?

VOICE: Yes.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you. You may proceed, Mayor.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANTHONY WILLIAMS,

MAYOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MAYOR WILLIAMS: Chairman Principi and members of the Commission: Thank you. Let me join Congresswoman Norton for thanking you for the opportunity to testify before you on the impact of the closure of Walter Reed and changes to other installations in the city.

If I could ask the indulgence of the Commission to just make a statement regarding the terrorist attack in London, because there are so many people who have been asking me for a comment. if I could just ask for 45 seconds of the Commission's time.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Please, Mayor.

MAYOR WILLIAMS: Thank you very much, sir.

I want to take this opportunity to join with the leadership of our country, with President Bush and other leaders, to first and foremost announce what is a heinous attack, not only on the people of London, but recognizing that an attack on good people anywhere is an attack on all of us everywhere. It is also an attack on the principles that are most important to our country and certainly to this city. The openness, the opportunity, the freedom to enjoy the kind of life that we all fight for and we've all struggled for is always imperiled by an attack like this.

I want to take the opportunity to reassure people that we've been in touch with the Secretary of Homeland Security, that while we have no evidence of any intelligence indicating an attack on our city here and on our region here, we are taking extra precautions to ensure

the safety of our transportation infrastructure and our system for the people that use it; and also take this opportunity to ask people to join with us to keep their eyes and ears open as they go about their daily business, and if they find anything unusual to alert our authorities.

But I also, as I always do in circumstances like this, urge all of our people, wherever they may be, to do just that, that while they remain vigilant to go about their daily lives, because the terrorists can't win and the terrorists win if we abbreviate our activities, if we cease our activities and cower and I think cede to what I think is an attack on freedom and an attack on compassion, an attack on tolerance, an attack on openness.

So I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make that statement. Again, because Congresswoman Norton has done such a good job in comprehensively stating our concerns, and while I would like to allow members of our council to also testify -- Councilman Fenty will be testifying and I believe Councilman Barry -- I'm going to abbreviate my remarks as much as I can and speak on a number of issues.

First of all, on the local economic impact. Although local economic impact, as you know, Mr. Chairman, is not among the factors that you and your Commission give great weight, they are important. I can't allow a hearing like this to pass without discussing the economic impact of these proposals on the city. The jobs the District will lose if these recommendations come to pass come from the

heart of our city and they represent about one percent of all jobs in the city, not to mention the lost economic activity associated with those jobs.

It's important for the Commission to understand that we labor here in the District of Columbia under a very difficult structural impediment created by federal intervention in the operation of our government. Despite the District's progress in recent years, efforts by the Federal Government to in a single decision remove some 6,000 to 7,000 jobs from our city just makes things much more difficult.

We've undergone a remarkable turnaround during the past few years, which I'm proud of. We've lifted many city services to levels that would have seemed impossible a few years ago. National magazines now cite the city as one of the best places in America for African American families to live and work, for families of all ethnic backgrounds as well. And most dramatic is our financial turnaround. We've helped turn a \$600 million accumulated deficit in our city into a \$1.2 billion surplus. We're growing financial reserves that surpass most every city in the country and even many states. We're experiencing a dramatic housing boom. We've provided hundreds of millions of jobs, millions of dollars of tax relief for our citizens.

Although we were spared a direct hit on 9-11, the city suffered a psychological blow and a severe downturn in one of the principle economic sectors, the hospitality industry. When I travel across our country, I can sense

that we are experiencing a renaissance. And it's in partnership with the Federal Government that we've achieved many of these things, and I think it sends a terribly bad signal to our country and to the world that our very own Department of Defense is seen fleeing the nation's capital.

Now, I want to reiterate what Congresswoman Norton said in stating her alarm with respect to the impact of the closure on our ability to manage mass casualties in the event of a large-scale attack on our capital city, indeed in the event of the kind of attack we've seen in London earlier today. We in the District have worked hard since 9-11 to prepare for the worst and Walter Reed, as the Congresswoman has stated, has been a vital partner in making available crucial personnel, equipment, and facilities should we be faced with a catastrophe here in our city.

Congresswoman Norton has detailed the faults in the Department of Defense's process and I want to underscore and reiterate them here. She's also detailed defects in the military value analysis, and Dr. Pierce will discuss in further detail those issues. Although we all understand that the basic premise that military value is a primary consideration in your decision process, we believe that the Defense Department has seriously undervalued the military value of one of our military's most valuable assets.

Very briefly, I want to underscore as well my alarm that the Department of Defense in its process

assigned no military value for a number of assets at Walter Reed: one, Walter Reed's preeminent programs in polytrauma patients, such as amputee care, prosthetics, and rehabilitation; the medical research performed at Walter Reed, including world-class programs in a number of areas; and finally, Walter Reed's capabilities for providing care to the President of the United States, the members of the cabinet, to senior military officials, members of Congress, and foreign heads of state.

In addition, Walter Reed was not given appropriate military value for its almost 50 graduate medical education programs and its capacity to handle large numbers of both inpatients and outpatients.

I want to reiterate my support for the Congresswoman's remarks as to the environmental costs that were disregarded. I think they are grave, I think they're sweeping, and it's alarming to me that they were not factored into so important a decision.

I would also add my concern to the lack of I think significant attention, let alone focused attention, to the huge historic preservation restrictions and costs that come into play in a city like Washington, D.C. As we've seen in, for example, St. Elizabeth's site in our city, they're enormous and I think they should be given great weight in your decisionmaking, the same kind of weight that you would give to other economic considerations.

There are a whole host of other impact issues

that have not been addressed in the DOD analysis and I want to mention them briefly. A major issue for the District is the prospect that the ultimate status of Walter Reed following any closure will remain unresolved for five to ten years. The hospital is expected to remain in full use until 2010, when it is shut down as replacement facilities come on line elsewhere. If the property just sits vacant, I believe it would have a very negative impact on the surrounding area and neighborhood.

Another open issue affecting the Walter Reed site that is not addressed by the Department of Defense is enhanced use leasing and other privatization programs which will seriously limit the reuse opportunities for the facility. I cannot emphasize strongly enough the importance of those considerations.

There are a number of other concerns that I have, Mr. Chairman, but they are in my written testimony. I want to once again thank you for the opportunity afforded by the Commission to make these remarks and I stand ready with my City Administrator, Robert Bob, and my other members of our team to answer any questions you may have.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you, Mayor.

Councilmen, please proceed. We appreciate your testimony. Good to see you.

[Pause.]

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Good morning. I believe you've both been sworn in. Thank you very much. You may proceed.

MS. SARKAR: Have you been sworn in, Mr. Strauss?

MR. STRAUSS: I have not.

MS. SARKAR: Would you please stand and raise your right hand for me.

Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give and any evidence you may provide are complete and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?

MR. STRAUSS: Thank you.

MS. SARKAR: Thank you.

STATEMENT OF ADRIAN FENTY, COUNCILMAN,
WARD 4, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MR. FENTY: Good morning. My name is Adrian Fenty, District of Columbia Councilmember representing Ward 4, the area of Washington, D.C., which includes the D.C. campus of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. First of all, I want to appreciate the opportunity to testify on the BRAC Commission's consideration of the Department of Defense's recommendation to close the D.C. campus of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

I understand that the BRAC Commission has an unenviable task and I commend you on the thorough and professional manner in which you are addressing the work before you. As you have undoubtedly seen from the number of regional hearings that have been held to date, any decision to realign or close a military base not only has an effect on the military and its operations as a whole, but also has an indelible effect on the community that

surrounds a particular base.

I come here this morning to testify that the proposed closure of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center would substantially alter the geographic, social, and economic landscape of not only the community that surrounds the campus, but the District of Columbia as a whole. Therefore, we must ensure that any decision that is ultimately made regarding the Walter Reed Army Medical Center and its campus is carefully implemented in partnership with the surrounding community and the government of the District of Columbia.

The 74,000 constituents of Ward 4 have contacted me in a variety of ways and with a variety of opinions about the potential closure of the D.C. campus of Walter Reed. Although each person's story is unique, the largest percentage of people I have heard from are adamantly opposed to removing Walter Reed from its current historic location. In 1909 Walter Reed was established in its current location on upper Georgia Avenue, Northwest. This is the only site the world has known for the premier military medical facility. Its symbolic location within Washington, D.C., the nation's capital, is not lost on those who receive medical care here nor on their families.

On May 26th of this year, I attended a community meeting on the BRAC Commission recommendations that was held at Walter Reed, moderated by MG Kenneth L. Farmer, Junior, Commanding General of the North American Regional Medical Command and Walter Reed Army Medical Center. At

that meeting, just about all the neighbors and patients who spoke did not want to see Walter Reed leave Georgia Avenue or Washington, D.C.

At that meeting we heard from active duty military members, retired Korean war veterans, dependents of active duty and retired military members, neighbors with no connection to the medical care provided at the hospital, and at least one neighbor who was born at Walter Reed. Their testimony centered on the following issues.

One, as happens with many military medical facilities, the neighborhoods surrounding Walter Reed, including Shepherd Park, Takoma, and Brightwood, are home to many military families who rely on the medical care provided at Walter Reed. Although the six-mile trip to the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda may seem like a short distance for patients to get used to, Walter Reed has such a long history where it is that many of those who use the facility do not have ready transportation to Bethesda.

One resident testified that the District is experiencing a health care crisis and that it would be irresponsible to close a hospital that serves so many of the neighbors in the neighborhoods nearby.

One veteran commented that the use of military criteria in judging a medical facility that has been part of a community for so long ignores the true benefit of the institution of Walter Reed.

Neighbors are also concerned, as the Mayor

discussed, about the economic impact on the neighborhoods.

The local businesses along Georgia Avenue are experiencing a renaissance. This is an area of the District that has weathered a steep decline and is finally turning around. The loss of so many workers would be a blow to many local businesses and service providers.

Urban military bases are becoming more and more and more rare. By moving facilities to the suburbs there are significant environmental and social impacts that cannot be ignored. As you may know, the Washington, D.C., region is consistently ranked among the most congested of American cities in terms of traffic. Putting more people on the roads to bases in the suburbs would add to air pollution. Additionally, the withdrawal of a major military base from an urban neighborhood removes many of the positive role models our youth can see now on Georgia Avenue and traveling to the Washington, D.C., Walter Reed campus.

I want to let you know that the neighbors repeatedly have told me that the presence of Walter Reed in the District helps make their neighborhood safe. Walter Reed's military presence in the District of Columbia does play a role also in deterring crime.

Finally, an informal poll taken by one of our local advisory neighborhood commissioners showed that a wide majority of residents in the neighborhoods, over 80 percent of those whom he heard from, opposed the closing of the D.C. campus of Walter Reed.

In summary, my constituents prefer that Walter Reed remains in our nation's capital, the District of Columbia. I ask therefore on behalf of the citizens most directly affected by any decisions related to the D.C. campus of Walter Reed that you reverse the Department of Defense's recommendation and move to keep the Walter Reed campus in the District of Columbia open.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you, Councilman.

Mr. Strauss.

STATEMENT OF PAUL STRAUSS, SHADOW SENATOR

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MR. STRAUSS: Good morning. My name is Paul Strauss and I am the elected United States Senator for the District of Columbia, but because of the unique nature of this position, it's a non-voting, non-seated position. However, in that capacity I do want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

Walter Reed Army Medical Center and Bolling Air Force Base are both part of the distinguished history of the District of Columbia. They deserve to be part of the future as well. Bolling was first commissioned in 1918. It began as the only military airfield near the Capitol. It's seen the start and completion of many historical flights, including excursions by Charles Lindberg, Hap Arnold, Carl Spatz, and Wiley Post. The base is also home to the 11th Wing, which reports directly to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The 11th Wing is the single

manager for all Air Force activity supporting Headquarters Air Force and other Air Force units in the national capital region, as well as 152 countries throughout the world. Its rich legacy deserves this Commission's support.

The history of Walter Reed is perhaps even more impressive and its future equally bright. The first patient was admitted back in 1909 and since its opening Walter Reed has saved hundreds of thousands of lives of young American soldiers. The hospital's capacity grew during World War II, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and continues to grow.

As it approaches its centennial celebration, it is near maximum capacity, with 96 percent of its outpatient beds filled with soldiers wounded in war. Since the commencement of operations in Iraq, the base has been near and continues to be near maximum capacity. Every day patients fly in from Langston Regional Medical Center in Germany and the U.S. Naval Hospital in Spain.

But beyond these historical and sentimental reasons, the Walter Reed Army Medical Center stands as the Army's foremost medical center. It's my understanding that a full 25 percent of the Army's patient load in the United States is handled by Walter Reed. As a fully accredited medical center, it received an impressive score of 97 out of 100 in the most recent inspection by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations.

As a premier research institution, it conducts nearly 800 clinical research projects. Of the 8,690 people

that Walter Reed employs, only 2,830 are military personnel. Under your recommendations, 2,866 jobs are scheduled to be transferred to DeWitt Army Hospital and the Naval Medical Center in Bethesda. But there's been absolutely no indication of what will happen to the remaining 5,824 employees.

Similarly, the recommendation to realign the Bolling Air Force Base results in the loss of 96 military and 242 civilian jobs, and again we have no idea where those jobs are going to be relocated yet.

Yes, I understand that the BRAC Commission has touted many success stories of communities rebuilding after their military installations have been closed or realigned, although you yourselves concede that these closures can cause near-term social and economic disruption.

I have no doubt that, given the economic renaissance we're experiencing here in the District, that perhaps an argument could even be made that the land could produce a higher economic benefit if it wasn't necessarily serving off the tax roles and serving our military. But I don't think that's really the issue here today.

If I could, let me just deviate a little bit from my prepared remarks because of the tragic events of today.

First of all, let me say how wrong I think it would be for me or anybody else to exploit a tragedy like we've seen in London, the tragic lessons of September 11th, the tragic lessons of March 11th in Spain, to advance a political argument. But I think it would be wrong to ignore the

realities that sudden current events have all brought home in clear focus to us this morning.

As we mourn and stand in solidarity with the citizens of London, the idea of closing the only military hospital in the capital of the United States when we are such -- continue to be such a number one target of terrorist threats, strikes me yesterday as an ill-advised policy. Today it borders on the criminally negligent.

You cannot evaluate the real threat that we face every day and seriously consider relocating a state of the art military hospital that we clearly need. This is not some underutilized facility. This hospital operates with the highest ratings, at or near full capacity, and could be called upon to save the lives of any one of us here in the Nation's capital.

I alluded to my status a little bit earlier, but I have to tell you that when you look at that decision something that's in the back of our minds is that perhaps it wasn't a clear analysis of military objectives that are targeting these bases. I am a non-voting Senator. Unlike the Senators of other states, I can't sit on an appropriations committee, a defense oversight committee. Is it perhaps the lack of our ability to fairly fight back in Congress that has suggested that the District of Columbia bear such a disproportionate burden? I hope not, but I urge you as you go forward with these recommendations to consider the fact that when we begin to consider these issues nationally in the Congress that for us it's not a

fair fight.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Councilman.

I believe Commissioner Coyle has a question.

COMMISSIONER COYLE: I'm not sure who this should be for, Representative Norton or Mayor Williams or who. Going into this BRAC round, jointness has been a high principle and I believe the DOD recommendation for Walter Reed is to transform what they call a legacy medical infrastructure into what they say would be a premier modernized joint operational medical platform. But it would seem to me that Walter Reed is already a premier state of the art joint platform and breaking it up and sending the pieces to Bethesda or Fort Belvoir or Aberdeen or Dover, Delaware, Houston, or Fort Dietrich actually takes away that jointness.

Does anybody have a comment about that?

MR. STRAUSS: I mean, I would agree. I think you raise an excellent point. You have an institution that's providing quality health care. It's working now. It's full. It's not underutilized, it's not underperforming. We need to keep it.

Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE NORTON: If I may, and I appreciate that question, because here the DOD has confused recreating a building with creating the medical care that

is necessary to serve our combat veterans and other seriously ill soldiers. The notion that a transfer from one place to the other results in the same quality of care we think is undermined by the metrics used to decide whether or not to close the hospital.

