

**Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Holds Hearing on Current and Long-Term  
Threats Confronting U.S. National Security**

**May 3, 2005**

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[\*] **PRINCIPI:** Good afternoon and welcome to the second hearing of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

As I noted this morning, in less than two weeks the secretary of defense will publish his proposal for realigning or closing the military bases he believes are no longer needed to support the men and women of our armed forces. The Congress established this commission to provide an independent assessment of that DOD proposal.

The Defense Department proposal will lay out a road map defining the infrastructure it believes it needs, the services will need, over decades to come.

The bases are not an ends, they are means. Bases support our nation's divisions, wings, fleets and expeditionary forces and their supporting elements. And those formation must in turn be tailored to defer or defeat the threats they are expected to face.

It's difficult to know when you've arrived if you don't know where you are going. This commission must understand the anticipated future threats to our nation if we are to intelligently evaluate the appropriateness of the base establishment the Department of Defense proposes to support the force structure we anticipate fielding in order to meet those threats.

This afternoon, Mr. David Gordon from the new Office of the Director of National Intelligence will testify. Mr. Gordon is chairman of the National Intelligence Council, the senior analyst position in the intelligence community. He is accompanied by Mr. Earl Scheck from the Defense Intelligence Agency and by Ms. Carol Rodley from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

They will provide the commission with the foundation for an independent assessment of the threats to our national security over the next 20 years. This assessment should serve as the basis for the Defense Department's force structure and the infrastructure to support that structure. Mr. Gordon, I understand that you will make an opening statement and then Mr. Scheck and Ms. Rodley will assist you in responding to our questions. Would you please rise so that I can swear you in?

Please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Thank you.

You may begin.

**GORDON:** Thank you for giving me the opportunity to address you today with my perspective on the threats and challenges facing our nation over the next 15 to 20 years.

My statement draws principally from two sources of analytic effort. First are the finished national intelligence products that have been generated under the auspices of the National Intelligence Council, or the NIC. Those assessments reflect the intelligence community's take on the most important national security issues of our day.

Second, given the long-term focus of your deliberations, I have borrowed heavily from the recently completed year-long NIC effort entitled, "Mapping the Global Future."

That work, which is based on consultations with more than 1,000 nongovernmental experts from inside the U.S. government, other American experts, and indeed experts from all around the world, attempts to capture the fundamental trends and factors driving global change through the 2020 time frame.

My colleagues' statements focus more on immediate issues.

Please be clear, however, that while my statement is undeniably influenced by these intelligence-related assessments this does not represent a coordinated intelligence community presentation.

I would like to begin by briefly outlining what I see as some of the enduring themes that characterize the present and future security environment.

**GORDON:** And the first of these – and it's a theme that we develop at length in our "Mapping the Global Future" paper that you've all received – is that we are in an expanded period of transition and in many ways of turmoil that began with the end of the Cold War and is likely to continue well into the future.

At no time since the formation of the Western alliance system in the late 1940s have the shape and nature of international alignments been in such a state of flux. Emerging powers, especially in Asia; retrenchment in the former Soviet Union and Eurasia; a roiling Middle East and trans-Atlantic divisions are among the many issues that have only come to a head in recent years.

The basic factors and forces driving global change, some of which I will address below, all have considerable staying power. And we don't believe that any circumstance, condition or power is likely to emerge in the next 10 to 15 years capable of overcoming them and creating a more stable global environment.

So the first point is that the very magnitude and speed and uncertainty of change will be a defining feature of the world over the next 15 years.

Let me address the issue of globalization, which I define here as the increasing flow of information, technology, capital, goods, services and people across borders around the world. We highlight this as an overarching megatrend that will constitute a force so ubiquitous that it will substantially shape all of the other major trends in the world.

Globalization will in many ways be positive. We anticipate that the world over the next 15 years will become a much richer place, with global economic growth totaling a global economy some 80 percent larger in 2020 than it is today, which will translate into average per capita incomes 50 percent higher.

**GORDON:** Particularly for those countries, regions and groups that can access and adapt new technologies, the impact of globalization will be predominantly positive.

China and India, for instance, are well positioned to become technology leaders, and their rise will put much more of an Asian face on globalization over the next 15 years.

But the benefits of globalization won't be global. In some areas, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere, globalization will leave large numbers of people seemingly worse off and may exacerbate local and regional tensions, increase the prospects and capabilities for conflict, and empower those who would do us harm.

Perhaps our greatest challenge over the next decade or so will be to encourage further and consolidate the positive elements of globalization while managing and containing its downsides.

The likely emergence of China and, to a lesser extent and further down the line, India, as major new global players will transform the geopolitical landscape with impacts potentially as dramatic as the rise of the united Germany in the late 19th century, and the emergence of the United States as a major global power in the first decades of the 20th century.

Both China and India are likely to experience combinations of sustained high economic growth, expanding military capabilities and growing populations.

Barring an abrupt reversal of the process of globalization or some major internal upheaval, this combination is likely to culminate in both China and India attaining significant political, economic and military power during this period.

How these states, the Asian region in which they exist, and the world accommodate their rise – whether they emerge in a cooperative or a competitive manner – is a critical uncertainty.

The growing demand for energy, driven by global economic expansion and, in particular, by the rising powers China and India, will have a substantial impact on geopolitical relations.

Despite the trend toward more efficient energy use, total energy consumed is likely to rise by some 50 percent over the next two decades, compared to a 34 percent expansion from the period 1980 to 2000.

**GORDON:** With an increasing share provided by petroleum, renewable energy sources are likely to account for only some 8 percent or so of energy supply in 2020. And nuclear power will probably decline, actually, in absolute terms at least during the first decade of this period.

Now, with substantial new investment in new capacity, overall energy supplies are potentially sufficient to meet growing global demand. There is no inherent shortage of energy in the ground.

But continued limited access by international oil companies to major fields could restrain this investment. And more significantly, many of the areas that we're counting on to provide increased output in the Caspian Basin, offshore Latin America, offshore West Africa, and the South China Sea, involve substantial political and/or economic risks. Moreover, traditional suppliers in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, are in politically precarious positions.

Thus, sharper demand-driven competition for resources, perhaps accompanied by a major disruption of oil supplies, is another key uncertainty that we face looking 15 years ahead.

State instability driven in part by global demographic trends, by uneven economic development and by the poor quality of governance, will remain a concern. We're particularly concerned about authoritarian regimes that are put under pressure by rising democratic forces and by new democracies who do not always have the adaptive capabilities to entrench and sustain themselves.

The world will be adding more than a billion people during the next 10 to 15 years. The overwhelming bulk of those new populations will be in the developing world.

Meanwhile, in the developing world, urbanization will continue with millions of the world's poorest peoples migrating to urban areas each year. Economic progress in many parts of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, is unlikely to keep pace with such change.

