

FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY (ARMY RECOMMENDATION - OPERATIONAL ARMY (IGPBS))

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Fort Bliss, TX, by relocating air defense artillery units to Fort Sill and relocating 1st Armored Division and various echelons above division units from Germany and Korea to Fort Bliss, TX. Realign Fort Sill by relocating an artillery (Fires) brigade to Fort Bliss. Realign Fort Hood, TX, by relocating maneuver battalions, a support battalion, and aviation units to Fort Bliss, TX. Realign Fort Riley, KS, by inactivating various units, activating a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and relocating 1st Infantry Division units and various echelons above division units from Germany and Korea to Fort Riley, KS. Realign Fort Campbell, KY, by relocating an attack aviation battalion to Fort Riley, KS.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This proposal ensures the Army has sufficient infrastructure, training land and ranges to meet the requirements to transform the Operational Army as identified in the Twenty Year Force Structure Plan. It also ensures the Army maintains adequate surge capacity. As part of the modular force transformation, the Army is activating 10 new combat arms brigades for a total of 43 active component brigade combat teams (BCTs). Including the results of the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), the number of BCTs stationed in the United States will rise from twenty-six to forty. Relocating the units listed in this recommendation to Fort Bliss, Fort Riley, and Fort Sill takes advantage of available infrastructure and training land. Fort Bliss and Fort Riley are installations capable of training modular formations, both mounted and dismounted, at home station with sufficient land and facilities to test, simulate, or fire all organic weapon systems. This recommendation enhances home station training and readiness of the units at all installations.

Relocating 1st Armored Division units and echelons above division (EAD) units to Fort Bliss will transform it from an institutional training installation into a major mounted maneuver training installation. This avoids overcrowding and overuse at other installations by stationing them at one of the installations with the greatest capacity. It also creates a potential opportunity for enhanced Operational Testing due to the close proximity of Fort Bliss to White Sands Missile Range.

Relocating an Air Defense Artillery (ADA) unit to Fort Sill supports the establishment of the Net Fires Center, combining the Artillery and ADA schools at Fort Sill and provides a force stabilization opportunity for soldiers in this unit. Relocating the Artillery (Fires) Brigade to Fort Bliss collocates the artillery with the maneuver units at Fort Bliss and vacates space at Fort Sill for the ADA unit.

Realigning Fort Riley by inactivating an Engineer Brigade Headquarters, two other engineer units, two maneuver battalions and other smaller units beginning in FY 06 directly supports the Army's modular force transformation. It also facilitates activating a BCT in FY 06, and relocating 1st Infantry Division Headquarters, the Division Support Command Headquarters, Aviation Brigade units and other units returning from overseas to Fort Riley. The relocation of an attack aviation battalion from Fort Campbell to Fort Riley supports the formation of a multifunctional aviation brigade at Fort Riley.

The Army obtained approval to temporarily station a BCT at Fort Hood in 2005 and another BCT at Fort Bliss in 2006. This recommendation validates the stationing of that BCT at Fort Bliss and relocates two maneuver battalions, an armored reconnaissance squadron and a support battalion from Fort Hood to support the activation at Fort Bliss. Relocating these battalions will provide the assets necessary to accomplish the activation. Relocating aviation units from Fort Hood supports the activation of a multifunctional aviation brigade.

While this recommendation does not in BRAC terms save money, the costs are mitigated by the non-BRAC savings that will accrue to the Department from the closure or realignment of the overseas locations from which these units come. Those non-BRAC savings amount to \$4,400M during the 6-year period and approximately \$20,000M of 20-year net present value savings.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Fort Bliss, TX was the only installation to express community issues to the Commission concerning the relocation of an operational air defense artillery (ADA) brigade to Fort Sill, OK. The Fort Bliss community argued relocating an operational ADA brigade to Fort Sill does not sufficiently consider the brigade's strategic deployment and training requirements. The community also believed that the certified data undervalued the airspace capacity at Fort Bliss. They urged the Commission to retain the ADA missile brigade at Fort Bliss and reject this DoD recommendation.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that realignments associated with this recommendation were consistent with the DoD justification.

The Commission conducted an independent and in-depth review of the requirements for training and live-fire of these systems. Fort Sill has 42,000 maneuver acres compared with 992,000 maneuver acres at Fort Bliss. While Fort Sill ranges cannot support live fire, and they are not compatible with tank or mechanized infantry unit maneuver requirements, they are compatible with the movement and positioning of artillery units. Field artillery units have trained at Fort Sill successfully for years, and the air defense artillery brigade will be able to accomplish its maneuver training at Fort Sill as well. The Commission's analysis confirmed that ADA units at Fort Sill will have to deploy to Fort Bliss to live-fire. The Avenger system requirement is to live-fire one missile per platoon every six months. Therefore, this will require additional simulation and deployments to Fort Bliss to meet the requirement. However, the Patriot system live-fire requirement is infrequent, with one missile launch per battery every other year, and only if missiles are available. This can be satisfied through simulation and deployments to Fort Bliss in conjunction with other joint exercises, to include Roving Sands.