I think we've shown that the DOD did not evaluate the medical facility for its medical mission properly by comparing, and that's the comparison we made, to the Florida facility. So if you're going to take a premier institution and disaggregate it, send it someplace else, without deciding how you're going to meet the military mission of that facility, a hospital in time of war, it seems to me that you'd best look for an alternative. And the alternative we are suggesting is that you leave the premier institution where it is. If you want to make renovations and the like, you do that, but you do not disturb the medical mission in time of war.

COMMISSIONER COYLE: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you all.

We'll call our next panel: Dr. Pierce and Dr. Seckinger.

STATEMENT OF JOHN PIERCE, M.D.,

FORMER CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, WRAMC

DR. PIERCE: Sir, may I speak from over here?

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Gentlemen, have you been sworn in?

DR. PIERCE: Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, my name is John Pierce. I am a

retired Colonel, U.S. Army Medical Corps. I spent 30 years in the Army, 16 of those years at Walter Reed. During that time I served in various positions. I was chief of the department of pediatrics, I was director of medical education, and for three years I was chief of the medical staff.

I'm here this morning to talk to you about the military value metric as it was done for health care services. I'd like to put up this first chart.

[Chart.]

This table is Table 5 from the chapter 10 of the BRAC report on the joint service work group. Unfortunately -- I hope you can see this, but what I'd like to point out is, this column here are the metrics for health care services. When they looked at health care they divided it into three different functional areas: education and training, health care services, and research and development. These are the metrics for health care services.

The justification for realigning Walter Reed Army Medical Center is that it had less military value for health care services than DeWitt Army Community Hospital at Fort Belvoir. DeWitt Army Community Hospital had a score of 58, Walter Reed had a score of 54 plus a little bit, and that score is derived by adding up all of these numbers in the far right column to get a total of 100.

DeWitt has 43 inpatient beds. It has one graduate medical education training program. Walter Reed

has 200 inpatient beds of high-level tertiary care. It has about 50 graduate medical education programs. It has a number of research programs and it's where the combat casualties are being sent.

How in the world can DeWitt Army Community Hospital have more military value than Walter Reed? When I first read that I was incredulous. I couldn't believe it.

Having been at Walter Reed for 20 years, I couldn't understand that. So I started looking at the metric very closely.

If you look at the bottom of the metric, it's the health care delivery part of it, inpatient care, outpatient care, pharmacy, that sort of stuff. You get, out of the 100 points, you get a total of 12 points for all of the health care you deliver. So the metric was set up to be biased against people who do health care or people who deliver a lot of health care.

Can I have the next slide. We actually want to save that because we're going to come back to that.

[Chart.]

What I'm showing here is at the top of this is the metric that shows that DeWitt, which is in this column, has a score of 58, Walter Reed had a score of 54.

Outpatient care is counted in what's called a relative value unit. It's not a single visit, but it's a relative value unit. DeWitt had 568,000 relative value units. Walter Reed had 1.148 million relative value units for outpatient care. DeWitt had 1854 relative weighted

products, which is the way inpatient care is accounted for.

Walter Reed had 16,500 relative weighted products.

Walter Reed had 33,000 dental visits. DeWitt had 8,000.

So here are two facilities, Walter Reed has twice the outpatient visits, has eight times the inpatient care at a much higher tertiary care level, has four times the dental care, but it's military value is less. Doesn't make any sense to me.

They looked at other things, but they didn't look at a lot of things that I think Walter Reed is unique for.

If you could put this one back up there for me.

[Chart.]

If you go down this list of metrics -- and I know it may be a little bit hard for you to see from there, but there are about 17 metrics. They start at the top with eligible population and enrollment, that sort of thing. All of these are important, but Walter Reed provides to the military a very unique set of services that are not found on this metric. Clinical research done at Walter Reed is not on this metric. There's a separate metric for research and development, but that is only done in medical R and D facilities. That doesn't count anything done in medical centers.

Walter Reed's staff has published 11 papers dealing with the current conflict with care and outcome, and none of that was given any military value. The graduate medical education programs at Walter Reed, many of

which are joint with the Navy and Air Force, was given no military value on the health care metric. Most civilians consider the teaching medical centers to be the best medical centers in the country -- Johns Hopkins, Harvard, Stanford. Those are teaching hospitals. Walter Reed is the largest teaching hospital in the military, but for health care services, which is this metric that the realignment is justified on, Walter Reed received no military value credit for being a teaching hospital and having about 50 graduate medical education programs.

Walter Reed has some unique cancer research programs. There's a Congressionally funded prostate cancer center, a breast cancer center, GYN cancer center. They have a deployment health center. None of those received any military value from this metric. I'm convinced that this metric is very flawed and it is biased against teaching hospitals.

If you can show these.

[Chart.]

Let me show you the reason that this metric I think is biased. This is the metric for inpatient care and you can get a top score of one. That score of one is multiplied by the weighted value to give you the score that adds up into that 100. If you have 10,000 relative weighted products for inpatient care, you get a score of one. If you have 16,500 like Walter Reed, you get a score of one. So the metrics are capped, they are capped against, biased against large facilities. They are biased

toward smaller facilities.

If you could show the next one, please.

[Chart.]

This is the same metric for outpatient care. It's capped at 450,000 relative value units. You get a score of one for 450,000. Walter Reed had 1.148 million outpatient visits and got the same score of one.

The metrics are biased against teaching hospitals. The military doesn't have a policy to turn against teaching hospitals, but these metrics are biased against large teaching hospitals. And Walter Reed's not the only one that's suffered from that bias.

If we could put -- what's the next one there? Go ahead and put that one up.

[Chart.]

Now, this is the table for research and development. I think this is also biased because here when it talks about your programs that are integrated, instead of asking how many programs are integrated, it says what percent of your programs are integrated. And your score is based on what percent of your programs are integrated. If you have one teaching program and it is integrated with another service, it's 100 percent. If you're at Walter Reed with 50 training programs and 30 of them are integrated, it's only 60 percent. You've got 30 times the number of programs; it would seem if integration with other services is good then the more would be better. So this metric is also biased against large teaching hospitals.

I think that it would be just awful to make a decision to realign, basically close the main campus of Walter Reed, based on a military value metric that said Walter Reed has lower military value than some other places.

I need to go back to --

[Chart.]

I call your attention to the bottom of this slide here. This is Hurlburt Field in Florida. I was in the Army 30 years, not the Air Force, never heard of Hurlburt Field. But it's a small field in Florida next to Elgin Air Force Base.

[Chart.]

Using the military value metric for health care services, the military value of Hurlburt Field is 56; the military value of Walter Reed Army Medical Center is 54. Hurlburt Field sees 51,000 relative value units for outpatients each year, 22 times less than Walter Reed. Walter Reed's over a million. Hurlburt Field sees no inpatients and it sees about 8,000 of these, and it has no graduate education training programs. But this metric says Hurlburt Field is of greater value than Walter Reed.

Now, if it was a Trident submarine against Walter Reed, I could understand that. But I don't understand where Walter Reed Army Medical Center has less military value than Hurlburt Field.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you, doctor.

DR. PIERCE: Just one other thing. The question

on jointness; I think Walter Reed is already that joint facility. It has striven to be that over the years and it is that, and that's the reason that the combat casualties are brought to Walter Reed, because that's where they'll get the best care.

Thank you, sir.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Dr. Seckinger.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL SECKINGER, M.D.,
PAST PRESIDENT, COLLEGE OF AMERICAN PATHOLOGISTS,
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, AMERICAN REGISTRY OF PATHOLOGY

DR. SECKINGER: Thank you very much.

MS. SARKAR: Excuse me. Has he been sworn in?

DR. SECKINGER: Mr. Chairman and members of the
Commission --

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Excuse me, doctor. Have you
been sworn in? Have you been sworn in, doctor?

DR. SECKINGER: Yes.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you.

DR. SECKINGER: Yes, I have.

The College of American Pathologists appreciates the opportunity to appear before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in its hearings on the District, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. I'm Daniel Seckinger, M.D., Past President of the College of American Pathologists, currently Chairman of the Board of the American Registry of Pathology, a sister organization of the AFIP, a practicing pathologist in Miami, Florida, and professor of pathology at the University of Miami School of Medicine.

I'm here today to represent the College of American Pathologists, which is a medical specialty society of 16,000 board-certified physicians who practice clinical or anatomic pathology in community hospitals, independent clinical laboratories, academic medical centers, and federal and state health facilities. I'm also testifying on behalf of several other national pathology organizations that share our view: the American Pathology Foundation, the American Society for Clinical Pathology, the Association of Pathology Chairs, and the Association for Molecular Pathology.

On behalf of our organizations, I strongly urge you to reject the Department of Defense recommendation to close the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology as part of a larger plan to relocate functions of the Walter Reed installation in Washington, D.C. I recognize you have a very, very difficult job, but a decision to close the AFIP is no small matter. It has far-reaching implications, not only for the military but also for civilian medicine, and as such should be evaluated in a larger context than simply its military function. I urge the Commission to keep in mind that once you dismantle 150 years of unmatched professional, medical and scientific expertise, there is no road back.

A word now on background. AFIP was first established in 1862 as part of the Army Medical Museum to serve as a repository for disease specimens of Civil War soldiers. In 1888 civilian medical professionals were

allowed access to the museum's educational facilities, creating a nexus between military and civilian that continues to this day.

The AFIP's mission is to support the United States Department of Defense, serve the American people by providing medical expertise and diagnostic consultation, education, and research to enhance the health and wellbeing of the people that it serves.

The semantics of the issue. The AFIP is more than the name implies. It's much more than an armed forces medical facility and much more than a pathology organization. The institute is a sophisticated grouping of 800 military and civilian medical professions with a capability of providing answers to very complex, difficult cases.

What makes AFIP so unique and valuable is its broad range of expertise, spanning 22 subspecialty departments in conjunction with the world's largest tissue repository, providing significant research and education opportunities.

Now, we've heard something over the last few weeks of a tissue repository. I think it's important that you understand the impact and significance of this repository in the practice of medicine and in our future, disease research and the role of the tissue repository. The recommendation to dismantle and retain in piecemeal fashion only certain components of the AFIP and to warehouse its massive tissue repository would deprive the

medical community here and abroad of a virtually irreplaceable resource for disease research and patient care.

Throughout its history, this national treasure of more than 3 million cases, 50 million paraffin blocks, and 10 million formalin-fixed tissue specimens, many rare and unusual, has helped us expand our knowledge of disease and given rise to curative therapies for previously untreatable and often fatal diseases. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, staff of the Army Medical Museum, which became the AFIP, conducted research on infectious diseases that revealed the cause of yellow fever and contributed to the diagnosis of a vaccine for typhoid fever.

Significantly, in 1997 AFIP pathologists published a complete genetic characterization of the 1918 Spanish influenza virus that killed more than 20 million people worldwide, including 675,000 in this country and 43,000 of our troops in Europe.

Now, sometimes numbers really don't register, but I know we're all concerned and very depressed when we see casualty reports from the war on Iraq, and we're approaching the range of 2,000 casualties. Here we're talking about 43,000 casualties in a one-month period due to one particular virus. Now, through AFIP activities this particular virus has been dismantled and probably we will never see its impact again. But there are other viruses out there and this is why we need to consider a manner of

retaining AFIP.

The AFIP also maintains 40,000 specimen registries from prisoners of war, Agent Orange, Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi Freedom and others. This benefits thousands of deployed forces and veterans by helping to identify disease trends and long-term health effects associated with military service.

The tissue repository is now more important than ever because new DNA technology allows us to conduct new studies not possible before utilizing patient specimens from the past, that is the stored specimens we've discussed in the repository. Such studies include the human genome as well as thousands of specific genetic abnormalities. Think of the possibilities.

Unfortunately, the DOD proposal allows only for the repository of this stored material. The proposal makes no provision for maintenance, access to specimens, involvement of expert pathologists and others needed to sustain this dynamic resource for future and for our education. Expertise in pathology is essential to effectively using the wealth of information to be gained from the study of these materials.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Doctor, could you please summarize your testimony. Your complete testimony will be made --

DR. SECKINGER: We'll submit some of our comments on consultive services and education, which is included in our handout. It's significant that 360,000 hours of

continuing medical education for clinical specialty disciplines was provided last year by AFIP.

I did want to say a very important word or two about bioterrorism preparedness. AFIP has a crucial role to play in homeland security. It's one of the few facilities in the country with the capability and expertise to respond to bioterrorism attack. This includes rapid diagnosis and also management of infectious disease epidemics.

AFIP scientists have developed a new test to detect biologic toxins such as cholera at sub-atomic levels and far superior than presently used. The institute has collaborated with the private sector to develop a biodetector with spectroscopy which has received the highest marks from physics, Applied Physics Laboratory at Hopkins.

In conclusion, AFIP has a vital role to play in advancing medicine and securing the homeland. To cast off key elements such as the tissue repository and eliminate others would break the connections from which AFIP draws its strength as national and internationally recognized leaders in medical research.

With this in mind, the CAP urges the Commission to reject the Department's recommendation. The fate of the AFIP should be decided through a broader discussion that takes into account all aspects of the AFIP mission.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you, Dr. Seckinger.

I would like to call our last panel of witnesses, please. I'm going to ask you to come up as a group: Mr. Joe Membrino, Shepherd Park Task Force Leader; Mr. Stewart Schwartz, Executive Director, Coalition for Smarter Growth; and Mr. Robert Brannum, Commissioner, ANC-5C04; and Mr. Don Walters, employee at Walter Reed.

Mr. Walters with us, or a designee?

[No response.]

Gentlemen, I'd request if you could limit each of your testimony to five minutes. I apologize in advance. Time is escaping us and we have the state of Pennsylvania officials here shortly. But your testimony is very important. Your complete testimony will be made part of the record. Thank you.

You may begin.

STATEMENT OF JOE MEMBRINO,
SHEPHERD PARK TASK FORCE LEADER

MR. MEMBRINO: My name is Joseph Membrino. I'm appearing today on behalf of a community task force comprised of representatives of the neighborhoods that surround Walter Reed Medical Center. We've been working with Walter Reed for the past, oh, ten months on development issues because the base has been a very dynamic source of activity for the myriad missions that you've heard discussed today that are going on there and the community has been interested in how those missions will be carried out.

Notwithstanding the importance of Walter Reed's

mission, successive administrations have consistently failed or refused to request and Congress has neglected to appropriate all of the funds needed by Walter Reed for the care of those who, in Lincoln's words, "have borne the battle," unquote, in the service of our country. Last week Congress was shamed into restoring more than a billion dollars in appropriations to the Veterans Administration after it was discovered that the administration had neglected to identify needed funding. There hasn't been a similar rescue being mounted for active duty medical care.

In May of this year, May 9th, we sat down with officials at Walter Reed to review 25 ongoing development projects that are valued at from several hundred thousand to scores of millions of dollars, major activities to continue the mission of Walter Reed. No one in that room on Walter Reed's behalf had a clue that four days later on the 13th this base was going to, was going to be closed. The people in that room took their mission seriously, from issues associated with fisher house development for the families of wounded patients to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology that you've heard spoken of.

We are concerned that by failing to fund appropriately the Army's medical mission at Walter Reed and elsewhere, but particularly at Walter Reed, we are going to witness the conversion of this property and the institutionalization really of funding for these needs into the commercial -- funneling those funding sources into the commercial sector.

We have -- Mayor Williams referred to the enhanced use lease program, which we think is a very dubious authority for financing the construction of needed facilities at places like Walter Reed, and then having the lion's share of those developments be devoted to things totally unrelated to the mission, but instead be devoted to commercial uses that would make the investment profitable for the developers who are participating in these activities.

We hope that the Commission will recognize what has been said by, what has been spoken to by so many witnesses before us today. We're from the community. We see the impact of Walter Reed on a very personal level. We support its mission. We think the Congress and the Commission need to recognize that it's not only the upfront costs of going to war, but the tail end costs of the consequences of war that remain fully funded and properly managed for the benefit of those who serve our country.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you, sir.