These conditions will strain the leadership, resources and infrastructures of many developing states. Corrupt and ineffective governments will be particularly hard pressed to cope, and their failings will likely foster instability; spawn ethnic, religious and cultural conflict; create lawless safe havens or ungoverned territories, and increase the powers of dangerous, nonstate actors, including terrorists. Part of the pressure on governance will come from new forms of identity politics centered on religious conviction.

Outside of Western Europe – and with the exception of Muslim populations in Western Europe – religion is taking on greater political significance in virtually all parts of the world, and it's leading to important political tensions.

**GORDON:** In our own hemisphere, we see in Latin America the rise of evangelical Protestantism challenging institutions in societies that had been dominated by the Catholic Church.

In Africa, we see a growing tension between an increasingly militant Islam, and particularly in the coastal areas of West Africa, a reviving Christianity.

In Asia, we're seeing the emergence to greater political salience of Buddhism, Islam and Christianity.

So, in general, identity politics and religious identity politics is an emerging factor of world politics. In a rapidly globalizing world experiencing population shifts, religious identity provides followers with a ready-made community that serves as a social safety net in times of need, both materially and spiritually.

Political Islam will have a particularly significant global impact during this time frame, rallying disparate ethnic and national groups and creating an identity that transcends national boundaries.

Developments in the Muslim world will remain a challenge as Islamic leaders, groups and individuals sort through competing visions of what it means to be a Muslim individually and what it means to be a Muslim state in the modern era.

Unfavorable demographic and economic conditions and efforts to strike a balance between modernization and respect for traditional values are likely to be made more difficult by developments in the global war on terror, by continued Israeli-Palestinian violence, by foreign presence – U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and roiled by fledgling democratic developments in the Middle East.

**GORDON:** These pressures will remain acute in a whole series of states important to the United States, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Outside of the Middle East, and particularly in Europe, political Islam will continue to appeal to Muslim migrants, who are attracted by economic opportunities but who may not feel at home in what they perceive to be alien and hostile cultures.

In these cases, identity politics will likely add stress to states that are forced to re-examine longstanding political, social and cultural precepts as they attempt to overcome the challenges of rapidly aging core populations and rising immigrant numbers.

Now, despite our significant successes to date, international terrorism will remain a serious threat. The key factors that spawn terrorism show few signs of abating over the next 15 years.

Facilitated by global communications, the revival of Muslim identity threatens to create a framework for the potential spread of radical Islamic jihadist ideology inside and outside of the Middle East, including in Southeast Asia, in Central Asia, in parts of Western Europe, in all of those regions where Islamic religious identity has traditionally not been as strong as it has been in the Middle East.

This revival has been accompanied by a deepening solidarity among Muslims caught up in national or regional separatist struggles, in Palestine, in Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir, Mindanao, and Southern Thailand and emerged in response to government repression, corruption and ineffectiveness.

So what we're seeing is the potential coming together of a series of informal networks: informal networks of money; informal networks of mullahs, motivated by extreme religious ideologies; madrassas, educational institutions designed to spread those ideologies; and the rise of international media.

**GORDON:** These informal networks will continue to proliferate and be exploited by radical elements.

While our counterterrorism efforts today focus on the Al Qaida network, I expect it to be superseded over time by similarly inspired Islamic extremist groups that may in some cases merge with or be spawned by local separatist movements.

Information technology, allowing for instant connectivity, communication and learning, will enable the terrorist threat to become increasingly decentralized, potentially evolving into an eclectic array of groups, cells and individuals that do not need a stationary headquarters to plan and carry out operations.

Training materials, targeting guidance, weapons know-how and fund-raising in this world can all become virtual. Terrorists will continue to employ primarily conventional weapons, but will incorporate new twists as they consistently adapt to counterterrorist efforts.

Terrorist innovation will probably come less from new technologies or weapons that they've developed on their own, and more from novel operational concepts.

That said, strong terrorist interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction increases the risk of mass casualty attacks.

**GORDON:** Bioterrorism appears particularly suited to the smaller, better informed groups that I described earlier.

I also expect future terrorists to seek to develop cyberattack capabilities to enable them to disrupt critical information networks and cause physical damage to our information systems.

Let me turn to rapid technology development and proliferation issues.

In information, computing, processing and communications technologies, biotech, advance materials and manufacturing, and weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction, technological change will continue to have a profound impact on the way people live, think, work, organize and fight.

New vulnerabilities, interdependencies and capabilities are being created all around the world at the high end and at the lower end of the technological divide.

The globalization of research and development intensive technologies is enabling smaller countries, groups and even individuals, access to capabilities that have historically been limited to major powers.

These trends, combined with the integration and fusion of various technological advancements, and unanticipated applications of emerging technologies, make it extremely difficult to provide meaningful technological warning. Surprises are likely to result and some aspects of our current technological advantage, both military and commercial, will become vulnerable.

I'm especially concerned about weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferation.

States still seek these capabilities for regional purposes or to provide a hedge to deter or offset U.S. military superiority.

Terrorists seek greater physical and psychological impacts and are drawn to these weapons.

**GORDON:** The perceived need to acquire weapons of mass destruction capabilities is intense and, unfortunately, globalization provides a more amenable proliferation environment – making it easier to transfer material and expertise, and to form partnerships, witting and sometimes unwitting, for pooling resources and know-how.

Much of the technology and many of the raw materials are available and, in some cases, the basic science of this is relatively easily understood.

Some two dozen countries possess or are pursuing WMD and missile programs, along with a handful of substate entities.

This problem is going to be with us, Mr. Chairman, for a long time to come.

International criminal activity is another enduring concern.

Criminal groups in Western Europe, China, Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Russia are broadening their global activities and are increasingly involved in narcotics trafficking, human smuggling, and illicit transfer of arms and other technologies.

We're particularly troubled by the potential for growing links between terrorist groups and organized criminal elements to facilitate terrorists financing their activities, trafficking in weapons and moving operatives.

One other core factor that I believe to be of increasing importance is how the world reacts to and copes with U.S. power and dominance.

One of the key take-aways from our 2020 project is that parts of the world are increasingly apprehensive about the perceived expansion, consolidation and influence of American values, ideals, culture and institutions.

Reactions to this perception can range from mild chafing to outright fear and violent rejection.

**GORDON:** I'm concerned that these perceptions, mixed with angst over perceived U.S. unilateralism, could give rise to significant anti-American behavior.

In this context, asymmetric capabilities that include terrorism, insurgency, sabotage, infrastructure attacks, information and cyber- warfare, the threat of use of WMD, denial and deception programs, and intelligence operations are particularly appealing to adversaries who understand that they cannot match our political and economic and military power on our terms. They don't want to fight the American way of war.