The Commission found that relocating this brigade was not optimal, but it was suitable and did not rise to the level of a substantial deviation. It enabled the Net Fires center and concepts at Fort Sill through the collocation of an operational ADA brigade with an institutional ADA brigade, thus creating synergies and force stabilization opportunities between the units.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation consistent with the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY (ARMY RECOMMENDATION)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Fort Gillem, GA. Relocate the Headquarters, 1st US Army to Rock Island Arsenal, IL. Relocate the 2nd Recruiting Brigade to Redstone Arsenal, AL. Relocate the 52nd Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Group to Fort Campbell, KY. Relocate the 81st RRC Equipment Concentration Site to Fort Benning, GA. Relocate the 3rd US Army Headquarters support office to Shaw Air Force Base, SC. Relocate the

Headquarters US Forces Command (FORSCOM) VIP Explosive Ordnance Support to Pope Air Force Base, NC. Close the Army-Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) Atlanta Distribution Center and establish an enclave for the Georgia Army National Guard, the remainder of the 81st RRC units and the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Forensics Laboratory.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation closes Fort Gillem, an Army administrative installation and an AAFES distribution center. The recommendation moves the major tenant organizations to Rock Island Arsenal, Redstone Arsenal, Fort Benning, and Fort Campbell. It also moves small components of the Headquarters 3rd US Army and US Army Forces Command to Pope AFB and Shaw AFB. It enhances the Army's military value, is consistent with the Army's Force Structure Plan, and maintains adequate surge capabilities to address unforeseen future requirements. This closure allows the Army to employ excess capacities at installations that can accomplish more than administrative missions.

The closure of Fort Gillem also enables the stationing of its tenant units at locations that will increase their ability to associate with like units and promote coordination of efforts. Both the 52nd EOD Group and the 2nd Recruiting Brigade have regional missions in the Southeastern United States. The 52nd EOD Group was co-located with operational forces at Fort Campbell to provide training opportunities. The 2nd Recruiting Brigade is recommended to relocate to Redstone Arsenal because of its central location in the Southeast and its access to a transportation center in Huntsville, AL. The Army is converting the 1st US Army Headquarters into the single Headquarters for oversight of Reserve and National Guard mobilization and demobilization. To support this conversion the Army decided to relocate 1st Army to Rock Island Arsenal, a central location in the United States. The 81st RRC Equipment Concentration Site is relocated to Fort Benning, where there are improved training opportunities with operational forces.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community emphasized that Fort Gillem and Fort McPherson are linked. They asserted that DoD understated costs, producing projected savings which appear to be the primary basis for the closure decision. They indicated relocation of three major headquarters (1st Army, 2nd Recruiting Brigade and 52nd EOD Group) would adversely affect Reserve Component training readiness, homeland defense, and efficient command and control. They also held that relocation of 1st Army Headquarters would separate it from the many related capabilities offered by homeland security organizations and Reserve Components located at Fort Gillem. They argued that cost, command and control obstacles, loss of Reserve Component synergies, homeland defense coordination issues, and security challenges for enclaved organizations should persuade the Commission to vote against closure. The community indicated the economic impact will be great on Clayton County and the surrounding community which suffers from high unemployment rates and low per-capita income. The community states that the proposed enclave at Fort Gillem would create security challenges and fragment potential reuse, in addition to challenges of long-term contamination cleanup.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission's findings supported DoD's overall recommendation, although the Commission found that DoD failed to adequately define its planned enclave at Fort Gillem, contrary to its agreement with the findings of a 2003 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of prior BRAC enclaves. GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense provide the 2005 BRAC Commission with data clearly specifying the infrastructure needed for any proposed enclaves and the estimated costs to operate and maintain such enclaves. The Commission found merit in community concerns about the adverse effect of multiple enclaves on reuse of the remainder of Fort Gillem, and therefore modified the DoD recommendation to require a contiguous enclave.

The Commission also found that units other than those explicitly stated in the approved recommendation, such as the Military Entrance Processing Station, may need to remain in the enclave, although the

Commission strongly believes that the size of the enclave needs to be minimized to give the community maximum opportunities for reuse. The Commission found that the recommendation failed to address the Ammunition Supply Point, the only Army ASP in north Georgia supporting the Federal Transportation Security Administration, Army Reserves, and National Guard. The Commission was advised by the Department that the ASP was not part of the enclave recommendation and that disposition of the ASP will be determined during implementation. The Commission found that DoD designated Fort Gillem as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) mobilization site for the Southeast United States and that further determinations by FEMA and DoD are required during implementation. The Commission found DoD's economic impact analysis failed to consider significant loss of jobs associated with closing the Army and Air Force Exchange Service Atlanta Distribution Center. The Commission notes that Fort Gillem borders Forest Park, GA, an Historically Underutilized Business (HUB) Zone and that the Garrison provides employment opportunities to a number of individuals with severe disabilities. The Commission strongly urges the Department to proactively work with the community to minimize these economic impacts.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final selection criteria 7 and the force structure plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Close Fort Gillem, GA. Relocate the Headquarters, 1st US Army to Rock Island Arsenal, IL. Relocate the 2d Recruiting Brigade to Redstone Arsenal, AL. Relocate the 52d Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Group to Fort Campbell, KY. Relocate the 81st RRC Equipment Concentration Site to Fort Benning, GA. Relocate the 3d US Army Headquarters support office to Shaw Air Force Base, SC. Relocate the Headquarters US Forces Command (FORSCOM) VIP Explosive Ordnance Support to Pope Air Force Base, NC.

Close the Army-Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) Atlanta Distribution Center and establish a contiguous enclave for the Georgia Army National Guard, the remainder of the 81st RRC units and the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Forensics Laboratory.

The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. The full text of this and all other recommendations can be found in Appendix Q.