Please.

STATEMENT OF STEWART SCHWARTZ,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COALITION FOR SMARTER GROWTH

MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you, Chairman and members of the Commission.

My name is Stewart Schwartz. I'm Executive Director of the Coalition for Smarter Growth, which with the Washington Regional Network unites civil, transit,

planning, and environmental organizations who've been engaged in transportation and land use planning in this region since the late 1980s. I also served on active duty and did one tour at the Pentagon and Crystal City.

We've been strong supporters of the rebirth of this city and the historic nation's capital, including its core suburbs. We are asking the Commission to reject proposals to move as many as 23,000 jobs away from transit-accessible locations in D.C. and Arlington and that you fully consider the negative transportation impacts and the costs of new transportation infrastructure for defense jobs proposed to be moved to Fort Belvoir, Fort Meade, Bethesda, and Quantico.

We believe that the proposed moves would not meet BRAC military criteria in terms of operational readiness and manpower implications and would also fail to meet other criteria, including economic impact on communities, the ability of infrastructure to support these forces, and the environmental impact.

For many years now, the national capital region, through plans and policies by our Council of Governments, by the federally-chartered National Capital Planning Commission, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, have committed to reducing traffic and air pollution and the resulting inefficiencies by building a world-class Metrorail system at a cost of over \$10 billion, most of which were federal dollars, and by focusing development in mixed use walkable centers at our Metrorail

stations.

The Council of Governments' long-term planning vision and recent analyses all reflect a planning scenario that shows the benefits of transit-oriented development as an approach for regional growth, and in fact the Texas Transportation Institute study which ranks us very high in congestion indicates that the region's traffic delays would be 50 percent longer had it not been for our investment in this transit system.

DOD office locations in D.C. and Arlington are served by carpools, the famous slug system, commuter rail, Metrorail, Metrobus, county bus services, private bus services, and van pools, achieving significant redundancy in transportation. During the critical rush hour, federal workers represent nearly 50 percent of Metrorail riders. Many, if not most, workers have arranged their home locations and commutes to take advantage of this existing transit and carpool infrastructure for commuting to work.

The shift of so many defense jobs and thousands more contractors to locations without rail transit and with inadequate road infrastructure will lead to large increases in auto commuting and traffic congestion on already overburdened highways and local roads. It will also have an associated negative impact on the operations and mission effectiveness of DOD agencies.

Moreover, the increase in driving and fuel consumption will add to national energy dependency, which is also an important national security consideration. The

increase in driving congestion would increase air pollution in a region in nonattainment of the Clean Air Act, which is already leading to significant costs to state and local governments and the Federal Government to meet pollution reduction goals.

Additional traffic and inefficiencies would be created by increasing the distance between the Pentagon and its numerous supporting offices and staffs. Many meetings would require long highway trips that could consume the better part of a work day.

One of the most important factors we believe is the cost to state and local governments in Virginia, Maryland, and D.C. for new roads and other infrastructure.

These costs would be significant at a time when federal, state, and local transportation budgets are already stretched to the limit. Additional spread-out housing development will add to those costs, and the nation itself is already struggling just to maintain the transportation systems we have already built.

Achieving transportation efficiencies through focused development near Metro stations helps us save infrastructure dollars that can also be applied to other national needs, including national defense.

Proposals by some officials to extend Metrorail to Fort Belvoir and Fort Meade are appreciated, but we do not believe they would be effective, simply because Metro would not connect to compact job centers, which would lead to inadequate ridership despite the high cost of these

systems. Offices on many military bases are rather scattered, with large walking distances, particularly if the transit system is located outside the security gates. We also believe these areas lack the fine-grain local road infrastructure, which would lead to significant gridlock and inefficiencies.

Others will talk about the effects on the workforce, so I will not go into that in greater detail. But we believe that the three criteria -- economic impact on communities, the ability of the infrastructure to support these forces, and the environmental impact -- would not be met due to traffic, transportation costs, and pollution costs of these relocations.

We also believe that operational readiness and manpower would be affected significantly by the disruption of the move, the traffic and commuting challenges represented by the new locations, and the distance from the Pentagon, and their impact as well on manpower and other inefficiencies.

We ask that the Commission not approve proposals to move these defense agencies away from efficient Metro station locations. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you very much.

Commission Brannum.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT VINCENT BRANNUM,
COMMISSIONER, ANC-5C04, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MR. BRANNUM: Greetings and salutations and good morning, Chairman and Commissioners. I am Robert Vincent

Brannum. I am also a proud District of Columbia veteran and a retired member of the United States Air Force. As a locally elected Commissioner, I welcome the opportunity to join Congresswoman Norton, Mayor Williams, and D.C. Council Member Adrian Fenty to ask the Commission to reject the recommendations and maintain the current force alignment and personnel strength of Bolling Air Force Base, the Naval District of Washington, and the Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

The proposed base alignments will not offer any significant or value added savings to the Department of Defense overall budget. The proposed realignments -- according to the General Accounting Office, the magnitude of savings is uncertain and the planned savings from streamlining business processes cannot be validated. However, the negative impact to the local economy and neighborhood stability will be enormous. More significantly, the special oversight relationship of the Congress into the municipal affairs of the District of Columbia does not afford District residents great confidence of any local use of these military sites if they are transferred to the District of Columbia.

Bolling Air Force Base and Walter Reed Army Medical Center have a clear and present military value to this nation and to the District of Columbia. If there is any underutilization of Bolling and Walter Reed, it's because many of its personnel have been redirected to support the varied military operations around the world.

All of us support the men and women of our nation's military. The availability and use of these installations to support all of our active duty, National Guard, reserve force members, military retirees, veterans, and America's overall homeland security strategy will be seriously compromised if this realignment plan is approved.

These military installations currently have a significant and vital function in the operational readiness of the total force policy of the Department of Defense, which includes training and readiness. They each have potential to expand and grow in America's warfighting capacity.

Due to the special relationship between the District of Columbia and the Federal Government, District officials must coordinate with federal partners for long-term land use and comprehensive planning. The historically structured city-federal legislative appropriations relationship and the inability of the District of Columbia to act under the principle of, quote, "states rights," has clearly been overlooked or ignored by the Department of Defense.

The economic and community impact on the quality of life in the immediate areas of Walter Reed and Bolling and across the District of Columbia have not been thoroughly thought out and considered. Just as the closing of Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House and the closing of streets around the Capitol and Congressional office buildings have caused considerable inconvenience to

business and hardship to residents of the District of Columbia, so too will this alignment, realignment.

I strongly urge the Congress to reject the Department of Defense proposals. I also recommend the Commission not only to visit Walter Reed Army Medical Center, but also to tour Sixteenth Street and Georgia Avenue. I urge the Commission not only to visit Bolling Air Force Base, but also to visualize a new South Capitol Street, Douglass Bridge, Anacostia Waterfront, subway rail system, and a new baseball stadium. When you visit Walter Reed, stop by the United States Soldiers and Airmen's Home off North Capitol Street, Northwest, and talk with those who have served in the nation's military and need the services provided by Walter Reed and Bolling. And when you visit Bolling, stop by Ballou High School, where many military service men and women volunteer to provide guidance and mentoring.

These human encounters alone demonstrate the importance of maintaining these installations. The Department of Defense views this as just about routine military realignment and defense cost effectiveness. The Department of Defense is missing an essential element. This is also about preserving hope and saving lives. It is also about what we value and seek to preserve as a people, as a community, and as a nation. Aren't these important parts of America's national defense and homeland security strategy? I think so, and I hope you do also; and I thank you for your time.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you, Commissioner.

I wish to express my appreciation once again to Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton for her courtesy in helping us to arrange this morning's hearing. I appreciate the testimony of all of our witnesses. Your insights will be very, very helpful to the Commission in our deliberations on the Secretary of Defense's recommendations.

We will stand in recess until 10:30, at which time we will hear from the representatives of the state of Pennsylvania. Thank you very much.

[Recess from 10:24 a.m. to 10:33 a.m.]

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: It's a great pleasure to welcome Governor Rendell, Senator Specter, Senator Santorum, members of the Congressional delegation, and citizens of Pennsylvania. It's a pleasure after so many years of testifying before Senator Specter to be sitting on the other side, having been grilled many, many times when he chaired the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee. But I wish to express my appreciation to him and to the delegation for all their support on our site visit to Willow Grove yesterday, Governor, as well. We learned a great deal, and we welcome you before the Commission today.

I will dispense with an opening statement. I made one before the last panel. So we can get right on with the testimony, as our time is very limited. We have two hours dedicated to the state of Pennsylvania and then we move on to the state of Virginia in testimony this

afternoon.

I'm pleased to be accompanied by the Honorable Philip Coyle, Commissioner; General Lloyd "Fig" Newton, United States Air Force Retired; Congressman James Bilbray, formerly a Representative of the state of Nevada; and Brigadier General Sue Turner, United States Air Force Retired.

Governor Rendell, I'll turn it to you.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD RENDELL,

GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA

GOVERNOR RENDELL: Good morning, everyone.

MS. SARKAR: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Excuse me. I apologize. The Base Realignment and Closure Statute requires all witnesses before the Commission to be sworn in. So I would ask all of those to please rise who will be testifying this morning, for the oath.

MS. SARKAR: Thank you.

Panelists, please raise your right hand for me. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give and any evidence you may provide are complete and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?

VOICES: I do.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you. Governor.

GOVERNOR RENDELL: Good morning and thank you all for your service.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has a strong and

proud history of service to this nation and this nation's military. As you all know, the United States Navy and the United States Marines were founded in Pennsylvania. In 1747 a gentleman by the name of Benjamin Franklin started the first National Guard unit, the Associators, which its progeny exists today in Philadelphia.

The Pennsylvania National Guard numbers 21,000 soldiers and airmen. It is one of the three largest National Guard contingents in the United States of America.

Just a little more than ten days ago, I was in Camp Shelby, Mississippi, where I said goodbye to 2100 Pennsylvanians, members of the 28th Infantry Division -- Pennsylvania is the only state that has an entire division inside its borders -- the Second Combat Brigade, named by General Pershing as the Iron Brigade. I said goodbye to those soldiers. They were on their way to Fallujah in Iraq.

They joined another thousand Pennsylvania guardsmen and guardswomen serving in Iraq and a total of 4700 fighting global terrorism around the world, one of the largest contributions of any state to the effort against global terrorism.

But despite this military tradition and this large contribution, Pennsylvania has suffered the second largest number of job losses since the BRAC process started in 1988, second only to California. We've lost over 16,000 jobs, 13,000 civilian and 3,000 military jobs. In this 2005 BRAC round, the Defense Department's orders would

result in the loss of 1878 full-time jobs and a total of 10,000 jobs if you consider reservists and guardsmen, many of whom, as you will hear, will not move with their reassigned units.

The total economic impact of this 2005 BRAC decision, Defense Department decision, would be \$510 million. Since 1988 60,000 -- let me repeat, 60,000 -- Pennsylvania businesses have been detrimentally affected by the orders of the Defense Department closing facilities and installations around the state of Pennsylvania.

But despite all of these facts and figures, we're not here to appeal every single base closure decision that the Defense Department made in Pennsylvania. We realize the mission and the importance of what is being done. But we are here to make significant points. You will hear today in our testimony that the DOD's military value criterion and other criteria truly justify the retention of job gains at Tobyhanna and Letterkenny facilities, two facilities that have consistently received top ratings for the job functions that they have done in supporting our warfighters around the world.

You will also hear that the Defense Department made a significant mistake deviating from their own criteria and their own procedures with the 911th Air Wing in Pittsburgh when they ordered that facility and others closed because there was no available land. You will hear concrete evidence that for almost a decade land was made available to the Defense Department for expansion and an

expansion of that air wing is probably best suited at the Pittsburgh International Airport.

You will also hear that the Defense Department made just as big a mistake by deactivating the 111th Air National Guard in Willow Grove. That National Guard unit again has a tremendous record of serving in combat presently and in the past and the Defense Department deactivated, not only took away the assets but deactivated, the 111th, without consulting with Adjutant General Jessica Wright and without consulting with me. I never gave my consent then and I do not consent or agree now to the deactivation of that unit.

But leaving the legalisms aside, you will hear strong and concrete evidence of the value of the 111th Air National Guard Wing to Pennsylvania and to the nation and the value of having the joint operation with the 111th and all the other units, the multiple different force units that are at Willow Grove. It is one of three joint installations that are operating in the United States of America. We believe that the Defense Department erred in ordering the Willow Grove closed.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Senator Specter.

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER,
UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA

SENATOR SPECTER: Mr. Chairman, distinguished Commissioners: Thank you for your service. I'm going to limit my comments now to one minute. You're going to hear

very impressive testimony about the importance of Willow Grove as a joint facility and about the 911th in Pittsburgh. It's a little hard for me to understand, given the nature and quality of these operations, how we can be even considering closing them down when we're at war. We're at war today. And we saw more evidence of it in what happened in London in the past few hours.

We're at war against terrorism and those units have served extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan and all over the world, in Kuwait and everywhere.

I'm limited to one minute, so I'm going to close by thanking the Commission and the distinguished Chairman.

He made reference to the fact that we have a little role reversal here. I used to be the Chairman and he was the Secretary, and I'm a little concerned about what may happen next. This Commission has important work, but what are we to do if the President nominates him for the Supreme Court?

[Laughter.]

But at least -- But at least it'll have one collateral benefit. Again I'll be the Chairman and he'll be the witness.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: I would dread that day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICK SANTORUM,

UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA

SENATOR SANTORUM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it, and you are still the Chairman, Senator

Specter. I appreciate the opportunity to testify about our bases in southeastern and southwestern Pennsylvania, and I also very much appreciate your service and the sacrifice you're making and the intensity of the work that you have to engage in.

The 911th Air Wing provides essential airborne -- airlift support for our airborne forces and their equipment and supplies. This unit also provides critical intratheater air-medical evacuation for injured or wounded military personnel. Since 1963 this unit has flown more than 128,000 hours without an aircraft accident. Members of the 911th have served with distinction, as Senator Specter said, in Bosnia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Panama, Kosovo, and most recently in the Middle East and Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly disagree with the recommendations to close the 911th based on the DOD's justification of land constraints for doing so. As General Newton will tell you, land currently owned and leased by the 911th can host 13 C-130s. Further, under the memorandum of agreement between the Air Force and the Pittsburgh International Airport the 911th can host seven more, for a total of 20 C-130s.

It also has the ability to expand the industrial operations to accommodate a bigger contingent there. In addition, it is a world-class airport with four runways, four runways of at least 8,000 feet, and has state of the art radar and other support equipment.

The other issue with the 911th is you're taking

the reserve out of the Pittsburgh area, one of the most key areas for our military for recruitment. In addition, you have a situation where we have a reserve facility there that provides a lot of services for our civilians in the region, both with the 911th as well as the 99th. Removing those services, like a PX, commissary, and the other services that are there, with the closure of those facilities will result in our veterans and our people on active duty having to go as far as Dayton, Ohio, or Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for services that they now can get relatively close to home.

In addition, the 911th is a reserve base and a reserve base that has reservists living a civilian life there that provide valuable services to our military. In a survey done of the people who are the reservists there, 94 percent of the personnel at the 911th has indicated they will not move. So we're going to be losing millions upon millions of dollars in training that we have put into these men and women. It will not be easy for the Air Force to replace them.

In southeastern Pennsylvania, the Willow Grove joint -- and I underscore, "joint" -- reserve base is an installation utilized not only by the Navy and Marine Corps, but also the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, making Willow Grove a truly joint installation. I served with Phil Coyle when I was on the Armed Services Committee and I don't know how many times I had somebody come before me from the military

and talk about the importance of jointness. In this case, as we testified to you a few days ago, Mr. Chairman, the jointness of this facility hurt this facility. It hurt the analysis because of the stovepiping of the services in doing their analysis and not looking at the importance of the jointness of this facility.