We can expect that our opponents will seek to avoid decisive engagements and act indirectly, hoping to extract a price we are unwilling to pay, or to present us with capabilities and situations we cannot or will not react to in a timely manner.

While asymmetric concepts are as old as warfare itself, they are increasingly important today because, in many cases, virtually all of our adversaries, from the lowest on the technology platform to the highest, they remain the only means our enemies have, and potential enemies have, for coping with U.S. military power and military dominance.

At the strategic level, asymmetric actions, such as the September 11th attacks, will be designed to fundamentally change the United States, change the way we behave in the world, and the way others see us.

Adversary goals include undermining our political, economic and social infrastructures, destroying our sense of societal optimism, thwarting our global leadership, weakening our will or our capacity to remain

globally engaged, curtailing the worldwide appeal of our ideas, our institutions, our culture, and denying our leaders the military option.

At the more tactical military level, our enemies are likely to try to level the playing field so we are unable to fight the way we want to fight.

While specific adversaries' objectives, targets and means of attack will vary, I expect that most military-oriented asymmetric approaches will focus on undermining the key enablers of the American way of war.

**GORDON:** Accordingly, we should expect our enemies to focus on several overlapping categories, to include counterwill, that is, to sever the continuity of will between our national leadership, our military, our citizens and allied and coalition partners and world public opinion; counteraccess, efforts to deny U.S. forces easy access into potential combat zones; counterprecision engagement, to defeat or degrade or undermine our precision intelligence and strike capabilities; counterprotection, to increase U.S. and allied civilian casualties, military casualties, and in some cases to directly threaten the U.S. homeland itself; and counterinformation, designed to prevent us from attaining information and decision superiority on the battlefield.

The complex integration of the factors outlined above with other second and third order trends and consequences, including the frequency, intensity and brutality of ethnic and religious conflict, local resource shortages, natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies, epidemics, mass movements of people, and limited global resource capabilities – this portends an extremely dynamic, complex and uncertain global future.

**GORDON:** So this takes us to a circle to where I began.

Collectively, these trends create the conditions in which specific threats and challenges emerge and they define the context in which U.S. strategy, interests and forces will have to operate.

In my remaining time, I want to shift from this general characterization of the emerging international environment and focus on a number of specific countries, regions and issues that are certain to challenge us over the next decade or so.

The prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflict has furthered anti-American sentiment, increased the likelihood of terrorism directed at U.S. interests, increased the pressure on moderate Middle Eastern regimes, and carries with it the potential for wider regional conflict.

The election of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas marks an important positive step, and Abbas has made it clear that negotiating a peace deal with Israel is a high priority.

His ability to deliver will depend on his success at rebuilding the damaged Palestinian Authority infrastructure and governing institutions, especially the security forces, the legislature and the judiciary.

Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's disengagement plan has passed a number of political obstacles, but there are still significant hurdles ahead.

**GORDON:** We're particularly concerned with the continued capacity and potential of extremists on either side to disrupt progress on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

Moving on, I expect we'll continue to face the risk of war between India and Pakistan for some time to come. Again, despite recent positive developments, the Kashmir situation remains unresolved, and the chance for miscalculation remains high, especially in the wake of some future triggering event, such as a spectacular terrorist attack or a political assassination.

Meanwhile, both sides maintain their zero-sum perspectives, continue to pursue nuclear and long-range delivery capabilities, and retain large forces in close proximity along a tense line of control.

North Korea will remain a very troubling state so long as Kim Jong II is in power. Pyongyang's open pursuit of nuclear power status is one of the most serious challenges to U.S. regional interests in a generation.

Meanwhile, Kim continues to develop long-range missiles potentially capable of delivering nuclear warheads to U.S. territory. North Korea's chronic proliferation activities, troubling in their own right today, are an indication that Kim might be willing to make good on his threat to market nuclear weapons or fissile material in the future.

At the same time, the North retains significant military capabilities that include forward-deployed infantry, armor and artillery forces, weapons of mass destruction and hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

War on the peninsula would be very violent and destructive and could occur with little warning.

Turning to Iran, in early February, the spokesman of Iran's supreme council for national security publicly announced that Tehran would never scrap its nuclear program. This came in the midst of negotiation with E.U.-3 members, Britain, Germany and France, who were seeking objective guarantees that Iran will not use nuclear technology for nuclear weapons.

**GORDON:** The nuclear standoff with Iran has significant regional and global implications, not the least of which is the potential for Israel to strike militarily at Iran's nuclear facilities.

Meanwhile, Iran continues its pursuit of long-range ballistic missiles, such as an improved version of its 1300-kilometer range Shahab-3, to add to the hundreds of short-range Scud missiles it already has, and Tehran continues to support terrorist groups in the region, such as Hezbollah, and could encourage increased attacks in Israel and the Palestinian territories to derail progress towards peace.

Iran also reportedly is supporting some anti-coalition activities in Iraq and seeking to influence the future character of the Iraqi state.

Finally, Iran's conservatives are positioned to consolidate their power in the June presidential elections, further marginalizing the reform movement.

As I mentioned earlier, China is a rising power that is increasingly confident and active on the international stage, trying to ensure it has a voice on major international issues, secure its access to natural resources – especially energy resources – and is able to counter what it sees as U.S. efforts to contain or encircle it.

During the past decade or so, Beijing has undertaken an impressive program of military modernization that is tilting the balance of power in the Taiwan Straits and improving China's capabilities to threaten U.S. forces in the region.

China's total military spending continues to grow with its expanding economy, resulting in an assessed defense budget of some \$60 billion last year.

**GORDON:** Strategic force modernization is a continuing priority, and China will likely field three new strategic missiles – more mobile, survivable and capable – within a decade.

Meanwhile, the People's Liberation Army continues to acquire a range of modern conventional weapons, particularly air, air defense, anti-submarine, anti-surface ship reconnaissance, missile and battle management capabilities, and to emphasize the professionalization of its officer corps.

In Russia, the attitudes and actions of the so-called Siliviki (ph), ex-KGB men that President Putin has placed in positions of authority throughout the Russian government, may be critical determinants of the course Putin will pursue in the years ahead.

Perceived setbacks in Russia's war on terrorism, perceived negative developments in Georgia, Ukraine, in Kyrgyzstan, and increased domestic criticism may make Putin and Russia a more difficult partner for the United States and could complicate the leadership transition process when Putin's term ends in 2008.

In our own hemisphere, Venezuela remains troubling. President Hugo Chavez continues to define himself in opposition to the United States.

Though he claims a mandate to help the poor and end discrimination and inequality, Chavez's six-year track record is one of increasing concentration of power, regional meddling, ties to Fidel Castro, and more recently, plans for more significant arms purchases.

