

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, North Carolina

### **Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Major Training Areas*

*Mission: Support active Army and Reserve Component training*

*One-time Cost: \$8.5 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$74.8 million*

*Annual: \$18.4 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION:** Close

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential facilities as a Reserve Component enclave.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

In the past ten years, the Army significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future requirements

Fort Indiantown Gap is low in military value compared to other major training area installations. Although managed by an Active Component garrison, it has virtually no Active Component tenants. Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Indiantown Gap can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Dix, Fort A.P. Hill and Fort Drum.

Fort Indiantown Gap is owned by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and leased by the U.S. Army through 2049 for \$1. The government can terminate the lease with one year's written notice. Facilities erected during the duration of the lease are the property of the U.S. and may be disposed of, provided the premises are restored to their natural condition.

### *Community Concerns*

Members of the surrounding communities in the Lebanon Valley, as well as officials of the Pennsylvania National Guard, believe the training and readiness of Reserve Component units within the state will suffer as a result of the recommendation. The recommendation made by the Secretary of Defense would require travel out of state for annual training. The community would like to continue the current level of daily operations and training on the installation with the support and funding provided by having an active Army garrison. The Pennsylvania National Guard pointed to several inaccuracies in the original data calls to The Army Basing Study, which resulted in the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) being recomputed and showing lower savings from closing the installation than first estimated. With the various tenant activities and daily work and training sites dispersed throughout the base, advocates of keeping the post open pointed out that any "enclave" would contain virtually the entire installation.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Army's recommendation to close Fort Indiantown Gap to be reasonable in view of the cost of maintaining the large amount of aging infrastructure. The Commission carefully examined other installations in the region and found adequate locations exist with sufficient capacity for Reserve Component annual training, without Fort Indiantown Gap, but scheduling of such training would be more difficult, especially during peak training load periods. The Commission also found National Guard and other RC units required continued access to Fort Indiantown Gap for both individual and annual training.

Claims by elected officials, the Pennsylvania National Guard, and community members that the Army's COBRA analysis was flawed were carefully reviewed by Commission Staff, the Army Audit Agency, and the General Accounting Office. Each review supported the Army's COBRA.

The Commission found the Army's analysis objective and an accurate projection of future, substantial savings.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure

plan and final criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas as a Reserve Component training enclave to permit the conduct of individual and annual training. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Command, Control and Administration*

*Mission: Administrative and logistics support*

*One-time Cost: \$0.3 million*

*Savings: 1996-01: \$2.1 million*

*Annual: \$0.7 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign the Kelly Support Center by consolidating Army Reserve units onto three of its five parcels. Dispose of the remaining two parcels. Relocate the Army Reserve's leased maintenance activity in Valley Grove, WV, to the Kelly Support Center.

#### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Kelly Support Center, a sub-installation of Fort Drum, NY, provides administrative and logistical support to Army Reserve units in western Pennsylvania. It comprises five separate parcels of property.

The Kelly Support Center is last in military value compared to other command and control/administrative support installations. Reserve usage is limited to monthly weekend drills. It possesses no permanent facilities or mobilization capability.

This proposal eliminates two parcels of property, approximately 232 acres and 500,000 square feet of semi-permanent structures, from the Army's inventory. Since there are no other feasible alternatives, the Army is retaining three small parcels for Army Reserve functions and Readiness Group Pittsburgh.

Relocating the Army's Reserve activity from Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity, WV, to the Kelly Support Center consolidates it with its parent unit and saves \$28,000 per year in lease costs.

### **Community Concerns**

Based on current staffing and reimbursable positions, the community contends the personnel savings are overstated. The community also argued the personnel savings appear questionable since the implementation plan indicates 70 percent of the current workforce would be retained to support the recently designated Reserve Support Command. Finally, the community believes no lease savings will be realized, because a new maintenance facility is being constructed in West Virginia for the Valley Grove unit.

#### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the revised Army cost analysis keeps the area support mission at the Kelly Support Center with a majority of the existing workforce. In addition, the Secretary of Defense informed the Commission on June 14, 1995, it was no longer viable to relocate the Valley Grove maintenance activity to the Kelly Support Center because a new facility is being built for the unit in West Virginia.

#### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign the Kelly Support Center by consolidating Army Reserve units onto three of its five parcels. Dispose of the remaining two parcels. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Depots*

*Mission: Depot maintenance*

*One-time Cost: \$49.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$226.5 million*

*Annual: \$76.0 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Letterkenny Army Depot by transferring the towed and self-propelled combat vehicle mission to Anniston Army Depot. Retain an enclave for conventional ammunition storage and tactical missile disassembly and storage. Change the 1993 Commission's decision regarding the consolidating of tactical missile maintenance at Letterkenny by transferring missile guidance system workload to Tobyhanna Army Depot.