In addition, Willow Grove is geographically positioned to support the rapid deployment of aircraft, personnel along the eastern seaboard and, as we've seen, from a homeland security perspective, the events of today in London, this is an important asset for not just our military but for our homeland security.

I strongly believe that the Department of Defense substantially deviated from the list of military criteria when evaluating Willow Grove. I believe their erroneous assumptions and the lack of analysis in assessing the jointness, as I mentioned, of Willow Grove and their miscalculation of the assets of the availability of land, facilities, and associated air space.

Furthermore, I believe there is a lack of consideration given to the strategic location of Willow Grove for homeland defense and homeland security. In recommending Willow Grove for closure, the Air Force did not adequately consider the demographics of the region and the manpower and skill set that will be lost as a result.

Most importantly, as the Governor mentioned, the 101st Fighter Wing, the Department did not even consult or engage the Governor or the Adjutant in decommissioning of

this unit, which is against the law.

Mr. Chairman, I would thank you again for allowing me to testify, and I ask for you to closely reexamine these recommendations. My strong belief is the Air Force is making a huge mistake in closing both Pittsburgh and Willow Grove and moving these reserve units to active bases, moving these reserve units in strategic locations, both militarily, homeland security, as well as recruiting our people in these important metropolitan areas, and in addition moving bases, as we have seen and heard from the Governor, continually and repeatedly out of the Northeastern part of the United States to the South and West.

This is not smart. This is not good, not only from a homeland security point of view, from the standpoint of our military and our ability to deploy, but it is not smart to move all of our bases out of these regions of the country and to move them to other areas. We are losing the presence of the military in a very strategic and important place in our country and we cannot afford to do that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you very, very much.

[Applause.]

[Pause.]

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

Representative Schwartz, I believe you're going to lead the panel.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, MEMBER OF

THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR PENNSYLVANIA

REPRESENTATIVE SCHWARTZ: Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you and Commissioners. Good morning. I'm Congresswoman Allyson Schwartz and I represent Willow Grove Joint Reserve Base.

Let me say first I appreciate the scope and the importance of the task before the Congress. I strongly support the goal of streamlining and modernizing our military as part of the larger mission of ensuring our nation's defense. I believe this goal is best met if Willow Grove is part of that future force.

Before turning to the panel, I want to emphasize one particular point. The closing of the joint reserve base at Willow Grove will directly impact our nation's ability to retain some of the most experienced men and women in uniform. Those who serve at Willow Grove are accustomed to joint service, cooperation, training, and warfighting. They work together on a daily basis. They are thoroughly prepared and committed to enhancing and expanding their joint operations -- a key aspect of DOD's modernization strategy.

Reservists are dedicated to the task of protecting our nation. The reserve components make up on average 50 percent of the troops currently serving overseas. 75 percent of the personnel of the 111th Fighter Wing have been deployed in combat since September 11, 2001. The 111th has 32 combat mission-ready pilots. It costs \$2 million and two and a half years to train each of these

combat-ready pilots. The closure of Willow Grove will require DOD to expand a great deal of time, energy, and money to recruit and train replacements for these experienced and dedicated men and women.

I urge the Commission to consider the consequences of closing the base at Willow Grove that has such a dynamic reserve and guard community, and in a region that would otherwise be without an installation to support these volunteers and to ensure their availability in the time of war or homeland emergency.

As we modernize our force structure to best protect and defend our nation against both old and new threats, the Commission should consider the contribution that this joint reserve base has already made and the leadership it can provide for the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you, Congresswoman. I'll leave it up to you to allocate the time.

REPRESENTATIVE SCHWARTZ: We've already set it aside. But it is my pleasure to turn to Ed Ebenbach, who's a Co-Chair of the Willow Grove Regional Military Affairs Committee.

STATEMENT OF ED EDENBACH, CO-CHAIR,

WILLOW GROVE REGIONAL MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

MR. EDENBACH: Thank you, Congresswoman, and good morning. My name is Ed Edenbach and I am the immediate past Board Chairman of the Suburban Horsham-Willow Grove Chamber of Commerce and the current Co-Chair of the

Regional Military Affairs Committee, a group formed by the Chamber to support and defend NAS-JRB-Willow Grove. I am a retired engineering and business executive from Motorola and a lifelong resident of the region.

It is an honor to appear before you today and lead off a panel of distinguished officials and leaders. On behalf of the people of the Horsham and Willow Grove area, I want to thank the Chairman for visiting our base two days ago and I want to thank all of the Commissioners and the Commissioners' staff for listening to our concerns.

I am pleased to be joined on the panel by Congressman Curt Weldon, Congressman Fitzpatrick, Major General Jessica Wright, and retired Major General William Lynch.

Previous speakers have touched on many of the reasons why we all believe that the proposed closure of NAS-JRB-Willow Grove, with the loss of Navy and Marine units, deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing, and closure of the 913th Airlift Wing, is a huge mistake. My job today is to give you a brief overview of the installation and to summarize the community concerns.

[Slide.]

Let me start by introducing you to this great entity we call Willow Grove. As you can see from the picture, the satellite photo, which is just a portion of the base, and the accompanying text, it's a lot more than most people think and it's a whole lot more than what's reflected in the DOD BRAC recommendation. It's not just a

naval station any more and it hasn't been for ten years.

NAS-JRB-Willow Grove consists of 1100 acres of Department of Defense properties, both Navy and Air Force, located in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, with an 8,000-foot runway and a state of the art digital air traffic control radar. The United States Naval Reserve, the United States Air Force Reserve, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, United States Marine Corps Reserve, and the United States Army Reserve have had personnel, equipment, and units training and operating jointly on the facility since 1995. Joint operations, maintenance and training are conducted at Willow Grove every day of the year.

I simply don't understand how a mature joint installation can be closed by a process in which one of the DOD's four written goals was to, quote, "capitalize on joint activity," unquote. The following slides illustrate the joint use and complexity of Willow Grove.

[Slide.]

The list of military units -- I know it's an eye chart, but -- the list of military units that operate out of Willow Grove read like a Who's Who of National Defense, with an emphasis on defending our homeland. Details of the individual military units will be covered later in General Lynch's presentation. What's more, as you can see, non-military agencies such as the FAA, FEMA, and PEMA operate out of Willow Grove.

For example, the ASR-12 digital radar owned by the Navy and operated by the FAA is Philadelphia

International Airport's sole backup unit. It is used every two weeks for routine maintenance on the Philadelphia Airport system and has been called on three times in the last year and a half on an emergency basis. Yet, as far as we can tell DOD did not consult the FAA as they were forming their closure recommendation for Willow Grove.

Given its military and non-military uses, the base is clearly a key asset in a key strategic location. It should not be abandoned through shortsighted planning and without a fair and evenhanded analysis.

[Slide.]

Like other community groups around the country, we've had difficulties obtaining all the data and analysis on which DOD based its recommendations. Still, we've been able to identify substantial deviations from the BRAC criteria in the actions proposed for Willow Grove. This slide lists the seven major issues we've found.

The DOD recommendation to close Willow Grove is based, we believe, on erroneous assumptions and a lack of clear analysis. There have been substantial miscalculations and an overall lack of consideration of key issues. Congressman Weldon, General Wright, and General Lynch will go into this in more detail. But I can tell you that from the perspective of a successful businessman, the quality and transparency of the DOD report falls far short of what should be expected.

Take a look, for example, at an eighth issue that we've found, the economic analysis. I know that every

community you speak to tells you about the loss of jobs and economic activity if their local base is closed. We have these same concerns in our communities. However, we are particularly concerned that DOD substantially understated the negative economic impacts, giving a false impression. DOD estimated that our area will lose 1930 jobs, the number on the bottom line of that chart over there. But an independent consultant, Econsult Corporation, who reviewed this for the Chamber, estimated a loss of over 10,000 jobs, which is a summary of the table that's on the top there. Based on this estimate, our area will lose five times as many jobs as DOD estimated.

As you can see by comparing the top and the bottom of that chart, DOD partially ignored active duty and civilian positions, but completely ignored the loss of nearly 5,000 guard and reserve slots at Willow Grove, even though we know and you know that these reserve personnel live in our communities and their pay makes significant contributions to regional economic activities.

Our consultant also estimated an accompanying loss of \$375 million in annual economic activity, 45 percent of which is located, concentrated in two surrounding Congressional districts. DOD's underestimation is a significant error.

It's important for you to know that our community stands behind the effort to save our base. Just last week Governor Rendell spoke to a throng of nearly a thousand people at the Hatboro-Horsham Senior High School and the

support for the base was tremendous.

I'd also like to take this opportunity to acknowledge and for you to see the strong support shown by the 150 yellow shirted supporters who, at some personal sacrifice, have traveled here today to participate in this hearing. They're all behind me.

Of course, we care about jobs and economic impacts, but we also care about military value and homeland security and the importance of Willow Grove as a strategic location for important joint military missions, operations, and training. Community support for Willow Grove takes several forms. Over Memorial Day Weekend the base attracted over half a million visitors to the annual air show. This great event, which included the Blue Angels, was a bonanza for the units at Willow Grove in terms of helping to build recruiting, retention, and support for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. It's astonishing that DOD would abandon an installation like ours.

We have worked very hard to understand what DOD was trying to do when it recommended closing Willow Grove, but the lack of data undermines the fairness of the process and there are real and substantial deviations from the final criteria. Military value was supposed to be the key consideration of the process. However, the military value of NAS-JRB-Willow Grove was never assessed for the installation as a whole.

We believe these errors and omissions cry out for action by the Commission to reverse the DOD recommendation.

I hope that these few minutes today laying out the community's concerns about the recommendation to close Willow Grove have been helpful.

So now let's get into the details, and for that I would like to turn the microphone over to General Lynch.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL BILL LYNCH, U.S. AIR FORCE-
RETIRED, FORMER PENNSYLVANIA ADJUTANT GENERAL

GENERAL LYNCH: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Bill Lynch. I'm a retired Air Force and Air National Guard guy. My last military assignment was as the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania. I serve as the Vice Chairman for Air of the National Guard Association of the United States as well and as a member of Governor Rendell's Base Development Committee.

Secretary Principi, there are 1.2 million veterans in Pennsylvania and on behalf of all of us I thank you for your service at the VA. Now we need your leadership.

I thank you and all of the Commissioners for taking on these duties. You have an opportunity to challenge the DOD recommendations when you find substantial deviation. Understanding the seriousness of our request, we ask you to do just that with regard to the only truly joint base marked for closure, Willow Grove Joint Reserve Base.

The very first BRAC criterion focused on the military value of jointness. Secretary Rumsfeld observed

correctly that for the first time BRAC decisions are to be made with an emphasis on jointness. Willow Grove is joint today. It is a functioning joint center of excellence.

[Slide.]

As you look at these slides, you will see where the various components are located on the base. You can see that this base has more than the mere potential for jointness; it is joint right now. Willow Grove is home to the Navy Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Army Reserve. The DOD recommendation to close Willow Grove and shut down many of its units substantially deviates from the military value criterion that emphasizes jointness.

It has taken a long time to evolve a truly joint day to day working relationship and to develop the significant joint training events that take place at Willow Grove and with the Willow Grove units. This jointness paid off during our combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

It is beneficial for Air Force air crew and support personnel to understand the Navy way of doing things, just as it's good for the Navy to understand the Air Force and the Army.

As we move toward a great deal more emphasis on jointness in the future, Willow Grove should serve as the model. If we allow Willow Grove to close, the actual joint operations taking place today, as well as many future joint operational opportunities, will be lost. These opportunities come from our proximity to air to ground

bombing ranges and ground maneuver training opportunities.

The 28th Infantry Division and the 111th Fighter Wing already work together on joint training and operations and there will be even more opportunity with the new Stryker brigade coming to Pennsylvania. These opportunities will involve the 913th Airlift Wing and the other Willow Grove units as well.

Perhaps the most substantial deviation with regard to jointness at Willow Grove stems from the fact that no one, not the Navy, not the Air Force, not the Department of Defense, evaluated Willow Grove as a joint installation. In fact, all the data and analysis make it seem as though Willow Grove was penalized for being joint.

This turns the first military value criterion on its head, but reflects the hidebound nature of some in DOD who apparently do not appreciate the value of jointness and who undervalue the military value of our reserve components.

Willow Grove is a great example of joint operations. Air Guard units participate in exercises with Marine Reserves and Army Guard. Soldiers on the ground use lasers to designate targets for aircraft at our own range at Fort Indiantown Gap. A joint working group plans and executes training missions involving Army, Air, and Guard and Marine forces, and it works.

[Slide.]

As the slide says, there were 24 joint training events in the last year alone. Why is this important? It's important simply because it prepares us for

warfighting. Units from Willow Grove have deployed -- have been deeply involved in the joint warfighting effort since September 11, 2001.

We train as we fight, and our joint base structure here is just like the joint base structure our forces encountered when they deployed overseas. Willow Grove should not be penalized for jointness. This is a substantial deviation.

Another important element, another important military value which relates to both military value criterias number one and two is proximity to training. This is a key element in military readiness.

[Slide.]

As these slides show, Willow Grove is located closer to air to ground training ranges and important air space than many bases not recommended for closure. This translates directly into savings. These slides show how much flying time is saved as a result of the proximity to ranges and savings in flying time translates directly into savings in fuel dollars. For example, the A-10 costs \$4,000 per hour to operate.

Now to military value criterion number two, which deals with the availability and condition of land, facilities, and air space. Here too the DOD recommendations substantially deviated from the BRAC criteria. Neither the Navy nor the Air Force evaluated Willow Grove as a total base. There is ample room for expansion at Willow Grove without spending one dime of

military construction money. Right now the installation can accommodate 24 A-10s and 16 C-130s on the reserve ramp.

[Slide.]

The satellite shows there is room to right-size the Willow Grove units right now with no construction costs. Willow Grove has more and better ramp space than any other guard A-10 installation. There are no significant encroachment issues at Willow Grove, but the same cannot be said for McGuire Air Force Base. The Navy recommendation for closing Willow Grove depends on the retirement of 16 KC-135 aircraft from McGuire, but Congress has told the services that these aircraft may not be retired.

Chairman Principi visited Willow Grove a few days ago and can tell you of the fine facilities there. Most importantly, it has a functioning airfield located in a prime strategic location essential for the homeland defense and homeland security missions that come together only in the guard and reserve.

Congressman Weldon will point out that this vital asset for homeland defense and homeland security cannot be replaced.

Let me say, make just a few important points about the 111th Fighter Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard. The wing has a great record of service to our nation and to our state. 75 percent of its members have combat experience. Governor Rendell spoke about the recommended deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing. We

believe this recommendation is illegal because it was not made with the consent or approval of the Governor.

What's more, the justification for the deactivation is a total subversion of the BRAC process. The Navy justified this deactivation by saying that it enabled the Air Force future total force transformation. But, as you know, that justification is completely improper. It has nothing to do with infrastructure.

The Secretary of Defense employed a red team to review all DOD potential recommendations and provide a critique. The red team captured exactly what appears to be going on with the Air Force recommendations. They observed that the Air Force is trying to use BRAC to move aircraft and gain MILCON funding, rather than reduce excess infrastructure. Air Force goals for BRAC 2005 focus on operational requirements rather than on the statutory purpose for BRAC, which is the reduction of excess infrastructure. This is simply wrong, a substantial deviation, and you must act to stop it.

Why would the Air Force and the Navy use BRAC to deactivate an Air National Guard unit? Could it be that they sought to avoid the site-specific Congressional scrutiny that would certainly come if they had tried to take the same steps in the correct and legal manner?

Let me say just a few words from the perspective of a former Adjutant General and guard leader. The National Guard in Pennsylvania and across America is federalism in action. It requires day to day collaboration

and interaction between the state and Federal Governments.

But when the Federal Government wants to change National Guard units, it has to consult with the states. This is how it should be. This is what the law intended.