Over the longer term, Chavez increasing authoritarianism and professed desire to spread his Bolivarian revolution throughout the region represent a clear challenge to U.S.-Latin American policy.

**GORDON:** Mr. Chairman, I could go on and talk about other issues of concern in other regions, to include chronic instability in much of sub-Saharan Africa or the growing terrorist threats in Southeast Asia.

But in the interest of time and my colleagues, I will conclude my statement here and open the floor to your questions and those of the other commissioners.

Thank you very much.

**PRINCIPI:** Thank you very much, Mr. Gordon.

I'll start out with a few questions.

Has the intelligence community played a key role in DOD's 20-year threat assessment, upon which their force structure was based?

**GORDON:** Let me turn to Mr. Scheck from DIA to begin to address that and I'll further address it.

**SCHECK:** Sir, the defense intelligence community routinely plays in providing the department foreign military force assessments, both current and 15 years out, to support all defense planning guidance and all contingency planning guidance scenarios. And that data is used for their future threat assessments. We do that every year.

**GORDON:** Our NIC 2020 paper that I drew from substantially for my comments today is done in collaboration and consultation with those elements at DOD who are working on the early phases of the quadrennial defense review that do focus on thinking about the future threat environment.

So we've been involved not directly in this, but indirectly through working with our colleagues in support of their efforts in the QDR.

**PRINCIPI:** Let me follow up.

Our responsibility is to determine whether the secretary of defense's recommendations to this commission are in conformance with the force structure plan, as well as other criteria, a force structure plan that is based upon a threat assessment to our national security over a 20-year period.

In your opinion, with such a long horizon, can you accurately predict, assess what that threat is 15 or 20 years from now?

I mean if you were to go back 20 years to 1985 and look at the situation today, your threat assessment in 1985, would it be viable, today's situation?

**GORDON:** I have not done that, but I suspect if I did it, it would probably not be very viable.

Whenever you're talking about long-range threats, you are talking about a situation of uncertainty.

The theme of uncertainty was one of the themes that I highlighted in my presentation, that for every trend that we're pretty sure of, there are significant uncertainties attached to it.

We're pretty confident about rising Asia, the rise of China and India. But what shape that's going to take, to what degree will it threaten and challenge U.S. interests, U.S. military forces, that's an uncertainty.

We talked about – I focused on the rise of identity politics, and in particular, Muslim identity politics.

**GORDON:** What direction Islamic identity politics will take is an uncertainty.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, there is a very, very deep conflict taking place within the Islamic world about the direction of Islam. And there are some forms of political Islam that we can quite easily reconcile ourselves to.

Our NATO ally Turkey is ruled by a democratic political party representing an Islamist perspective, but one that is not at all threatening to us.

So I didn't mean to suggest here that the domination of Islam by radical elements is by any means foretold, that it's the threat and that's what we're worried about.

But we cannot say decisively what the threat environment is going to look like over a 15 or 20 year period.

**PRINCIPI:** Do you want to add to that?

**SCHECK:** Sir, I'd just like to add, when it comes to traditional military force projections, if I were to look out 20 years or even in the past 20 years, I think we have a relatively good capability to forecast what military capabilities are going to be out there over 10- or 15- or 20-year period.

We may not get the timing exactly right or we might not get the numbers right, but, I think, as far as macroforce capabilities, I think we have a pretty good capability to do that.

**PRINCIPI:** OK. One final question: In your experience as an intelligence analyst, do our potential adversaries adjust their force structure, strategies and tactics to changes they observe in our strategies and tactics and force structure as well?

**SCHECK:** Absolutely.

The predominant strategy being used by any major foreign military today is to deny access to our military in any region where we could strike that particular territory.

They know our ability to collect intelligence, reconnaissance and use that immediately on the battlefield and rapidly project power.

And so most of the actions they take are to deny us that capability.

**PRINCIPI:** What does that say as to the relative benefits of flexibility compared to strength?

**SCHECK:** The more options you have to come at them in an unexpected manner, the better off you're going to be from that perspective.

**PRINCIPI:** OK. Thank you.

Mr. Bilbray?

**BILBRAY:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My question – I served on the Armed Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee when I was in the House, and what you said now was pretty true of what was said in 1995 – 1994.

North Korea, Iran, at that time Iraq – all those threats to us. China’s potential – we have to look at an overall picture of where we’re going to be in the next 10 years, too, in the sense of military bases.

Of course, this commission is charged with following to see what we should close, what we should realign, what we shouldn’t close.

I remember, it may have been the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, we were talking about fighting two wars simultaneously – one in the Middle East and one in the Koreas. From what I see, our capability is not there. Is your assessment at this point – and you didn’t mention this, but I’m going to ask you anyway – that our military, as we see it today, is too small to meet the threats that we’re facing in the 21st century?

**SCHECK:** Sir, I spend my time studying foreign military capabilities and not U.S. military capabilities. So I’m not really the right person to comment on that.

**GORDON:** We do not undertake those kinds of net assessments. Our mandate specifically excludes that.

**GORDON:** If you look at the range of threats outlined in our 2020 report, they vary from threats that are way down the technological chain, threats of terrorism, of ungoverned areas, all the way through threats of a rising significant military power in Asia.

But that’s as far as I am able to go in addressing – this is something we literally don’t look at.

**BILBRAY:** All right. I appreciate that.

And hopefully, Mr. Chairman, we will get somebody that will testify in that regard, because that’s something we got to look at.

If we’re going to close bases, and it turns out we have too small a military – and having been there and voted for the concept, and Congressman Hanson too, I think we made a mistake. I think we cut our military too small to meet the requirements of a two-front war.

If North Korea invaded tomorrow, I don’t know what we’d do. Maybe we’d send this committee over there to help.

**PRINCIPI:** Well, hopefully we’ll get some information on that tomorrow, Mr. Bilbray.

Mr. Coyle?

**COYLE:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Gordon, for your testimony.

Dr. Gordon, in your testimony, you characterized international terrorism in monolithic terms, speaking of Muslim solidarity and long-term trends continuing in a coordinated way around the world. But I think when you look at terrorist incidents in detail, there are many motivations and factors behind each one that are each quite different from the next: some are political, some are economic, some are religious; others are not.

**COYLE:** And overall, international terrorism is not really a monolithic entity that's coordinated worldwide, but rather something that comes and goes in different parts of the world with different periods and frequencies, and often, in one place or another, lasting only three or four years.

From the point of view of this commission, however, what's important is not which of these views is correct, but what does our government and what does the Department of Defense think. If you view international terrorism as a monolithic entity your approach to base closing would be quite different, I think, and relocation of troops overseas, than if you saw it as something with different motivations and drivers in different places around the world.