The National Guard is a continuous military collaboration between the states and the Federal Government, except when, as here, the Air Force apparently decided that it was possible to use the BRAC process as cover for just doing it themselves without the required coordination, without consultation, and without the Governor's consent.

You will not hear us complain about the proposed relocation and moves under BRAC for the Army National Guard because the Army did it right. They coordinated, they consulted. And I must tell you that as a retired Air Force General I'm a little embarrassed to say that my Air Force got it all wrong this time. The deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing must be overturned.

In addition to the important legal and federalism issues, this recommendation must be overturned simply for operational reasons as well. Sacrificing this unit quite simply makes no sense. It is a joint warfighter. It trains jointly all the time. The Air Force supplied active duty constructs and active duty assumptions to reserve component units. If we deactivate the 111th, air crew and support personnel with invaluable combat experience and very expensive training needed for the ongoing global war on terror will be lost forever. Our personnel have three

times the experience, yet cost only one-third as much to maintain, as the active force.

The recruiting and retention success of the 111th Fighter Wing is notable, particularly in comparison to other A-10 units that are not on DOD's list. And this fine level of success in recruiting and retention carries across to the other reserve component units at Willow Grove. It is a marvelously rich, diverse recruiting environment that we must not abandon. We ought to be trying to enhance units like the 111th Fighter Wing, not destroy them.

This violates BRAC criteria. It is a substantial deviation. Process produces results and when a process is fundamentally flawed it produces results that are similarly flawed.

The minutes of the Navy and Air Force deliberations tell a story of the services making assumptions rather than performing the required analysis. We know from Air Force and Navy minutes of meetings held between mid-December '04 and early May '05 that in December '04 the Air Force acknowledges that its actions will impact another service. Then in February part of the justification for the Navy's departure from the base was based on -- quoting now -- "Army and Air Force assets that were scheduled to move out of Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove." But it's not until May that we note in the minutes of the BCEG that the Air Force unit relocations were justified, again quoting, "because it enables Department of the Navy 0084." That document is the Navy's Willow Grove

closure action.

The Navy's action to close the base is justified by the assumption that the Air Force would relocate, and the Air Force decision to relocate is justified by the assumption that the Navy would close the base. The records of minutes and justifications make it clear that each service was using the other as a reason to depart and neither felt comfortable enough with the action to claim responsibility based on military value arguments.

Willow Grove Joint Reserve Base was never properly evaluated as an installation in its entirety by either the Navy or the Air Force. The Navy analyzed its side of the field and the Air Force studied how and where to move, based on the assumption that the Navy would close the base. This is a substantial deviation from BRAC criterion number seven and the force structure plan.

It is quite clear that no analysis of Willow Grove as a joint base was ever performed. The Navy and the Air Force each analyzed its own portion and stopped. For example, no credit was given by the Air Force for joint use of the Navy ramp and hangar space immediately available for mobility and deployment operations. No analysis of alternatives was performed with respect to either the Navy or the Air Force expanding into joint use facilities or facilities vacated by the other service.

In fact, in this case being a joint base proved to be a detriment, as each service relied on assumptions made about the other's anticipated actions. DOD should

have evaluated alternatives. If the Navy wants to cease flying operations at Willow Grove, what alternatives were considered for maintaining the other flying units there? Willow Grove could be operated by the Marines or the Army Reserve or the 913th Airlift Wing of the Air Force Reserve or the Air National Guard, or it could be converted to a joint military-civilian use airfield. But none of these alternatives was even considered.

In the process of this partial analysis, entire units stationed at Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove were overlooked. What happened to Marine Wing Support Squadron 472 of the Marine Corps Reserve? And the 913th Airlift Wing of the Air Force Reserve just seems to disappear, with no analysis and no articulated justification.

The COBRA analysis was flawed as well. It overstates savings. In one case the Navy takes credit for 25 more people than are actually assigned. What's more, the costs are understated because the positions proposed for elimination from Willow Grove are not bought back in calculating the costs at receiving installations. This has been termed "Enron-like accounting" by other communities and is specifically criticized in the GAO report on the Department of Defense BRAC process.

Finally, both the Navy and the Air Force subverted the BRAC process by applying active duty mind sets to reserve component units. The reserve components offer three times the experience and one-third the cost. At Willow Grove there are shared facilities now and the

potential for many more in the future.

Unlike our active duty counterparts, reserve component personnel at Willow Grove and across the nation are part of the communities where they serve. For example, the 111th Fighter Wing surveyed its personnel and found that 85 percent can't or won't move if the unit is deactivated. Their outstanding combat experience will be lost forever.

On the Air Force side, the seemingly objective military compatibility indices were slanted to favor active duty installations over reserve component ones. Willow Grove -- at Willow Grove, the key CSAR-MCI was flawed because of data errors. It is now clear that Willow Grove was underrated because of a data collection error.

[Slide.]

This slide shows the corrected MCI rating. We will submit certified data demonstrating that Willow Grove was underrated in other cases and that it wasn't rated at all as a total installation.

Members of the Commission, thank you very much for the opportunity to provide this statement. I am now extremely proud to introduce the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, Major General Jessica L. Wright.

[Applause.]

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: General.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL JESSICA L. WRIGHT,

PENNSYLVANIA ADJUTANT GENERAL

GENERAL WRIGHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My

name is Jessica Wright and I am the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania. I appreciate the difficult task you have before you and I thank you for your selfless service on this very important Commission.

Last week in Atlanta you heard from adjutants general across America about the huge flaws in the BRAC 2005 process as it applies to the Air National Guard. The Air Force and the Navy applied active duty mind sets to the reserve component units. As Governor Rendell has stated, he was not asked to approve and did in fact not approve the recommendations for deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard. As Adjutant General, I was not consulted on the 111th Fighter Wing deactivation.

In fact, between December of 2003 and July of 2004 I was led to believe that the wing would be plussed up with additional A-10s. Subsequent to July 2004, the message was that we would have to wait until after the BRAC process for future force planning. We were assured that the BRAC process was not a substitute for future total force actions.

My other purpose for speaking for you today is to point out the joint opportunities that exist and can be enhanced at Willow Grove in the future. The 111th Fighter Wing and the 28th Infantry Division have developed habitual training relationships over the past five years that has been institutionalized in a working group, co-chaired by the 111th Fighter Wing tactics officer and the 28th

Infantry Division's operations officer. They have conducted joint close air support, to include joint live fire, on a regular basis.

In fact, some of those larger exercises have included Army artillery and infantry, Marine aviation, including both active and reserve, Air Force active duty, guard and reserve forces, to include the C-130s, Army aviation, and Special Forces. This training is by all accounts the benchmark against which joint opportunities can be measured. Deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing would degrade this joint training.

As you are well aware, the Army is transforming to brigade units of action, a paradigm shift to modularity.

With transformation of the 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division to the only reserve component Stryker brigade combat team in the Pennsylvania National Guard is certainly at the sharp end of these dramatic changes.

I believe we are in a unique position due to our combat capability as well as our ability to provide the best joint training. Additionally, Willow Grove is the key location to provide future support to the Stryker brigade headquarters, one of its battalion headquarters, two infantry companies, the division air defense artillery battalion headquarters, and a battery.

The Federal Government is investing more than \$300 in military construction for this new brigade. Stryker units are located across Pennsylvania, with many of the units located in southwestern Pennsylvania --

southeastern Pennsylvania. The brigade headquarters is located fewer than ten miles from Willow Grove. I believe there is real potential to station the Stryker units at Willow Grove in the future. These joint training opportunities depend on continued flying operation at this key strategic location.

Sir, the reserve components make up approximately 50 percent of those forces that are now in Iraq. Last month I saw off 2100 Pennsylvanians along with 1900 guard members from 36 other states. They form the Second Brigade Combat Team of the 28th Infantry Division. They were recognized the best prepared fit to fight unit to date at the National Training Center.

As difficult as these departure ceremonies are, it gives me great solace that the leaders of the brigade, from the brigade commander, Colonel John Gronsky, to the most junior platoon leader, have the best joint training opportunities possible to assure that their soldiers succeed on the battlefield and return home safely to their families.

You've heard all about the mistakes that DOD made in calculating military value at the Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove and the 111th Fighter Wing. To me the most important military value is preparing soldiers to survive on today's battlefield. I know that Willow Grove joint training operations do just that.

I ask you to reverse DOD's recommendation on Willow Grove.

Sir, it is now my honor to turn the microphone over to Congressman Fitzpatrick.

[Applause.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, MEMBER OF
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR PENNSYLVANIA

REPRESENTATIVE FITZPATRICK: Thank you, General.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Commissioners, it is undeniable that the needs of the United States military have changed since the last BRAC round. September 11th and the news from London this morning show us that the threat we now face is strikingly different than those posed during the Cold War. Our new enemy requires us to reevaluate the way our armed forces are structured and based throughout the world.

The attacks also shed new light on the need for enhanced domestic security. Willow Grove is uniquely equipped to act as an important homeland security asset for Pennsylvania as well as for the entire mid-Atlantic region.

Its location, situated between New York and Washington, as well as its proximity to Philadelphia and the ports of Wilmington and Baltimore, mean that the base can deliver military assets from its 8,000-foot runway to these areas at a moment's notice during a homeland security emergency.

Furthermore, the base acts as an alternate FEMA disaster site for use in the event of a disaster. By acting as an alternate site, Willow Grove would serve its immediate community as well as the tristate area, providing necessary response in times of emergency.

These are but a few of the important ways Willow Grove can enhance our homeland security. We know that you will take a close look at the importance of Willow Grove to our homeland security infrastructure as I introduce now Congressman Curt Weldon, who is Vice Chairman of the Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees, who will expand on these and other points.

Thank you very much.

[Applause.]

STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, MEMBER OF
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR PENNSYLVANIA

REPRESENTATIVE WELDON: Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear and to meet you for the second time on this issue. I do not represent Willow Grove, but I am here as the Vice Chairman of both the Armed Services and the Homeland Security Committees in the House of Representatives. And I'm here as someone who has consistently supported the BRAC process during the 20 years I've been in Congress.

In fact, I'm the only member of Congress that testified in previous BRAC hearings to close a military base in my home town. It took me five years, but the Army finally agreed with me that we could save money by closing that facility.

So I don't come before this Commission lightly. I have other facilities that are scheduled to be closed in my district. I'm not here to talk about them. I'm here to talk about Willow Grove. I believe the military has made a

fundamental mistake, one that we would pay a dear price for, for a number of reasons.

I sat here during the 90s as we cut our end strength by one million men and women, one million. As we made that decision, we had to make a decision to also establish a joint force concept where the guard and reserve would take a much larger role. And in moving toward that process of a jointness of our services, bringing in the guard and reserve as equal players with the active duty personnel, we made a commitment for jointness in training and jointness in operations.

What's amazing to me is that Willow Grove represents the need in both of those areas. We're having a terrible problem right now with recruitment. As you know, the Army over the past several months has fallen severely short of its requirements. We need to find new ways to entice more people to join the Army, to join the reserves and the guard.

Pennsylvania today operates the largest guard in America and one that we are all proud of. And if you look at this entire country, there is one outstanding base where this jointness process takes place, I think above all else, and that without any hesitation is Willow Grove. We have 7100 guard and reservists assigned to that base. It is an absolute example of what we talked about in the 90s to move forward to, to entice more young people to join, to have a jointness in training, so that when they are deployed overseas they're able to operate as one unit with a great

deal of success, and that's happening.

But Willow Grove also is a key site for us from a homeland security standpoint, with its close proximity to Philadelphia and the major metropolitan area. When we had severe snowstorms over the past winter, the Philadelphia Airport closed three times. Willow Grove's runway never closed. It was the emergency backup site for any traffic coming into our region.

It has an unblemished record of providing support. In fact, I was just contacted this week by the EPA in Los Alamos. They want to relocate and put into place in Willow Grove an aircraft that will do cutting edge technology detection for biological, chemical, toxic plumes, and they want to base it at Willow Grove. Yet never considered by the military.

What happened here -- and I think it's been summed up very well by my colleagues -- we saw an example where the services went down their own paths and they looked with blinders on at their own needs and their own requirements, never understanding the big picture here is what we decided upon in the 90s is a key priority for us, to move into an era of jointness, of common training, of common efforts to cooperate, because that's what happens on the battlefield.

So as a result, the decision to close Willow Grove was not based on logic, it wasn't based on an overall philosophy that Don Rumsfeld has put forth so many times. It was based on individual services looking at their own

individual needs, without considering the implications of one of in my opinion three sites in the country where this jointness occurs, and in my opinion the number one site where we have a practical example of that jointness in operations.

Willow Grove is also a magnet for attracting young people. With our shortness that we're currently experiencing with the Army and with the Air Force and the Marines and the Navy in getting young people in, Willow Grove is a magnet in the most heavily populated area of our country. If you take Willow Grove away, you'll lose all of that. You lose that magnet that today has attracted 7,100 guard and reservists that operate out of that base. I don't know where we're going to pick up those young people, but I certainly know the Army and the other services are having terrible problems recruiting new people. If we lose Willow Grove, we lose that capability.

In addition, we have the only Stryker brigade in the country being operated by guard and reserve units, and Pennsylvania's doing an outstanding job. And our Governor, who was just here today, has made a commitment -- and you've heard it from our Adjutant General -- that we will look to move infrastructure into Willow Grove to support that Stryker operation.

We're setting an example in Pennsylvania for the Stryker brigade, which is the cornerstone of the transformation of the Army for the twenty first century. To take away Willow Grove takes away an important asset in

that process of standing up that Stryker brigade and, more importantly, setting a role model for the entire country for other guard and reserve units that eventually want to establish Stryker capability as well.

So if you look at the big picture, to me as someone who sits back not having direct impact by the base being in my district, but looking at it from both the Homeland Security and the Armed Services Committee and as someone who has consistently supported this process that you're involved in: We've made a fundamental mistake here. The services have not done right by Willow Grove. They underestimated the count. When they looked at the loss of jobs they didn't include the guard and reservists. That's a fundamental flaw.

If you look at the analysis done by the General, you'll see that the numbers that were used were not the proper numbers, the process was not the proper process that Congress originally envisioned when my good friend Jim Bilbray and my other good friend Jim Hanson helped write the BRAC legislation and helped modify the BRAC legislation back in the 90s.

This decision in my opinion needs to be overturned. You've got a Governor who wants to put more emphasis on Willow Grove, who wants to bring in more assets, who wants to expand its use from the homeland security standpoint. You've got a commitment from the Adjutant General and the Army to use Willow Grove not just to expand Stryker, but to use it as a model for the country

in jointness. And we've got a Congressional delegation that stands behind the decision, that reverses the decision made by the recommendations of the Pentagon.

Mr. Chairman, in closing let me just say that I just got back from another trip to the Iraqi theater. I've made many of them in my capacity. I took over a bipartisan delegation over Memorial Day and we spent time in Baghdad, in Fallujah, and Bilad. And boy, were we impressed. We were impressed because our soldiers and corpsmen and airmen and sailors are such great human beings.

What was amazing to us is 30 percent of the people that we met there are guard and reservists, 30 percent, because of what happened back in the 90s when we eliminated one million billets and had to fill up that end strength with guard and reservists.

We also saw jointness. We saw jointness in Baghdad. We saw jointness in Fallujah. We saw jointness in Bilad. We saw the services working together, just as I had seen in the training that takes place every day at Willow Grove.

We can't let the services make this fundamental mistake. I implore you, help us do what's right for America, the military, and our homeland security. Reverse the decision on Willow Grove. Allow us to keep that gem for America's future.

Thank you.

[Applause.]

COMMISSIONER: Curt, I want to know: When you

get a chance, tell us how you really feel.

[Laughter.]

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: I'd like to welcome our next panel, I believe Congressman Murtha. Good morning, gentlemen. I assume everyone's been sworn in; is that correct?

Congressman Murtha, sir, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY, MEMBER OF THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM PENNSYLVANIA

REPRESENTATIVE MURPHY: Good morning. I'm Congressman Tim Murphy and I represent the area which is home to the 911th Air Force Reserve Airlift Wing, the 99th Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command, and the Charles E. Kelly Support Facility. Today I'll focus my comments on the 911th Airlift Wing, where significant and substantial errors were made in the analysis, falsely leading to a show-stopping score that does not accurately reflect the high military value of the 911th in Pittsburgh.

These include: The wrong conclusion that only ten planes can park at the 911th. In fact, we have paved room for 20.

The wrong conclusion of the weight-bearing properties of the paved ramp. In fact, it is ready now to handle even C-17s, C-5s, and Air Force One securely.

The wrong score for runways. We do not have only one runway, like some other bases slated to remain open. We have four in excellent condition, open 24-7-365.

The wrong conclusion regarding joint operations

capabilities. In fact, much joint training and facilities use already takes place and there are thousands of acres ready for expansion.

Members of the Commission, we are a nation at war. To fight that war we will continue to need men and women who answer the patriotic call to our nation's defense. Pennsylvanians make up the second largest group of reservists and National Guard now deployed, and at a time when recruitment and retention are critical for a combat force that is now 40 percent guard and reserve, it is essential to locate bases near metropolitan areas easily and quickly accessible by combat-experienced personnel.

The 911th has all of these and more ready, right now, right here.

Finally, as you review the oceans of numbers about dozens of bases, please remember one number: 911. 9-11 is an important date that our nation cannot forget. 9-11, when heroes in the sky above southwestern Pennsylvania struck first against terrorists. Our 911th is strong, ready for our defense, and continues to respond to terrorism home and abroad. Keep the 911th.

Thank you. Now I'd like to turn, to ask you to watch a video about our bases. Thank you.

[A video recording was played, the audio track of which is as follows:]

MODERATOR: "Homeland security, keeping our country safe. Our homeland, our families."

PRESIDENT BUSH: "Whenever I dream, I come back

to this beautiful city and say, we've got to be on alert. But here I am and that's what I'm saying."

MODERATOR: "The 911th Airlift Wing and the 99th Regional Readiness Command are mission-capable, operation-ready, and integral to joint warfighting, training, and readiness. They play a critical role in homeland security and in the national disaster medical system plan. It's just one of 74 coordinating centers in the nation."

GOVERNOR RIDGE: "We need a military that is both efficient and effective, and I think that consolidation at the 911th Air Wing rather than closing goes much further to advance both of those goals. Clearly there's ample room for expansion at the Pittsburgh International Airport and such expansion I think would enhance considerably not only our national defense capability, but also our homeland security capability."

MODERATOR: "The 911th is a receiving station in the case of a natural disaster, technological disaster, a major transportation accident, or an act of terrorism, including a weapons of mass destruction disaster."

MR. ROSSI: "The 911th is strategically located here for our purposes. The fact that it's isolated but it's also part of the Pittsburgh International Airport makes it perfect for bringing in patients. Just as when the President flies in, he flies in here because it's private."

MODERATOR: "Also, the region has one of the largest collections of health care facilities in the nation

-- 73 hospitals, more than some states have. 20 of them make up the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, which has developed a strategic biodefense initiative with the Pennsylvania National Guard. It's also instituted the real-time outbreak and disease surveillance system, within all UPMC acute care emergency departments, for automated biosurveillance."

PRESIDENT BUSH: "What we saw was how to take real data on a real-time basis to determine if there was a outbreak of any kind, including a terrorist attack. The best way to protect the homeland is to understand what's taking place on the homeland so we can respond."

MODERATOR: "The fleet of C-130 aircraft is being used to protect the homeland, to airlift and airdrop combat forces, equipment and supplies in the Middle East, to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although the 911th consists of eight of these aircraft, known as Hercules, it has the capacity to hold a total of 20, the land to house 20 C-130s, and the ability to train additional personnel -- invaluable to the United States military and to homeland security."

MR. ONORATO: "We believe as the Defense Department consolidates we're a logical place to be a consolidated site, because we have an airport building that is much bigger than we need because we built it for U.S. Airways' hub. It's now available. And we're the only urban airport in the United States that has 10,000 acres sitting around it. That land's available and we're

prepared to set aside a part of that land for military expansion or consolidated sites to bring more here."

MR. GEORGE: "There is 53 acres total that are available. Now, the size of the base is 113 acres and we have 53 more that is ramp, paved, available, on a brand-new taxiway next to a cargo area that is all available for the 911th any time they want to use it, and we can add it to their leasehold or do it under a memorandum of agreement."

MODERATOR: "The 911th has authorized manning of about 1275 Air Force Reserve members and approximately 350 civilian employees, and it has more than 10,000 military recruits processed each year -- a vast resource of reserves in this community, which would be severely impacted by BRAC's proposed changes.

"The Army's 99th Regional Readiness Command is in a new \$25.5 million state of the art facility, totaling 152,000 square feet. If this command relocates to Fort Dix, there'll be ample space and land left behind to create a secure regional joint readiness center incorporating civil-military operations, a homeland security complex, a community-based medical facility, the Naval-Marine Corps Reserve Center, and a commissary and exchange. This center will be capable of stockpiling emergency supplies in the event of a terrorist attack and ready to deploy troops who are trained and available."

VOICE: "With the joint readiness center, you integrate the active military, you integrate the guard and the reserve. There's some homeland security benefit that

derives from that, and you have access to a brand-new, brand spanking new facility to start with that they just built a couple years ago. You continue to provide economic support for a couple of thousand families, the support that you have for the 70,000-plus retirees in the neighborhood. You pull all that together, that speaks to consolidation rather than closure."

PRESIDENT BUSH: "While Pittsburgh used to be called Steel Town, you need to call it Knowledge Town."

MODERATOR: President Bush has the vision to see Pittsburgh as a valuable resource to the United States military and to the mission of homeland security. The 911th Airlift Wing has the vision to be the best-trained and most valued wing in the U.S. Air Force, effective in peace, ready for war. They are our guardians of freedom, our homeland security."

[End of video presentation.]

REPRESENTATIVE MURPHY: Thank you. I am now pleased to introduce Mike Langley, the Chief Executive Officer of the Allegheny Conference on Community and Economic Development and its affiliates. A graduate of the Naval Academy and Naval Postgraduate School, he served as a Navy pilot. He retired as a captain aboard the USS COLE, where he was the commanding officer for Naval Air Station Norfolk's Reserve Command, and also served as executive officer of the Naval Doctrine Command Staff.

Mr. Langley.

STATEMENT OF MIKE LANGLEY, CO-CHAIR,

PITTSBURGH BRAC TASK FORCE

MR. LANGLEY: Thank you, Congressman Murphy.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, staff, ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of the Military Affairs Council of Western Pennsylvania and our Chairman, Judge and retired General John Broski, who is with us here today, as well as the scores of Pittsburghers who showed up to support us, I'm honored to present today.

Before I begin I'd like to acknowledge the leadership team from our community that has worked tirelessly to make this case: Allegheny County Chief Executive Dan Onorato, who serves as Co-Chair of our Task Force; Colonel Charles Hollsworth, Staff Director of the Task Force and former National President of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States and a reserve augmentee to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Reserve Affairs; Kent George, Executive Director of the Allegheny County Airport Authority; and Major General Rod Ruddock, retired Commander of the 99th Regional Readiness Command, a county commissioner, educator, and community leader.

We were joined by hundreds of community volunteers and worked countless hours to prepare for you.

Citizen soldiers, the reserve forces of this country, have always been and will always be the link between the American people and the U.S. military. To sever that link will seriously degrade recruiting, retention, and community support for the armed forces.

Furthermore, the actions affecting the reserve forces as proposed by the Department of Defense with this BRAC ignore the loss of experience and training costs associated with unit moves and must be reconsidered.

Land is not a show-stopper, scoring is flawed, and we have undervalued homeland security and military value at Pittsburgh. When the facts are fully presented, you'll see that the joint opportunities and surge capacity at Pittsburgh International Airport will benefit homeland security and enhance greatly our military value. The alleged lack of expansion space should not have stopped full evaluation of the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station, as it did with the capacity analysis study given to the Base Closure Executive Group.

As I said, the airport is a world-class facility, containing over 10,000 acres of land with four runways. These runways are served by precision instrument landing systems with the capacity of operating dual simultaneous CAT-3A approaches. The airport currently handles 900 operations a day, but is capable of handling and is designed for 1600 operations a day. It's an all-weather airport that has never closed.

The Pittsburgh Airport is serviced by an FAA-operated control tower and radar center open 24 by 7. U.S. Customs, Immigration, and Agriculture are also available 24 by 7, and are extensive medical resources as well.

The airport authority provides aircraft rescue and fire capabilities to its tenants, manned 24-7, spending

\$5.2 million of its own money each year for that. Additionally, the authority maintains the entire infrastructure of the airport and provides snow removal services estimated this year at a cost of \$8.7 million to its tenants. To maintain the airport's world-class status, the authority has averaged \$49 million per year for the last five years in a row for infrastructure improvements to the benefit of the military.

The airport's operating budget every year is \$134 million, much of that benefiting the military tenants. All these benefits are utilized by the 911 Airlift Wing for only \$20,000 a year, \$20,000 a year. Even with the utilization of additional land, that number will not change.

The average operations and maintenance costs alone for all Air Force Reserve command bases with fire departments averages \$3.8 million. But for the 911th Airlift Wing there is no additional cost. It doesn't get any cheaper than that.

The county is willing to add more land to meet military mission requirements and even more land on which to develop a regional joint readiness center, again at now additional cost. This base as it is today with the land currently being used by the 911th Airlift Wing has the capacity for nearly any mission contemplated by the Air Force. The capacity to surge at this airport is astounding. Give us the mission; we're ready today.

I know you've been hearing this a lot, but land

is the issue. However, land was not considered. In 1993 the Air Force Reserve Command and Allegheny County entered into a memorandum of agreement, or MOA, for 21.7 acres of land, a paved aircraft parking ramp that was part of the Pittsburgh Airport terminal that had just been relocated to the other side of the field. That memorandum has been renewed and used ever since. The county has offered to make the expiration indefinite, but Air Force Reserve Command could only approve it in five-year increments.

What's important here is that the 911th and the Air Force Reserve Command have used the pavement for 12 years. Such ramps are allowed to be counted in the MCI analysis purposes, but they were not counted here.

In November 1994, Allegheny County made the first offer to add 53 acres of parking ramp, including the MOA property, to the lease. I'm now at tab 13. The ramp is capable of handling any type of aircraft in the Air Force inventory. In May 1996, the Air Force rejected the offer, saying there's no requirement for additional land at Pittsburgh ARS.

Now, again in February 1998 current Chief of the Air Force Reserve General John Bradley responded: "The Air Force Reserve has not changed its position. Pittsburgh ARS has no new mission requirements that would require acquisition of any new land."

In September 1998, in a response by Congressional inquiry by Congressman John Murtha, Air Force Reserve Command said: "Existing property is adequate to support

the existing mission. No additional missions are planned for the foreseeable future. If future development or expansion impacts the Air Force Reserve missions and installation security, all agencies must reevaluate the proposal." No reevaluation ever occurred.

Since then the land has been reserved by the airport authority for expansion of the 911th and the airport will either amend the lease or the MOA to include whatever portions of land the military desires.

[Slide.]

Now, at the chart, let's look at parking capabilities. The DOD capacity brief stated that the 911th had ten parking locations, as you can see there. What the Air Force didn't consider, however, was parking three aircraft in hangars at the 911th, bringing the total number of parking spots for C-130s up to 13, which exceeds the minimum C-130 squadron requirements.

But we're not done. Also not considered are the additional seven parking spots on the memorandum of agreement ramp, a ramp that the 911th has been using for over 12 years. 20 spots on a base that the Air Force Reserve Command reported had 10. It far exceeds the metric of 16 spots that defines the goal for future C-130 locations.

Taking this into account, we see our military value beyond the C-130.

[Slide.]

As you can see on the slide, the 53 acres

available for expansion would allow the wing to park 14 C-17s at the base and still build hangars to support them.

The Air Force Reserve Command capacity briefing to the BRAC is incorrect. It did not count the hangars nor the MOA ramp that the Air Force Reserve Command has approved for 911 use for the past 12 years. Isn't it ironic that in the past we were denied additional land for lack of a mission and now we're denied a mission for lack of land.

Land is not a show-stopper. But no further analysis was conducted. Let's look at what this did to the 911th's score. Exclusion of the 90,000 square yards of MOA ramp cost us 2.98 points towards our overall score. The pavement classification numbers there is for 52 for concrete and 58 for asphalt, sufficient for anything except a B-52 aircraft loaded to maximum capacity weight.

We're taking back those 2.98 points that we lost. This additional land changes the scoring for Pittsburgh. Also in question, 1205.1 buildable acres for industrial operational growth, again another .1 points added.

[Slide.]

On this chart the land area offered repeatedly by Allegheny County is sufficient to change the total scoring for Pittsburgh significantly, and this slide represents a change in relation to all other bases affected by BRAC, moved us up significantly.

[Slide.]

The next chart. This is a -- here's the change

in Pittsburgh's position versus bases that are gaining or remaining unaffected by BRAC. Pittsburgh's revised score places it well up the list of bases that were considered valuable enough not to be affected.

I'd like to address the airlift MCI and its qualitative flaws. Some of the questions were simply not applicable to C-130s. Question 1 measures fuel hydrant capability. Fuel hydrant systems are for planes that carry over 20,000 gallons of fuel. C-130s carry at most 9,000 gallons of fuel. So it was not appropriate.

The surge refueling capability at Pittsburgh International in times of need could be enormous through an underground pipeline to fuel storage only a half mile away, and from the DLA storage 3.1 miles away. In this case, 4.32 points should not be lost.

Question 9 addressed runways available at the location. You heard this earlier. One 11,000 foot long by 150 foot wide airplane would gain an installation maximum score. Pittsburgh ARS received that maximum score. The question is flawed, however, because it in no way measures the benefits of having more than one runway. You could have one or 100 11,000 foot runways and still get the same score.

Of the ten bases scoring the full 5.98 points, three of them have only one runway operation. Pittsburgh has four runways exceeding the reported criteria and we're the only ones that have that. With one runway, like Pope, who by the way scored zero points, you're a blown

tire away from shutting down all operations for hours. We have four runways. The smallest is 8100 feet. All are located at Pittsburgh International Airport, not at nearby airports like Little Rock claims, and there are five ILS approaches available for recovery. The runways are far enough apart that military operations can be conducted on one side of the airfield while at the same time commercial operations will occur and continue unabated on the other.

This speaks to the inability -- of the ability to surge while not affecting the rest of the airport. None of this was taken into account.

Question 1246 measures our proximity to military training routes or MTRs. This is irrelevant because they are not required for C-130 low-level training. The 911th Airlift Wing has a low-altitude training and navigation, or LATN, area that is 85,000 square miles of air space surveyed down to 500 feet above ground level, made up of varying terrain that is flat, rolling and mountainous and allows air crews to design their own dynamic routes to optimize training.

[Slide.]

This slide clearly depicts locations to which our air crews fly regularly in support of joint training missions. While flying high or low-level flight training through the LATN area, they accomplish training en route to Pope, Fort Bragg, with a 60 to 70-minute sortie.

Questions 1248 and 1249 address surveyed landing zones, or LZs, that are part of the Air Mobility Command

database. 1248 measures proximity to these zones, 1249 the quality of the zones. It's not relevant because the LZs are not required for C-130 training. In fact, LZs can be accomplished with a zone painted on a normal runway, just like the one that's going to be painted on the center runway at Pittsburgh. This has been planned for quite some time and is in final approval phase with the FAA.

Question 1271 measures the number of days where the prevailing weather was greater than 3,000 feet and 3 miles visibility. This is not a valid benchmark for C-130s. Pittsburgh air crews are instrument rated airdrop-qualified air crews and fly formation with the weather as low as 200 feet and one mile visibility. Only 1500 and 3 is needed for VFR single ship training and 2,000 and 3 for VFR formation training.