**GORDON:** Mr. Coyle, I did not mean to suggest at all that we view the terrorist threat as a monolithic entity. In fact, as we look out over time, our judgment is that the terrorist threat is likely to become increasingly decentralized.

I do believe that in that decentralization, that the predominant source and the predominant ideological driver behind the threat is likely to continue to be radical jihadist ideology.

Now, that will get expressed in lots of different parts of the world. It will get linked up to local conflicts, ethnic disputes. And it's unlikely to be in any sense monolithic.

**GORDON:** But when we look out at the terrorist landscape over time, that's our predominant fear.

Let me say that it won't be the only, and there are other potential sources of terrorism, as well and we need to be on our toes to pay attention to those, but it is the judgment of the intelligence community that radical Islamic ideology and jihadism will become a unifying thread shaping the terrorist landscape.

That's quite different, though, from saying it will be monolithic.

I don't think it's going to be monolithic. I think we're looking at a situation in which the kind of organization that Al Qaida created may very well turn out to have been an exception to the organizational attributes of our adversary.

**SCHECK:** That's consistent our view, also.

**COYLE:** Any comment, Ms. Rodley?

**RODLEY:** There is a large degree of consensus about this within the intelligence community, and we share that as well in the State Department.

And I just would add that, obviously, the further out you look the harder it gets to predict. But Al Qaida has been with us for some time already. Their earlier attacks go back to the early- to mid- '90s. We certainly don't see that going away any time soon.

**RODNEY:** So I think that the earlier comment about strength versus flexibility, I think has some application here, as the U.S. government seeks to respond to a more fragmented and decentralized terrorist movement, rather than a single organization, that flexibility in response is going to be critical for us.

**COYLE:** Thank you.

**PRINCIPI:** Admiral Gehman?

**GEHMAN:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your comments, Mr. Gordon. And I have a couple of questions.

I always react when I hear terms like rapid pace of change and rapidly changing times and things like that, because it seems to me that if we go back through the history of the 20th century, in the '30s we had the rise of some strong military totalitarian regimes which tried to expand their spheres by means of a war. In 1945, that war was ended, and we had a period of 45 years of one challenger, one enemy, the Soviet Union. That period ended in 1990.

Many people predicted that we would enter a period of fractionalized – a fractionalized world, in which there would be more disorder than order and many little hot spots all around that would have to be taken care of.

**GEHMAN:** And that's essentially what's happened. And so I'm not so sure – I react slightly negatively when I hear talk about rapid change. Change is always perceived to be rapid to the person who is standing there watching it happen.

But the fact of the matter is that if you take a macro view of these things, they really don't change all that fast, if you subscribe to the description that I just gave you, which does help this commission a little bit.

And would you react to my comment that predicting the future is risky business, but if you take a macro view of it, it really is not all that mysterious?

**GORDON:** I think that your statement is true, I think, particularly when talking about state actors and the state system. And I think that's why we spent so much time in our report and in my discussion today talking about the implications of the rise of China and India.

This is something that has hardly been an overnight phenomenon; even though it's on the cover of "Newsweek" this week, and the Atlantic, and how we're going to fight China. This is something that has been happening for a long time.

But what we're predicting essentially is that over the next 10 to 15 years, the rise of China, the rise of India, the shift in weight in the global economy toward Asia, that's likely to create a change on the order of the rise of Germany in the second half of the 19th century and the rise of the United States in the first couple of decades of the 20th century.

**GORDON:** Certainly, in both China and India – China for 20 years, India for most of the last decade, had very, very rapid economic growth. But the main impact of those changes have been internal to those countries.

Over the next 10 to 15 or 20 years, those impacts will continue to have important domestic changes, but they're likely to have a much heavier impact on the nature of global relations.

But it is something that we can – this is not a change that is going to be at all something that we'll wake up one morning and see.

So to that extent, I think that you are absolutely right.

On the nonstate side of this, it's a little more complicated. And there, I think, the evolving threat situation is harder to predict, and things can come on the scene much more radically and dramatically.

As is the case with most things looking backwards, can you always make the argument that you should have seen it coming.

**GEHMAN:** Thank you. That leads me to my next question.

**GEHMAN:** I tend to shy away from attempting to predict future actions of individuals, or even states, because one country which is our enemy today might be our friend five years from now.

But one of the areas in which you spent a lot of time in your remarks was the area of globalization. And I would like to ask two or three questions to see whether or not my understanding of the impacts of globalization are the same as you.

Globalization, of course, can be both a blessing and a curse. If, as you mentioned in your remarks, it spreads the wealth of the world around a little bit, then it's probably a good thing.

What I want to get to is the impacts of globalization, without regard to putting any names on any countries, because I don't have a lot of faith that we can pick the spot.

Would you agree that one of the attributes or one of the outcomes of successful spreading of wealth around the world, would be that the countries, or the regions which became more wealthy, now demand such things as energy, they probably are going to demand reliable access to food and water, they're probably going to demand reliable access to natural resources and free markets, and that that might be a logical future outcome of successful – that might be one, I have some others, by the way – that that is a likely outcome of globalization, that countries which heretofore had mostly internal domestic markets all of a sudden now demand – they're going to demand and they're going to take military actions or diplomatic actions to assure access to resources and markets and food and water and energy?

**GORDON:** Yes. Particularly those markets which have inherent scarcities to them.

So food market is something that will respond to rising demand, so there is a great capacity in the world to produce more food; energy is a bit less flexible.

And so particularly on scarce resources, energy resources, and in some situations, water resources, I would definitely concur with your assessment.

**GEHMAN:** Thank you.

And, Mr. Chairman, I'll just ask one other question, and that is, again, along the line of globalization, in the Asian-Western Pacific region, you mentioned China. I would agree with your assessment and we could expand that maybe to include India. But there are also some other very, very active players in that region – Japan, Korea, Taiwan – which are economic giants. Several of them have fledgling militaries. Some of them we have treaty relationships with; some we do not.

So not just China and India wanting to exercise more of their self-interest in the future, but there is a possibility that other nations may want to exercise self-interest matters in that area also.

**GEHMAN:** Do you agree that we have a region of the world here that we have to focus on?

**GORDON:** I'm not going to comment on whether or not we focused on it, but I do agree with your basic assessment, and it's very consistent with the findings of our report, that Asia will become an increasingly important part of the world.

We highlighted China and India, because we believe that the rise of China and India will be a major shaper of what all of the other players in the region do. But that's not to say at all that they are the only significant players in the region.

There are, as you mentioned, a number of other very significant players, and a significant number of less important players.

So this is a very complicated region, and it's also a region of the world that is institutionally thin in terms of regional arrangements, both for security and economic purposes.