All that aside, the Air Force chose only two years, 2002 and 2003, for the data, rather than the 30-year average that the Air Force Combat Climatology Center, the weather agency that supplied the data, strongly advised they use. A two-year sampling of weather is hardly a valid capture of weather data.

Question 1273 measured how far the base was from select overseas aerial ports of embarkation. This is a strategic airlift measure. C-130s are a theater airlift asset. It is not our role to carry strategic cargo to aerial ports of embarkation.

All totaled, these questions that are not relevant to the C-130 made up 41 percent of the airlift

MCI. This is an invalid measurement of Pittsburgh.

The Pittsburgh region actually has tremendous surge capability. As you saw in the video, the 911th is an essential part of the national disaster medical system plan. In the region, only the 911th has the proper maintenance crews, spare parts, special equipment, medical crews, etcetera, needed to service the C-130 aircraft. But it's not realistic to have a patient endure up to a two-hour one-way ambulance ride from Youngstown to Pittsburgh to be available to our 73 world-class hospitals.

[Slide.]

On this chart you can see Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station hosts and supports many military, federal, and other local agencies at the 911th. If the 911th closes, who accepts or assumes responsibility for these agencies, and at what cost to the taxpayer to relocate them? Consideration of financial impact to other agencies is required by law, but the DOD violated that here and did not consider it.

There's an annual cost savings of \$1.2 million for the Military Entrance Processing Station, or MEPS, just from using the 911th facilities. Closing this base would affect them most definitely now, and in the future as well.

No consideration was given to these associated cost savings to the Federal Government.

The impact of reserve structure would be devastating if the Department of Defense's recommendations to BRAC are accepted. The population recruiting

demographics seen here in the Pittsburgh area versus those proposed to gain from closures are illustrated here. It is a tremendously rich area for recruitment.

[Slide.]

Retention has not been considered. This chart shows the commuting distances associated with these BRAC moves. A round trip expected of a drilling reservist at Pope and living in Pittsburgh is over a thousand miles. For those required to travel to Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, it would be over 1800 miles. For a once a month drill weekend, these reservists would have to bear these costs personally. For air crew members this trip would be necessary at least five other times a month -- a massive loss of experience.

[Slide.]

What is going to be the cost to replace those personnel? The average cost to train an enlisted airman to level three status is \$48,000; a non-rated officer, \$96,000; a navigator, \$361,000; and a pilot, over a million dollars. This does not include the cost of recruiting. Multiply that across the full reserve and guard force and you'll see a massive number that was not considered in the analysis at all. And remember, this cost gives you a three-level one-striper or a one-level second lieutenant.

The costs incurred to train or retrain will never replace the years of military experience lost.

The 911th Airlift Wing is authorized manning, as you heard earlier, of 1245 Air Reserve technicians and

reservists at Pittsburgh. They have a long history of exceeding that number and are currently manned at 104 percent. Recruiters at Pittsburgh, by the way, have a ten-year average performance of 114 percent of their recruiting goals. That speaks volumes for the local populace and their willingness to serve even during a time of war.

As a matter of fact, the same AFRAC capacity brief that claims we're unable to grow because of land constraints identifies Pittsburgh as a future reserve location because of its recruiting base.

We can only reach one conclusion for the 911th: Remove the 911th from the closure list. As we've shown, not only is the DOD proposing to remove the Air Force Reserve from the western Pennsylvania equation, but they've also left the region with a number of unexplained Army Reserve moves and closures. Major General Ruddock, as I mentioned earlier, was instrumental at the 99th in the design of the existing \$25 million headquarters building and land acquisition for planned relocation of a commissary and exchange years ago. General Ruddock joins me today in stating it's not our intent to debate the realignment of the 99th Regional Readiness Command, but to raise significant concern over the planned closure of the Charles E. Kelly Support Facility. There remain many unanswered questions regarding personnel, transportation and maintenance plans that support the proposed realignment in spite of our efforts to gain that information.

On behalf of the Military Affairs Council, I want

to offer a Regional Joint Readiness Center as our centerpiece strategy to increase the operational effectiveness of units in the western Pennsylvania region and the sustained military presence at Pittsburgh International Airport. This concept, while not directly related in all aspects to the suggested BRAC actions, is offered to you as a recommendation to the DOD. Permissive language would help us in this regard.

More specifics can be found in a DuPuy study which we've made available to you in our supporting materials.

[Slide.]

From the chart, a Regional Joint Readiness Center in essence would combine mission-essential and support functions to offer a one-stop shop that facilitates joint service cooperation and collaboration. The military value of this concept includes joint basing, the capability to mobilize and surge, cost-efficient operations, while enhancing the demands of the national military strategy and homeland defense plan.

The 911th, the 171st Air Refueling Wing for the guard, and elements of the 99th Regional Readiness Command are anchor organizations in support of this planned strategy.

[Slide.]

This slide depicts the concept plan of a joint inter-agency coordination group for the Readiness Center. This concept is rooted in a few points. Number one, co-

locate the Military Entrance Processing Station with the 911th Airlift Wing to continue to take advantage of those cost savings.

Two, formalize the partnership with the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and the 171st to develop a readiness skills program for expeditionary readiness support.

Three, link military distance learning centers through the existing infrastructure of participating commands. As you heard from Secretary Ridge in the video, the proposed Joint Readiness Center is critical to the region's and to the country's homeland security.

Also allow me to speak to the importance of sustaining both commissary and post exchange entitlements to the many thousands of those who access our facilities. Approximately 166,000 military personnel using our commissary and exchange each year. Displacing the commissary and post exchange at Charles E. Kelly without a relocation plan would signal a breach of commitment to those veterans, relatives, retirees, but most importantly family members of currently mobilized military personnel. Otherwise, they would be required to travel over 400 miles round trip to go to the commissary and buy groceries.

Active duty, reserve, and National Guard personnel have earned this right. This is a retention and recruiting issue. This is military value.

As it stands today, the Pittsburgh ARS does not need a new fire station, it does not need new funds to pour

more concrete for parking spaces or taxiways. We do not need new hangars or billeting facilities or enhanced air traffic control. We have all of that. If the Air Force will give us five gallons of airfield marking paint for drawing lines on our pavement, Pittsburgh will give this nation its highest performing C-130 wing and Joint Readiness Center, with unlimited potential for expansion and mission change. That's military value.

In conclusion and in full consideration of low operating costs and expansion opportunities at Pittsburgh, all proposals for closure of the 911th Airlift Wing must be rejected. As was presented today, there are some of the most obvious impacts of the significant deviations of the DOD recommendations dealing with reserve forces in the Pittsburgh region and associated military units have been presented to you.

Point: The Department of Defense did not accurately account for land available at Pittsburgh International Airport.

Point: The Department of Defense did not account for high costs associated with recruiting and retraining, the replacement of highly experienced members of the reserve forces being lost with these moves from Pittsburgh.

Point: The Department of Defense did not account for high costs of relocating and rebuilding that will be incurred by the numerous units and activities being supported by the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station.

Point: We implore you to consider the full

implications of your basing decision on these facts. We respectfully request that you do the right thing. First, keep the 911th open. Second, implement our proposal for a Joint Readiness Center in Pittsburgh. We've provided you a book of certified supporting documentation for every slide in our presentation.

Chairman, Commissioners, thank you.

It's my honor to introduce the ranking member of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, Representative John Murtha. Thank you.

[Applause.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MURTHA, MEMBER OF THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM PENNSYLVANIA

REPRESENTATIVE MURTHA: Mr. Chairman, I've been through a lot of these hearings and I know how tough it is. You've got the toughest job in the world and we appreciate it. But I came early to hear the testimony on Walter Reed. I'm very interested in that. We put language in our bill that said we need a new hospital, but I'm not sure I agree with where they want to put it. So I hope you'll look at that very carefully.

I've been on the Appropriations Committee for 25 years, the Defense Subcommittee almost that many years, and I see a train wreck heading in our direction here with this recommendation by the Defense Department of the BRAC. You folks got a tough job trying to figure out how to sort it out.

I know that in the past they say how much money

we're going to save and it don't come near that kind of savings. We talk about how much money we're going to spend and they don't come near about the money they're going to spend. With the war going on where we put \$277 billion into this war, everyplace I go we have shortfalls and some kind of shortages that aren't going to be taken care of.

I have four-star generals who come to me and they say: What's the matter with recruitment? Well, that's easy to say, but it's very hard to solve. We've done everything we could in the Congress to provide the money. When you were Secretary of Veterans Affairs, you remember the problems that we had trying to come up with the money to take care of the veterans who were coming back from Iraq and the veterans who were retiring from the other services.

I agree with the concerns of the Commission about recruitment and retention. Reserve and the guard are always a target for the regulars. The regulars hate to hear me say that, but every time we go through a BRAC it's always the reserve and guard we have to worry about. Every time we have an appropriation, all of us have to worry about getting money available for the guard and reserve. And retention comes from and recruitment comes from these units being decentralized out in the country.

When you say you're concerned about it, I'm just as concerned as you are. They're 25 percent short right now in recruitment and it doesn't look any better. If you look at retention, you've got to look below the lines where you see it's '06 or '07 and '08 where they're retaining

people, and they're having a heck of a time retaining people that are going to have to stay in now.

But the Pentagon should take appropriate action to accurately answer the question, the vital question. Anticipating and guessing whether it's going to affect recruitment is not enough. We've got to hear, and I hope you'll ask the question, what is this going to do if we shut down these reserve bases.

The reality is the guard and reserve are suffering serious problems. You have heard so much about that. But here's my real concern: Serving on the Appropriations Committee, knowing full well that the money is not going to be there to implement whatever you decide.

As carefully as you try to decide, it's not going to be there. When I go to a base I find billions of dollars in shortfall, every single base I go to.

Now, let's take the base we're talking about here. They're going to move these people from Pittsburgh down to Pope. Pope's going to be part of Bragg. I was just down at Bragg three or four weeks ago and they've got a billion dollar shortfall in just infrastructure. In other words, they put in some new systems and the sewage system wouldn't even take care of the new systems they put into Bragg. So they're going to bring in maybe 6,000 people into Bragg and we're not going to have the money to pay for that.

Sitting on the Appropriations Committee, I know how difficult it's going to be to come up with the money to

implement these kind of decisions.

A little outfit we've got in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, it's a Marine Corps Reserve squadron. They've served in Iraq for a period of time. They want to send them to McGuire Air Force Base. We just built a new facility there, just like the new facilities built in western Pennsylvania. Now this will have to be duplicated or have to be changed. And of course, the most effective we've always said in the Congress is the reserve and guard units. Once you consolidate them, you not only lose the recruitment, you lose the ability to go out into the countryside and do the things like fly-overs and all the type things that keep people so patriotic throughout the rest of the country.

I just asked the Defense Department before I came in here, I said: How much backlog do you have right now, real property maintenance? Mr. Chairman, take a guess. What do you think? How much backlog do you think in real property maintenance? 110 years, 110 years of real property maintenance backlog.

Now, we're going to make some changes here and when we make those changes we're going to have the money to implement them? That's why I urge the committee to be so careful when not only -- the consolidation sounds good. Okay, we're going to consolidate this base. But if you don't have the money to do it, we have to come up with the money. This year, this year alone, they cut \$3 billion out of the allocation for the Appropriations Committee on the

House side, \$7 billion in the Senate side.

Now, a war's going on and we made those kind of cuts. I went down to Fort Stewart, Fort Hood, and Fort Bragg. I found one unit going from Fort Stewart into Iraq was C4. C4's the lowest state of readiness. Now, why were they C4? Because they didn't have the equipment that they needed to train with before they went. They said, well now, they'll be C1 when they go to Iraq. Well, when they go to Iraq what do you think they're going to find in Iraq?

I just had Marine Corps officials come back, highest level Marine Corps officials. They gave me a list of things that they think we need in Iraq for the Marine Corps alone, \$3.5 billion worth of equipment that they need to replace, spare parts, and all the things that they need in Iraq right now, today, in order to replace the equipment that's worn out and so forth.

I just want to close by saying, in Pennsylvania I lived on a street where we had three houses had 15 people went to World War II. I was over in Normandy not long ago at the cemetery there, D-Day cemetery. 1300 out of 9,000 were from Pennsylvania that were killed in that and buried in that cemetery.

My brother and three -- myself and three of my brothers went to the Marine Corps because we believe in this great country. I have 12 people killed from my district that have served in Iraq. Half of them were National Guard and Reserve. It's the best money we could spend.

What I ask is that we consider very carefully, not only the so-called spending that the military is saying is accurate. What I ask you to do is consider the danger to this great country, to the support that this great country has for the military, which comes from reserve and guard. So I feel very strongly about this, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that -- I know that this Commission will, and the members of this Commission, will take that into consideration.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you very much.

[Applause.]

We're going to have to swear you in because of the BRAC statute. So those who are going to testify and have not been sworn in -- we're running late on time, so we'll proceed. Go ahead.

MS. SARKAR: Mr. Representative, do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give and any evidence you may provide are complete and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?

REPRESENTATIVE SHUSTER: I do.

MS. SARKAR: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Congressman Shuster, you may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL SHUSTER, MEMBER IN THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM PENNSYLVANIA

REPRESENTATIVE SHUSTER: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners. Good morning. I am Bill

Shuster from the Ninth Congressional District, which is home to Letterkenny Army Depot. I want to thank you very much for your service as BRAC Commissioners and the very difficult but necessary challenge of streamlining our Department of Defense infrastructure without interrupting our nation's support to our deployed warfighters.

As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I frequently struggle with the growing funding requirements associated with transforming our military and the finite resources available to meet those requirements.

I have recently visited our deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and throughout Southwest Asia and I see the necessity of upgrading our current equipment and funding the technology necessary to win the war on terror. The results of this BRAC process will have a significant impact upon our Department of Defense operations for decades to come and the savings from efficient consolidations will help us transform our military.

I have four slides to review with you today. The first slide, please.

[Slide.]

Letterkenny Army Depot was evaluated number one for military value in tactical missile category and number one for military value in the tactical vehicle category by the Department of Defense. The DOD BRAC recommendations move workload from depots and arsenals with lower -- I repeat, lower -- military value rankings to military. The DOD and Army recommendations are sound.

I believe it's also important to note that this year's BRAC recommendation supports previous BRAC recommendations to consolidate tactical missile workload at Letterkenny.

I would like to use part of my time to familiarize you with the depot, to highlight Letterkenny initiatives which make it number one in military value, and tell you how it will efficiently accept new missions. Letterkenny Army Depot is certified and registered in both ISO-9001 and 14,001. The depot has undergone extensive outside evaluations and reviews in order to achieve this distinction.

The ISO-9001 register recognizes that Letterkenny standards for quality management to control depot processes and operations meet exacting industry criteria and assure the warfighter the highest quality business processes are followed. The ISO-14,001 register recognizes that Letterkenny Army Depot has undergone additional outside evaluations on the installation's environmental processes and that Letterkenny environmental practices meet or exceed all industry standards.

Letterkenny is designated the center of industrial and technical excellence for air defense and tactical missile ground support equipment, and it has produced praiseworthy results in this commodity for many years. Letterkenny's highly skilled workforce, secure missile facilities and state of the art equipment have the capacity and capability to expand to meet additional

requirements.

Cross-service studies have recommended the consolidation of all aspects of joint missile workload at Letterkenny -- maintenance, modifications, repairs, upgrades, certifications, storage, and demil. Many of these initiatives started in the early 1990s, but they have not been completed yet. This BRAC is an opportunity to make that consolidation a reality.

In the tactical vehicle commodity, Letterkenny also finished number one in military value. Letterkenny delivered every requirement for armor doors and improved armor vehicles ahead of schedule. Before the military action to free Iraq was initiated, Letterkenny worked with Special Operations Command to modify unique tactical vehicles to meet the special mission requirements of Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, Special Force troops, and Air Force Special Operations. Vehicles were again delivered ahead of schedule and the field utility of these tactical vehicles has led to increased requests from regular forces to improve their tactical vehicles.

Letterkenny and its tenants also use their 17,000-plus federal acres and state of the art facilities for military reserve and National Guard training.

Letterkenny has a partnership with the 99th Regional Readiness Command, which uses Letterkenny's land and facilities for thousands of hours of training every year.

Letterkenny's professional workforce is proud of all the above, but they do much, much more, and I'd like to

acknowledge that there are many of those fine workers here and people from the community that have joined us here today. In addition to the missile and tactical vehicle work, Letterkenny now rebuilds entire force provider systems, mobile kitchens and associated components, shelters, a multitude of different generators.

Letterkenny is also performing extensive generator work around the world with field support teams and we anticipate that the depot will soon be named the Army's center of industrial and technical excellence for power generation.

After 9-11, Letterkenny developed a growing partnership with a joint PEO for chemical-biological defense in order to meet the expanding homeland defense requirements. Letterkenny products are now deployed worldwide in order to protect our citizens and military. When the ricin incident occurred in this city, Letterkenny immediately deployed chemical detection equipment to support homeland defense.

Next chart, please.

[Slide.]

Letterkenny is military value, and this chart depicts that Letterkenny has 17,773 secure federal acres in rural Pennsylvania. The center of the chart highlights some of the important aspects of the installation: 150 miles of roads, 54 miles of rail with 27 docks and served by two railroads, a million square feet of shop space, 2.3 million square feet of explosive storage, and \$6.2 billion

in joint munitions are stored on the installation, munitions that can and were rapidly deployed to meet warfighter requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Letterkenny has many tenants. I want to mention one, the Letterkenny Munitions Center. The DOD recognizes the need to eliminate two storage sites as we go to more precision guided munitions. High technology missiles such as Patriot and future joint missiles must be stored and maintained at Letterkenny, our tactical missile depot, to obtain true efficiencies. Letterkenny has the space and training to store and maintain additional munitions.

[Chart.]

This chart also shows the proximity of Letterkenny to major transportation hubs -- 50 miles from Harrisburg International Airport, 182 miles from Dover Air Force Base, 197 miles from the strategic port of Philadelphia. Letterkenny is four miles from Interstate 81 and about 100 miles from the nation's capital. I think it is also important to note that a recent Department of Defense joint land use study between Letterkenny Army Depot and the surrounding communities revealed that there are no encroachment issues.

Letterkenny has the room for expansion. The graphic at the bottom left of the chart shows that Letterkenny has 4,642 buildable acres of space immediately available. This land is behind the fence on Letterkenny. The utilities and access roads are already in place. Letterkenny has room to grow and provide additional support

to the Department of Defense.

Next chart, please.

[Slide.]

I think it's important to say a few words about Letterkenny and the community's ability to support new workload at the depot. On the left of this chart you'll see 11 universities, community college, vocational schools which have working agreements with Letterkenny to help train the workforce of the future. The community and Letterkenny are prepared to work to expand the skilled Letterkenny workforce without any degradation to warfighter readiness.

The Letterkenny leadership team has visited the most productive commercial companies in the United States and have implemented their best business practices at the depot. Letterkenny is a leader in lean implementation. In the last two years, lean initiatives have opened up over 50,000 square feet of interior space for new business. Lean efforts have also resulted in millions of dollars of cost avoidance, which is depicted in the graph on your right.

What does that mean to the American people? That Letterkenny is productive and they return the dollars which result from their efficiencies to their military customers.

That's an unheard-of thing, I think, returning dollars back to be able to use them and employ them for our warfighters and other sources.

Letterkenny is the only depot to return dollars

to their customers. I would say that again: The only depot that has returned dollars to their customers.

Letterkenny looks forward to continuing to use lean principles to integrate new BRAC-directed work into the depot's business.

I'm proud to mention that Letterkenny is the Army 2005 nominee for the prestigious Shingo Award for excellence in manufacturing.

There's one last bullet on this chart and it is an important part of your deliberation and final recommendation. All the elements of Letterkenny are an energized team dedicated to supporting our warfighters. They're a cost-efficient operation with tremendous military value and prepared to grow with additional mission.

Next chart, please.

[Slide.]

The final chart speaks for itself and you can probably read it faster than I can even talk, so I'll give you a second to take a look at it.

[Pause.]

As I mentioned at the start of this short briefing, I see the need for DOD to consolidate similar missions and close similar installations. It is a tough reality. But in order to realize real savings at working capital fund facilities like Army depots, depots must close or the overhead costs of administering the facility, the costs of security, firefighters, installation maintenance, will drive the cost of production through the roof.

The closure and realignments of other installations with less military value ratings and the consolidation of workload at Letterkenny recommended by DOD offer the opportunity to increase efficiency and free up funds for other high priority national defense issues.

I want to take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Commissioners for you taking on this very, very difficult task. I know that in the end you'll make the right decisions for this nation. So thank you all very much.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you.

[Applause.]

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Gentlemen, have you been sworn in?

VOICES: Yes.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you very much.
Congressman Kanjorski, sir, you may begin.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI, MEMBER OF THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM PENNSYLVANIA

REPRESENTATIVE KANJORSKI: We're representing the Tobyhanna Army Depot, and that's located in Monroe County in my Congressional district, but I represent the donut and Mr. Sherwood -- I represent the hole and he represents the donut of that configuration.

I'm here to tell the Commission: one, we understand and agree with the military report not to close Tobyhanna or reconfigure it, but to enlarge it; two, it has a facility and workforce that's second to none in the

Defense Department. I spent the better part of yesterday morning at the depot myself meeting with the management and the workforce. They have over the last 20 years that I've had a personal relationship at the depot in representing them depicted again the highest quality workforce in the entire Defense Department. They provide and work on 70 percent of the electronic materials in repair, maintenance, and refabrication for the Defense Department.

I guess the message that the workforce and the management wanted me to deliver to this Commission is that they are willing, able, and ready to assume any responsibility or additional mission the Defense Department needs, and I can attest to you this: That while I was there they told me of the 45 civilians that are presently serving in Iraq. They're not earning \$200,000 a year as contractor employees. They're civilian American workforce Defense Department employees, and they voluntarily commit themselves to four month segments to serve in Iraq. I don't think anything attests to their willingness to serve this country and their dedication to the Defense Department and this country.

So I'm here to request on behalf of the Tobyhanna Army Depot, its workforce, to recommend the smart determination of the Defense Department in maintaining them, consolidating further work there, and urge this Commission to conclude and agree with that conclusion.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you, Mr. Kanjorski.

Mr. Sherwood.

STATEMENT OF HON. DON SHERWOOD, MEMBER OF THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM PENNSYLVANIA

REPRESENTATIVE SHERWOOD: Thank you. Thank you for your participation and your attention to this very important process. Cameron Moore is going to give you a presentation about Tobyhanna, but we've got our order stretched out a little bit here, but I'm going to take it just a step further.

I represent about half of the workforce. The depot was in my district until the 2002 redistricting. The presentation you will hear makes a strong case for supporting the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. But I'd like to go just a little bit further.

If this Commission is looking for a facility that can take on even more communications and electronic work, as recommended by the Secretary, Tobyhanna is the answer. Tobyhanna has gained new workloads from every BRAC and we have gotten new employees from every BRAC. We know what it takes to have a seamless transition so that our warfighters receive the highest level of support. We know how to integrate new missions to maximize our existing facilities and minimize the need for new construction. We have the people with the skills and the work ethic to get the job done, as shown by Tobyhanna's consistently high rankings. We have the experience in welcoming new families from other parts of the country who are moving with their jobs to northeastern Pennsylvania. And those families find a low cost of living and a high quality of life.

The 1995 decision to move the Air Force ground communications and electronics work to Tobyhanna was not in the original recommendation by the Secretary of Defense. It was the Commission that decided to fully take advantage of the efficiencies and expertise at Tobyhanna. The 1995 BRAC Commission's decision helped to establish Tobyhanna as the leader in jointness among maintenance depots. Toby works with all the services on a wide variety of systems at the depot itself and at 28 forward locations.

In short, Tobyhanna Army Depot is ready to accept new communications and electronic workloads, the ones that are included both in the Secretary's recommendations and any others the Commission might identify.

You have a very difficult mission and a short time in which to do it. I thank you for your willingness to serve on this very important Commission and to do the hard work on the behalf of our men and women in uniform.

Tobyhanna has the people, it has the facilities, the training, and the expertise. You give us the work; we'll take on what you send.

Thank you so much.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you, Congressman Sherwood.

REPRESENTATIVE SHERWOOD: And it's my privilege now to introduce Cameron Moore, the Chairman of the BRAC Committee for Tobyhanna.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Mr. Moore, we're almost out of time, so anything you could do to help us, because we

have to travel to Virginia for another hearing very shortly.

MR. MOORE: I'll do my best.

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Do your best, that's all we ask. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF CAMERON MOORE, CHAIR,

BRAC BLUE RIBBON TASK FORCE

MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission: We do appreciate the opportunity to be here.

As Congressman Sherwood said, my name is Cameron Moore. I'm the President and CEO of the Northeastern Pennsylvania Alliance, which is a regional economic development group. It's really been my honor to serve as a Co-Chair of the Tobyhanna Army Depot Task Force.

[Slide.]

Tobyhanna's been supporting the men and women -- Tobyhanna's been supporting the men and women of our military for over 50 years and in recent years has become a premier example of jointness at work. Tobyhanna, as Congressman Sherwood mentioned, supports our warfighters from 28 forward locations. On average, on an average day, 35 volunteer technicians are on the ground in places like Iraq and Afghanistan supporting critical systems such as satellite communication, air defense radar, air traffic control, and aircraft survivability.

Tobyhanna's civilian personnel were on the ground in Baghdad within days of the start of the ground war. Of course, this depot is very attractive for expansion -- no

encroachment issues, modern facilities, highly productive workforce, an excellent multimodal transportation system, and partnerships with 12 area colleges and universities to ensure the current and workforce future needs are met.

The depot is certified ISO-9001 and 14,001 and has recently achieved about \$25 million in cost avoidance from the aggressive implementation of lean initiatives.

As the Congressman mentioned, prior BRACs have recognized this and have rewarded the excellence at Tobyhanna.

Let's go to the next slide.

[Slide.]

So to build upon the successful development of the joint installation at Tobyhanna, the Secretary of Defense has recommends as a component of BRAC 2005 that Tobyhanna receive missions from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. In the material we've submitted there is a brief outlining our capability to accept those missions, and certainly we can easily accommodate those missions and more with a minimal investment in facilities.

A couple of findings of BRAC 2005 that I think are important to highlight, and that is that Tobyhanna was rated number one in having the lowest operational costs of any industrial installation in DOD; also rated as number one quality of life for all Army maintenance facilities; also had more number one BRAC rankings than all but one of 49 DOD maintenance facilities, and it had number one or number two rankings in 16 of the 19 commodity areas that

are handled at Tobyhanna.

However, we do have one concern about a BRAC 2005 recommendation. The Joint Cross-Service Group recommends that the supply, storage, and distribution functions at Tobyhanna and many other DOD maintenance centers be moved from these installations for consolidation at another location. If implemented, we believe that these recommendations will make depots and maintenance centers less efficient, will cause them to lose control of functions critical to their missions, will duplicate functions, increase operating costs, and ultimately reduce support for our warfighters.

We do request that the Commission thoroughly evaluate this recommendation. Again, in our material we did submit a brief highlighting some of the concerns we have with this recommendation.

Overall, we believe that the recommendations to move missions to Tobyhanna build on prior BRAC decisions, further promote jointness, and maximize efficiencies at DOD's most cost-efficient depot. Our region is prepared and experienced in working with the depot to facilitate the transition of additional missions. Our Commonwealth's goal, as you've heard, is to be the best in supporting our armed forces, and for us the bottom line is: DOD recommends it, the facts support it, the warfighter requires it, and we ask you to keep and build upon the best.

Thank you.

[Applause.]

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you very much.

SENATOR SPECTER: Mr. Chairman, distinguished Commission: Thank you for your rapt attention. I knew that Pennsylvania had a strong case. I didn't realize how strong it was until I heard the very impressive testimony during the course of the past two hours.

Commissions are coming to be called upon more and more in our country to take over some of the really hard decisions when, candidly, the regular government bureaucracies can't handle it. The best illustration recently is the 9-11 Commission. We had a lot of those answers a long time ago, and I mention briefly in Willow Grove -- and it's worth repeating -- you have an extraordinary Staff Director, Charles Battaglia. I have special plaudits for him. I trained him. Of course, I trained Governor Rendell, too, as an Assistant District Attorney.

But Charlie Battaglia, back when he was the Staff Director for the Intelligence Committee when I chaired it in 1995, put together legislation which we introduced that had put all of the intelligence agencies under one umbrella. And without going into great detail because I have a limited amount of time, it was shelved by objections from bureaucrats, including the Department of Defense. A lot of bad experience later, after the terrorist attack on 9-11, the Commission got together and did a job.

That's what we're calling on you to do here

today. But if you take a look at the two principle installations, Willow Grove and the 911th, it is hard to understand how many factual mistakes there can be. DOD's a busy place and they have left the cleanup work to the Commission. But it's in the statute they want joint operations, and Secretary Rumsfeld emphasized it himself. But yet it was the very fact of jointness that caused Willow Grove to be on the list. The Navy thought the Air Force was going, so the Navy didn't really make a case. The Air Force thought the Navy was going, so the Air Force didn't really make a case. And here you have an installation which is getting recruits from New York to South Carolina, been in Iraq and Afghanistan three times in the past four years, vital for homeland security when we had 9-11 and those fighter planes go up. Southeastern Pennsylvania needs some protection, but if Willow Grove is not there they won't get it.

Then at the other end of the state they did about the same thing: Not enough space for the C-130s. Well, it's factually not true. Not a matter of argument or conjecture or speculation. They said they'd only accommodate ten. The fact is they can accommodate 20, and the fact beyond that is that when they measured the land they left out 33 acres which had been made available, and then they omitted noting that there were 21 more acres which could be made available.

Those areas are great recruiting areas. Willow Grove over Memorial Day had 500,000 people come for a

series of events, and when those events occur there are a lot of young people and they come in and they see the military and they see the patriotism and they see the contribution to service. But if Willow Grove's not there, they don't see it.

You heard the statistics about recruiting from Pittsburgh. It was an enormous figure. I thought it was recruiting to the NFL instead of the military services, from all that have been contributed around there.

Pennsylvania has been very hard-hit. We have lost 16,000 jobs. The Philadelphia Navy Yard was closed when key evidence was suppressed. I personally took the case to the Supreme Court of the United States, argued it there myself, won the case in the Court of Appeals, and you know how hard that is to do, and it was evident that it was an unfair closure, but the U.S. Supreme Court was not about -- they had to take them all or none -- not about to rescind 300 base closures across the country.

I was impressed when I heard the statistics that Congressman Murtha gave about how many fatalities there had been and I asked my deputy to give me the total number of fatalities for Pennsylvania. I sign these letters every few days, so I know there are a lot. But nationally, out of 1731 killed, 81 have been from Pennsylvania. 13,189 wounded, 554 from Pennsylvania. And we're not doing any more than our share. We're not making any representation.

But when you look at base closures and we're second only to the nation to California -- California's not

a state; it's a nation. It's 35 million people, three times as big as Pennsylvania. And when you take a look at the number of people where we're losing jobs, a total of 1454, a lot of them are out here today -- I really hate to address the Commission and turn my back on constituents and voters, but I know it's necessary.

But I think we've done more than our fair share, and we ask you to leave Willow Grove and leave the 911th intact. Thank you.

[Applause.]

CHAIRMAN PRINCIPI: Thank you. Thank you very much. This concludes today's regional hearing. I want to thank all of our witnesses. I want to thank the many citizens of the communities represented here today that have supported the members of our armed services for so many years, making them feel welcomed and valued in your towns. It is that spirit that makes America great.

Thank you all. The hearing is closed.

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

UNCERTIFIED