**GEHMAN:** And would you – my last question, and this is the \$64,000 question – we've discussed the kind of negative outcomes of globalization, the competition for resources and all that sort of stuff. And I agree

with your comment that you made about the perception of the United States in the world, as being a potential for a problem in the future. And then you discussed the business of terrorism and radicalism and all that other good stuff.

Would you care to rank those as the more significant threats to the United States' security?

**GORDON:** I think it's easier to rank the current threats than it is to...

**GEHMAN:** We have to work a decade in the future.

**GORDON:** ... down the line. Well, but partially for the very reason that you suggested, that – and I agree with your construct – when you start coming to the specifics of predicting the behavior of particular states, very, very hard to do, except in the short term.

**GEHMAN:** Not worth it, as a matter of fact.

**GORDON:** Right. Yet when you're talking about thinking about the threat environment over that long a time period, it really does depend on what the behavior of states are.

So that's what makes it – I think all of us would agree, the assessments of the intelligence community are that terrorist threats coming from radical jihadism followed by proliferation and in particular the potential of the linking of those two is the most significant current threat that the United States faces.

**PRINCIPI:** Mr. Hansen?

**HANSEN:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, like my colleague over here, I spent a lot of years on the Intelligence Committee and 22 years on the Armed Services Committee.

And in a way, I've often enjoyed sitting in the Intelligence Committee and listening to the CIA, the FBI, the Defense Intelligence, and on down the line, give their assessments.

First, I was very critical of you people, because were you so often wrong. On other side of the coin, I'm always impressed the way you do it. And I don't know how you can look into a crystal ball and come out and get this thing right all the time.

But I admire your approach, and I think that was a very interesting presentation that you made there, Dr. Gordon.

Like the admiral pointed out, this globalization thing is a very interesting concept that you've put out, kind after new one to me. You kind of tied it in to a religious thing to a certain extent.

I drew a distinction – and maybe an incorrect distinction – between the possible radical people in a religious thing, like the jihad that you referred to, and then you also made inference to say the Protestants in taking – infiltrating – I don't know if that's the correct word – but working with the Catholics in South America, how the basis of that has changed a lot.

**HANSEN:** I don't know if I can draw the same premises that you do. But the way I see it, for this commission, is evaluating the troubles that could come out of it.

We all know there is going to be philosophical and economic changes. You know that's going to happen. And you know that people have become more educated. And I agree they're going to demand more things and they are going to want to be a bigger player in the world.

But I don't necessarily draw from that the conclusion that the United States military is going to be part of it. Now, I'm not saying that you do either, but I am saying that the radical part of it very likely we will be, as we are now.

But tell me, to what extent do you think that the United States military will be involved in these changes, this globalization. This is kind of hard to do, I know, and you have to take individual cases. We talked about North Korea, China, Iran, India, and on down the line.

But in a general term, what would you think the United States military involvement would be? Any way of guesstimating that one?

**GORDON:** Well, this question has a number of dimensions. I think one of the important dimensions of this is that globalization increases the ease of technology spread and will increase the level of capabilities for all sorts of other actors, including potential and actual adversaries.

So the main way that the U.S. military is going to have to respond to the challenges of globalization is by looking at what the potential capabilities are of adversaries and weighing their own decisions in terms of that.

**GORDON:** Admiral Gehman raised the issue of resource scarcity. And I think particularly on the issue of energy resources and during this period that we're that we're looking out to, energy will still be the commodity that makes the world go round, in many, many ways. And keeping energy-rich regions secure and the transportation mechanisms secure will be an issue that will potentially fall to U.S. military forces.

I didn't want to suggest for a second that globalization and the changes imply that U.S. military forces will, or should be, involved in any particular conflict. That was not my intent at all here.

But I think certain elements, resource scarcities, particularly in energy, and how other countries are utilizing the relative ease of technological defusion, are questions that the U.S. military will have to engage with.

Earl?

**SCHECK:** I think, as Dr. Gordon outlined, a 20-year period where the threats go from single terrorists all the way to relatively sophisticated potential military opposition, and as we have seen over the last two years or so, the U.S. military has been involved in things – wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, humanitarian aid in tsunami relief, et cetera.

So my view would be that the next two decades we'll be faced with a whole bunch of different challenges that I think will require a lot of flexibility.

**HANSEN:** If I may end my comments now: I kind of got an impression that you felt that the influx and the change in some of these developing nations toward a religious type of thing was detrimental to them. Did I misinterpret you there?

**GORDON:** No. I was suggesting that religious identity is an important global phenomenon, not just in the – it's not simply the rise of Islamic religious identity. And I was trying to highlight what we envision as significant shapers of the world out over this period.

I did not mean to suggest at all that religious identity in general is equal to Islamic jihadism in its impact. That was not at all my suggestion here.

**HANSEN:** That would make the headlines. Thank you very much for your answer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**PRINCIPI:** General Hill?

**HILL:** Yes, thank you.

I have appreciated your remarks. And I'll – it's a good – I hate the term segue, but it's a good rejoinder to me. This idea of being able to respond to the global challenge will indeed affect the military, in my opinion, in dramatic ways and affect the work of this commission.

I was particularly pleased to see that you get into that a little bit. On page 3, you talk about benefits of globalization will be global, that in point of fact there will be large numbers of people who it will not affect them.

**HILL:** In our own hemisphere, for example, Bolivia leaps up at you. Bolivia, in the next five to 10 years could completely disintegrate as a state, and it will be an issue of not globalization but the haves and have-nots.

The most grinding problem in Latin America is – in my view, the biggest threat to Latin America is poverty. And unless you can get the poverty down, you will never be able to get at the other issues.

How does that affect the U.S. military? Well, it affects the U.S. military, in my view, in the sense that we must begin to train and work with militaries and security forces in ways that are not traditionally military, more in terms of security forces, police forces. That requires a change not only in our force structure, but a change in our own laws. We have to get past that.

That allows us then to go down and work with our friends and allies in ways that are responsive to 21st century versus the 20th century especially in Latin America.

So I was glad to see that you're thinking your way through that because I think it is a very real problem.

The other problem is very true. And, again, you brought it up, you talked about criminals and the linkage between terrorism and criminals. That's a very – as you well know – a very real link.

The one thing you did not mention – and I'd like your views on it because, again, it affects the way the United States military deals with our allies and affects the mission of this commission – and that is the issue of gangs, particularly in Central America and the fact that those gangs come into play into the United States.

In my view, the single most dysfunctional possibility in the next five to 10 years is the continued emergence of gangs in Central America. They have the capability to completely destabilize that region. They have a very real capability of doing that in terms of the economy and all of the above.

Do you have any thoughts on that?

**GORDON:** I share your views that the gang threat is a real and serious threat. I think it's a classic example of a threat in which the distinction between foreign and domestic just disappears.

**HILL:** And it does really affect us in terms of how we deal with it.

**PRINCIPI:** General Newton?

**NEWTON:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, I really enjoyed your presentation and the discussion, just as my colleagues have indicated.

One question comes to mind for me, particularly, when we are thinking about – and as you did you work for "Mapping the Global Future" and you talked to a lot of people – the question that comes to mind for me is, as we are thinking about the radical part of the group that engages us at one time or another, and particularly when we're thinking about the Islamic world, did you find it to be that they are thinking this is religious, this is ethnic, this is governmental, the governments of people? What's going through their minds?

**RODLEY:** I'll start, and then I'm going to let David carry on.

This follows very nicely on the previous question about globalization, because part of what you see is that in the process of globalization, there are winners and losers.

And the losers, the countries that are losing out and see themselves losing out in this process, have the potential to become very fragile, very unstable places, and in the worst case, really all the way to failed states.

**RODLEY:** It poses a particular challenge for the United States that a lot of those countries that are failing to be able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by globalization are in the Arab and the Muslim world.

And so a lot of those things that you mentioned get very tangled up: religion, identity, economics, poverty, governance. And it's often hard to tease those threads apart.

**GORDON:** I think that's right.

I think that's where – to get back to Mr. Coyle's question, it's here that I think the radical jihadist ideology becomes such a threat.

It's not that these groups are being directed from a central location, but what the jihadist ideology provides for them is a world view that brings all of these things together in a way that leads people to see the United States and the West as the source of all of their problems and offers a way out for them to engage in extremist activities, including terrorist activities, against us.

So it's in that sense that's there is a potential for tying these different threads together that come out of the down sides, the losers, in globalization, not that there is any kind of a uniform pattern there, but it's something that is mobilizable politically in a way that can be very threatening to us.

**NEWTON:** Thank you.

I just think that is something that obviously is going to be very critical here for the leadership – hopefully, they're already thinking about this.

And as we deliberate going forward here, if you don't understand what it is you're trying to fight, then it's difficult to create a force that goes to fight that. It's like predicting the future again, as was mentioned earlier.

You mentioned briefly drugs and that trafficking, can you give me a little bit more? Because we just haven't discussed that very much. I mean, before we really engaged in more recent conflicts that was a lot more on the forefront of our discussions – there are drug lords around the globe and so on.

How is that tying in to your assessment of what will be happening and anticipate happening in the future?

**GORDON:** Well, drug trafficking is an important challenge. It's a very large challenge in our hemisphere. It is a challenge that can have a very negative impact in undermining the coherence of states and governments, as drug lords gain influence over particular regions in countries, can gain influence over sectors of state institutions.

**GORDON:** We see that in Colombia and elsewhere in the Andean region. It's certainly – the challenge of drugs and drug producers and traffickers and networks is one of the major challenges facing the new government in Afghanistan.

You do have a very active set of narco-traffickers that operate globally now. Their product comes into our country, into our cities, into our schools.

Right now – right now – we believe that there is only a very limited relationship between these forces and terrorist organizations. But it's one that we try to monitor and we are, frankly, concerned about linkages between them and among them.

**NEWTON:** Very good.

Go ahead, please.

**RODLEY:** Just one point that I'd like to add to that. It's a problem that we can't fight by ourselves.

It's a problem that we need strong allies. We need to have good cooperative working relations with other countries, with other countries' law enforcement and security services, in order to have any hope of being successful in this fight.

I'll just use China as an example, since we have talked about China a bit earlier. China has discovered that they have a growing and quite serious internal drug problem. This realization has led them to be much more receptive in some ways to working with us in joint anti-narcotics efforts. And you see that play out in a number of other countries around the world.

**NEWTON:** Well, let me thank you very, very much. I think it's going to really be important – the work that all three of you are doing and your departments are doing to help with our Defense Department in getting it right as we go forward in the future just as we've done in the past.

Thank you.

**PRINCIPI:** Mr. Skinner?

**SKINNER:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, thank you for your work.

I had one question for Dr. Gordon.

You indicate that you think nuclear power will decline globally in absolute terms over the next decade.

That surprised me a little bit because it's my understanding that, putting aside what's going on in the United States, which may or may not be a revitalization, that other countries continue to explore this technology as they meet their energy needs.

**GORDON:** People are exploring it, and I think that beyond that 10-year time frame, the trend line could definitely shift.

But in terms of the time it takes to go from planning into operation, we have a pretty good judgment of what the sum total of nuclear energy production is likely to be at the end of the next decade, and as a proportion, it is likely to go down slightly.

Now, that said, that's not to suggest at all that that trend will hold further out, nor is it to suggest any kind of a judgment about nuclear energy. We are not making that.

But it's simply that given the time lines involved and given our sense of the increase in total energy that will occurring in the next decade, the nuclear component is likely to go down.

**SKINNER:** That's fair. You're just talking about plants or units that are under development or will be under development.

**GORDON:** Right.

**SKINNER:** Another question, because as has been mentioned, our challenge is to make sure that the infrastructure supports the force structure that is needed to be developed to deal with the threat.

And maybe, Mr. Scheck, you're the one that should take this, because at one time – I notice from your bio – you were kind of on the other side of that and did some force structuring work.

**SKINNER:** Are there significant changes necessary, in your opinion, to the existing force structure to meet the threats that you've outlined today? Are we in an evolutionary basis, or are we in a revolutionary basis to deal with these threats? Because that's what we really got to judge. I'm sure you didn't want this question.

**SCHECK:** I would just generally comment on the military, that I think most foreign militaries are reacting to us. And as we lead the development in war fighting from information dominance or precision strike, et cetera, I think they are really reacting more to us. I think we lead in that perspective.

But they are looking at innovative ways to try deny us those capabilities, and that's a constant battle that you have.

So every time we use military capability, foreign governments study it. They study Iraq; they study Afghanistan. They learn from that and they modify their plans, and some people are modifying them pretty rapidly these days.

And so I think it's a constant struggle of technological capabilities versus asymmetric threats or operational responses.

**SKINNER:** Following up on that question: We've seen that we've gotten much more into a training mode over the last number of years in training not only military forces but police forces, and they have struggled to do that.

Do you have any thoughts on the force structure as it exists in the U.S. military, and what capability is needed to be added and facilities, et cetera, to expand our capability to go where I think Dr. Gordon was suggesting, is more involvement with the policing and the other forces necessary so deal with the threats as we see them in these various countries?

**SCHECK:** I can't comment on that, actually.

**SKINNER:** OK. Well, we'll save that for another panel on another day.

Thank you.

**PRINCIPI:** General Turner?

**TURNER:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the group for being with us this afternoon.

My questions go to your comments in the section on identity politics and international terrorism where you spoke to the informal networks of charitable foundations, madrassas, savalics (ph) and other mechanisms that will continue to proliferate and be exploited by radical elements.

Not long ago I was sitting in a hotel room in Paris watching television and of course being an English-speaking person, I had a little difficulty, so I was just watching as opposed to really listening. But it amazing – Al Jazeera was on – and it was amazing how effectively the message gets across to someone who doesn't speak that language.

And it kind of motivated me when I got home to check out the Al Jazeera Web site. I checked out the English Web site.

And I guess my question to you is – if you know the answer to this – can we assume that anyone who goes to the English Al Jazeera Web site would get a considerably less radical content than its Arabic counterpart?

**GORDON:** That's a very good question, General. I do not have the specific answer to that question.

Al Jazeera ebbs and flows politically. And they do not represent anything like the real negative anti-American media and communications links that the radical networks are utilizing.

**GORDON:** So they're in a somewhat different category, but they do have a very large reach, certainly. They have a very large reach.

I will try to get back to you on the answer of whether there is a distinction between the English language and the Arabic language content. That's really what you're asking.

**TURNER:** Yes, that's correct.

OK, my second question goes to cyberspace threat, that broad category, especially as we see it in the coming years, so-called radical elements may exploit that to a greater degree.

Can you give us an idea of military capability that would be necessary to meet future expanding challenges in that area, that perhaps we should be considering in these deliberations?

**SCHECK:** I can't give you the response that you might take to those, but I think the threats, the cyberspace threats, go all the way from the teenage hacker through some very sophisticated state programs. And so that's a tremendous range of capabilities that we have to protect against, protect all of our systems against or protect the military capabilities that we have against them.

And I can't go into what exactly those capabilities would be, but it's something that the military needs to worry about, for sure.

**TURNER:** Thank you very much.

That's all, Mr. Chairman.

**PRINCIPI:** Do any of the commissioners have any further questions?

Yes, Admiral?

**GEHMAN:** Just a couple quick ones.

Mr. Scheck, one of the things that didn't get discussed very much – we discussed weapons of mass destruction a little bit, but we didn't discuss delivering weapons of mass destruction.

**GEHMAN:** Would you say a few words about whether or not the intelligence community is worried about and this commission should know about, delivering weapons of mass destruction, particularly to our homeland?

**SCHECK:** It is clear that there are a number of states that are pursuing intercontinental-range capabilities for their missile forces. There is a growing theater capability around the world, and there will in the next decade or so be other nations that will join that intercontinental range capability. So it's definitely a threat to our homeland.

**GEHMAN:** Thank you.

Dr. Gordon, in a very short period of time, could you comment whether or not the intelligence community sees any, what I would say, holy cow technological breakthroughs which somebody would gain some kind of a military advantage? Maybe you can defer that to Mr. Scheck.

In other words, a lot of – take for example, most software is not written in the United States anymore. You know, GPS, stealth, UAVs, is there anything that's out there that – any area in which, for example, in the research and development area, that we should be concerned about?

**SCHECK:** I wouldn't want to go into specifics here, Admiral.

The whole issue of threats to our information dominance is something that we really need to worry about, because it's a force multiplier for us and it's something that is potentially pretty fragile.

So I would just give you that as an area that we're constantly looking at.

And then other areas where we know we have military advantage, we are constantly looking for someone pursuing a capability that would deny us that pretty quickly.

But I think it would be better to deal with this in a different session.

**GEHMAN:** Thank you.

My last question, Mr. Chairman, is to Ms. Rodley. Is it your estimate that in the time frame that we're talking about here, five, 15, 20 years, that the national security challenges the United States is likely to face would involve more nonstate kind of crises and nonstate kind of actors rather than conventional, national, you know, "I don't like you; you don't like me. I'm going to argue over your border"?

And then what would be the role – if that is the case, that we're likely to see as many, or more, of these Darfur kinds of things, failed states, Kosovo kind of things – of the military in the future in solving those?

**RODLEY:** Sadly, I think that our view is that we're likely to see both.

**RODLEY:** Again, predicting the future, very difficult, but it's clear that the capabilities of nonstate actors, as Dr. Gordon has pointed out throughout his testimony, have improved dramatically, maybe even exponentially in a very short period of time.

So we take those threats and challenges very seriously. That said, the more conventional kinds of challenges that we faced, you know, throughout our history, haven't gone away either, so our only prudent course is to be prepared to face both.

I'm not going to comment specifically on the role our military should play in that. That's not my role.

There is, of course, a role for our military as there is for diplomacy. But I can't go beyond that.

**PRINCIPI:** Mr. Skinner?

**SKINNER:** We've talked a lot about the threats. I'd be interested in your observations about the progress that's being made, at least, the progress we hear about that's being made in some of the growth of democracies in some of these countries and whether you think this will continue and obviously some of the obstacles that you see these activities you've talked about here today are going to put in the way of that.

And maybe that goes to either you or Dr. Gordon or Ms. Rodley.

**GORDON:** We do believe that there will be opportunities for the spread of democratic institutions and that the globalization process has something of a positive tendency on that, but I wouldn't take that all that far.

The challenge for democratic institutions and for nation democracies will be consolidation that will often be very challenging in these circumstances.

But we expect to see new democracies and democratic movements in parts of the world that have been relatively left behind, the Middle East, even Africa.

**GORDON:** I think it's not unlikely.

And so, I'd say that the lesson from history isn't that democracy is impossible in poor countries. You do have some quite successful – India, when it became democratic, consolidated democracy was a very poor country. Even in the '90s in sub-Saharan Africa, that is really the poorest part of the world, but there are more partially democratic regimes today than there were 10 or 15 years ago.

So we do see these as some opportunities.

In general, the period that we're talking about is going to be a period with a lot of opportunities for the United States. We tend to look at the threat side, because that's what we're in the business of doing. But to focus on the threat is to not at all understate the opportunity side of the equation.

**PRINCIPI:** Mr. Coyle?

**COYLE:** Mr. Scheck, your written testimony could be read as defining the threat in religious terms. There's several paragraphs where you're talking about various threats and religion is characterized as the common theme behind the threat.

I'm not sure it's wise to define the threat in terms as you put it here a billion adherents, 22 percent of the world's population. But wise or not, I'm not sure it's accurate.

As I commented to Dr. Gordon, when you look at terrorism around the world, the motivations are quite different in different places.

Was that your intention here?

**SCHECK:** No, sir. I think that Dr. Gordon expressed the view of the community pretty well, when he laid out the different issues in the terrorist world threat.

**COYLE:** Thank you.

**PRINCIPI:** If there are no further questions, we'll recess.

I want to thank Dr. Gordon, Mr. Scheck, Ms. Rodley for your testimony today.

We'll stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

Thank you.

**END**